


GEGEN DIE STRÖMUNG



Organ für den Aufbau der marxistisch-leninistischen Partei Westdeutschlands

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On the Communist Party of China's "Proposal on the General Line of the International Communist Movement", 1963:

The Requirements of an International Marxist-Leninist General Line and the Struggle of the Communist Party of China Against Modern Revisionism

Part II A

Concerning the History of the Struggle Against Modern Revisionism

- Basis for Discussion -

Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of

ROTE FAHNE	(Central Organ of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Austria)
WESTBERLINER KOMMUNIST	(Organ for the Building of the Marxist-Leninist Party in West-Berlin)
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CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST MODERN REVISIONISM

1. The Vacillating Attitude of the C.P. of China Towards Titoite-Revisionism

The attitude towards Titoite revisionism was and is a question of great and fundamental importance.

Before the rise of Khrushchevite revisionism, Titoite revisionism was the main representative of Right opportunism of modern revisionism in the International Communist Movement after the Second World War. This was all the more dangerous, because for the first time in the history of communism, revisionism held state power in a country.

The struggle against the ideological trend of Titoite revisionism was the struggle of the World Communist Movement against modern revisionism.

This struggle was, of course, a thorn in the side of the Khrushchevite revisionists, who inter alia borrowed their bankrupt revisionist theses also from Tito. Surely, the Marxist-Leninists could fruitfully utilise the experiences of this fight in the struggle against the Khrushchevite revisionists, too.

Thus the Khrushchevite revisionists connected their overall attack against Marxism-Leninism with a simultaneous fraternization and reconciliation with Titoite revisionism.

Already in 1955, in a demonstrative gesture, Khrushchev had gone to Belgrade to embrace Tito and to beg his pardon for all the "injustice" that the communists of the world had done to him.

In the "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement", the C.P. of China exposed with whom Khrushchev had fraternized and stated:

"Cloaked as 'Marxist-Leninist' and flaunting the banner of a 'socialist country', the Tito clique has been undermining the international communist movement and the revolutionary cause of the people of the world, serving as a special detachment of U.S. imperialism."
("Proposal", in "Polemic", p. 47) (1)

1 "The Polemic of the General Line of the International Communist Movement", Peking, 1965; further quoted as "Polemic". "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement", "The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963 in "Polemic"; further quoted as "Proposal"

This attitude of the C.P. of China, also expressed in the comment "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist State?", was clearly a blow at Khrushchev's revisionism. The C.P. of China revealed that Yugoslavia was a revisionist country, dependant on U.S. imperialism and had at its head a degenerated revisionist party. It also exposed that the Titoite revisionists were typical representatives of Right opportunism, that they represented that ideological and political movement, actually being the main danger within the World Communist Movement.

This comment also exposed in great detail the capitalist development taking place in Yugoslavia both in the city and in the countryside. It denounced the rejection of planned economy, its replacement by a "workers' self-government". This comment also contained an abundance of facts about the counter-revolutionary machinations of the "League of the Yugoslav Communists" in the whole world, as well as about the power wielded by U.S. imperialism in this country.

In addition, the fundamental nature of the Yugoslav question was emphasized, which meant that it was a question of defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The common features of Khrushchevite and Titoite revisionism were emphasized.

Nevertheless we have a number of criticism against the whole attitude of the C.P. of China towards Titoite revisionism.

The C.P. of China raised the issue of Titoite revisionism proceeding above all from the 1960 Moscow Declaration. This gives rise to the impression that this was the first time that the International Communist Movement had concerned itself with this question.

Already in 1948, however, the revisionist line of Tito and the C.P. of Yugoslavia was fundamentally and irrefutably unmasked by the struggle of the C O M I N F O R M under J.V. S T A L I N's leadership. The letters of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (B) and the resolutions of the Cominformburo of 1948 and 1949 (2) revealed the essence of the anti-Marxist theory and practice of the Titoite revisionists:

- * Denying the hegemony of the proletariat and propagating that the peasantry constituted the "firm base" of the socialist state.
- * Rejecting the Marxist-Leninist thesis that class-struggle intensifies while building socialism, refusing to liquidate the rich peasants as a class - instead, an increasing collaboration with the capitalist elements in the rural and urban areas.

2 Recently published in a brochure "The Struggle of J.V. Stalin and the Cominform Against Titoite Revisionism", published by the Marxist-Leninist Study Circle of the MLPA in the series "Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism", No. 1/79, Ger. ed..

- * Denying the necessity of the Communist Party to lead the working class and its state; instead a merging into the people's front as the alleged "leading force of the revolution".
- * Establishing a military-bureaucratic regime within the Party; stifling inner-Party democracy; elimination of the principle of criticism and self-criticism; control of the Party cadres by the secret police.
- * Destruction of the mutual aid and criticism between the communists parties, as well as the betrayal of proletarian internationalism; great-nation chauvinism against the heroic socialist Albania, which the Titoite revisionists wished to annex and colonize.
- * Transition into the imperialist camp as a result of the nationalist path oriented towards the consolidation of capitalism demagogically appealing to "safe-guarding Yugoslavia's independence."

As a result of the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, Yugoslavia degenerated into a revisionist country, which has been completely dependent on imperialism and where capitalism has been promoted in all spheres. It has become a country which internally has proceeded against Marxist-Leninists and all revolutionaries with the methods of fascist terror. It also has become a peoples' prison.

The early exposure of the C.P. of Yugoslavia's revisionist line by the C.P.S.U.(B) under J.V. Stalin's leadership, which concentrated its struggle on basic ideological and political differences, in 1948 led to the unanimous condemnation of the C.P. of Yugoslavia (later called "League of the Yugoslav Communists") by the Cominformburo. The correctness of its resolutions in 1948 and 1949 was completely confirmed by the further development of the C.P. of Yugoslavia and the whole country. The attempts of modern revisionists of various hues to rehabilitate Titoite revisionism sets all Marxist-Leninists parties the task to urgently and earnestly propagate and defend the resolutions of the Cominformburo.

The documents of the C.P. of China mentioned above did not support the Cominformburo resolutions even with a single word. Rather they attacked its essential contents. They did not defend the Marxist-Leninist thesis that class-struggle intensifies while building socialism. They did not fight against the disregard of the teaching of the hegemony of the proletariat. The bureaucratic-military system of the Party, the lack of self-criticism etc. was not exposed.

The C.P. of China did not proceed from the clear evaluation of Titoite revisionism laid down in the Cominform documents. Instead, it put forward d i v e r g i n g concepts about the development of Titoite revisionism, describing the way of the betrayal of Titoite revisionism as follows: "The process of degeneration has gone on for fifteen years". ("Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?", "Polemic", pp. 14 - 175)

In contrast to the views of the Cominformburo, the C.P. of China

was of opinion that restoration in Yugoslavia began only in 1948, that is, at a time, when Titoite revisionism and the development of capitalism in Yugoslavia had already been exposed internationally and the Tito clique had already become an appendage of U.S. imperialism.

On the basis of such an evaluation the following justification of the C.P. of China's position in 1954 also was not surprising:

"In 1954, when Khrushchev proposed to improve relations with Yugoslavia, we agreed to treat it as a fraternal socialist country for the purpose of winning it back to the path of socialism and watching how the Tito clique would develop". ("Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?", "Polemic", p. 176)

This was a catastrophical wrong evaluation of the situation in Yugoslavia. This attitude and evaluation of Titoite revisionism stood above all in blatant contradiction to the struggle of the International Marxist-Leninist Movement after 1945 and to the conclusions and practical consequences drawn from it.

The C.P. of China not only did not mention the principled Cominformburo resolutions of 1948 with a s i n g l e w o r d and hushed it up. Rather, it obviously did not agree with this evaluation and confronted it with its own false one.

What were the reasons for such an approach?

In our opinion we have to consider two aspects. The quotation of 1954 evidently shows that the C.P. of China v a c i l a t e d on the question of Titoite revisionism. We cannot help feeling that in 1954 the C.P. of China actually shared Khrushchev's opinion about Yugoslavia - and with that very clearly opposed the Marxist-Leninist evaluation of the Cominform.

The cited passages make clear that the C.P. of China disagreed to continue the Cominformburo's struggle under J.V. Stalin's leadership against Titoite revisionism and against the degeneration of the Yugoslavian Party and the whole country. The article "On the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", which appeared in "Remnin-Ribao" in 1956, and which was based on an extended Politburo discussion of the C.P. of China, even very openly attacked J.V. Stalin's correct course:

"He made some serious mistakes..., he gave certain wrong advice on the international communist movement, and in particular, made a wrong decision on the question of Yugoslavia". ("On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peking, 1963, p. 7)

"It is understandable that the Yugoslav comrades bear a particular resentment against Stalin's mistakes". ("More on the Historical Experience of the Proletarian Dictatorship". Supplement. People's China, 2/1957, p. 9)

When the counter-revolutionary alliances of the Khrushchev revisionists with Tito could not be ignored any longer, the C.P. of China now tried to extricate itself from the whole affair by means of an opportunist trick.

The C.P. of China did not self-critically confess and condemn its massive concessions towards the modern revisionists, which were connected with the anti-Marxist attacks against Stalin. Instead, they justified these concessions with the argument that they "wanted to win back" the Tito clique. This meant discrediting all the Marxist-Leninist parties that had exposed Titoite revisionism.

The C.P. of China's attitude towards Yugoslavia implied an attack against the irrefutable Marxist-Leninist position of the resolutions of the Cominformburo and a defamation of Stalin. It showed a gross underestimation of the ideological and political struggle against Titoite revisionism. It ignored the anti-Marxist positions of the Yugoslavian Party and implied an open concession to the wishes of modern revisionism. (3)

2. What Positions Did the C.P. of China Take Towards the Attacks of the Khrushchevite Revisionists Against Stalin?

Under the cloak of the struggle against the "Cult of the Individual and its consequences", the Khrushchev revisionists started their rabid attacks against Stalin with the aim of a total revision of Marxism-Leninism. They had to attack Stalin because he, - the leader of the C.P.S.U.(B), of the Soviet people and the International Communist and Workers' Movement -, fought revisionism in his great theoretical and practical work up to his death. He consequently developed further Marxism-Leninism and defended it. The Khrushchevite revisionists stirred up hatred to this extent against Stalin in order to discredit his teachings, the strict application of which had yielded such great victories for the International Marxist-Leninist Movement.

Khrushchev's struggle against the "Cult of the Individual" was a means to justify his revisionist line. The defamation of Stalin as a "tyrant" and a "dictator", carried out by Khrushchev in his infamous secret report at the 20th Congress, was in fact a direct attack on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union with Stalin at his head. The Khrushchevite revisionists aimed at making acceptable their revisionist thesis of the "State of the

3 In the question of Tito, the Party of Labour of Albania took a fundamentally different and principled attitude. The Party of Labour of Albania incessantly exposed the counter-revolutionary face of Titoite revisionism and did not resort to evasions about "possible positive changes" etc.. It propagated and defended Stalin's and the Cominform's correct line towards Yugoslavia, for example, in the brochure "15 Years after the Publication of the Resolution of the Informationsburo" (in the "Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism", 1/1979, p. 73, Ger. ed.), or in Enver Hoxha's speech at the Meeting in Moscow in 1960, where he documented the complete historical struggle of the Party of Labour of Albania against Titoite revisionism. In an internal letter the Party of Labour of Albania most sharply protested to the Khrushchevite revisionists against every step they took to rehabilitate the Tito clique.

Whole People", the goal of which was the liquidation of the proletarian class state.

The slander that Stalin's policy was "a policy of mass terror" was demagogically used against Stalin's Marxist-Leninist position that class struggle intensifies while advancing on the path towards communism. With this and using the slogan of "restoration of socialist democracy" in reality the path was cleared for bourgeois "liberalization" in order to degenerate the socialist social order.

In this situation, after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., when the modern revisionists along with the imperialists and reactionaries of all countries opened fire on Marxism-Leninism, the question of defending Stalin was a significant touchstone for all Marxist-Leninists.

* In view of this slander campaign against Stalin, in view of these attacks on Marxism-Leninism, it was then as now the primary task for the Marxist-Leninists to defend Stalin - without making any concessions -, the great Marxist-Leninist, the classic of Marxism-Leninism, who superbly defended and developed further the inheritance of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Defending Stalin means to defend his theoretical contributions to Marxism-Leninism as well as to defend his practical work on the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the socialist Soviet Union and his practical work in the International Communist Movement.

Taking this as our starting point, we want to consider the attitude of the C.P. of China on Stalin immediately after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.. What position did it take in this situation of intensified ideological and political class struggle in the world?

In 1956, a few month after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the C.P. of China published two articles which were also translated into many foreign languages: "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "More on the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". In these articles it can be seen that the C.P. of China did not agree on the total demonisation of Stalin by the Khrushchevite revisionists:

"Some people consider that Stalin was wrong in everything; this is a grave misconception. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist, yet at the same time a Marxist-Leninist who committed several gross errors..." ("On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", People's China, 8/56, April, p. 11)

"Therefore in summing up Stalin's thoughts and activities, we must consider both his positive and negative sides, both his achievements and his mistakes. As long as we examine the matter in an all-round way, even if people must speak of 'Stalinism', it could only mean, in the first place, Communism and Marxism-Leninism, which is the main aspect; and secondarily it contains certain extremely serious

mistakes which go against Marxism-Leninism and must be thoroughly corrected... In our opinion Stalin's mistakes take second place to his achievements". ("More on the Historical Experience of the Proletarian Dictatorship", Supplement, People's China, 2/1957, p.8)

Let us now examine what the C.P. of China regarded as "very serious errors" of Stalin:

-the "main edge" should have been against the "aggressive forces of the foreign imperialism" and not against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, as Stalin did. (Ibid., p. 11)

-After the elimination of classes, the class struggle should not continue to be stressed as being intensified, as it was done by Stalin... The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is completely right in firmly correcting Stalin's mistakes in this respect." (Ibid., p.7)

-It was alleged that Stalin made a "wrong decision in the question of Yugoslavia" (Ibid., p.7)

-In addition, in chorus with Khrushchev, the most disgusting slander against Stalin was supported: "He became conceited" ("On the Historical Experience..." op. cit., p.6); "took more and more pleasure in this cult of the individual" (ibid., p. 7); "his arbitrary method of work" ("More on the Historical Experiences..." op. cit., p. 6); "estranged himself from the masses" (ibid.); "showed a tendency towards great-nation chauvinism" (ibid.). These and similar catchphrases were strung together!

In spite of the C.P. of China's refusal to totally condemn Stalin, it becomes evident that these attacks of the C.P. of China on the theoretical and practical work of Stalin basically corresponded with the attacks of the Khrushchevite revisionists in these questions.

Based on these views, it is no wonder that the C.P. of China did not lead an offensive struggle against the Khrushchevite revisionists for the defence of Stalin at the 1957 and 1960 Meetings. Thus, in the Declaration of 1960, the C.P. of China could more or less uncontradictedly formulate that the "elimination of the harmful consequences of the Personality Cult" was a massive victory for the International Communist Movement. (See: "Documents of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties", Moscow, Nov.-Dec. 1960, New Age Publication, New Delhi, 1960, p. 43)

In the "Proposal Concerning the General Line", the C.P. of China did not take the attitude towards Stalin as an object of struggle against the Khrushchevite revisionists. Only by way of suggestion the Khrushchevite revisionists were "tactfully" criticized in the question of the "Fight against the cult of the individual":

"Over the past few years, certain persons have violated Lenin's integral teachings about the interrelationship of leaders, party, class and masses, and raised the issue of 'combatting the cult of the individual', this is erroneous

and harmful... While loudly combatting the so-called 'cult of the individual' certain persons are in reality doing their best to defame the 'proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat'. ("Polemic", pp. 39-40)

Without doubt, a correct aspect against the attacks of the Khrushchevite revisionists was raised here: the "fight against the personality cult", which the Khrushchevite revisionists had written on their banner, was confronted by Lenin's teachings about the relationship between leader, party, class and masses.

It would be an error, however, to assume that the C.P. of China would thereby declare its total opposition to the modern revisionists concerning the attitude towards Stalin and would, in future, combat them all along the line. Instead, it was declared in relation to the Khrushchevite revisionists:

"In addition there are other questions of common concern, such as the criticism of Stalin". ("Polemic", P. 53)

What could be understood as these "questions of common concern" was apparent, when, after 1963, after the beginning of the public debate with the Khrushchevite revisionists, both these articles of 1956 were not self-critically rejected by the C.P. of China, but emphatically approved:

"These two articles made an all-round analysis of the life of Stalin... and tactfully but unequivocally criticized the erroneous propositions of the 20th Congress." ("Polemic", pp. 65-66)

Explicitly they stuck to the attacks on Stalin, which in the essence were the same as those of the Khrushchevite revisionists.

In the comment "On the Question of Stalin" it was further clarified why the C.P. of China regarded the attitude towards Stalin as a question of "common concern". Therein the C.P. of China explained its position concerning Stalin in great detail.

In the introduction it was stated:

"The question of Stalin is one of world-wide importance... It is likely that no final verdict can be reached on this question in the present century." ("Polemic", p. 117)

Already here, the whole approach of the C.P. of China towards Stalin was expressed. They did not start from the point that Stalin had to be defended against modern revisionists. Rather, they proceeded from an "unresolved question", the "question of Stalin".

This was already a position within the C.P. of China which had clearly been influenced by modern revisionism. For Marxist-Leninists, however, a "question of Stalin" exists just as little as a "question of Lenin". Under no circumstances do they permit a distinction of principle to be made between Lenin and Stalin; just as little as they permit such a distinction to be made between Marx and Engels on the one hand, and Lenin on the other.

The C.P. of China considered the following approach to Stalin to be correct:

"Stalin deserves to be criticized, but we do not agree with the method of criticism, and there are some other matters we do not agree with". ("Polemic", Mao Tse-tung on receiving the Soviet Ambassador to China on Oct. 23, 1956, p. 64)

We see that the C.P. of China agreed with the modern revisionists that Stalin had to be criticized, that his "mistakes" had to be discussed. It did not agree, however, with the "method" of the criticism of the Khrushchevite revisionists. Along with that, it also did not agree with the Khrushchevite revisionists regarding the contents of "some" of the attacks.

On its part, the C.P. of China, approaching Stalin, formulated the following task:

"The Communist Party of China has invariably insisted on an overall, objective and scientific analysis of Stalin's merits and demerits by the method of historical materialism and the presentation of history as it actually occurred..." ("Polemic", p. 119)

But even in this comment the C.P. of China basically only repeated - albeit in a slightly weaker form - the unbelievable and completely unacceptable accusations against Stalin, which it had already raised in the above-mentioned articles of 1956. Not even in a rudimentary way it was hinted that perhaps arguments and proofs were surely needed. Rather, a number of "charges" were globally repeated without having comprisingly analysed and evaluated Stalin's work. Thus it is said that Stalin

"fell into metaphysics", ... "on certain occasions and on certain questions he confused two types of contradictions", ... went too far in the task "of suppressing the counter-revolution", ... did "not fully apply proletarian democratic centralism", ... gave "some bad counsel in the international communist movement". ("Polemic", p. 121)

If the Khrushchevite revisionists called Stalin a "tyrant" and "dictator", then on the other hand, the C.P. of China was of opinion that Stalin went "too far" in some cases in the suppression of the counter-revolution. Basically, these are the same unproven reproaches, though the C.P. of China's manner of putting them forward is not so crass limiting them by words like "in a certain way" and "at certain times".

In one question, however, the C.P. of China tried to theoretically criticize Stalin. Two passages were quoted from Stalin's work in order to criticize them.

At issue was the question of the causes for the existence of class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat after the establishment of socialist production relations.

While the C.C. of the C.P. of China, i.e. its Politburo in its 1956 document "Concerning the Historical Experiences..." still criticized Stalin for stating that his premise was the intensification of the class struggle, and that he turned the

main stroke on the dictatorship of the proletariat inwards rather than outwards, this criticism was forgotten in 1964. Now exactly the opposite was criticized:

"...he (Stalin) prematurely declared after agriculture was basically collectivized that there were 'no longer antagonistic classes' in the Soviet Union and that it was 'free of class conflicts'". ("Polemic", p. 429)

In our opinion, even this criticism against Stalin is false and contains an error of grave consequence.

At a time, when the exploitation of man by man did not exist any more in the Soviet Union because of the elimination of private ownership of means of production; when the last remnants of exploitation were eliminated by the liquidation of the antagonist exploitation classes, it was precisely Stalin's greatness that he emphasized the intensification of class struggle internally and propagated against all ideas that now the period of "harmony" had come. (See Stalin's Works 14, Red Star Press Reprint, London, 1978, p. 264)

By not recognizing this fact but actually criticizing Stalin on this account, the C.P. of China was basically propagating that class struggle was dependent on the existence of bourgeoisie as a class.

In the articles of 1956 it is correctly stated that the antagonistic classes are liquidated after the establishment of socialist production relations. The C.P. of China drew from this fact the false, capitulatory and revisionist conclusion that thereby the class struggle would become extinct and it would be absurd to speak of intensifying class struggle. In 1964, the C.P. of China simply denied the fact that in the Soviet Union the bourgeoisie as a class had already been liquidated in 1936.

Here the basic problem is that the C.P. of China's narrow idea that class struggle is dependent on the existence of the bourgeois class contains a mortal danger for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The class struggle is against all enemies and hostile views and habits that the proletariat on its path towards communism. Till the ultimate victory of communism all hostile phenomena carry the class stamp and must therefore be destroyed in the class struggle which takes on various forms, respectively. After all the question arises how exactly did the attitude of the C.P. of China differ from that of the Khrushchevite revisionists. Above all, the C.P. of China did not agree with "...the complete negation of Stalin." ("Polemics", p. 117)

Starting from this premise, it also criticized among other things the Khrushchevite revisionists for the following:

"They have treated Stalin not as a comrade but as an enemy. They have not adopted the method of criticism and self-criticism to sum up experiences but have blamed Stalin for all errors, or ascribed to him the 'mistakes' they have arbitrarily invented... Khrushchev has abused Stalin as a

"murderer", a "criminal", a "bandit", a "gambler"... etc. In abusing Stalin, Khrushchev is in fact widely denouncing the Soviet system and state."
 ("On the Question of Stalin", from "Polemic", p. 114 and p. 126)

Against this thorough condemnation of Stalin, the C.P. of China emphasized:

"Yes, we do defend Stalin." (ibid. p. 122)

However, they added the following restrictions:

"In defending Stalin, the Chinese Communist Party defends his correct side ..." (ibid. p. 122)

To such "correct sides" the C.P. of China counted Stalin's merits: the fact that after Lenin's death Stalin led the Soviet people, that he earned great merits during the building of socialism and in the Great Patriotic War.

Furthermore it said that Stalin defended Marxism-Leninism against opportunists of all hues and developed it further. It said that the theoretical works of Stalin were "immortal Marxist-Leninist works" (ibid. p. 120). Concluding it stated that

"Stalin's life was that of a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary." (ibid. p. 120)

Without doubt, the C.P. of China opposed the Khrushchevite revisionist scandalous attacks at that point of time with such enumerations of certain merits of Stalin. This commitment of the C.P. of China towards the defence of Stalin played an important role for many young Marxist-Leninist forces at that juncture in the International Marxist-Leninist Movement. This, however, in no way meant that the C.P. of China met the demands that were made on the Marxist-Leninists in connection with the defence of Stalin (and do still exist.)

This becomes very clear if one realizes that the modern revisionists, too, by all means had to admit great merits to Stalin for demagogic reasons. Brezhnev, for example, after he had come to power, was forced to praise Stalin and to avoid the worst of the crude aspersions that had been typical of Khrushchev. The reason for this was not at least the fact that the Brezhnev revisionists had to demarcate themselves from the ultra-revisionist forces.

These went "too far" and too obviously demanded the abolishment of the "Soviet system", which was often connected with propaganda for an even stronger influence of the western imperialists.

In a publication by the Brezhnev revisionists with the title "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" it is said about Stalin in the chapter on the 20th Party Congress:

"As an outstanding theoretician and organizer he led the fight against the Trotskyists, Right-wing opportunists and bourgeois nationalists, against the intrigues of the capitalist encirclement. He rendered great services not only

in ensuring the victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., but also in developing the World Communist and Liberation Movement." ("History of the C.P.S.U.", Moscow 1960, pp. 670-671)

The following passage, too, could have been written by the C.P. of China:

"We... see two sides to Comrade Stalin's activities: the positive side, which we support and value highly, and the negative side, which we criticize, condemn and repudiate..." (ibid. p. 671)

Thus the enumeration of Stalin's merits did not in any way mean that the C.P. of China really defended Stalin, because it did not totally repudiate many fundamental attacks of the modern revisionists but itself, although in a weakened form, brought basically forth the same attacks against Stalin.

* The line of demarcation between Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists in reality could have been drawn only by means of such an offensive defence of Stalin and his work taking the defence of Marxist-Leninist theory as its starting point and smashing all direct and indirect attacks of the Khrushchevite revisionists.

By not defending the great theoretical and practical work of Stalin against the modern revisionists in an all-round way, the C.P. of China abandoned teachings that are always topical and victory-bringing for the Marxist-Leninists.

* * *

Regarding the significance of this attitude of the C.P. of China towards Stalin in the "Polemic", it was essential that the C.P. of China enjoyed tremendous authority within the then newly forming International Marxist-Leninist Movement at that time, because of its stand against the Khrushchevite revisionists.

On the one hand, this position of the C.P. of China of not totally condemning Stalin and, for e.g., continuing to hang his portrait next to that of Marx, Engels and Lenin, had the effect of acting as a break block in that situation where the revisionists of all countries, in league with the world imperialism, had unleashed their frenzied tirades against Stalin. It prevented many young revolutionaries from foundering in the vortex of the anti-Stalin tirade.

On the other hand, however, the "criticism" of Stalin by the C.P. of China, was more easily accepted rather than the attacks of the Khrushchevite revisionists. In fact, the false position of the C.P. of China on Stalin has largely contributed to the attitude towards Stalin within the International Marxist-Leninist Movement, which has remained defensive and inconsequent in many cases.

Thus it is apparent that in the long run the faulty point of view of the C.P. of China on Stalin in the "Polemic" has caused a great deal of damage and continues to do so.

Obviously, the attitude towards Stalin, as presented in the documents of the "Polemic", must be seen to be one root for the development of the revisionist line of the C.P. of China.

Therefore, it was no coincidence that in 1975, in the campaign carried out in China to study the teachings of Marxism-Leninism on the dictatorship of the proletariat, they only called for studying the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin's work on the dictatorship of the proletariat was simply left out.

The fact that already since long the C.P. of China has not consequently defended Stalin and especially his teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat, has made it easier for the present-day revisionist leadership of the C.P. of China to join up with this trend and defame Stalin in an extreme way.

Thus Huo-Guo-feng proclaimed that one could learn from Stalin's Soviet Union only as a "warning example".

For the Marxist-Leninists today it is a task of foremost importance to defend Stalin and thus to defend Marxism-Leninism in the struggle against modern revisionism and opportunism of all shades.

3. Wrong Attitude of the C.P. of China to the Frontal Attack of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. on the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

With the 20th Congress in 1956 the Khrushchevite revisionists' frontal attack on Marxism-Leninism became highly official. At this Congress the Khrushchevite revisionists openly presented their revisionist line in all basic questions concerning the tasks of the Communist party to the whole world.

They put forward this "new line" as a directive for the whole International Communist Movement.

The main theses of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. which attacked the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism under the pretext of "great changes on a world scale" were:

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the inevitability of wars in imperialism, Khrushchev put forward his revisionist thesis: "But war is not fatalistically inevitable" (Khrushchev, "Report of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. at the 20th Congress", Ananda Press, New Delhi 1956, p. 48).

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist thesis that in the imperialist world system the great imperialist powers strive for world hegemony, Khrushchev put forward his revisionist thesis: "The Soviet Union, like Great Britain, France, ... are vitally interested in preventing the outbreak of a new war in Europe, ..." ("Resolution of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.", Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1956, p. 10)

Thereby the great imperialist powers were declared to be angels

of peace.

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the oppressed peoples could liberate themselves from imperialism, comprador and big landowner classes only by means of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution under the hegemony of the proletariat and only in this way advance towards socialism, Khrushchev put forward his revisionist thesis: "More than twelve hundred million people or nearly half of the world's population, have been freed from colonial or semi-colonial dependence during the last ten years... Peoples' China and the independent Indian Republic have joined the ranks of the great powers." (Report of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. at the 20th Congress", Ananda Press, New Delhi 1956, p.27)

Countries like India, where colonialism had been replaced by neo-colonialism, were represented by the Khrushchevite revisionists to be nations liberated from imperialism. Accordingly, socialist China was equated with India, which was ruled by imperialism, comprador and big land-owner classes. The necessity of the victory of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution as a pre-condition to achieve true independence and liberation was disputed.

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the unavoidable necessity of a violent proletarian revolution in the transition from capitalism to socialism Khrushchev stated the revisionist thesis: "...the working class... is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces opposed to the popular interest, to capture a stable majority in parliament, and transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will..." (ibid, pp.51-52)

This was a rejection of the violent proletarian revolution and the propaganda for a "peaceful, parliamentary path" in the transition from capitalism to socialism.

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist thesis that proletarian internationalism was the general line of the foreign policy of every socialist state, Khrushchev put forward the revisionist thesis: "The Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy". (ibid, p. 43)

According to Marxism-Leninism after the creation of socialist production relations the allround ideological class struggle is of special importance to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and to break down the most stubborn ideological resistance of the bourgeoisie, that is the ideological resistance. Khrushchev opposed this with the revisionist thesis of productive forces that now: "the economic side of the theory of Marxism has come to the forefront". ("Resolution...", p. 151, german ed.)

In contrast to the Marxist Leninist thesis that the proletarian vanguard must always irreconcilably fight

against all varieties of bourgeois ideology, Khrushchev stated the revisionist thesis of merging with the counter-revolutionary social democracy. It was desirable: "...to find points of contact and on these grounds to lay the foundations for co-operation, sweeping aside mutual recriminations." ("Report... ", p. 25) etc., etc. (4)

This offensive, sharp and concentrated attack on Marxism-Leninism and on comrade Stalin, the classic of Marxism-Leninism, was greeted enthusiastically and with jubilation by world imperialism and all their lackeys, like the Tito clique.

The attitude towards the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. was a very serious question for the Marxist-Leninists of the whole world; it put to severe test their allegiance to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

How did the C.P. of China react in this situation?

Immediately after the 20th Congress, it was w e l c o m e d by the Chinese Party leaders, in the Chinese press as well as at the 8th National Congress of the C.P. of China.

In the editorial article of the "Renmin-Ribao" of April 1956 "Concerning the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", which was still propagated as being absolutely correct in the "Polemic" in 1963, it is said.

"The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union summed up the fresh experience gained both in international relations and domestic construction. It took a series of momentous decisions... The question of combating the cult of the individual occupied an important place in the discussions of the 20th Congress." ("On the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peoples' China, No.8/1956, p.4)

Mao-Tse-tung declared at the 8th National Congress of the C.P. of China that the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.:

"formulated many correct policies and criticized shortcomings which were found in the Party." (Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China, VI. Documents, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1956, p. 10)

The C.P. of China thus initially supported and greeted the 20th

4 We refer here to the "Black Material" published by the "Westberliner Kommunist". "Main Positions of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.", where besides a criticism of these positions the concluding resolutions of the 20th Congress are also published. Unfortunately, the documents of the 20th Congress have been studied much too little and as far as we know, till today there has been on the international scale no systematic analysis of them.

Congress of the C.P.S.U. (5) However, only two months after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. the C.P. of China internally criticized some revisionist core theses of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.:

"On many occasions in internal discussions after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., leading comrades of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China solemnly criticized the errors of the C.P.S.U. leadership." ("The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves", from "Polemics", p.64)

After some time, it also became evident from publications of the C.P. of China, especially from the brochure "Long Live Leninism", which appeared in 1960, that it did not agree with several principal revisionist theses of the 20th Congress.

The C.P. of China began to polemicize in the press against certain revisionist views of the Khrushchevite revisionists. However, this was not done directly. Instead, they apparently fought only against the Titoite revisionists, in the beginning they did not attack the Khrushchevite revisionists by name.

The C.P. of China wrote:

"The fact is that at no time and in no place did the Chinese Communist Party c o m p l e t e l y affirm the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. ..." (ibid, p.65)

This was certainly true, especially when one regards the word "completely".

Further the C.P. of China stated:

"It needs to be said, of course, that for the sake of unity against the enemy... we refrained in those days from open criticism of the errors of the 20th Congress ..." (ibid, p.66)

In spite of essential contradictions with revisionist core theses of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the C.P. of China did not publicly criticize the Khrushchevite revisionists. Instead, in its publications it increasingly propagated views that diverged from the Khrushchevite revisionists and in this way criticized indirectly.

The C.P. of China gave yet another reason for its "tactful" procedure:

"...also... the leaders of the C.P.S.U. had not yet departed so far from Marxism-Leninism as they did later." (ibid, p. 66)

This is why the C.P. of China emphasized :

5 See Note 3: "The Attitude of the Party of Labour of Albania to the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U." p. 36

"...By stressing positive lessons and principles in their public speeches, leading comrades of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China explained our position with the regard to the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U." (*ibid*, p.66)

This attitude meant that the C.P. of China looked for and found "positive aspects" in the 20th Congress:

"...we always endeavoured to seek out positive aspects and on public occasions gave them whatever support was appropriate and necessary." (*ibid*, p.66)

Summing up, we can say that the C.P. of China criticized the C.P.S.U. publicly only very much later. This was basically due to two reasons:

- * rejection of nominal criticism in public because apparently this might have harmed unity and been of use to the enemy.
- * underestimation of the extent of the revisionist betrayal: the C.P. of China did not realize the entire significance of the 20th Congress, among other reasons, because they themselves - as we shall see later, and as has already been discussed in the case of Stalin and Tito - agreed with a number of basic theses of the 20th Congress and of Khrushchev, or had similar views. (6)

In our opinion it is very important that the C.P. of China even at a time when the consequences of the revisionist betrayal became very apparent, did not self-critically examine its own proceeding and did not question them, but continued to propagate them as being correct.

This attitude of the C.P. of China and the arguments, with which it substantiated its stand, shall be dealt with and discussed later in detail.

4. The Declarations of the Moscow Meetings of 1957 and 1960 Were a Further Challenge to the Marxist-Leninists in Order to Begin With the Open Struggle.

The Meetings of the parties of the socialist countries in 1957 and those of the communist parties from all over the world in 1960 took place at a time when after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the floodtide of modern revisionism erupted within

- 6 It should not be overlooked that in the documents of the 8th National Congress of the C.P. of China that took place shortly after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., similar type of revisionist positions are contained as propagated by the 20th Congress itself. Compare: "Criticism of the Revisionist Line of the 11th National Congress of the C.P. of China", Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of "Rote Fahne", "Westberliner Kommunist" and "Gegen die Stroemung", Note 8: "On the 8th National Congress of the C.P. of China", p. 80, German ed.

almost all the communist parties of the International Marxist-Leninist Movement; at a time when the C.P.S.U. attacked the C.P. of China and the Party of Labour of Albania more or less openly; at a time when it became increasingly obvious that there were serious differences of principle within the International Communist Movement.

This situation was also reflected in the documents adopted at the two conferences.

At the deliberations of the International Communist Movement, the propagandists of modern revisionism, the Khrushchevite revisionists, wanted to make their revisionist programme, presented at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., to the general programme of the International Communist Movement.

The Marxist-Leninists, i.e. above all the C.P. of China and the Party of Labour of Albania tried to oppose the modern revisionists, especially the Khrushchevite revisionists, at these international forums and tried to start a fight to defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

This fight of the Marxist-Leninists resulted in the fact that in the documents of the conference obviously opposing viewpoints were to be found in a whole series of questions, sometimes stuck together within a single sentence. This was an attempt to get under one umbrella what was at most connected only outwardly and formally, but was opposed in its content.

Let us examine some of the main contradictions in these documents:

We find correctly stated in the Declaration of 1960 in the passage about imperialism and war: "The aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed." ("Documents of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties" Moscow, November- December 1960, New Age Printing Press, New Delhi, p. 19)

However, only a few pages further, one reads the completely opposing view:

"The Communists regard it as their historical mission ... to also deliver mankind from the nightmare of a new world war already in our time" (*ibid*, p. 26) and "In these conditions a real possibility will have arisen to exclude war from the life of society even before socialism achieves complete victory on earth, with capitalism still existing in a part of the world." (*ibid*, p. 23)

In the 1960 Declaration, in connection with the situation of the oppressed people, the necessity of the "anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution" (*ibid*, p.29) was correctly underlined and it was demanded: "(to) sweep away the remnants of medievalism..." (*Ibid*, p.29). But in the same sentence the demand for an anti-feudal revolution was abruptly changed into the necessity for "radical agrarian reforms" (*ibid*, p. 29)

In the same way, on the one hand, it was stressed that: "Communists have always recognised the progressive,

revolutionary significance of national liberation wars," but, on the other hand, a paragraph lower it was said: "The people of the colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and by non-military methods, depending on the specific conditions in the country concerned". (ibid., p.27) At the same time the path of "non-capitalist development" (ibid., p.30) was propagated as the path towards freedom for the oppressed peoples.

All the same in the Declaration of 1957 it was stated: "That is why a fairly long time is needed to resolve the issue of who will win - capitalism or socialism. The existence of bourgeois influence is an internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist pressure is its external source". ("Basic Documents of the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties - 1957-1960-1969", Communist Party Publication, New Age Printing Press, New Delhi, p.11)

Three years later, in total contrast to this attitude, it was emphasized in the Declaration of 1960: "Today the restoration of capitalism has been made socially and economically impossible not only in the Soviet Union but in the other socialist countries as well." ("Documents of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties", Moscow, November- December 1960, p. 12)

In the documents of 1960 a correct line of demarcation was drawn up from the modern revisionists in the question of peaceful coexistence: "Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply the renunciation of the class struggle as the revisionists claim". (Ibid., p. 24) This was a correct statement, though not adequate. At another place, however, it became clear that class struggle was in no way considered to be the primary and basic principle. There it was said: "The foreign policy of the socialist countries rests on the firm foundation of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence..." (ibid., p.22)

Further the Declaration referred directly to the 20th Congress, which had declared peaceful coexistence in place of proletarian internationalism, to be the "general line of the foreign policy of the socialist states." ("Report of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. of the 20th Congress" op.cit., pp.48-49) Furthermore, this was not only declared to be an alleged Leninist principle, but also to be a "further elaboration" of the principle supposedly put forth by Lenin. ("Documents of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, November - December 1960, p.23)

In the Declaration of 1957 the attitude of modern revisionism towards the hegemony of the proletariat was criticized: "the revisionists try to exorcise the revolutionary spirit of Marxism... (they)... deny the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party..." (Basic Documents of the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties, 1957 - 1960 - 1969, p.11)

Two pages later in the same Declaration it was demanded: "(that) in the struggle for winning power and building socialism, the communist parties seek cooperation with the

socialist parties" (ibid., p. 14) which actually meant that the necessity of the hegemony of the proletariat in the proletarian revolution, as realized through the leading role of the communist party, was thrown overboard.

In the Declaration of 1960 it was stated in reference to the fight against modern revisionism: "The further development of the Communist and working-class movement calls, as stated in the Moscow Declaration of 1957, for continuing a determined struggle on two fronts - against revisionism, which remains the main danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism". (Documents of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, November - December 1960, p. 44) At the same time, however, it was also declared: "the Communist Parties have ideologically defeated the revisionists in their ranks who sought to divert them from the Marxist-Leninist path." (ibid., p.43)

In the Declaration of 1957 Titoite revisionism was not even mentioned once. On the contrary, the Titoite revisionists were invited to sign the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto. They signed only the Peace Manifesto, though.

In the Declaration of 1960, Titoite revisionism was condemned: "The Communist Parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of modern revisionist 'theories' in concentrated form" (ibid., p. 43). This attitude, however, was restricted by the following: "The leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia...(have) exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing the revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle" (ibid., pp. 43-44). This means that even in 1960 (!) Yugoslavia was still practically portrayed as a socialist state where the "revolutionary achievements" had to be defended!

In 1960 it was very correctly stated: "Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily" (ibid., pp.40-41). At the same time, on the very same page, this principle was opposed: "...the working class... has the opportunity...(to) secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people,... and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realisation of the socialist revolution" (ibid., p. 40).

One could make a long list of such examples. They all show that the Documents of 1957 and 1960 were dangerously compromising in character; they did not highlight the deep-rooted contradictions of the International Communist Movement, but mixed Marxist-Leninist theses with revisionist ones.

The result of the fight of the anti-revisionist forces against the revisionist views was that some revisionist extreme were successfully removed and certain Marxist-Leninist positions, formulated mostly in a very general way, were accepted. A uniform

Marxist-Leninist line, however, was n o t accepted and passed.
(7)

So, in these Documents, in a whole series of questions, in fact in all basic issues of the International Communist Movement, correct and wrong Marxist-Leninist and revisionist theses were put side by side. In the overall context of the Documents, the revisionist theses naturally devalued the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist positions and these Documents were as a whole changed into a means for propagating revisionist ideas in the World Communist Movement with the highest authority.

This result, this effect of the two Documents was most clearly and strikingly evident in the attitude of the modern revisionists themselves to these Documents.

In their revisionist concoction "History of the C.P.S.U." the revisionists of the C.P.S.U. devoted an entire chapter to the Meetings of 1957 and 1960 and especially to the Declarations passed there. They celebrated these Meetings as their victory. They in detail quoted core theses of both Documents as victories of their line, especially of their programme of the 20th Congress.

The character of these Documents, which offered "each person something, although not in equal parts", becomes once again very

7 Enver Hoxha's remarks on the C.P.S.U.'s first draft of the 1960 Declaration, which he rejected to be a rotten and revisionist document, are a proof for the antirevisionist' struggled about the 1957 and 1960 Declarations. They are also a proof for the fact that some changes could be brought about in the contents of these Documents because of this struggle. E. Hoxha wrote on this in a telegram to M. Shehu:

"The Declaration is rotten, revisionist, a stale repetition and a dwelling on questions in order to spread the poison... they have built in some "statagems", supposed to be retreats. However, they do not satisfy us in any way. That is why I have warned Hysni and have instructed him as to how the issues are to be formulated." (E. Hoxha, "Radiogram to Comrade Mehmet Shehu" of 4.10.60 in: "The Struggled of the PLA Against Khrushchevite Revisionism", Vienna, 1977, p. 170, Ger. ed.)

However, E. Hoxha's following position is fundamental for the PLA's overall evaluation of the 1957 and 1960 Documents:

"The fundamental issues in which there were differing views have been correctly represented in the Declaration and have been explained from the Marxist viewpoint... But one thing must be paid attention to. There is the possibility that each one interprets the theses of the Declaration in his own way". (ibid., p.321)

Here E. Hoxha does not see that the possibility of differing interpretations of both the Declarations does not simply arise from the fact that it is possible to quote one-sidedly, but from the fact that right and wrong positions stand next to one another.

clear, if we take a look at this entire bunch of revisionists positions.

The revisionist "History of the C.P.S.U." emphasized as the core of the Declarations of 1957 and 1960:

-the loose characterization of our era in the Declaration of 1957: the "main content (of our era) is the transition from capitalism to socialism" (ibid., p. 701) by means of which they circumvented the Marxist-Leninist characterization of our era as that of imperialism and the proletarian revolution.

-the revisionist statement regarding the "possibility of both a peaceful and a non-peaceful transition to socialism" (ibid., p. 703), which is directed against the Marxist-Leninist law of the necessity of a violent revolution.

-the reformist propaganda that "the peoples... can - with the support of the socialist community - resist imperialist intrigues,... and take the path of non-capitalist development" (ibid., p.703), by which the necessity of a new democratic revolution is denied.

-the catastrophic theses that "opportunities for restoring capitalism have been eliminated" (ibid., p. 702), which throws overboard the Marxist-Leninist teachings that, until the victory of communism on a world scale, the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains.

-the revisionist thesis that mankind can be delivered "even in the present epoch from the nightmare of a new world war" (ibid., p. 702) mixes up the question of preventing a particular war with the abolition of wars in general and lays aside the Leninist thesis of inevitability of wars in imperialism as being obsolete.

The great satisfaction of the Soviet revisionists with the content of the Declaration climaxed in the statement:

"The unanimity with which the conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties adopted the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto signified a major ideological and political victory of the World Communist Movement" (ibid., p.700).

With this assessment the revisionists of the C.P.S.U. could also directly refer to a formulation of the Deliberations of 1957:

"Contrary to the absurd assertions of imperialism about a so-called crisis of communism, the communist movement is growing and gathering strength" ("Basic documents of the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties 1957-1960-1969", New Age Publication, New Delhi 1972, p. 15).

This evaluation of the Declaration of 1957, which sounded like mockery in the face of the situation of the International Communist Movement at that time, was further continued in the Declaration with a veritable hymn of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. :

"The historical decisions of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. are of tremendous importance, not only to the C.P.S.U. and to the building of communism in the U.S.S.R.; they have also opened a new stage in the World Communist Movement and pushed ahead its further development along Marxist-Leninist lines." (ibid., pp. 15-16)

A main cause for all evils in the International Communist Movement was cited here as a proof for the unity of the movement. The Khrushchevite revisionists could refer to the "historical" appreciation of their revisionist Congress by the entire World Communist Movement. They could do so in spite of the fact that precisely at this Congress the deep-rooted differences of opinion between Marxist-Leninists and Khrushchevite revisionists began to emerge.

The following fact shows up a serious of questions: The C.P. of China and other parties, too, which manifestly struggled against the modern revisionism of Khrushchev, signed the Declarations of 1957 and 1960 and after the break with the C.P.S.U. continued to propagate this as a Marxist-Leninist platform of the International Communist Movement. We can touch upon and analyse only some of the questions now and in the further course of this entire work.

Did the C.P. of China not "notice" these revisionist positions, or did it notice them only partially? Did it approve of them, or did it approve of them only partially?

If it had noticed them, out of what reasons did it then not publicly disclose these mistakes and criticize them in a responsible way? Even if these Documents had initially not been comprehensively criticized, supposedly because of "tactical" reasons, why was this omission not made good later, after the break with the C.P.S.U., after having started the public polemics?

And further: If the C.P. of China wanted to oppose the revisionist positions in the adopted Documents, because it had recognized them, what should it have done?

The complete silence over the differences in reference to many positions of the Documents of 1957 and 1960 had even more far-reaching consequences, because the majority of the leaders of the communist parties present in 1957 and 1960 were outright revisionists. In their own interest and in front of their own party "at home" they naturally portrayed and falsified the stands of the C.P. of China and the Party of Labour of Albania in their own sense. This had the consequence that many honest revolutionaries and communists in the ranks of these parties were unable to form an independent and objective picture about the differences and the course of the fight.

The C.P. of China declared its own proceeding to be correct even years after the betrayal of the Khrushchevite revisionsits, after the unbridgeable rift, the irreconcilable opposition between their views and Marxism-Leninism had manifested themselves clearly and unambiguously. It continued to propagate the Documents of the Deliberations as embodying the general line of the World

Communist Movement; it continued to justify its emphatic silence in public over the differences.

Thus the C.P. of China wrote in 1963 in the "Polemic":

"The common line of the international communist movement which was thus worked out at the meeting (the reference here is to the Meeting of 1957; Author's note) embodies the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism and is opposed to the erroneous views deviating from Marxism-Leninism which were advanced by the 20th Congress." ("The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves", from "Polemic", p. 71)

And about the results of the Deliberations of 1960 it states:

"The outcome of the struggle at this meeting was that the revisionist line and views of the leadership of the C.P.S.U. were in the main repudiated and that the Marxist-Leninist line gained a great victory." (ibid., p. 88)

These positions of the C.P. of China were closely connected with the fact that these documents were regarded to be basically acceptable because of its own views which deviated from Marxism-Leninism. But when one realizes that the C.P. of China had in fact openly put forward its divergent views internally at the Deliberations and that the C.P. of China was also aware that its concessions to the Khrushchevite revisionists at these Deliberations went partly too far, then it becomes clear that the correct procedure in the fight against modern revisionism, the manner, the methods in this fight, was of great importance and continues to be so. (8)

In spite of the different viewpoints in important basic questions, the impression was created in public of "complete harmony" between the C.P. of China and the Khrushchevite revisionists, precisely because of this procedure of the C.P. of China. By not openly and publicly declaring its attitude towards

8 The Party of Labour of Albania agreed with the C.P. of China in the evaluation of the 1957 and 1960 Documents. But it almost went a step further in comparison to the C.P. of China by evaluating the concessions made at the Meetings to the revisionist leaders of the C.P.S.U. as being much less momentous:

"Of course, it (the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1960 - Author's note) contained some wrong evaluations and theses about which the PLA had completely opposing views which it also openly expressed at the Meeting. In spite of this, the delegation of the PLA signed the Declaration, because it proceeded from the fact that its content was correct in general. However, even while the PLA made some concessions in the less important questions, it did not make any concessions whatsoever in the main principles of Marxism-Leninism." (Introduction to E. Hoxha "Speech Delivered at the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on 16 November, 1960", p. VI. Tirana, 1971, Transl. from Ger. ed.- Tr.)

the Documents, by not opposing the Khrushchevite theses with an offensive propagation of the Marxist-Leninist principles and viewpoints, the C.P. of China took up an attitude which was completely defensive. This led to the fact that it propagated the Documents as Marxist-Leninist and accused the Khrushchevite revisionists of violating the line of these Documents, a line which was not Marxist-Leninist at all. Precisely this fact gave the Khrushchevite revisionists all possibilities to pick out all those passages agreeable to them and to present themselves as the true defenders of the line of these Documents.

Because of all this, total confusion reigned in the International Communist Movement. Such a procedure did not permit any real offensive ideological struggle. Instead, what came to the fore was in each case the "right" choice and interpretation of the completely contradictory contents of the Documents of 1957 and 1960.

This procedure of the C.P. of China made it impossible to make out:

- which positions of 1957 and 1960 were revisionist and which were Marxist-Leninist;
- which were the positions, with which the C.P. of China and other Marxist-Leninist parties wanted to fight the modern revisionists, but which were in fact themselves false, even revisionist.

Thus these Documents brought the International Marxist-Leninist Movement, the Marxist-Leninist forces only a p p a r e n t l y a step forward towards the consolidation of the unity of the International Communist Movement. In reality, they were a hindrance for the public and uncompromising ideological exposure of the core revisionist theses of the 20th Congress and the C.P.S.U. as well as of modern revisionism in general. On the whole, they could n o t b e u s e d in the ideological fight. Seen in connection with such a course, as adopted by the C.P. of China, one realizes that these Documents undermined the Marxist-Leninist offensive and to a large extent left the initiative in the hands of the Khrushchevite revisionists.

We think that it is necessary to refer back to the rich experiences and lessons of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, particularly to the fight of the Bolsheviks against the betrayal of the IIInd. International and their fight for the creation of the IIIrd. International in order to assess the Documents of 1957 and 1960 and take a correct stand on their uncritical propagation by the C.P. of China.

We want to refer to this fight by Lenin because we are of opinion - taking all concrete circumstances into account, which can and must be known and analysed, which led the C.P. of China n o t to openly criticize the revisionism of the C.P.S.U. (the underestimation of the revisionist danger; the argument that one could thus protect the "unity" of the International Communist Movement; their own lack of ideological clarity) - that the principles of the struggle of Marxism-Leninism against opportunism have to be given first place and are the decisive criterion for judging w h a t should have actually happened,

or what had been failed to do.

In all tactics, even while agreeing to compromise with certain opportunist forces, there was o n e aspect that was a fundamental aspect for Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin:

Marxist-Leninists do not carry on a h a g g l i n g o v e r p r i n c i p l e s, ideological contradictions must be s e t t l e d and the class conscious proletariat must be educated through these contradictions. Compromises, that lead to dulling the class consciousness of the revolutionary workers must be r e j e c t e d. Marxist-Leninists always demand the unconditional freedom of Marxist-Leninist p r o p a g a n d a.

These were decisive principles in Lenin's fight even in such situations in the International Communist Movement when he and the Bolsheviks were in an extreme minority compared to the opportunist parties and immediate support was hardly to be expected. These were Lenin's principles even in situations when the most far-reaching concessions to vacillating forces were required.

We want to look at Lenin's attitude at the deliberations of Zimmerwald in 1915 and at Kienthal in 1916.

As Lenin wrote, at the Zimmerwald conference the ideological struggle was carried out between a group of internationalists and revolutionary Marxists on the one hand and vacillating near-Kautskyists on the other, who represented the Right-wing at the conference. At this conference the revolutionary Marxists did not succeed in bringing all their positions into the manifesto, which was to be passed.

In this situation, Lenin raised the question:

"Was our Central Committee right in signing this manifesto, with all its inconsistency and timidity? We think it was. Our non-agreement, the non-agreement, not only of our Central Committee but of the entire INTERNATIONAL Left-wing section of the Conference, which stands by the principles of REVOLUTIONARY MARXISM, is openly expressed in a special resolution, a separate draft manifesto, and a separate declaration on the vote for a compromise manifesto. We did not conceal a jot of our views, slogans, or tactics. A German edition of our pamphlet, 'Socialism and War' was handed out at the Conference. We have spread, are spreading, and shall continue to spread our views with no less energy than the manifesto will. It is a fact that this manifesto is a STEP FORWARD towards a real struggle against opportunism towards a rupture with it. It would be sectarianism to refuse to take this step forward TOGETHER with the minority of German, French, Swedish, Norwegian, and Swiss socialists, when we retain full freedom and full opportunity to criticize inconsistency and to work for greater things." (Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 21, p. 387. Emphases by Lenin in capital letters)

So, Lenin did not reject taking a step forward in making a break in idea and in practice, with opportunism and social chauvinism

along with inconstant elements, indeed, even with opportunist elements. But as a c o n d i t i o n he steadfastly demanded the complete freedom to express his view and to criticize - of course, publicly.- the in consequence of the manifesto.

At another place, Lenin lashed out emphatically at: "those Zimmerwaldists who signed the Manifesto without combating its timidity or making reservations!" (Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 21, p. 432)

The further course of the discussions clearly showed the complete correctness of Lenin's action and that of the Bolsheviks. Things had to come to a head because of the character of the manifesto as a compromise between the views of the revolutionary Marxists and the "near-Kautskyites".

At the second Zimmerwald conference in Kienthal it soon became clear that only a few, the genuine leftists were prepared to go a further step ahead. The opportunist majority slid completely into the mire of social chauvinism. Lenin, at the head of the leftists, waged a merciless fight against them.

When the leftists wanted to go forward towards creating a new International that would be free of opportunists and also actually did it, the centrists and opportunists tried to transform Zimmerwald into a brake block.

In April 1917, Lenin wrote in his article "The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution" in the chapter "The Collapse of the Zimmerwald International - the Need for Founding a Third International":

"From the very onset, the Zimmerwald International adopted a vacillating, "Kautskyite", "Centrist" position, which immediately compelled the ZIMMERWALD LEFT to dissociate itself, to separate itself from the rest, and to issue ITS OWN manifesto... The chief shortcoming of the Zimmerwald International, and the cause of its COLLAPSE (for political and ideologically it has already collapsed), was its vacillation and indecision on such a momentous issue of CRUCIAL practical significance as that of breaking completely with social-chauvinism and the old social-chauvinist International, headed by Vandervelde and Hysmans at the Hague (Holland), etc." (Lenin, Coll. Works, vol. 24, pp. 80-81, 1917.- Emphases by Lenin in capital letters)

Lenin concluded from this:

"The Zimmerwald bog can no longer be tolerated. We must not, for the sake of the Zimmerwald "Kautskyites" continue the semi-alliance with the chauvinist International of the Plekhanovs and Scheidemanns. We must break with this International immediately." (ibid., p. 82)

And Lenin laid down the immediate task:

"Let us make use of this freedom, (the freedom in Russia after the February Revolution - author's note) not to advocate support for the bourgeoisie, or bourgeois "revolutionary defencism", but in a bold, honest,

proletarian Liebknecht way TO FOUND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL, an International uncompromisingly hostile both to the social-chauvinist traitors and to the vacillating "Centrists" (ibid., pp.83-84, emphases by Lenin in capital letters.)

Irrespective of a number of grave differences between the situation at the time of Zimmerwald and at the time of the Declarations in Moscow in 1960; irrespective of the question whether the character of the Documents could directly be compared as a "step forward in the fight against opportunism"; irrespective, too, of the question whether the C.P. of China could have possibly begun an open polemic immediately after the 20th Congress and could have refused to sign the Declarations of 1957 and 1960 on the basis of a solidly worked out position, or whether the signatures on 1957 and 1960 could have been circumvented; irrespective of all these questions the essential difference between the fight of Lenin and the fight of the C.P. of China seems to be to us:

Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not let their hands be tied up in Zimmerwald. Lenin and the Bolsheviks unrestrictedly propagated offensively and in public their revolutionary and Leninist positions among the international proletariat and among the revolutionary Left of different countries. Armed with Lenin's theoretical and ideological clarity they did not leave any doubt as to the half-heartedness of the Zimmerwald Manifesto. They comprehensively showed e x a c t l y i n w h a t this half-heartedness lay and stated that in future while going further in the path towards creating the IIIrd International, it was necessary to break with this half-heartedness in an allround way.

It was different in the case of the C.P. of China. Due to the fact that it actually was in agreement with the line of the Documents of 1957 and 1960 in basic questions, and also because it was of the opinion that even in questions, where it held a differing view it was imperative to declare unrestrained allegiance to the jointly concluded Documents in public. That is why it did not take the offensive in the fight for the correct viewpoints and further tied up its hands. In this way it offered the Khrushchevite revisionists plenty of scope and pretexts for their demagogies.

This short evaluation of the history of the struggle of the C.P. of China against the Khrushchevite revisionists up to the "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" and the "Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement" showed what great damage was caused due to the disregard of Lenin's struggle against revisionism of the IIrd International, as well as the disregard of Stalin's struggle against international revisionism (i.e., against the Titoite revisionists). Instead, the C.P. of China basically allowed the modern revisionists to dictate the manner of fighting to them and did not break through the revisionist

framework in a Marxist-Leninist way. (9)

In our opinion, however, the crucial point here is not that the C.P. of China did not take the path of Lenin in the method of fighting against opportunism in the period between 1957 and 1960.

After the death of Stalin and after Khrushchev's frontal attack there prevailed a very, very difficult situation in the International Communist Movement. No communist party and none of their leaders was able to start an immediate fight with the foresight of a Lenin or a Stalin. Mistakes, even serious ones, were at first practically unavoidable. The main harm lay in the fact that the mistakes were not corrected during the public polemic of the C.P. of China against Khrushchevite revisionism and that no self-criticism was carried out. On the contrary the very basic question about the method of fighting opportunism some views were propagated and the own practice justified, which fundamentally contradicted the method of Leninism. Unfortunately, till today, these views continue to exert the same great influence within the International Communist Movement as well as the view that the Documents of 1957 and 1960 are Marxist-Leninist platforms for the unity of the International Communist Movement.

5. The C.P. of China was Opposed to Khrushchev's Measures Against the Party of Labour of Albania - but was not for the Struggle of the Party of Labour of Albania Against Khrushchev.

The Khrushchev revisionists who at the 22nd Congress and on other occasions, directly called for overthrowing the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania, at the same time tried by demagogic means to throttle the open polemic of the Party of Labour of Albania against Khrushchevite revisionism. In the "Letter of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. to the C.C. of the C.P. of China" it was stated: "Our Party, having condemned the splitting activities of the Albanian leaders, has at the same time taken a number of steps towards normalizing the relations between the Albanian Party of Labour and the C.P.S.U. and other fraternal Parties." ("Polemic", p. 522)

- 9 Alone the fact that neither the C.P. of China nor any other Communist party had initiated an offensive ideological struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism before the Meeting of 1957, already suffices to state that a mere keeping away of the C.P. of China from the Meetings would not in any way have been useful for the struggle of the Marxist-Leninists. Rather, it would have been advantageous to the Khrushchevite revisionists, for whom the isolation of the Marxist-Leninists would have been facilitated. Such consideration, however, is based on the circumstance that a frontal struggle did not take place after the 20th Congress. Precisely this is a painful fact and is no model in the fight against revisionism.

In the "Proposal" the C.P. of China criticized the revisionist, great nation chauvinistic proceeding of the Khrushchevite revisionists, like the call to overthrow the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania, or transferring the differences between the Soviet and Albanian parties to the state relations. ("Polemic", pp. 43-44) (10)

However, while the Party of Labour of Albania in October 1962 gave out the slogan: "Let us draw once and for all a clear-cut line of demarcation from revisionism in all spheres." ("History of the PLA, p. 540), the C.C. of the C.P. of China, even a year later, was writing in the "Proposal":

"We once again express our sincere hope that the leading comrades of the C.P.S.U. will observe the principles guiding relations among fraternal Parties and countries and take the initiative in seeking an effective way to improve Soviet-Albanian relations." ("Polemic", p. 44)

In fact, this appeal of the C.P. of China was directed against the correct slogan of the Party of Labour of Albania, once and for all to draw a line of demarcation in all spheres. This was grist to the mills of the Khrushchevite revisionists who demagogically prattled about the "normalisation" of their relationship with the Albanian "brother party".

The aim of the efforts of the C.P. of China was not to draw a line of demarcation between themselves and the modern revisionists, but to establish and strengthen unity between that which was already irreconcilable:

"In the sphere of relations among fraternal Parties and countries, the question of Soviet-Albanian relations is an outstanding one at present. Here the question is what is the correct way to treat a fraternal Party and country... The correct solution of this question is an important matter of principle in safeguarding the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement." ("Polemic", p. 43)

When we look upon Chinese attitude in this light: "We hope that the public debate among fraternal Parties can be stopped." ("Proposal", p. 52) then it must be evaluated as an indirect condemnation of the struggle of the Party of Labour of Albania against Khrushchevite revisionism. This was at a point of time when the Party of Labour of Albania had completely correctly declared:

"that there could be no unity with the splitters of and the renegades from Marxism-Leninism, with the Titoites, Togliattists or Khrushchevites." ("History of the Party of Labour of Albania", p. 542)

- 10 See Note 4: "What Significance does the Degeneration of a Communist Party of a Socialist State have for the Relations between States", p. 37

6. The Vacillating Attitude of the C.P. of China in the Question of the Final Break with Khrushchevite Revisionism

In October 1961, the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. took place. In the comment "Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves" it was stated about the line of this Congress that:

"It is a programme which opposes revolution on the part of the people still living under the imperialist and capitalist system, who comprise two-thirds of the world population, and opposes the carrying of revolution through to completion on the part of the people already on the socialist road, who comprise one-third of the world's population. It is a revisionist programme for the preservation or restoration of capitalism." ("Polemic", p. 92)

In spite of this correct evaluation in January 1962, the C.P. of China accepted the suggestion of the Viet Nam Workers' Party that "mutual attacks in the radio and in the press should be stopped by the Parties." ("Polemic", p. 349)

Only because the leadership of the C.P.S.U. refused to make a definite commitment "to halt public polemics... gave us no choice but to make public replies to the attackers". ("Polemic", p. 349)

The C.P. of China still maintained its conciliatory attitudes and illusions, although the Khrushchevite revisionists systematically continued on the revisionist path and already since long had developed a totally counterrevolutionary line, which they put through in word and deed day after day, and although they had already committed innumerable crimes against world revolution.

Thus it was concluded in the comment "The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. are the Greatest Splitters of our Times":

"We would like to advise the leaders of the C.P.S.U. to think matters over calmly: what will your clinging to revisionism and splittism lead to? Once again, we would like to make a sincere appeal to the leaders of the C.P.S.U.: We hope you will be able to return to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." ("Polemic", p. 357)

What is remarkable here is that, besides the illusionary hope of a possible change in the Khrushchevite revisionists, an attempt was also undertaken to draw up an account for the revisionists that their revisionism did not pay: they should "very calmly" reflect on its "consequences"!

The appeal to the "good sense" of modern revisionism, that they should "calmly think matters over" implied a complete denial of the class character of the ideology of modern revisionism.

Indeed, on the basis of such mistakes the reaction of the C.P. of China to the removal of Khrushchev was no more surprising. In the comment "Why Khrushchev fell" of 21st of November, 1964 it was stated:

"Khrushchev has fallen and the revisionist line he enthusiastically pursued is discredited... These ogres (the American imperialists, the reactionaries of all countries and the modern revisionists, - Author's note) are vociferously proclaiming his "contributions" and "meritorious deeds" in the hope that events will develop along the lines prescribed by Khrushchev, so that "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" may prevail. It can be asserted categorically that theirs is a blind alley." ("Polemic", p. 491) (11)

This was a catastrophic misinterpretation of the causes and reasons for Khrushchev's fall. It appeared as if the "leading comrades" of the C.P.S.U. had now really "thought it over exactly" that nothing possible could come out of revisionism. Consequently the C.P. of China sent a congratulatory telegram to the leadership of the C.P.S.U..

It was only after the open and practical mockery of this evaluation by the Khrushchevite-Brezhnev revisionists that later the C.P. of China corrected its false evaluation and took note of the fact of Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.

* * *

Before we begin the discussion of the fundamental questions of the world proletarian revolution, first we would like to examine in detail the method of the struggle against opportunism and the Marxist-Leninist relations between communist parties. Without the Leninist method of fighting against opportunism the struggle for the unity of the Marxist-Leninist World Movement against world imperialism is not possible.

- 11 In fact, the evaluation that a Khrushchevism without Khrushchev is impossible and only a pipedream of the imperialists and revisionists, is directed against the PLA, which already on the 1st of November, i.e., almost a month before this comment, had stated: "Khrushchevite revisionism has not died with N. Khrushchev's expulsion from Party and State leadership. His politics and ideology, manifested with the line of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., have not been liquidated... We should not harbour and give way to any illusions. We should not let ourselves be led astray by the demagoguery and the masks." ("Zeri i Popullit of 1.11.1964: "Khrushchevism has not been Liquidated with the Downfall of N. Khrushchev", p. 10, Tirana, 1964, translated from Ger. ed.-Tr.)

Note 3: The Attitude of the Party of Labour of Albania to the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.

In one aspect the attitude of the Party of Labour of Albania to the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. was the same as that of the C.P. of China, namely, in its public sanction of and support to the 20th Congress.

Thus, immediately after the 20th Congress Enver Hoxha spoke at the 8th National Congress of the C.P. of China in 1956 of the: "historical decisions taken on the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.". (8th congress of the C.P. of China, p. 81, Ger. ed.)

The representatives of the Party of Labour of Albania, Sadik Bocaj, stated in the message of greetings in the name of and on behalf of the C.C. of the Party of Labour of Albania at the 3rd Party conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany:

"Your Party Conference is carrying out its work under the influence of the stimulating decisions of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., a Congress of extraordinary historical significance not just for the Communist and Workers' Parties of the entire world, but for the whole mankind." ("Protocol of the Proceedings of the 3rd Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany", Vol. 1, p. 441, Dietz, 1956, Trans. from the Ger. ed. - Tr.)

Five years after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., Enver Hoxha said in his speech on the occasion of the 20th Founding Day of the Party of Labour of Albania and the 44th Anniversary of the October Revolution in Tirana:

"The Party of Labour of Albania has always declared and does so even now that the experiences of the C.P.S.U., the experiences of its Congresses, including the 20th and 22nd Congresses, were always and will always continue to be an immense help on our path towards building socialist and communist society." (E. Hoxha, "Speech on 7th November 1961, Tirana, 1962, p. 46, Transl. from Ger. ed. - Tr.)

It would be wrong to conclude from this publicly proclaimed assent that the Party of Labour of Albania agreed with all the positions of the 20th Congress. Like the C.P. of China, the Party of Labour of Albania, too, had objections of principle, i.e., deep rooted ones against the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. - for example, in the attitude towards Stalin. The "History of the Party of Labour of Albania" portrayed the attitude of the Party as follows:

"However, (in spite of differences in content, - Author's note) the 3rd Congress did not openly condemn the anti-Marxist theses of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.. The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania had made known to the Soviet leadership its opposition and reservations over a number of their theses and actions." ("History of the Party of Labour of Albania", p. 413)

In spite of this attitude of the Party of Labour of Albania, we do not think it correct to belittle the message of greetings at

the 3rd Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany as simply "fine phrases", or for "form's sake". For we take each word of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania seriously and therefore we must discuss both its correct as well as its wrong positions. In addition to that the position that only "polite phrases" were used, included the danger that messages of greetings, addresses etc., would degenerate into utterly uninteresting ceremonials, since it would in any case be clear that "these words were not to be taken seriously".

Note 4: What Significance does the Degeneration of a Communist Party of a Socialist State have for Relations Between States

The Khrushchevite revisionists accused the C.P. of China that it had allowed ideological contradictions between parties:

"To be transferred also to relations between states. On the initiative of the government of the People's Republic of China, China's trade volume with the Soviet Union has decreased almost to a third the last three years." ("Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to all Party Organisations, to all Communists of the Soviet Union", in "Polemic" - appendix, p. 599, Germ. ed.)

The C.P. of China exposed these accusations as contradicting to the facts and proved that, in fact, the Khrushchevite revisionists themselves had sabotaged and stopped all further help.

It is naturally correct to sharply denounce these unscrupulous acts in the economic and political fields, which resulted from revisionist politics.

A further factor is that, for a long time, the C.P. of China considered the C.P.S.U. to be a Marxist-Leninist Party. In so far, it proceeded from the premise that the differences between the two parties should not be transferred to their relations between states.

But the question that concerns us is, seen from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, to what extent and how long can fundamental ideological and political contradictions between two parties remain and be allowed to remain without consequences for the relations between states.

It is obvious that when a former socialist state changes sides and capitalism is restored in it the ideological and political differences between the party which continues to be communist and the degenerated revisionist party must in a certain sense be transferred to the state relations. For, now the state relations are those between a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and a state of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, which now can naturally no longer be based on proletarian internationalism.

This problem was by no means new at the time of the appearance of

the Khrushchevite revisionists. The experience of Stalin with degenerated revisionist Yugoslavia has shown how this difficulty has been resolved from the Marxist-Leninist view point.

The Soviet Union not at all thought of unselfish helping Yugoslavia on a proletarian-internationalist basis after it was proved that Yugoslavia was taking the capitalist path under the leadership of the Tito clique.

This experience shows that when there is a change from friend to foe there is no reason for the socialist side to break off such treaties and agreements that are not conditioned by the socialist character of the other side (like trade agreements and other economic treaties, as these are also normally concluded with other capitalist countries within the framework of peaceful coexistence). It is different in the case of treaties that are based on the character of both sides as states of the dictatorship of the proletariat, treaties such as military aid, mutual assistance pacts, friendship treaties etc.

In this sense, it is wrong to formulate, independent of the class standpoint, that contradictions between parties cannot be transferred to the level of relations between states.

Unless otherwise indicated, all emphases in quotations are ours.

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General Evaluation of the Teachings and the Work of Mao Tse-tung

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PART I



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