


PROLETARIER ALLER LÄNDER VEREINIGT EUCH!
PROLETARIER ALLER LÄNDER UND UNTERDRÜCKTE VÖLKER VEREINIGT EUCH!

GEGEN DIE STRÖMUNG



Organ für den Aufbau der marxistisch-leninistischen Partei Westdeutschlands

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General Evaluation of the Teachings and the Work of Mao Tse-tung



PART I

Investigations towards the Evaluation of the Teachings and the Work of Mao Tse-tung



- * On the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, 1926-1937
- * Mao Tse-tung's Writings from 1950-1976 and the so-called "Volume V"

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PROLETARIAT ALLES JÄHRES VERBODEN! PROLETARIAT ALLES JÄHRES UND UNTERDRÜCKT WERDEN VERBODEN!

GEGEN DIE STRÖMUNG



Organ für den Aufbau der marxistisch-leninistischen Partei Westdeutschlands

October 1984 DW 2,50 / 15 GS.

On the "Proposal" of the C.P. of China's "General Line of the International Communist Movement", 1963

THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL MARXIST-LENINIST GENERAL LINE

Part VI:

The Scheme of the "Peaceful and Non-peaceful Path" Contradicts Marxism-Leninism

Basis for Discussion

Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of
ROTE FAHNE (Central Organ of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Austria)
WESTBERLINER KOMMUNIST (Organ for the building of the Marxist-Leninist Party in West-Berlin)
GEGEN DIE STRÖMUNG (Organ for the Building of the Marxist-Leninist Party in West-Germany)

General Evaluation of the Teachings and the Work of Mao Tse-tung

GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE TEACHINGS AND THE WORK OF MAO TSE-TUNG

- T h e s e s f o r D i s c u s s i o n -

The three undersigned organizations would like to emphasize that we think it is very urgent, especially in the current situation, to thoroughly and completely study the immortal teachings of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, to evaluate and propagate them on the basis of the original writings, and not merely on the basis of secondary literature. The great work of Comrade Stalin, which is and which will remain relevant, has to be defended in a particularly offensive manner against all opportunist and revisionist attacks and distortions.

In the context of defending the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin - complete in themselves - , of defending the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, it is also necessary to take a clear and principled position on M a o T s e - t u n g .

1. MAO TSE-TUNG'S MARXIST-LENINIST WORK ON THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND PEOPLES' WAR MUST BE UNCONDITIONALLY DEFENDED

Mao Tse-tung's fundamental and greatest world-historical accomplishment, which no one can deny, exists in the fact that he led the 600 million people of China, shoulder to shoulder with all other forces of the proletarian world revolution, based on Stalin's socialist Soviet Union, to victory in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal stage of the revolution.

Mao Tse-tung's writings on the democratic stage of the revolution in China, contained in volumes I-IV of his works, as well as the points on revolution in colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries are based on Marxism-Leninism and in particular on the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.

With great brilliance Mao Tse-tung applied Lenin's and Stalin's teachings and the fundamental guidelines of the Comintern to the different periods within the democratic stage of the revolution in China.

Fundamental principles of the revolution in not capitalistically developed, colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries (1) are :

- ★ The stage of the democratic revolution is a prerequisite for the transition to socialist revolution and to the dictatorship of the proletariat in these countries. An agrarian revolution as well as an anti-imperialist revolution are necessary in these countries and must be treated as a joint process, whereby one of these aspects will be in the forefront in the various periods.
- ★ The struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat is , in any

case, absolutely necessary for the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance as the fundamental part of the united front with all anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal forces; a genuine victory in the democratic stage of the revolution is impossible without the leadership of the proletariat and its party.

- ★ During the democratic stage of the revolution in colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries temporary alliances and blocs with a section of the bourgeoisie are fundamentally possible.
- ★ A basic prerequisite for the victory of the democratic revolution is the creation of armed forces.
- ★ It is a principle that already in the stage of the democratic revolution, the maximal program of the Communist Party, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the building of Socialism and Communism must be propagated, in order to proceed successfully to the socialist stage.
- ★ The democratic revolution must be viewed and propagated as one part of the proletarian world revolution. The alliance with the proletariat of the imperialist countries as well as with the peoples of the world in general, the alliance with the existing socialist country or countries, all of these are unconditional necessities of proletarian internationalism.

Mao Tse-tung applied and concretized these teachings of Lenin and Stalin on the individual phases of the Chinese revolution in a principled manner.

The people of all colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries must study Mao Tse-tung's application of these teachings of Lenin and Stalin in the course of the Chinese revolution and then investigate how they can apply these Marxist-Leninist teachings to their own conditions.

One of Mao Tse-tung's most outstanding accomplishments is without doubt the creative development of the teachings on revolutionary war , the revolutionary military strategy and tactics.

Stalin had already shown that in a country like China, the main cities could not be conquered first, but rather forces must firstly be gathered in the countryside (2).

Mao Tse-tung developed and successfully carried out the military strategy of "enclosing the cities from the countryside", of creating red base areas, and the strategy of protracted peoples' war in the context of the conditions in China through a fierce ideological struggle.

In order to really learn from this great Marxist-Leninist teaching of Mao Tse-tung, a fundamental principle, which Mao Tse-tung himself emphasized, must be considered: the principle that Marxism-Leninism must be applied to the conditions in one's own country.

In order to draw lessons on the democratic stage of the revolution from the Chinese revolution and the work of Mao Tse-tung for other colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries, the concrete conditions in China must be analyzed so that those

aspects which are not applicable for one's own country are not schematically adopted.

Experience in the current ideological debate has shown that the following must be addressed:

- The experience of the period of the Anti-Japanese war in China is a part of the great anti-fascist world war. Mao Tse-tung's evaluation of the sections of the comprador bourgeoisie which were dependent on the U.S. imperialists have to be viewed in the context of the evaluation of the U.S.A. on a world scale and in the context of the U.S.A.'s participation in the Anti-Hitler coalition.

It would be i n c o r r e c t in today's situation - in the case of all semi-feudal countries occupied by o n e imperialist power - to enter alliances with t h o s e sections of the comprador bourgeoisie which are dependent on imperialists not currently occupying that country, or who have not yet occupied the respective country. (In Afghanistan today, for example, it would be incorrect in the struggle against Russian social-imperialism, to make alliances with sections of the pro-American, pro-Western comprador bourgeoisie).

- The history of the Chinese Communist Party shows that there is no generally valid principle for the whole stage of the anti-imperialist revolution - n e i t h e r for China, n o r for other countries, which could be formulated, for example, as follows:

"The work in the countryside is primary, the work in the cities secondary".

It is also completely incorrect for these countries to view the work in the cities as primary for the entire stage of the democratic revolution in the name of hegemony of the proletariat.

The Communist Party of China itself worked primarily in the cities (until 1927), then primarily in the countryside, then before the victory in 1949, again primarily in the cities (3).

Every Communist party must decide according to their conditions, when and for how long the work in the city is primary or secondary.

- In this context, it is crucial to state that the peasants, who made up the main army of the Chinese revolution, did not alone compose the Red Army.

One of the most important things to learn from the Chinese revolution is that numerous Communist-oriented workers went to the countryside and built the basic guerilla and partisan units as well as the Red Army.

- Further, it should be emphasized that every Communist Party must precisely investigate the conditions in its own country, in order to determine whether or not it is possible to build base areas.

It does n o t correspond to the facts that automatically in all colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries the

building of such base areas is possible.



The evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's works, Volumes I-IV, particularly on the democratic stage of the revolution in China, shows that they are rich in Marxist-Leninist experience for Communists all around the world which they must absolutely defend and evaluate.

Such a fundamental evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's work does not, however, mean that we do not see problems or that we do not have criticisms in several areas (5).

2. MAO TSE-TUNG'S VIEWS ON THE TRANSITION FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION TO SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND ON THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT ARE PARTLY UNCLEAR AND PARTLY IN CONTRADICTION TO MARXISM-LENINISM

Mao Tse-tung's writings before 1966 did n o t make clear that the transition from the democratic revolution to socialist revolution must correspond on a political level to the transition from the dictatorship of all anti-imperialist, anti-feudal classes and forces to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the instrument of the proletariat to annihilating the bourgeoisie. Although at first following the victory in 1949 in China, the fundamental internal contradiction was termed that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (6), it became evident in Mao Tse-tung's central writing "On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions Among the People" (1957) that he considered it possible that a political alliance with the bourgeoisie existed in the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that he even assumed that the building of socialism in a political alliance with this bourgeoisie was possible (7).

This viewpoints are incompatible with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and practically supported the attempts of the Khrushchevite revisionists to establish the idea of class collaboration between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the international Communist movement.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that e c o n o m i c a l l y the existence of the bourgeoisie and of capitalist relations of production cannot be completely destroyed immediately (thus the NEP phase, which is generally valid, as Stalin taught (8)). Rather the liquidation of the economic positions of the bourgeoisie can only take place step-by-step. This is, however, o n l y possible when the bourgeoisie no longer has a share in political power and this is why the building of socialism is not possible without the complete dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, without the dictatorship of the proletariat.

3. THE LINE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA UNDER MAO TSE-TUNG FROM 1957 UNTIL HIS DEATH

It is an indisputable fact that no comprehensive theoretical writings of Mao Tse-tung from the period a f t e r 1957 (as well as from 1949 till 1955) are available, rather merely singular individual statements and brief theses, positions or quotes have been published (the context of which is often unclear).

Therefore, an evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's works and his impact during this period must necessarily take this shortcoming into account that important indications in the evaluation of Mao Tse-tung must be drawn from an analysis of the line of the Chinese Communist Party based on Mao Tse-tung's co-responsibility as leader of the C.P. of China.

Although the Communist Party of China under Mao Tse-tung's leadership took a wavering position on the CPSU's 20th Party Congress at first, and supported it at least in public, the C.P. of China' publicly took a stand after 1960 against some of the modern revisionists' main positions, thereby encouraging the anti-revisionist forces around the world in the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism. Even if this struggle on the part of the Communist Party of China included many mistakes and deficiencies, it should be defended as an energetic beginning in the struggle of the C.P. of China against Khrushchevite revisionism.

At the same time, however, it is important to overcome the mistakes and deficiencies which occurred in this struggle in the spirit of self-criticism of the international Communist movement.

In this context, it is also indisputable that the Communist Party of China under Mao Tse-tung's leadership - at the latest after 1966 - propagated holding firm to class struggle, the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the "life and death struggle" (9) against the bourgeoisie, opposing the revisionist forces in the C.P. of China (and to some extent took appropriate measures against the bourgeoisie).

We have determined that the Communist Party of China waged an inspiring struggle against bureaucratism and revisionism after the Khrushchevite revisionists' betrayal during the time of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). Even today this struggle provokes cries of rage from revisionists and opportunists of all types. In particular, the practice of carrying on internal party struggle before the masses, the open and public debate is a Marxist-Leninist principle, which was applied broadly to the masses during the Cultural Revolution under Mao Tse-tung's leadership.

However, we must keep in mind that on the theoretical and ideological level the incorrect development of the Communist Party of China's attitude towards the national bourgeoisie was n o t analyzed and n o t self-critically corrected. It was instead the case that Mao Tse-tung's "On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People" was given much importance, in which the national bourgeoisie's share in power in the construction of socialism was called for, and in which the transition of the antagonistic contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to a non-antagonistic contradiction was de-

clared to be possible.

To act against the bourgeoisie using non-antagonistic methods instead of antagonistic methods, that is to say, to act against the bourgeoisie democratically, using the method of convincing, instead of dictatorship and violence - this means denying one of the central ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat, namely that of the violent oppression of the bourgeoisie and the struggle to annihilate the bourgeoisie. Further, this means adopting the revisionist thesis of the "democratic road to socialism".

The Cultural Revolution is itself an example of the impossibility of resolving the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie by any other means than that of "class struggle", in the sense of "one against one".

Even more serious is the fact that the ideological education of the masses in China, particularly in the Cultural Revolution, took place on the basis of "Mao Tse-tung Thought".

The so-called "Mao Tse-tung-Thoughts" - as they were propagated by the C.P. of China since 1966 - were then till 1973 presented to be Marxism of "a completely new epoch". Thus it was denied that our epoch is still the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, as well as the significance of Leninism as Marxism of this epoch. Instead of Leninism, they propagated the "Mao Tse-tung-Thoughts" to be Marxism of this "new epoch".

"Mao Tse-tung Thought" was further propagated following the 10th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China, which concluded that this epoch is still the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution. The old definition was not really discarded, therefore the mistake essentially remained.

We would like to emphasize that we regard all positions which view Mao Tse-tung's teachings as a general further development of Marxism in respect to the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, mass line and the proletarian party as i n c o r r e c t. In these areas, none of Mao Tse-tung's teachings qualitatively advance those of Lenin and Stalin.

On the contrary, the Communist Party of China propagated - in the name of "Mao Tse-tung Thought" - some viewpoints which were i n c o r r e c t and directed against Lenin and Stalin, for example the position on the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class up until Communism, or the position on the "two-line struggle" as a generally valid rule within the party.

Regarding the period after the Cultural Revolution, an increasingly openly revisionist line of the Communist Party of China became evident, particularly in the area of foreign policy, for which Mao Tse-tung was likewise at least c o - r e s p o n s i b l e.

The revisionist "3 Worlds" scheme existed without doubt in the Communist Party of China b e f o r e Mao Tse-tung's death and also before 1974, when Teng Hsiao-ping officially presented it. We have no indication of Mao Tse-tung disassociating himself from this reactionary theory; moreover there are elements and points in Mao Tse-tung's statements from the beginning of the 60's linking them to the "3 Worlds" scheme.

4. THE ATTACKS ON AND CONDEMNATION OF MAO TSE-TUNG ARE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND THE TEACHINGS ON PEOPLES' WAR

The Russian modern revisionists were the ones who began - in a thousand and one publications - with the virulent campaign against Mao Tse-tung, after it had already become clear that Mao Tse-tung would not subordinate himself.

An analysis of these "criticisms" shows that the modern revisionists furiously attacked Mao Tse-tung's teachings, primarily those on the peoples' democratic revolution and peoples' war, and opposed them with their theories of the "peaceful road". Even their "criticism" of Mao Tse-tung's genuine mistakes preceded from an anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist standpoint.

One of the most serious errors made by the international Communist movement was that of having failed to go deeper into the struggle against modern revisionism and to thoroughly analyze and refute the attacks on Mao Tse-tung.

It is an equally serious error that the international Communist movement did not notice nor publicly and comradely criticize Mao Tse-tung's visible mistakes, nor those of the Communist Party of China.

In this context, the situation arose which made it possible that the PLA almost literally repeated the attacks of the modern revisionists in 1978 (10), whereas at the same time a tendency developed among those forces who refuted these attacks on Mao Tse-tung, a tendency which linked up precisely with the deviations of the Communist Party of China in the time before Mao Tse-tung's death as well as with his mistakes, which systematized these errors and actually tended to be anti-Stalin and generally anti-Marxist-Leninist (11).

5. THE TASKS OF THE MARXIST-LENINISTS AT REFUTING THE ATTACKS ON MAO TSE-TUNG

Marxist-Leninists view all questions of the ideological struggle, the struggle against the revisionist attacks on Mao Tse-tung as well, in the context of the principal teachings and methods of Marxism-Leninism.

First of all, it is necessary to make up for what has been neglected, to beat back the modern revisionists' "criticism" towards Mao Tse-tung as an attack on that in his work, which is, without any doubt, Marxist-Leninist; at the same time, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze and criticize Mao Tse-tung's mistakes as well as those of the Communist Party of China. This is even more important in view of the fact that not only the Russian revisionists, but also the Teng-Hua revisionists increasingly attack Mao Tse-tung's Marxist-Leninist positions.

This ideological struggle against the revisionist enemies has to be the b a s i s in leading the struggle against the in-

correct viewpoints of those parties and forces tailing along behind the PLA, as well as in the struggle against the incorrect path taken by those forces, who, in opposing the PLA, actually use the incorrect basic positions of the Communist Party of China's line before Mao Tse-tung's death.

Such a struggle on two fronts is absolutely necessary in the ranks of those who we do not view as forces of counter-revolution, in order to defend the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and in particular the work of Stalin against those forces led by the PLA (who claim to be the Stalin defenders No.1, but who in reality disregard and distort Stalin's teachings), as well as against those forces who base themselves on incorrect positions of the line of the Communist Party of China before Mao Tse-tung's death (who want to more or less "replace" Stalin through Mao Tse-tung).

Each of these directions has its particularities and the tendency of each of these is presently to i n c r e a s e in its incorrectness.

The particular danger of the incorrect viewpoints of those forces led by the PLA is based on the PLA's a u t h o r i t y. This authority, however, is rapidly declining in the face of the increasingly less restrained and more unprincipled attacks on Mao Tse-tung and in the face of the absolute absence of the willingness to discuss.

The particular danger of the other ideological tendency is based in the broad circulation of the Communist Party of China's documents from Mao Tse-tung's time, the mistakes of which have barely or not at all been criticized, which enables them to use Mao Tse-tung's extraordinary a u t h o r i t y, whom they generally and uncritically defend, complete with his errors.

To attempt to now define which of these deviations is more "dangerous" for the building of unity in the international Communist movement, now when the ideological struggle has just begun, disregards Stalin's statement - which precisely addresses such cases as these - that every deviation is dangerous, against which one is n o t struggling.

The g o a l s of the two-front ideological struggle are: defending the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, adhering to that in Mao Tse-tung's works which is Marxist-Leninist, and determining Mao Tse-tung's errors, as well as those of the Communist Party of China during Mao Tse-tung's lifetime.

6. DID MAO TSE-TUNG CONTINUE THE WORK OF MARX, ENGELS, LENIN AND STALIN AS A CLASSIC OF MARXISM-LENINISM?

The teachings of Mao Tse-tung before 1949, as reflected in his works, Volume I-IV, are a great application of Marxism-Leninism to China, and an important concretization of Lenin's and Stalin's teachings on colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries. But these works can, i n n o w a y, be viewed as a fundamental advance in the work of Marx, Engels, Lenin or Stalin on the problems of the proletarian world revolu-

tion.

Following the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU and the complete condemnation of Stalin, following the beginning of the C.P. of China's open polemic in 1963, and especially since 1966 the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the idea became firmly established in many parties, that just as Stalin stood at Lenin's grave, and moved on to advance the cause of Marxism-Leninism around the whole world, that after Stalin's death, Mao Tse-tung would further the cause of the worldwide defense of Marxism-Leninism, of the theory and practice of the world revolution, that he would take the unity of the international Communist movement upon himself and would, thereby take his place in the ranks with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

Our opinion is that Mao Tse-tung did not realize this possibility, and this fact is based not only on his serious errors in the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat (participation of the bourgeoisie in political power).

Moreover, it became evident that the first beginnings in building an ideological platform for the international Communist movement (the 25-Point Proposal), which was composed under Mao Tse-tung's leadership (12), contained serious errors and was not further pursued, discussed, nor corrected.

Serious errors in the "25 Point Proposal" and the following "Nine Commentaries" which should have been corrected through ideological struggle were (among others):

- the construction of the scheme of two possible roads to revolution: "peaceful and not peaceful" ;
- the complete neglect of the agrarian revolution in capitalistically not developed countries ;
- the directing of the struggle in all capitalist countries, primarily versus U.S. imperialism instead of the "own" bourgeoisie;
- the incorrect and unproven criticisms towards Stalin ;
- the rotten thesis of the "norm" of the exclusively internal discussion, which was directed against public debate and which allowed mutual criticism at the most behind closed doors;

It became evident that Mao Tse-tung did not assume the role of the leader of the international Communist movement like Stalin did following Lenin's death; nor did he wage a comprehensive ideological theoretically consistent struggle against modern revisionism.

In the 70's, Mao Tse-tung actually didn't take part any longer in the great ideological struggles in the international Communist movement in the form of comprehensive articles, brochures or books. Even the meetings with leaders of other Communist parties came to an end in the late of the 60's/ early 70's.

Therefore one cannot say that Mao Tse-tung took up the continuation of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, on an equal level, that is as a classic of Marxism-Leninism.

For these above-mentioned reasons, we have come to the conclusion that it is incorrect to place Mao Tse-tung as a classic in the ranks of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

As far as we know, Mao Tse-tung himself never wanted to be placed in the ranks with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin or regarded himself as a classic of Marxism-Leninism.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Many comrades formulate the question as follows: Mao Tse-tung is either in sum a Marxist-Leninist, or he had in sum revisionist viewpoints. Or: if Mao Tse-tung led a revolution as great as the Chinese revolution to victory, it is impossible that he later took revisionist positions.

Other comrades conclude the opposite: if Mao Tse-tung held revisionist viewpoints in 1957, it is impossible that he previously held Marxist-Leninist viewpoints.

All of these conceptions are fundamentally incorrect.

Those who argue in this manner assume that Marxist-Leninists cannot make basic errors.

Behind this argumentation one finds the idea, which dulls one's alertness, that a Marxist-Leninist can never become a representative of a revisionist line. This understanding also includes the opposite of this: that a revisionist or a representative of a revisionist line can never have been a Marxist-Leninist. Such an idea is, however, extremely mechanical. It necessarily overlooks the necessity of criticism and self-criticism and of ideological struggle, in order to prevent Marxist-Leninists from taking up a revisionist line or from becoming revisionists.

This determination is necessary because it became evident in the course of heated discussions around the question "was Mao Tse-tung a Marxist-Leninist or was he not?" that such a simple schema was at the base of these discussions.

Our opinion is that one must come to the following conclusions: in face of Mao Tse-tung's theory and practice which is known, rich in proof and verifiable:

Mao Tse-tung as a great Marxist-Leninist successfully applied the teachings of Marxism-Leninism to the democratic stage of the Chinese revolution.

Mao Tse-tung represented in a later stage several serious revisionist positions.

These errors do not justify though, a denial of Mao Tse-tung's extraordinary accomplishments.

We decisively refuse the viewpoint therefore that the fact that

Mao Tse-tung for some period of time put out incorrect and revisionist positions is sufficient to portray him as "degenerated" or even as revisionist right from the beginning.

Likewise we refuse to defend all of Mao Tse-tung's viewpoints and his political line as a whole and to propagate this as being in agreement with Marxism-Leninism or even as a further development in Marxism-Leninism.

In order to make a correct evaluation of Mao Tse-tung, his role in the Cultural Revolution and the struggle he led versus Teng Hsiao-ping directly before his death are essential. It appears that Mao Tse-tung recognized some of his errors in this period and attempted to correct them. It is possible that he made a self-criticism during this time - however not public - (which it is unfortunately not possible to confirm in the near future because of the lack of documents). The Cultural Revolution shows, in any case, that he no longer wanted to build socialism in alliance with the bourgeoisie, rather that he propagated this struggle against the bourgeoisie as one of "life and death".

OO "Defending Mao Tse-tung" should not mean, in our opinion, to
OO conceal the problems and to present things so, as if he always
OO would have represented Marxist-Leninist positions.

OO Defending Mao Tse-tung means above all defending his work on
OO the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution and
OO people's war, but at the same time it means that one has to criticize his later revisionist positions and his errors.



Footnotes:

- (1) See the definition of the three types of countries in the "Program of the Communist International", Marxistisch-Leninistische Schriftenreihe, p.49 (German edition).
- (2) See Stalin: "A Talk with the Students of Sun-Yat-sen University", in: J.W. Stalin, On the Chinese Revolution, Marxistisch-Leninistische Schriftenreihe, p.56 (German edition), or Stalin's Collected Works, Volume 9 (German edition), 1927, p. 221.
- (3) See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Volume 4, p. 359, 360, 386 (German edition).
- (4) For example the workers from Schuikouschan and Anyuan, see Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Mountains of Djinggang", 1928, Volume 1, p. 88, 116 (German edition).
- (5) It refers to some special passages and formulations of Mao Tse-tung concerning the following areas : problems of transition to the socialist revolution, concrete tactical problems in the parts of the democratic revolution as well as concrete and perhaps exaggerated formulations of Mao Tse-tung in struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism during the inner-party-struggle.
- (6) Mao Tse-tung, "Report on the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, elected on the 7th Party Congress", 1949, Volume 4, p.393 (German edition).
- (7) See Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions Among the People", 1957, Volume 5, p.435-437 (German edition).
- (8) See Stalin, "On the Program of the Comintern", 1928, Marxistisch-Leninistische Schriftenreihe : "Programm der Kommunistischen Internationale", p. 82/83 (German edition), or Stalin, Collected Works, Volume 11, p.128/129 (German edition).
- (9) See "Important Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Peking 1970, p.132 (German edition).
- (10) See Enver Hoxha, "Imperialism and Revolution", 1979, second part, third chapter, "The Mao Tse-tung-Thoughts - an anti-Marxist Theory" (German edition).
- (11) see: the proposal (draft) from RCP USA and RCP Chile "Summary of a Text Proposal on the Basic Principles on the Unity of Marxist-Leninists and on the Line of the International Communist Movement (Proposal)".
- (12) On the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China it was pointed out that the "25 Point Proposal" was "written under the personal leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung" (see "Important Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Peking 1970, p. 189,) (German edition).

PART I

Investigations towards the Evaluation of the Teachings and the Work of Mao Tse-tung

- A) ON THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG,
VOLUME 1, 1926 - 37
- B) MAO TSE-TUNG'S WRITINGS BETWEEN 1950 -76
AND THE SO-CALLED "VOLUME V"

PRELIMINARY NOTE
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Printed below are the preliminary results of the collective discussion of Volume I of the Selected works of Mao Tse-tung and the so-called "Volume V", the problems of which we shall deal with later. These results encompass only a few central complexes of questions chosen out of the abundance of material because they seem important to us at the moment. Thus, the discussion results presented here are by no means a completely exhaustive assessment of Volume I and "Volume V", inclusive of the period between 1950-1976. Rather, they form the first material for a still necessary extensive and comprehensive discussion on the work of Mao Tse-tung, which shall definitely be carried on over a longer period of time. In this context we would like to point out that we are working out our position on Volumes II, III and IV.

In our opinion, the full significance of Mao Tse-tung's writings cannot correctly be assessed if it is not preceded by a basic study, i.e., a study of Lenin's and Stalin's writings on the revolution in colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries and on the democratic stage of the revolution, since in all his writings Mao Tse-tung takes these as his starting point. He presupposes an exact knowledge and observance of these fundamental Marxist-Leninist theses and repeatedly emphasizes that as his own work, as his achievement, is to be regarded the application of these basic principles to the particular conditions of China.

April 1981

Editorial Board of "Rote Fahne" of the MLPA
 Editorial Board of the "Westberliner Kommunist"
 Editorial Board of "Gegen die Strömung"



ON THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, VOL.1, 1926 - 1937

Introduction
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In 1919 Lenin explained to the Communists of the East:

"In this respect you are confronted with a task, which has not previously confronted the communists of the world: relying upon the general theory and practice of communism, you must adapt yourselves to specific conditions such as do not exist in European countries; you must be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals (+) and not against capitalism."

("Address to the Second All Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East", 1919, Selected Works, Progressive Publishers, Moscow 1975, p.510)

And Lenin continued:

"The task is to arouse the working masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organization, regardless of the level they have reached; to translate the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people, to carry out those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to join the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle. Such are the problems whose solution you will not find in any communist book, but will find in the common struggle begun by Russia. You will have to tackle that problem and solve it through your own independent experience."
 (Ibid, p.510)

As we shall show in the following, Mao Tse-tung's great merit lies in the fact that he was able to tackle and successfully solve this difficult task up to the victory of the democratic stage of the revolution in China which Lenin had put before the Communists of the East, namely, based on the general theory and practice of Communism, to apply this theory and practice in their own countries.

(+) Incidentally, in this passage by Lenin is also to be seen the origin of the formulation "feudal survivals" used by Stalin and the Comintern. "Feudal survivals" as a synonym for "medieval survivals" does not mean that it is a question of a few secondary aspects of the revolution which can never play a decisive role. On the contrary, "remnants" means that they are elements which originate from a historical period which is already outdated, namely, the period of feudalism.

That Mao Tse-tung thereby based himself on the theory of Marxism-Leninism is not simply a question which can be clarified with the help of slogans in this direction, but is a question of evidence proving that Mao Tse-tung, basing himself on the theory of Marxism-Leninism, was able to develop a correct line for the democratic revolution in China.

Of course, there are also general indicators which show how much importance Mao Tse-tung attached to Marxism-Leninism. In his essay "On Contradiction" he emphasized:

"Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution precisely because Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for their resolution."

("On Contradiction", 1937, Selected Works I, p.325)

In his essay "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", which deals with the questions of revolutionary warfare, Mao Tse-tung emphasized:

"The experience of the civil war in the Soviet Union directed by Lenin and Stalin has a world-wide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, regard this experience and its theoretical summing-up by Lenin and Stalin as their guide."

("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, Selected Works I, pp 194-195. See also p.189)

In 1937, when the concrete questions of the situation in China, faced by Japanese aggression and the tasks resulting therefrom, i.e., questions of concrete tactics stood at the centre of debates and discussions within the CP of China, and the danger to generalise in an inadmissible way the particular conditions and problems of China and to lose sight of the general teachings of Marxism-Leninism was very great, Mao Tse-tung emphasized that it was absolutely essential:

"to raise the Marxist-Leninist theoretical level of the whole Party, for Marxism-Leninism alone is the compass which can guide the Chinese revolution to victory."

("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, Selected Works I, p.275)

In the period, dealt with in Volume I, in which the CP of China was already part of the World Communist Movement and a member of the Communist International, the question of the Chinese revolution played a great role on a world-wide scale in the discussion between Marxism-Leninism and Trotskyism. Stalin's writings and the Communist International's resolutions and articles were characterized by the struggle against the Trotskyites who rejected the democratic stage of the revolution, denied the essential role of the peasantry and categorically excluded possibilities of forming alliances with parts of the bourgeoisie in countries like China.

Even if we have not yet completed our study of the Communist International's experiences, a preliminary examination of the Comintern's essential resolutions in this period (+) shows that in essential and basic questions there is an identity in Mao Tse-tung's views and those of the Comintern. It goes without saying that within the Comintern, specially during the period when Zinoviev and Bucharin exerted a considerable influence, there existed vacillations and also - as Stalin himself reported (see J.V.Stalin: "On the Chinese Revolution", Marxistisch-Leninistische Schriftenreihe p.130 (++)); original source J.V.Stalin, "Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B)", 1927, Works 10, p.18, Moscow 1953, Red Star Press Reprint, London 1975) errors on the part of the Comintern in tactical questions, since the Comintern was not infallible. But, specially against the sensation-hungry speculations of all manner of pseudo-scientific accounts of the relation of the CP of China and Mao Tse-tung to the Comintern and Stalin, every honest Marxist-Leninist who compares Mao Tse-tung's documents with those of the Comintern will have to admit there is agreement in basic questions, which has to be set against the many pseudo-Marxist misrepresentations.

In Volume I, Mao Tse-tung himself emphasized in many passages the significance and importance of the Comintern's basic line for the Chinese revolution (++). Thus, he wrote in "Why is it that Red Political Power Can Exist in China?"

"According to the directives of the Communist International and the Central Committee of our Party, the content of China's democratic revolution consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in China so as to complete the national revolution, and in carrying out the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landlord class."

("Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?", 1928, Selected Works I, p.64)

And in another writing Mao Tse-tung said:

"We fully agree with the Communist International's resolution on China."

("Struggle in the Chiangkang Mountains", 1928, Selected Works I, p.97)

(+) At the moment the Marxist-Leninist Study Circle of the MLPA is working at the publication of the most important documents of the Comintern with reference to the Chinese revolution for the series "Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism". (Translator's Note: Part I containing Comintern documents from 1925-28 on the CP of China and the Chinese Revolution appeared in early 1983 under No. 34 of this series. Part II, containing documents from 1929-43, is in preparation.)

(++) This is a collection published in German under this title in 1980. The "Marxistisch-leninistische Schriftenreihe" is jointly brought out by the MLPA, WBK and GDS. All Stalin's speeches and writings on the Chinese revolution, referred to in this analysis are to be found in this collection. - Translator's note.

footnote contd. on the next page

That these statements are no mere empty niceties is evident from the fact that the Programme of the CP of China, which was adopted at the Sixth National Congress in July 1928 (see footnote 30, p.177, Selected Works I), corresponds exactly to the Comintern's "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and the Semi-Colonies", which were adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International (see "Protocols of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International", Volume IV, p.192, German ed.).

For understanding the relationship of Mao Tse-tung and the C.P. of China to the Comintern and Stalin, it is particularly important to analyse the influence of the 7th World Congress on the C. P. of China and Mao Tse-tung. Such an analysis is particularly important in order to understand the changes in the tactics of the C.P. of China and Mao Tse-tung after 1935 in face of the aggression by Japanese imperialism, to understand their switch over to the policy of the revolutionary national united front. Mao Tse-tung himself stated, in conformity with the Communist International, that an anti-fascist united front should be set up in all the countries which have been invaded by fascism.

If we have spoken of the identity in the basic views of Mao Tse-tung and the Comintern it does not mean that Mao Tse-tung, because of his exact knowledge of the conditions in China was not able to, and also did much more precisely and exactly assess and describe the situation in China and to derive corresponding tasks, just as Lenin and Stalin demanded (see: Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder", 1920) Precisely that was his task as head of one of the Sections of the Comintern. It was not and could not be the task of the Comintern to always decide single tactical questions for the sections, and it was not and could not be the task of the Comintern to lay down the realization in practice of the basic line in every minor detail. (+)



footnote from page 28

(+++) A few opponents of the Comintern and Stalin who think themselves very clever, and who claim to uphold Mao Tse-tung, devalue such statements by Mao Tse-tung with a smiling undertone by saying: "Mao Tse-tung had to make such statements" - they are only "tactical" and are not to be taken seriously.

This kind of refutation by the pseudo-defenders of Mao Tse-tung, who thus present him as being a double-dealer, and make clear that for them it is legitimate to praise outwardly a thing, while actually condemning it, has to be rejected very sharply.

(+) There existed and exist various differences in terminology, which possibly reflect certain differences of opinion between Mao Tse-tung and the Comintern in the application of the basic line. That is the case with regard to the use of the term "national bourgeoisie" by Mao Tse-tung. (See Note 1: "The use of the term national bourgeoisie" and the term "armed struggle" as it was used by the members of the Comintern, for example at the Sixth World Congress. These questions, however, cannot be discussed here in detail.

With regard to the question of "armed insurrection" in the case of China we would like to point out here that in 1927 Stalin warned against a premature take-over of the cities (see also J.V.Stalin, footnote contd. on the next page

For the reader's information we shall now give a brief outline of the development of the Chinese revolution in the period covered by the writings in Volume I and about the most important writings of Mao Tse-tung in this period:

Volume I of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung covered the period from March 1926 to July 1937. In this very important period of the democratic stage of the revolution in China fell the First Revolutionary Civil War Period from 1924 to 1927, the Second Revolutionary Civil War Period from 1927 to 1937 and the Third Revolutionary Civil War Period, characterized by the aggression of Japanese imperialism, started making itself apparent. Since 1931 Japanese imperialism undertook a massive effort to bring all China under its influence.

In the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War there existed an All-China National United Front. The immediate task of the revolution consisted in struggling against the rule of the various imperialist powers, above all England, the U.S.A., Japan and France. In this phase of the democratic stage of the revolution, in addition to the main forces - the workers and the peasants -, a section of the bourgeoisie, represented by the Kuomintang, also participated.

This period of the revolution was brutally put to an end by the counter-revolutionary coup d'état by Chiang Kai-shek on April 12, 1927, which signalized the desertion of the "national bourgeoisie" into the camp of counter-revolution and the development of the Kuomintang from a revolutionary party in the spirit of Sun Yat-sen into a counter-revolutionary party of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, which meant a temporary defeat for the democratic revolution in China. (+)

The Second Revolutionary Civil War Period covered a time when the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek set up a fascist dictatorship of the imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords in the entire country and shed streams of blood of China's workers, peasants and progressive intelligence, in order to exterminate the revolutionary movement in China. But the broad masses of the people in China rose up against this dictatorship, specially in the countryside, but also in the cities (for example in Canton and Shanghai) under the leadership of the CP of China and continued the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. In this period, i.e. after 1928, fell the period of the creation of the Red Army, the emergence of liberated areas in the countryside, the establishment of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants in these areas, the carrying out of the agrarian revolution by the forcible expropriation of the landlords' land.

FOOTNOTE contd. from page 29

"Talk with Students of the Sun-Yat-Sen University", 1927, Works 9, p.260) and recommended first accumulating strength in the rural areas. This is an important advice, pointing towards Mao Tse-tung's military strategy of surrounding of the cities from the villages, which was of such paramount importance for the outcome of the Chinese revolution.

(+) See for that Note 2: "On the Question of the Causes for the Defeat of the Chinese Revolution in 1927" p.86

Since 1931, as Japan occupied the four northeastern provinces, i.e. Manchuria, and in the course of further aggressions of Japanese imperialism against China it became clear that the attempt of Japanese imperialism to convert entire China into its colony, had to lead to an important change in China's situation and to a re-definition of the tactics of the CP of China. (Mao Tse-tung has dealt with this phase in the democratic stage of the revolution mainly in his writings in Volumes II and III.)



We regard the following writings from Volume I as the most important ones:

In the article "ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY", written in 1926, Mao Tse-tung made a f u n d a m e n t a l analysis of the role of the various classes in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the Chinese revolution, mainly in order to combat the under-estimation of the peasantry by the opportunists within the CP of China.

Mao Tse-tung followed the same purpose with his "REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN", written one year later, in 1927. This is an inspiring vindication of the revolutionary struggle, mainly of the poor peasants, and clarifies the tasks of the CP of China with reference to the revolutionary peasant movement.

"WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA?", written in 1928, is a part of the resolution of the Second Party Congress of the CP of China, drafted by Mao Tse-tung. This is the first article to deal with the problem of establishing base areas in the countryside. It emphasizes their importance and lays down the tasks of the CP of China in these areas.

Mao Tse-tung dealt with these problems in greater detail in his report to the Central Committee of the CP of China: "THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS", written in 1928. In this report he basically dealt with questions of the Chinese revolution, but also with particular problems of the base areas.

In 1929, two years after the establishment of the Red Army, during which the Party organizations of the Red Army had gained important experiences, even in the struggle against incorrect views, Mao Tse-tung wrote the draft resolution: "ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY". This article contributed towards giving Marxist-Leninist guidelines for the organization of the Red Army. Moreover it is also of fundamental importance with regard to some questions of communist party building in general.

In 1930 Mao Tse-tung wrote the letter: "A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE". In this he analysed the political situation in China, propagated the consolidation and extension of the Red base areas, in order to combat pessimistic views prevailing in the Party because of the temporary set-back to the revolution.

The first article in Volume I is the article: "ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM", written in 1935. In this Mao Tse-tung dealt

with the question of the steady intensification of the aggressions of Japanese imperialism against China.

Mao Tse-tung wrote: "PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR" in 1936 in order to sum up the experiences of the Second Revolutionary Civil War and also to sum up the discussions within the CP of China on military questions.

When, as Mao Tse-tung ascertained in 1937, the contradiction between China and Japan had become the principal contradiction for China, he delivered the report: "THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN" which laid down the tasks of the CP of China in this period. Unlike the article "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism" (1935) it expressed a changed attitude to the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek.

In order to clarify the problems and contradictions that arose in the face of the changed tactics of the CP of China, expounded by Mao Tse-tung in the report mentioned above, Mao Tse-tung made the speech: "WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT" (1937).

Similarly in 1937, Mao Tse-tung wrote the two philosophical essays "ON PRACTICE" and "ON CONTRADICTION" as weapons in the struggle against "left" opportunist views, which did not wish to take into consideration the peculiarities of the practice of the Chinese revolution. At the same time, it was also his concern to substantiate in philosophical terms the change in the CP of China's tactics that had become necessary in view of Japanese aggression. Both these writings give evidence of Mao Tse-tung's and the CP of China's serious occupation with the theory of Marxism-Leninism under difficult conditions. Apart from the necessity of discussing a few passages in both these essays, we wish to emphasize here that we regard these theoretical-philosophical achievements of Mao Tse-tung with great respect. We have to admit that no head of any section of the Comintern, apart, of course, from Stalin, can show an even approximately similar achievement. (+)



The following analysis of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung is divided into four parts:

The first big complex of questions deals mainly with the key problems of the democratic stage of the revolution, with the questions regarding the nature of the Chinese revolution in this stage, with the question of connecting the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist tasks of the revolution with the question of orienting the Communist Party and the proletariat towards the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution.

(+) A detailed discussion of both these philosophical essays of Mao Tse-tung is an important task, which we could not fulfil within the limits of this analysis of Volume I, but which we shall definitely tackle in the near future.

The second big complex of questions deals with the question of Mao Tse-tung's military-line, especially with the problem of the Liberated Areas in the countryside. In the last chapter of this part we deal with the questions important for communists in colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries, namely, the relationship between work in the rural areas, respectively work in the city, the connection between both of them, and the necessity of emphasizing one or the other under particular conditions.

The third big complex of questions presupposes in essence a very exact and detailed knowledge of the conditions then prevailing because it deals with tactical questions, especially with the question of the anti-Japanese national united front. We have very consciously concentrated only on the basic problems of tactics and have not gone into details. The main problems of the anti-Japanese national united front are: the withdrawal of a few slogans from the previous period, for example the slogan of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants, and the inclusion of parts of pro-American and pro-British comprador bourgeoisie in the anti-Japanese national united front, - which was seen to be possible in the new situation.

The fourth big complex of questions deals with the problems of the Party (which will be dealt with only in passing here and in detail later in the analysis of Volumes II, III and IV), with the question of building up the Party organization, with ideological training and with the struggle to clear out anti-Marxist views and fractionist leaders from the Party.



I. MAO TSE-TUNG'S BASIC LINE ON THE DEMOCRATIC STAGE OF REVOLUTION IS A MAGNIFICENT APPLICATION OF MARXISM-LENINISM TO THE CONDITIONS OF CHINA

[illegible]

1. The Character of the Democratic Revolution in China

[illegible]

There exists a super-proletarian view which defames the democratic stage of the revolution as being directed against the hegemony of the proletariat. As Volume I shows, Mao Tse-tung had to wage a sharp struggle against this Trotskyite deviation. Mao Tse-tung dealt with this question in great detail in his essay "On New Democracy" (SW II, 1940, pp.339 ff) and declared that the Chinese revolution as a New Democratic Revolution (+) was part of the world proletarian revolution. However, he always explained that and why in that phase the revolution in China had a democratic character, and that the determination of this character did not exclude, but necessitated the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party.

In the various phases of the Chinese Revolution, dealt with in Volume I, Mao Tse-tung repeatedly emphasized that the present democratic stage of the revolution was anti-imperialist and anti-feudal in nature.

In 1928 in connection with the emphasis on the agreement of the line of the CP of China with the resolution of the Comintern, it is stated:

"There is no doubt that China is still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The programme for a thorough democratic revolution in China comprises, externally, the overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete national liberation, and, internally, the elimination of the power and influence of the comprador class in the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution in order to abolish feudal relations in the villages..."

("Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains", 1928, SW I, p.97)

On the connection between feudalism and imperialism Mao Tse-tung wrote,

"that the forces of rural democracy have risen to overthrow the forces of rural feudalism. The patriarchal-feudal class of local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords has formed the basis of autocratic government for thousands of years and is the cornerstone of imperialism, warlordism and corrupt officialdom."
 ("Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", 1927, SW I, p.27)

(+) Mao Tse-tung did not use the term "New-Democratic Revolution" in Volume I, but only in Volume II. We shall go into this question when we take up the analysis of Volume II.

It is emphasized, mainly against "left" deviations, that in the various phases of the democratic revolution in China the nature of the revolution remains democratic. Thus, Mao Tse-tung and the CP of China stated during the agrarian phase of the Chinese revolution:

"The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National Congress are correct, i.e. the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist." ("A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire", 1930, SW I, p.122; see also SW I Note 8, p.128)

And in connection with the development of the tactics in the struggle against Japanese imperialism in 1935, Mao Tse-tung again emphasized:

"It is perfectly obvious that the Chinese revolution at the present stage is still a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist revolution in nature. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites talk such nonsense as that China has already completed her bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The revolution of 1924-27 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was not carried to completion but failed. The agrarian revolution which we have led since 1927 is also a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because it is directed not against capitalism, but against imperialism and feudalism."

("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.169)

In determining the democratic nature of the revolution in China, in laying down the two basic tasks in this revolution as being the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, Mao Tse-tung based himself on the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the socio-economic condition of China as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country and on a corresponding class analysis.

The first article in Volume I is not just accidentally "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society". The main aim of this article is to substantiate why the proletariat and not some other class or section has the leading role in the democratic stage of the revolution and in the creation of the prerequisites for the transition of this stage into the socialist stage.

2. The Classes in the Democratic Stage of the Revolution in China and the Hegemony of the Proletariat

In the "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" Mao Tse-tung himself set the task of distinguishing the real friends from the real enemies of the revolution. He came to the following conclusion:

"To sum up, it can be seen that our enemies are all those in league with imperialism - the warlords, the bureaucrats, the comprador class, the big landlord class and the reactionary section of the intelligensia attached to them. The leading force in our revolution is the industrial proletariat. Our closest friends are the entire semi-proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. As for the vacillating middle bourgeoisie, their right-wing may become our enemy and their left-wing may become our friend - but we must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks." (+)
("Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, SW I, p.19)

In 1936 Mao Tse-tung again emphasized as a fundamental principle for all revolutionary wars in China:

"In all three of its stages this revolutionary war has been, is and will be fought under the leadership of the Chinese proletariat and its Party, the Chinese Communist Party. The chief enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie may take part in the revolutionary war at certain historical junctures, yet its selfishness and lack of political and economic independence render it both unwilling and unable to lead China's revolutionary war on to the road of complete victory. The masses of China's peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie wish to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to carry it to complete victory.

(+) In this connection we have to criticize the fact that this analysis of Mao Tse-tung, valid for the period of the democratic revolution, was printed as a quotation in 1966 in the Red Book without any comment whatsoever. This must naturally have given additional strength to those forces, for whom the differentiation of the "national bourgeoisie" into friends and enemies was correct even for the socialist stage of the revolution.

At the same time we emphasize that we do not principally reject quotation collections. Of greater importance is, that in cases where the statements are valid only for certain phases, either one makes clear the historical background, or one limits oneself to those theoretical problems, which independent of certain historical periods are universally valid for a greater time period, for example for the entire era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution.

They are the main forces in the revolutionary war, but, being small-scale producers, they are limited in their political outlook..., so that they are unable to give correct leadership in the war."

("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, pp.191/192)

The class against which the proletariat in China had to struggle for hegemony was the bourgeoisie. So, Mao Tse-tung declared:

"It is the bourgeoisie that will contend with us for leadership."

("Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", 1937, SW I, p.290)

In the Chinese revolution, the rival in the struggle for leadership was mainly that section of the Chinese bourgeoisie which had certain revolutionary potential in the struggle against imperialism and could therefore play a leading role in the struggles of the Chinese masses. This was the Chinese middle bourgeoisie, defined by Mao Tse-tung as the national bourgeoisie (+) .

"The middle bourgeoisie, by which is meant chiefly the national bourgeoisie... This class represents the capitalist relations of production in China in town and country."
("Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, SW I, p.14)

In the same article, Mao Tse-tung speaks of the conflicting role of this section of the bourgeoisie in the revolution:

"The national bourgeoisie is i n c o n s i s t e n t in its attitude towards the Chinese revolution. They feel the need for revolution and favour the revolutionary movement against imperialism and the warlords when they are smarting under the blows of foreign capital and the oppression of the warlords, but they become suspicious of the revolution when they sense that, with the militant participation of the proletariat at home and the active support of the international proletariat abroad, the revolution is threatening the hope of their class to attain the status of a big bourgeoisie."
(Ibid, p.14)

Against all those, who, referring to the authority of Mao Tse-tung, attempt to convert the p o s s i b i l i t y of cooperation with parts of the bourgeoisie in a country like China into an absolute necessity at all times, we would like to emphasize here that Mao Tse-tung always stressed the contradictory nature of the national bourgeoisie and made clear that it "c a n b e a friend" - as we already quoted - but must not be one, and that one must "constantly be on one's guard" against it.

Keeping this fact in mind, Mao Tse-tung followed a correct policy towards the national bourgeoisie in the different phases

(+) See for this Note I: " The Use of the Term 'National Bourgeoisie'." p.83

of the d e m o c r a t i c revolution in China. He utilized every p o s s i b i l i t y of cooperation with it in the interest of the revolution (for example in the period between 1924 - 1927 and later, once again in the period of the anti-Japanese united front). But he never understood this in the sense of becoming a tail of the national bourgeoisie, but repeatedly pointed out that the Communist Party must have and must struggle for the leadership in the revolution.

While analysing the national bourgeoisie, Mao Tse-tung raised a question of great importance for problems of revolution in countries, where just as in China at that time the national bourgeoisie had a dual nature, i.e., it possessed a certain amount of revolutionary potential because of which it was possible for the Communists to cooperate with it in the democratic stage of the revolution. Mao Tse-tung said:

"its attempt to establish a state under the rule of the national bourgeoisie is quite impracticable, because the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in a final struggle."

("Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, SW I, p.14)

Mao Tse-tung also emphasized that the "weakness of the national bourgeoisie" was not a "new sickness", but

"one that accompanies it from the very womb... One of the chief political and economic characteristics of a semi-colonial country is the weakness of its national bourgeoisie."
("On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.157)

These comments by Mao Tse-tung are a weapon against proponents of the "Three world Theory" (+) who in fact deny the dual role of the national bourgeoisie by considering only o n e aspect, namely, the possibility of support for the revolution. They go so far as to speak of and call for the support of countries where allegedly the national bourgeoisie is in power. In this way they hush up the fact that in these countries, because of the political and economic weakness of this bourgeoisie in the era of imperialism, it is not the national bourgeoisie holding power, but the compradors and lackeys of imperialism, who have to be overthrown.

One of the most outstanding features of Mao Tse-tung is his correct and consequent Marxist-Leninist view of the role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution. He also succeeded in getting this view accepted in the CP of China against strong opportunist trends. His struggle for the correct estimation of the role of the peasantry and a corresponding policy towards it by

(+) See in this connection also "Critique of the Three-World-Scheme of Teng Hsiao-ping - Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of 'Rote Fahne', 'Westberliner Kommunist' and 'Gegen die Strömung'", chapter "The rotten Dream of a 'Dictatorship of the National Bourgeoisie'" ("Rote Fahne", No.165, "Westberliner Kommunist", No.3, "Gegen die Strömung", No.6, pp.34-35).

the CP of China was directed mainly against the Right opportunist view headed by Chen Tu-hsiu. Even as the reactionary forces of the Kuomintang, who were later to carry out the counter-revolutionary putsch in 1927, gathered strength, Chen Tu-hsiu continued to give priority to cooperation with the Kuomintang. He disregarded and did not wish to support the flaming revolutionary struggles of the peasants.

In various writings Mao Tse-tung analysed the condition of the peasants, made a class analysis, took a stand on their struggles and formulated corresponding tasks for the Communists. In this connection his "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, and his "How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas", written in 1933, should be mentioned. Undoubtedly, Mao Tse-tung had a thorough knowledge of the differentiation of the population in the villages. His description of the social conditions and political struggles of the peasants in "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (1927) is one of the most splendid documents of the Chinese revolution.

Mao Tse-tung had a clear understanding of the dual nature of the peasantry and did not in any way overestimate their revolutionary possibilities. We wish to stress this against those who want to dismiss him as a "peasant philosopher". (+)

Thus, he explained fundamentally the role of the peasantry in the democratic revolution. On the one hand - as already quoted - he emphasized that they constituted a "main force in the revolutionary war". On the other hand, however, he pointed out their "limited political outlook" arising from their property of being small-scale producers, which prevents them from being the leading force in the revolution, (see SW I, p.192).

It is clear, what immense tasks the Chinese proletariat had in leading the peasantry, which constituted the major part of the population.

On the reasons, as to what makes the Chinese proletariat, just as the proletariat in general, into the hegemon over the other classes and sections in the revolution, although the industrial proletariat in China consisted of only two million, Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"Though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represents China's new productive forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has become the leading force in the revolutionary movement... The first reason why the industrial workers hold this position is their concentration. No other section of the people is so concentrated. The second reason is their low economic status. They have been deprived of all means of production, have nothing left but their hands, have no hope of ever becoming

rich and, moreover, are subjected to the most ruthless treatment by the imperialists, the warlords and the bourgeoisie. That is why they are particularly good fighters." ("Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, SW I, p.18)

Taking this as a starting point, Mao Tse-tung repeatedly and from various aspects explained that and how the leadership of the proletariat has to be attained. Thus it is stated in Volume I :

"Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the revolution... For in the revolution in semi-colonial China the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers..." ("A single Spark can start a Prairie Fire", 1930, SW I, p.122-3)

Similarly Mao Tse-tung emphasized:

"China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat." ("Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?", 1928, SW I, p.64)

And with reference to revolutionary warfare he pointed out:

"In this era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party... Hence only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie." ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, p.192)

All these passages show that for Mao Tse-tung the victory or defeat of the democratic stage of the revolution depended on the hegemony of the proletariat. But also over and beyond this, as Mao Tse-tung emphasized, it was self-evident that even the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution was impossible without proletarian leadership. Since only

"...proletarian leadership has...created the possibility of the transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution." ("On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, pp.325,326)

Finally, we would like to deal with another aspect which seems important to us. Mao Tse-tung's numerous statements that the leadership of the proletariat must be realized through the leading role of the Communist Party still does not exhaust the question of the realization of the leadership by the proletariat.

Mao Tse-tung emphasized that the ideological-political leadership had to be supplemented and in a way be based on the fact that workers from the cities went to the villages. Worker comrades in the Red Army and in the leading bodies of the Party

(+) See Note 3: "Enver Hoxha's Criticism of Passages From Vol. I of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung does not have a Marxist-Leninist Basis," Point a) "Enver Hoxha Claims, Mao Replaced the Hegemony of the Proletariat by the Hegemony of the Peasantry." p.89

had to play a decisive role. In the Liberated Areas workers had to participate decisively in the leadership. On this complex of topics Mao Tse-tung stated at first:

"In our opinion the question of proletarian ideological leadership is very important. The Party organizations in the border area counties, which are composed almost exclusively of peasants, will go astray without the ideological leadership of the proletariat."
("The Struggle in the Chinkang Mountains", 1928, SW I, p.97)

But beyond this Mao Tse-tung also emphasized that it was necessary to

"increase the workers' representation in the government bodies. The proportion of workers...should also be increased in the leading organs of the Party at all levels."
(Ibid.)

Thus, Mao Tse-tung very unequivocally gave prime importance to the ideological leadership by the proletariat, or its vanguard. But he made clear that in order to ensure this leadership a corresponding weight of the proletarians themselves was indispensable in the leading bodies.

3. The Transition from the Democratic to the Socialist Revolution =====

The anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution in countries like China represents only the first stage in the struggle on the road to socialism. As expounded by Lenin and Stalin, the democratic revolution must pass into the socialist revolution. In this sense Mao Tse-tung too propagated the necessity of the transition from the lower stage of the revolution in China to the next, to the higher stage and stressed the connection between these two stages.

"We must go through such a democratic revolution before we can lay a real foundation for the transition to socialism."
("The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains", 1928, SW I, p.97)

In 1937, Mao Tse-tung answered the question of some comrades on the perspectives of the revolution:

"We are fighting for socialism... It is the great future goal to which our present efforts are directed; if we lose sight of the goal, we cease to be Communists... We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution and we are for the transition of the democratic revolution in the direction of socialism."
("Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese United Front", 1937, SW I, p.290)

Against Enver Hoxha's imputations that Mao Tse-tung, just as the leaders of the Second International, stood for a special

historical period of bourgeois rule as a pre-requisite for the development into socialism, it must be emphasized that Mao Tse-tung made unequivocally clear that "the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism",

"w i t h o u t taking the old historical road of the Western countries, w i t h o u t passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship."
("On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, p.341)

In connection with the question of the hegemony of the proletariat, it is very important to exactly understand that Mao Tse-tung generally proceeded from the fact that the democratic revolution in China had begun long before even the founding of the Communist Party of China. However, in a phase in which the bourgeoisie had the leadership, there was no possibility of developing this revolution into a socialist revolution. It was only the leadership of the democratic revolution by the proletariat which created this possibility. Mao Tse-tung emphasized this very clearly:

"In other words, proletarian leadership has fundamentally changed the whole face of the revolution,...created the possibility of the transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution... None of these was possible in the period when the revolution was under bourgeois leadership."
("On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, p.325-5)

It was always Mao Tse-tung's concern to make clear on the one hand that a clear distinction has to be made between the present democratic stage of the revolution and the future stage, the stage of the socialist revolution. On the other hand, any concession to the Right opportunists is impermissible, who wish to completely dispense with propagating socialism and the future stage of the revolution, in order not to lose certain forces, especially from the ranks of the bourgeoisie.

"Communists will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism, which they will attain by going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese Communist Party has its own political and economic programme. Its maximum programme is socialism and communism."
("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, pp. 270-271)

In order to understand the full significance of the absolutely essential propaganda for socialism in the democratic stage of the revolution one must keep in mind that in China, being a very backward country, socialism could not be put forward as such an immediate perspective to the majority of the population, as say in the highly developed industrialized countries of the West. The propagation of socialism and communism as a goal was in actual fact a basic ideological-propagandistic training which was to help guarantee the later transition to socialism.

In our opinion, it is all the more to Mao Tse-tung's credit to

have insisted on propagating the maximum programme in the stage of the democratic revolution, at a time when the struggle had to be concentrated against Japanese imperialism, at a time of the struggle for the "defence of the motherland". Even a rough analysis of the theory and practice of the communist parties of say France, Italy, or Germany, all highly industrialized countries, at the time of Hitler-fascism is enough to show that Mao Tse-tung fought much more thoroughly than the leaders of these parties against the danger of Right opportunism in this area.

It becomes all the more important to emphasize this because the Party of Labour of Albania and its followers accuse Mao Tse-tung of not having fought for the transformation of the democratic into the socialist revolution, of not having propagated the transition of one into the other. (+)

On the process, how and at what speed the transition from the democratic stage to the socialist stage of the revolution can take place, Mao Tse-tung writes, after he confesses to being an "exponent of the theory of the...transition of the democratic revolution in direction of socialism", that:

"The change from the predominance of the bourgeoisie to that of the proletariat is a long process of struggle, of struggle for leadership in which success depends on the work of the Communist Party in raising the level of political consciousness and organization both of the proletariat and of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie."

("Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese United Front", 1937, SW I, p.290)

These statements of Mao Tse-tung appear to us to be in total agreement with the principle emphasized by Lenin.

"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and second (the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolution - Author's note) to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarize it, to substitute liberalism in its place."

(Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky". 1918, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1975, p.98 - Emphasis by Lenin)

We underline this statement of Mao Tse-tung all the more because it will become very important not only while discussing other, deviating statements by Mao Tse-tung (++) , but also in rela-

(+) See for this Note 3, Point b) "Enver Hoxha claims, Mao Tse-tung holds the view that the bourgeois-democratic revolution need not pass into the socialist revolution".p.90

(++) In the frame-work of the discussion numbers on Volumes II, III, and IV of his Selected Works we will deal with some state-Footer continued on the next page

tion to the "theory of productive forces", later unambiguously propagated by Liu Shao-chi and his consorts, who wished to contemplate a socialist revolution only after China's transformation into an industrialized country.

Finally, a few remarks on Mao Tse-tung's emphasis that the goal of the democratic stage of the revolution was naturally not the liquidation of capitalism in its totality, but the liquidation of comprador capitalism, of capitalism dependent on imperialism. Mao Tse-tung repeatedly said that in the democratic stage of the revolution the bourgeoisie as a class, i.e. as representative of the indigenous capitalist mode of production, would not be liquidated immediately. We underline that in our opinion this view of Mao Tse-tung is fully correct and it is also in total agreement with Lenin's, Stalin's and the Comintern's views in this connection.

Mao Tse-tung clarified:

"In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people's republic will not expropriate private property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and so far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people's republic will protect the interests of the workers, but will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises, because such development is bad for imperialism and good for the Chinese people."

("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, pp.168-9)

Here the interconnection of the democratic and socialist revolution becomes evident. The expropriation of certain sections of the bourgeoisie in the democratic stage takes place not as part of a policy of the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class, not as part of the socialist revolution, but for other reasons, chiefly because and in so far as they are traitors to their country. However, at the same time an element of the transition to the socialist revolution already becomes de facto visible, i.e., a step in that direction is already taken.

In other words: The fact that Mao Tse-tung did not put forward as an immediate goal the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class in the democratic stage of the revolution, was fully correct and was in no way a rejection of the socialist perspective, the perspective of the democratic revolution passing into a socialist revolution. Therefore, it is totally wrong to assert or try to prove any such thing by quoting out of the historical context.



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ments by Mao Tse-tung on the prerequisites for the transition to the socialist revolution (see SW I, pp.170, 290), which seem problematic to us.

II. ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE CITIES FROM THE VILLAGES

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In the last years, in the discussion on Mao Tse-tung's work the modern revisionists as well as, lately, the Albanian Party of Labour lumped together in a - in our opinion - totally unacceptable manner the question of the revolutionary war in China, i.e. the military line, with the question of the hegemony of the proletariat and the role of the peasantry. To be sure, neither can be considered in total isolation from one another. On the contrary, their real connection can only be comprehended, perceived and discussed if one has understood that warfare has its own particular laws, which cannot be confused with the question of the hegemony of the proletariat.

For example, the peculiar features of China do not alter the fact that here as in all other countries, the hegemony of the proletariat is necessary for the revolution. The peculiar features of China, however, influence essentially the method of warfare, the military line in this country.

In Volume I, Mao Tse-tung deals with questions of the military line chiefly in four articles: "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", written in December 1936; "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains" of the year 1928; "Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China", written in 1928, and "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire" of the year 1930. Out of these the central work is the one named first. In it Mao Tse-tung summed up the discussions on military questions and evaluated the experiences of the Period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War. Proceeding from basic Marxist-Leninist positions on the two kinds of wars, just and unjust ones, as well as from the necessity of the proletarian leadership in revolutionary war, he developed here an entire system of military conceptions and gave instructions on the peculiar features of waging warfare in a country like China, which will have to be examined in greater detail.

Before going into a few aspects (+) of Mao Tse-tung's military line we wish to remark that we are still in the middle of the necessary deep study of these questions. We think that for a real understanding it is not only necessary to study thoroughly and in their context all the writings of Mao Tse-tung on military questions, but it is also necessary to discuss and study in detail Marx's, Engels', Lenin's and Stalin's comments and statements on this question.

(+) In our discussion number on Volumes II, III and IV of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, which will come out in the foreseeable future, we shall go further in the problems of Mao Tse-tung's military line.

1. Mao Tse-tung Proceeded from the Experience of the October Revolution and Took Into Consideration Stalin's Advices Regarding Warfare in China

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In his central military writing in Volume I "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"The experience of the civil war in the Soviet Union directed by Lenin and Stalin has a world-wide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, regard this experience and its theoretical summing-up by Lenin and Stalin as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically - ly to our own conditions." (Ibid, 1936, SW I, pp.194-195; see also p.181)

Stalin, too, had also warned against a mechanical copying of the Soviet Union's military experiences. He emphasized:

"In China, the troops of the old government are confronted not by an unarmed people, but by an armed people, in the shape of its revolutionary army. In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. And therein lies the special significance of the revolutionary army in China." (Stalin, "Prospects of the Revolution in China", 1926, Works 8, p.379)

Stalin laid down as an important task for the Chinese revolutionaries that they had to :

"undertake a thorough study of the art of war. They must not regard it as something secondary, because nowadays it is a cardinal factor in the Chinese revolution." (Stalin, Ibid, p.380)

On the concrete question of military line, Stalin emphasized already in 1927 that it would be more expedient to first accumulate strength in the countryside and then venture towards the big capital cities:

"There will be battles yet for Shanghai, and not of the kind that are now being waged for Changchow, etc. No, the battles there will be far more serious. Imperialism will not so lightly relinquish Shanghai, which is a world centre where the cardinal interests of the imperialist groups intersect.

Would it not be more expedient first to join forces with Feng, acquire sufficient military strength, develop the agrarian revolution to the full, and carry on intense work to demoralise Chiang Kai-shek's rear and front, and then, after that, to tackle the problem of Shanghai in all its magnitude? I think that would be more expedient.

Consequently, it is not at all a matter here of "blurring" the front of the struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie, because in any case it cannot be blurred if the agrarian revolution develops - and that the latter is developing and will continue to develop is now scarcely open to doubt. I repeat, it is not a matter of "blurring", but of developing appropriate fighting tactics." (Stalin, "Talk With Students of the Sun Yat-Sen University", 1927, Works 9, p.260)

Even if there exist only a few, isolated advices by Stalin in this direction they seem to us to be all the more important as an entire pack of bourgeois and pseudo-revolutionary theoreticians is at pains to play off Mao Tse-tung against Stalin and impute to Stalin that he was against the line of surrounding the cities from the countryside.

Mao Tse-tung did not only take up and pursue, but also in an outstanding manner personally put into practice both the concrete advice with regard to war in the cities and in the countryside, as well as the call that the revolutionaries in China should make a thorough study of military science.

Mao Tse-tung himself said in total agreement with Stalin:

"A special characteristic of the revolution in China, a country with a predominantly agricultural economy, is the use of military action to develop insurrection. We recommend that the Central Committee should devote great effort to military work." ("The Struggle in the Chiangkang Mountains", 1928, SW I, p.99)

2. The Establishment of Liberated Areas in China - an Essential Component of Mao Tse-tung's Military Strategy and an Important Lesson For Revolutionaries of The World

In his writing "Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?", written in 1928, after the revolutionary struggles of the masses of people had already led to the emergence of liberated Chinese Soviet areas in a few regions, Mao Tse-tung explained under what condition Red Power existed and was developing in China:

"First, it can not occur in any imperialist country or in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but can only occur in China which is economically backward, and which is semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule. For this unusual phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another unusual phenomenon, namely, war within the White regime. It is a feature of semi-colonial China that, since the first year of the Republic (1912), the various cliques of old and new warlords have waged incessant wars against one another, supported by imperialism from abroad and by

the comprador and landlord classes at home. Such a phenomenon is to be found in none of the imperialist countries nor for that matter in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China which is under indirect imperialist rule. Two things account for its occurrence, namely, a localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit. The prolonged splits and wars within the White regime provide a condition for the emergence and persistence of one or more small Red areas under the leadership of the Communist Party amidst the encirclement of the White regime... Second, the regions where China's Red political power has first emerged and is able to last for a long time have not been those unaffected by the democratic revolution,...where the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers rose in great numbers in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1926 and 1927... Third, whether it is possible for the people's political power in small areas to last depends on whether the nation-wide revolutionary situation continues to develop.... Fourth, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary condition for the existence of Red political power... Fifth, another important condition in addition to the above is required for the prolonged existence and development of Red political power, namely, that the Communist Party organization should be strong and its policy correct." ("Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?", 1928, SW I, pp.65,66,67)

On the question of the reasons for the existence of one or many areas of Red power in the midst of a White regime, Mao Tse-tung stated a few weeks later:

"We find on analysis that one reason for this phenomenon lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador and landlord classes. So long as these splits and wars continue, it is possible for an armed independent regime of workers and peasants to survive and grow. In addition, its survival and growth require the following conditions: (1) a sound mass base, (2) a sound Party organization, (3) a fairly strong Red Army, (4) terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance." ("The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains", 1928, SW I, p.73)

On studying these passages it strikes one that in the first of these writings Mao Tse-tung specially emphasized the splits and wars between the local military warlords within the White power area which led to a significant weakening of the counter-revolution. In this connection, he also pointed out the localized agricultural economy and the division of China into spheres of influence of various imperialists.

In the passage from the second writing it is particularly striking that, besides the conditions already mentioned earlier for the existence and development of Red power areas, Mao Tse-tung emphasized in addition terrain favourable to military operations

and economic resources sufficient for sustenance - both absolutely concrete aspects - important for the selection of areas in China suitable for the establishment of liberated base areas. (+)

Against the pessimistic moods emerging in the C.P. of China in face of suppression campaigns launched by Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung once more clearly emphasized in his writing "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire" in opposition to the view that first the masses in the entire country have to be won before one can proceed towards armed insurrection in the entire country:

"Their theory that we must first win over the masses on a country-wide scale and in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution."

(Ibid, 1930, SW I, p.117)

In all his writings of Volume I dealing with the question of liberated red base areas it was important for Mao Tse-tung to emphasize that the possibility of establishing revolutionary base areas existed in China and "o n l y in China" (see SW I, pp.65,73,117, 216).

However, this does not mean (as a note to the writing "Why is it that Red Political Power Can Exist in China?" emphasized, written after 1949 by the Committee for the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung at the Central Committee of the C.P. of China) that it always had to remain so, that only in China it was possible to set up red base areas. In reality, the experiences in countries like Thailand, Burma and the Philippines etc. showed that even there, under certain conditions, liberated areas could and can be established. The note in Volume I still expresses in a very cautious manner the p o s s i b i l i t y of creating red base areas in countries other than China. However, it does not claim as Lin Piao later did in his writing "Long live the Victory of People's War", that in a l l countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America this military path of revolution will n e c e s s a r i l y have to be taken. The note in Volume I says:

(+) Another special task, yet to be undertaken, is to study in their interrelationship a l l passages of Mao Tse-tung in his Selected Works in which he sets forth his views on the question of the reasons and conditions for the emergence and development of liberated areas, and thus be able to derive lessons for the present day problems of revolution in the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries, and to be able to optimally evaluate the experiences of the Chinese revolution.

"When the Japanese imperialists were driven out of these countries at the end of World War II, the imperialists of the United States, Britain, France and the Netherlands attempted to restore their colonial rule, but, having built up armed forces of considerable strength during the anti-Japanese war, these colonial peoples refused to return to the old way of life. Moreover, the imperialist system all over the world was profoundly s h a k e n because the Soviet Union had become strong, because all the imperialist powers, except the United States, had either been overthrown or weakened in the war, and finally because the imperialist front was breached in China by the victorious Chinese people. Thus, much as in China, it has become p o s s i b l e for the peoples of all, or at least some of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to maintain big and small revolutionary base areas and revolutionary regimes over a long period of time, and to carry on longterm revolutionary wars in which to surround the cities from the countryside, and then g r a d u a l l y to advance to take the cities and win nation-wide victory. The view held by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in 1928 on the question of establishing independent regimes in colonies under direct imperialist rule has changed as a result of the changes in the situation." (Note 7 to "Why is it that Red Political Power Can Exist in China ?", SW I, p.71, translated from the German edition)

One shortcoming of this note is that the formulation "thus...it has become possible for t h e peoples of colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America" leads to the generalization of the military experience for a l l countries of this region. (+)

Firstly, it is not correct to treat all countries of Asia, Africa and Latin-America as such as having the same conditions. Secondly, there are certainly a number of countries, especially in Latin America, where the possibility exists of f i r s t capturing power in the cities.

On the other hand, with regard to the international situation, there have been many great changes as compared with the situation directly after World War II.

We think that the questions of revolutionary people's war must unconditionally be studied and discussed i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y in connection with Mao Tse-tung's military writings

(*) This criticism of the "shortcoming" of this note of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China refers to the version of the note in the German edition of the Selected Works. In the English edition, as well as in another German publication, called "Selected Military Works" (1969, p.15), the sentence concerned runs as follows: "Thus...it has become possible for the peoples of all, or at least some, of the colonial countries of the East..." (SW I, p.71, English edition). Thus, in comparison with the German version of the Selected Works, the English one (as well as the one in the "Selected Military Works", German edition) is considerably more cautious in regard to the generalization for other countries of the possibility of establishing revolutionary base areas in China - Translator's Note

and other statements in Volumes II, III and IV, and also in connection with a discussion in the entire world communist movement about the concrete conditions in various countries. (+)

However, it must be said that Mao Tse-tung in his writings in Volume I has not yet expounded in a systematic and detailed manner the military strategy of the Chinese revolution, namely by a protracted people's war to create liberated areas in the country, based on these to surround the cities from the villages, and by encirclement of the cities by the Red Army on the one hand, and by insurrections in the cities themselves on the other, to win victory on a country-wide scale.

Mao Tse-tung, however, laid down in Volume I (as we have already shown) important positions on this question and fought a hard battle, chiefly against Li Li-san, to gain acceptance of this line. The latter developed in 1930, while he was leading the Central Committee of the C.P. of China, an adventurous plan to organise immediate armed insurrections in the key cities of China. (See also: "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Note 5, SW I, p.249) In opposition to this line Mao Tse-tung and the C.P. of China emphasized:

"The present task of the Party (here the words "in the big cities" should have been added) is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate insurrections."

("A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", 1930, SW I, p.122)

Very often the political and ideological significance of creating revolutionary base areas is overlooked. Over and above the pure military aspect, they had an immense propagandist value in China. Among other things, Mao Tse-tung said with reference to the creation of base areas:

"Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration."

("A Single Spark can start a Prairie Fire", 1930, SW I, p.118)

These, not only military, but also extraordinary propagandist effects of the creation of red base areas are an important additional argument proving the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's military strategy.

(+) In this connection we wish to draw attention to a brochure, which appeared in the series "Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism" "The Communist Party of Columbia (ML) on People's War". (MLSC, No. 2/1980, published in German)

Mao Tse-tung himself convincingly emphasized that certain military operations possessed not only a purely military significance. Thus he wrote on the long march (which from the military point of view had among other things, the purpose of creating a hinterland for the Red Army in the form of the socialist Soviet Union) :

"The Long March is...a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seed-ing-machine... The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future."
("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SE I, p.160)

3. A few Remarks on the most important Military Essay in Volume I "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War"

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In his lecture "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" Mao Tse-tung convincingly set forth the view that it is not only necessary to study wars and revolutionary wars in general, but that it is also particularly necessary to study the specific laws of revolutionary war in China within the frame-work of the world proletarian revolution. (See SW I, pp.179-182)

Regarding the basic questions of revolutionary war, Mao Tse-tung propagated - as we have already shown - the absolute necessity of the leadership by the proletariat and its Communist Party. (See SW I, pp.191-194)

Further he made unambiguously clear that the revolutionary war has basically a different target from reactionary war, namely to eliminate all wars:

"But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war."
("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, pp.182-183)

Mao Tse-tung placed himself firmly on the side of revolutionary wars and said :

"History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just."
(Ibid, p.183)

Asked how the just revolutionary war has to be waged, Mao Tse-tung in the first instance explained that this cannot be learnt from books, but by revolutionary war itself. Mao Tse-tung emphasized this all the more as the Red Army did not have at its disposal a large contingent of cadres trained at some academy, so that, as Mao Tse-tung stressed in one sub-title "the important thing is to be good at learning". (Ibid, p.186)

In our opinion, this principle is also, in general, an essential one for communists. It stands in close relationship to the paramount role of criticism and self-criticism and of evaluation of experiences made. This principle could almost be placed as a guiding motto over this writing by Mao Tse-tung. For, in it, Mao tried to systematise previous military experiences, to draw lessons from defeats, tactically unavoidable in a war, in order to set up an entire system of tactical (and strategical) rules for the revolutionary war in China.

With regard to the particular features of China, Mao Tse-tung mentioned four: that China is a vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically (p.196), that the enemy is powerful (p.197), that the Red Army is weak (p.198) and fourthly that under the leadership of the Communist Party an agrarian revolution is being carried out (p.198). From these particular features of China Mao Tse-tung concluded, among other things, that in China the revolutionary war will be "protracted" in nature (p.199).

The perspective of generally reckoning with more difficulties rather than with less, of preparing oneself for a longer rather than a shorter perspective played a tremendous role in creating within the Communist Party, the Red Army and the masses on the whole, an ideological and moral confidence in victory which was based on realistic estimations and not on an euphoria, quickly to be refuted by reality. It is well-known that the most important factor in a revolutionary war is the subjective factor, the consciousness of the masses and the fighters participating in the revolutionary war.

Based on the experiences of the C.P. of China, Mao Tse-tung laid down the principles of strategic active and passive defence, the measures against Chiang Kai-shek's encirclement and suppression campaigns, and the specific problems of strategic retreat. He explained how difficult it is to have to retreat from an area already liberated, and that the masses accept such a decision of the army leadership only with great difficulty. He said:

"It is extremely difficult to convince the cadres and the people of the necessity of strategic retreat when they have had no experience of it, and when the prestige of the army leadership is not yet such..."
("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, p.222)

Thus he declared "failure is indeed the mother of success", since the masses and also the Communists have to realize by their own experience the correctness of certain military decisions. However, and this seems to us to be particularly important, Mao Tse-tung emphasized that such learning on the basis of one's own experiences, which is a tactical principle for the masses, is not valid in this form for the cadres. Specifically for the cadres Mao Tse-tung emphasized:

"But it is also necessary to learn with an open mind from other people's experience, and it is sheer 'narrow empiricism' to insist on one's own personal experience in all matters and, in its absence, to adhere stubbornly to one's own opinions and reject other people's experience. Our war has suffered in no small measure on this account."
("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, p.223)

In his writing Mao Tse-tung goes on to expound the questions of counter-offensive, of the concentration of one's forces, of the necessity of mobile warfare, of the partisan character of the war, and of the negation of positional warfare in this phase of the revolution and makes clear that the aim is not just to wear down the enemy, but to annihilate it. "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" is a required reading for all revolutionaries concerned with revolutionary warfare. This does not mean that this work should not be studied together with the other military writings by Mao Tse-tung. Just such a writing by Mao Tse-tung makes clear how much arrogance and ignorance it takes to dismiss such magnificent writings with one stroke of the pen as the work of a "revisionist". We think, no comrade who really makes a study of these writings will be able to resist their power of persuasion.

Without doubt, one of Mao Tse-tung's major strength was revolutionary warfare, which also took up a great deal of his working energies. His military writings are outstanding scientific works on this theme.

4. Emphasizing the Political Tasks of the Red Army does not mean replacing the Leading Role of the Communist Party by the Role of the Army
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If we lay particular stress on Mao Tse-tung's great military achievements, we in no way wish to imply that Mao Tse-tung was only or chiefly a military man, as the revisionists and their hanger-ons would like to make out. It is definitely to Mao Tse-tung's credit to have repeatedly emphasized in Volume I (as well as in his later writings) that the military line is naturally s u b o r d i n a t e d to and serves the political line, and that obviously warfare is only o n e , even if a very essential aspect of the politics of the Party and must be brought in line with and subordinated to the general aims of the revolution. This principled approach to military questions by Mao Tse-tung becomes specially clear in his attitude towards the Red Army.

The founding of the Red Army on August 1, 1927, its building up, further consolidation and development falls in the period of the Chinese Revolution covered in Volume I. Chu Teh's detachments, which had participated in the Nanchang-Uprising, and those led by Mao Tse-tung which had participated in the Autumn-Harvest-Uprising, formed the main core of the Red Army.

In his writing "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", Mao Tse-tung explained in various passages the distinction between the Red Army and the armies of reactionary classes. He pointed out that the Red Army is not a mercenary army, but that
"they are fighting for themselves and for the people, and not for somebody else."
(Ibid, p.81)

He emphasized the decisive and vital necessity of Communist Party leadership in the Red Army and resolutely fought to establish this leadership at all levels. (See SW I, pp.81-84) The draft resolution "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" was written in 1929 by Mao Tse-tung exactly for the purpose of opposing mistaken ideas in P a r t y organizations of the Red Army.

On the significance and role of the Red Army in the revolution, over and above the purely military aspect, Stalin wrote in 1926:

"I have already spoken of the great importance of the revolutionary army in the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary army of China is the force which f i r s t penetrates new provinces, which f i r s t passes through densely populated peasant areas, and by which above all the peasant forms his judgment of the new government, of its good or bad qualities. It depends primarily on the behaviour of the revolutionary army, on its attitude towards the peasantry and towards the landlords, on its readiness to aid the peasants, w h a t the attitude of the peasantry will be towards the new government, the Kuomintang and the Chinese revolution generally."
(Stalin, "Prospects of Revolution in China", 1926, Works 8, p.387)

Exactly this point of view was also upheld by Mao Tse-tung. Thus, he emphasized on principle in relation to a section of comrades in the Red Army, among whom in 1929 the "purely military view-point was very highly developed":

"These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one m e a n s of accomplishing political tasks...

They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White army, is m e r e l y to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution;... besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing p r o p a g a n d a among the masses, o r g a n i z i n g the masses, a r m i n g them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence."

("On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", 1929, SW I, p.106)

It becomes very clear here that Mao Tse-tung, while emphasizing the political tasks of the Red Army was i n n o w a y trying to assign the tasks of the Communist Party to the Red Army, as a few superficial critics would like to make out. Rather, Mao Tse-tung struggled against understanding the Red Army to be purely a military instrument. Against the purely military view-point, he tried to enforce a conscious estimation of the political tasks of the Red Army as an army, which s e r v e s the interests of the Party.

5. On the Question, under what Conditions Should in a Country like China the Emphasis be laid on Work in the Towns and under what Conditions Should it be laid on Work in the Country

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In this question, too, the practice of the Chinese revolution, the teachings of the C.P. of China and Mao Tse-tung have a great significance for communists of all countries, provided they do not study these experiences in an abstract manner, but draw lessons for their own struggle. For that, however, it is very important to exactly understand when and why the main weight of the C.P. of China's work lay in the country, and when and why it lay in the towns.

On principle, it must be stressed that the struggle for gaining the hegemony of the proletariat in the Chinese revolution, the military necessity of surrounding the cities from the countryside as well as the carrying out of the agrarian revolution in the country as an essential component of the democratic stage of the revolution, are important aspects when answering the question as to when work in the city, or work in the countryside should be emphasized, and as to the connection between the two.

Mao Tse-tung laid great stress on work in the rural areas for the Chinese revolution chiefly for two reasons: one was the necessity of leading the agrarian revolution of the peasants in the rural areas; the second was the military strategy of the Chinese revolution; creating liberated base areas in the countryside, accumulating enough forces in the course of a protracted people's war to encircle the cities and then, in conjunction with workers' uprisings in the towns, to gain victory in the entire country.

However, there are a few false interpretations of these viewpoints of Mao Tse-tung, in the sense that allegedly in industrially less developed countries the main emphasis of work of the Communist Party has always to be laid on work in the countryside. We think that by studying the history of the Chinese revolution it can be ascertained that this view is not only incorrect, but also that it was never upheld by the C.P. of China or by Mao Tse-tung, either in theory or in practice.

On studying the history of the Chinese revolution since the foundation of the C.P. of China it can be ascertained that in the first period of the revolution, from 1924 to 1926, the C.P. of China grew and strengthened itself chiefly in the cities, that it worked mainly among the industrial proletariat and led strikes and demonstrations in the cities. In Volume I of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works it has been described at times how the C.P. of China right from the beginning worked among the proletariat. It worked among the miners of Shuikoushan, in the Anyuan coal mines, where Party organizations and miners' unions were set up, and where later on many workers joined the Red Army. (See SW I, pp. 102ff) It was only in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War that the C.P. of China worked chiefly in the villages. But after the Red base areas and the Red Army had been strengthened, even before the cities had been captured, it put forward the line

of once again working chiefly in the cities, in order to prepare for the total seizure of power, which then took place in 1949. (See also SW IV, pp. 337, 338, 363)

To understand correctly why the C.P. of China had initially worked primarily in the cities requires total clarity about the validity of the general laws of Party building, as put forward by Lenin in his "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder", and by Stalin in his writings on the strategy and tactics of the Russian Communists. These general laws apply even to a country like China where right from the beginning the mass movement - that is the revolutionary mass movement - played an immense role. Thus is particularly so in relation to the two phases of Party building. It is impossible to really lead an immense mass movement without creating a revolutionary nucleus equipped with the revolutionary theory, without first creating a solid core of cadres, and a strong organisation based on it.

While creating a basic revolutionary core, the winning of the most conscious proletarian elements undoubtedly plays the outstanding role. For, the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and the proletarian character of the Communist Party also has to find its expression in the social composition of the Party, however, without making an absolute fetish of this aspect.

The practice of the Chinese revolution corresponded to these requirements. It was thus not by chance that Mao Tse-tung, together with the miners of Anyuan, among whom he had carried out revolutionary activity for a long period of time, went to the rural areas after the failure of the revolution in 1927. Thus intensive work was carried out in the cities in order to systematically win over, educate and train worker cadres, who then went to the rural areas to fulfil there their revolutionary tasks.

In Volume I, precisely during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, when the centre of gravity of the work naturally lay in the rural areas, there are passages which clearly show that even during this period the fixing of this focus did not at all imply elimination of work in the cities.

This is to be seen very clearly in the "Letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" in April 1929, quoted in Mao Tse-tung's writing "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire":

"Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundation for the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises in key districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present; but at the same time the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in the cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specifically the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of Red political power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities, but in our opinion it would also be wrong for any of our Party members to fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers' strength and harm the re-

volution. For in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers."

("A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", 1930, SW I, pp. 122, 3)

In opposition to the crude attacks on Mao Tse-tung which claim that the high estimation and support of the peasants' struggle and the temporary stress laid by the C.P. of China on work in the countryside imply a negation of the hegemony of the proletariat in the Chinese revolution, it has to be emphasized that :

★ The hegemony of the proletariat has a l w a y s to be struggled for, no matter where the centre of gravity of the work lies - in the cities or in the rural areas. The hegemony of the proletariat is a basic principle, not to be relinquished in any phase or stage of the revolution. It is an absolute prerequisite for its real and lasting victory.

★ Work in the city is a l w a y s of decisive importance because it is a question of creating and preserving a "proletarian base of the Party".

★ Work in the rural areas obtains its decisive significance because of the necessity to lead the agrarian revolution of the peasants.

★ Work in the rural areas has furthermore decisive importance because of the military necessity to set up liberated areas and to surround the cities from the countryside.



III. BASIC QUESTIONS OF TACTICS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

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1. The Tactical Line in the Period of the Struggle against Japanese Imperialism was based on the Basic Line of the Democratic Revolution

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The intervention by the Japanese imperialists, beginning in 1931 itself, and continuously increasing in scale, falls in the period dealt with in Volume I.

This period, characterized by the military intervention, was as Mao Tse-tung formulated elsewhere, a s u b - s t a g e in the still continuing democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. It is important to be clear on this point. In this phase, on the one hand the b a s i c tasks of the struggle against imperialism and feudalism are retained. But on the other hand, the stress laid on the one or other task undergoes modification. In short, it is n o t a question of s t r a t e g y, i.e., of the essential political aims of the stage of the democratic revolution, but, it is a question of t a c t i c s. These have a temporary character. They serve and are s u b o r d i n a t e d to the strategy, to the realization of the tasks of the struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

In his first article in 1935 dealing with the problem of the change in the tasks of the Communists resulting from the intervention of Japanese imperialism, Mao Tse-tung already emphasized this important aspect in the title "On T a c t i c s Against Japanese Imperialism". He explained in the following that the building of a revolutionary national united front in the struggle against Japanese imperialism at that juncture was:

"the basic t a c t i c a l task of the Party."
(Ibid, SW I, p. 162; see also p. 165)

This fact has to be emphasized because today it is precisely this phase of the anti-Japanese national united front, which is either specially popular with, or specially denounced by the various opportunist currents. It is popular with those who continually try to use this phase of the Chinese revolution as a justification for their own Right opportunism. They a p p l y this policy of the C.P. of China, practised at this particular juncture, today and to every country, and use it as a justification for forming an alliance with the bourgeoisie of their countries. It is denounced by those who reproach Mao Tse-tung and his writings of this period with capitulationism.

Both have in common that they "overlook" that Mao Tse-tung made very clear that the C.P. of China's line during the period of the anti-Japanese united front had changed tactically, but not strategically.

With regard to strategy Mao Tse-tung emphasized, specially in his writings after 1935,

- ★ that China as before is still in the "bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution" (See SW I, pp.270,271,290), that even for the phase of the revolutionary national civil war against Japanese imperialism it is basically true that "The chief enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces". ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, p.191)
- ★ that gaining the hegemony of the proletariat and its Party is still absolutely necessary because "in the present circumstances, without the political leadership of the proletariat and its Party it is impossible to establish an anti-Japanese national united front". ("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party", 1937, SW I, p.273)
- ★ that "Communists will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism" (Ibid, p.270), that they struggle for "socialism...for the transition of the democratic revolution in the direction of socialism". ("Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", 1937, SW I, p.290)

On the basis of this basic line, since 1935, Mao Tse-tung formulated and propagated the creation of a national united front, in order to use it

"as a means of organizing and rallying millions of people and all the armies that are potentially friendly to the revolution for the purpose of advancing to strike at our main target, namely, Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors."

("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.164)

For only in this way it is possible to recruit

"large forces for the purpose of surrounding and annihilating the enemy."
(Ibid, p.163)

It is known that Mao Tse-tung thereby continued to defend the role of the allies of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie in the Chinese revolution during the anti-Japanese national united front. Thus, he said for example:

"The staunch ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, and next comes the urban petty bourgeoisie."

("Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", 1937, SW I, p.290)

All the same Mao Tse-tung did not restrict the participation in the united front to these forces, but stated:

"Our united front should include the bourgeoisie and all who agree to the defense of the motherland."
("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party", 1937, SW I, p.264)

And here the debate starts. Some accuse Mao Tse-tung of capitulationism, others pick out such passages with real enthusiasm in order to justify that always and in all cases a cooperation of the communists with the bourgeoisie should be attained.

We now wish to examine in detail the question of cooperation with the bourgeoisie in the framework of the anti-Japanese national united front: the concessions that were made in this connection, the conditions for these concessions and the relationship between the two tasks of the democratic revolution, i.e., the anti-imperialist and the anti-feudal one, in view of the fact that priority had to be given to the struggle for national liberation.

Thereby, it should be clear right from the start that the tactics of the anti-Japanese national united front - apart from the various concrete concessions, which the C.P. of China was prepared to make during this period - was in its totality a concession in so far as these tactics included the policy of working together even with enemies of the democratic revolution, for example with the anti-Japanese compradors and with creatures like Chiang Kai-shek in the framework of the united front. Besides bringing certain advantages, this policy also brought with it many dangers and disadvantages.

Fully conscious of this fact, of both these aspects, Mao Tse-tung also polemicised against such comrades who said:

"The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight."

("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.164)

Precisely against such a simplifying view, Mao Tse-tung defended the policy of the national united front and fought for its acceptance in the C.P. of China.

Lenin himself made clear in "'Left-wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder" that it may be necessary to enter into compromises, if the objective situation demands it, and had polemicised against those who at the very thought of compromise began to cry traitor. (See Lenin, "'Left-wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder", Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1975, p.64) However - and Lenin laid great stress on this - not every compromise is like the other. The decisive question is not so much whether one is allowed to make compromises or not, but which compromises are permissible and which are not. This question is also the decisive one while evaluating the united front policy of the C.P. of China under Mao Tse-tung's leadership.

We shall now proceed to analyse the C.P. of China's tactics in greater detail. Thereby, it must once again be pointed out that, in order to clarify some questions, we shall have to refer above all to Volumes II and III of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works.

2. The Struggle against Japanese Imperialism did not imply an Absolutisation of the National Tasks of the Democratic Revolution in China
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In the inner-Party struggle, Mao Tse-tung clarified theoretically that

"the contradiction between China and Japan has become the principal one and China's internal contradictions have dropped into a secondary and subordinate place."
("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, p.263)

Also in his philosophical essay "On Contradiction" it was very much Mao Tse-tung's concern to make this shift of the principal contradiction in China in China comprehensible.

If previously the struggle against feudalism and inner reaction was the main task, now it was the struggle against the currently invading imperialism.

The concentration of the struggle against Japanese imperialism, the formation of a very broad national united front is misused by the proponents of the "Three World Theory" to solely propagate the struggle against social imperialism and to ignore the internal contradictions in the various countries. The question now arises whether this revisionist politics has any right to refer to Mao Tse-tung's policy during the period of Japanese aggression. We vehemently oppose that.

Against Right opportunist deviators in that period, who thought the more concessions - no matter in which area - they make to Chiang Kai-shek, the greater will be the chance to fight together with him against Japanese imperialism, Mao Tse-tung emphasized on principle:

"It must be understood that just as a genuine and solid anti-Japanese national united front cannot be established without internal peace, so it cannot be established without internal democracy (+). Hence at the present stage of development the fight for democracy is the central link in the revolutionary task. If we fail to see the importance of demo-

(+) "Fighting for democracy" at that time concretely meant fighting for the free political activity of the people and the Communist Party, for the release of all political prisoners among other things. "Internal peace", a catch phrase of the today's imperialist bourgeoisie in Western Europe did not mean keeping still in a social chauvinist sense. It meant the real cessation of civil war by the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek against the Communist Party, against the Red Army and the Liberated Areas.

cracy clearly and slacken our fight for it, we shall be unable to establish a genuine and solid anti-Japanese national united front."
(Ibid, p.266)

In this phase Mao Tse-tung correctly concentrated the policy of the C.P. of China upon the struggle against Japanese imperialism, which "wants to turn China into a colony", "while our task is to turn China into a free and independent country with full territorial integrity" ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.162).

At the same time Mao Tse-tung unequivocally opposed the argument brought forward in the Party that

"the emphasis should be solely on resistance to Japan."
("Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese United Front", 1937, SW I, p.288)

Against this argument Mao Tse-tung emphasized that for an effective resistance against Japanese imperialism certain prerequisites were necessary:

"Similarly today, in the new stage, democracy is the most essential thing for resistance to Japan, and to work for democracy is to work for resistance to Japan. Resistance and democracy are interdependent, just as are resistance and internal peace, democracy and internal peace. Democracy is the guarantee of resistance, while resistance can provide favourable conditions for developing the movement for democracy."
(Ibid, p.288)

Elsewhere Mao Tse-tung laid down which struggle within China should be stopped and which one should be continued. This also shows that in the concrete policy of the C.P. of China in this phase of the democratic revolution it was not at all a question of struggling solely against Japan, against external imperialism. But also such tasks of the C.P. of China continued to remain on the agenda and were also carried out which were directed against the bourgeoisie and against the landlords.

"It is both possible and essential to put an end to such struggles as are detrimental to unity and to resisting Japan (the civil war, the antagonistic conflict between the political parties, provincial separatism, feudal political and economic oppression on the one hand, and the policy of insurrection and excessive economic demands harmful to the resistance on the other, etc.), and to continue such struggles as benefit unity and resistance to Japan (for freedom of criticism, for the independence of the political parties, for the improvement of the political and economic life of the people, etc.)."
("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, p.272; see also p.268)

3. Attitude Towards the "National Bourgeoisie"

In "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" Mao Tse-tung had stated that in the democratic stage of the revolution the national bourgeoisie may be an ally of the proletariat. In 1935 he once again charted a course of cooperation with it after this policy had been given up because of the counter-revolutionary putsch in 1927.

However, in this period, the view was prevalent in the C.P. of China that in spite of the new conditions created by Japanese aggression there was no possibility of once again working together with the national bourgeoisie in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. As opposed to this view Mao Tse-tung stated in 1935:

"But at a certain stage of the struggle, one section (the left-wing) may join in."
("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.156)

As to whether the right wing of the national bourgeoisie can also change itself to such an extent that it becomes ready to similarly participate in the struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao Tse-tung did not "for the moment" wish to "consider whether it can change or not" (Ibid). (Only in 1937 Mao Tse-tung committed himself on this question.)

In his writing of 1935 Mao Tse-tung finally declared:

"Basically, the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie are still the motive forces of the revolution, but now there may be the national bourgeoisie as well."
(Ibid, p.170)

Mao Tse-tung, however, even in the period of struggle against Japanese imperialism, had never understood the policy of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie as being one of trailing behind it but had always emphasized the leading role of the proletariat and its Party. While advocating cooperation with the national bourgeoisie, he also warned against its "negative aspects", its vacillations. From that he concluded that the C.P. of China, even while cooperating with the national bourgeoisie, has to be critical of it and has to struggle for leadership.

"Certain elements among the national bourgeoisie are often past masters at deceiving the people. Why? Because apart from the genuine supporters of the people's revolutionary cause, this class includes many who temporarily appear as revolutionaries or semi-revolutionaries, and who thus acquire a deceptive status which makes it difficult for the people to see through their lack of revolutionary thoroughness and their false trap-pings. This increases the responsibility devolving on the Communist Party to criticize its allies, unmask the fake revolutionaries, and gain the leadership."
(Ibid, p.158)

4. The Attitude Towards China's Comprador Bourgeoisie

In view of the fact that the Kuomintang Government not only did not resist the occupation of Manchuria and further aggressions by Japanese imperialism, but on the contrary actually supported these aggressions, Mao Tse-tung expressed himself in clear negative terms against the possibility of cooperation with those elements of the comprador bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. In his own words:

"The big local tyrants and evil gentry, the big warlords and the big bureaucrats and compradors...have formed a camp of traitors... Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek. This camp of traitors are deadly enemies of the Chinese people. Japanese imperialism could not have become so blatant in its aggression were it not for this pack of traitors. They are the running dogs of imperialism."
("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.155)

Simultaneously, already in 1935, Mao Tse-tung opposed the attitude of those comrades, who did not see the possibility of a change in the situation, who did not perceive

"splits will occur in the enemy camp when all China comes within the range of Japanese bombs, and when the struggle changes its normal pace and suddenly surges forward."
(Ibid, p.157)

And he pointed out that now already:

"even the landlord and comprador camp is not completely united."
(Ibid, p.158)

Mao Tse-tung saw the reason for this in the fact that

"China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs."
(Ibid, p.158)

However, in this period, it was for Mao Tse-tung solely a question of utilizing the contradictions within the enemy camp and was not yet a question of a treaty or of possible alliances with elements of these exploiting classes. Thus, Mao Tse-tung said:

"We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy."
(Ibid, p.159)

The Committee for the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung at the Central Committee of the C.P. of China inserted the following note with regard to the essay quoted above from the year 1935:

"And Japan's attack on northern China did subsequently lead to serious clashes of interest between Japanese and Anglo-American imperialism. The Chinese Communist Party maintained that the Chiang Kai-shek clique, with its close ties with Anglo-American imperialist interests, might change its attitude to Japan at its masters' bidding, and therefore it adopted the policy of compelling Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan." (Note 9, SW I, p.173)

Mao Tse-tung's position held in the year 1935 actually underwent a few changes in the subsequent years. Various factors played an important role thereby, which were not in every case dealt with in detail and completely in Volume I of the Selected Works.

A decisive turning-point was the Sian Incident of 1936 when Chiang Kai-shek was detained by his own rebelling soldiers. Put under enormous pressure by the patriotic revolutionary masses he was compelled to declare in negotiations with the C.P. of China that he would offer resistance to Japanese imperialism. Why did the C.P. of China enter at all into negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek? In answer to this question it must be emphasized that for the C.P. of China the most essential point was to clear up before the masses, on whose support even Chiang Kai-shek was to some extent dependent, that in that particular concrete condition of Japanese aggression, the war waged by Chiang Kai-shek against the C.P. of China would only be of advantage to Japanese imperialism.

The purpose of this tactic was above all to compel Chiang Kai-shek to stop, or at least restrict considerably, his suppression campaigns against the Red Army, the Liberation Areas and the C.P. of China, so that the Red Army could lead an effective struggle against Japanese imperialism. If the C.P. of China had had to constantly face the fire of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, it should have had to fight the war against Japanese imperialism under considerably more unfavourable circumstances. From this fact it becomes evident why Mao Tse-tung laid such great stress on getting Chiang Kai-shek to publicly commit himself to offer resistance against Japanese imperialism and to withdraw his civil war troops from the Liberated Areas of Shensi and Kansu. In return Mao Tse-tung even offered the C.P. of China's support to Chiang Kai-shek (See "Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement", 1936, SW I, p.255)

A further important aspect, which Mao Tse-tung pointed out in 1935 itself, but which is also very important within the framework of cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, was the fact that there existed in China a strong Communist Party and Red Army. Mao Tse-tung said:

"The special feature on the revolutionary side at present is the existence of a well-stepped Communist Party and Red Army. This is of crucial importance." ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.166)

These were no mere empty words, for there existed in fact in China a Red Army built up through long years of war and a strong Communist Party having millions of people as followers. Further, in this context it must be emphasized that there existed large Liberation Areas under the C.P. of China's leadership. Thus there was a territory on which a new type of state power, the Chinese Soviet Republics under the C.P. of China's leadership, had already been established.

It is all the more important to emphasize this because only on the basis that the hegemony of the Communist Party and the proletariat can actually be realized and guaranteed is it possible to cooperate with enemies of the revolution. This has to be emphasized specially against those who propagate cooperation with sections of the bourgeoisie in a country like China irrespective of the concrete correlation of forces, which in actual fact cannot but lead to a subordination to the interests and policies of the bourgeoisie.

Likewise, we wish to point out another aspect referred to later by Mao Tse-tung: For understanding the possibility of even an alliance with those sections of the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie dependent on American and British imperialism, the fact is also important that by the invasion of China by Japanese imperialists and the civil war in Spain, by the entire world developments it became clear on an international level that a world war was forthcoming, in which the fascist axis powers including Japan could be confronted by an alliance of "democratic" states with the socialist Soviet Union. After the attack of the Hitler-fascists on the Soviet-Union in 1941, the anti-Hitler-coalition of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin with American, English and French imperialism came immediately into being.

This international anti-fascist united front with imperialist powers also brought with it the possibility of entering into certain relationships with the compradors dependent on the Western powers, for the purpose of the common struggle against Japanese imperialism. In this direction Mao Tse-tung said (since he wrote this in the year 1937, it is all the more far-sighted), that it was the task of the C.P. of China and the Chinese people to link

"China's anti-Japanese national united front with the world peace front. This means that China should not only unite with the Soviet Union, which has been the consistently good friend of the Chinese people, but as far as possible should work for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism with those imperialist countries which, at the present time, are willing to maintain peace and are against new wars of aggression." ("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, p.264)

This estimation of Mao Tse-tung is completely correct. It is also in agreement with the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, which, as it is well-known, clearly stated that the fascist axis powers have to be stigmatized as the main instigators of a new war. This estimation by Mao Tse-tung is also in agreement with Stalin's statement made at the Eighteenth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B) that a distinction has to be made between the current aggressive war-mongering powers and the current non-aggressive powers.

On the whole, for understanding the C.P. of China's tactics in this struggle against Japanese imperialism, the general international debate in the world communist movement which found its culmination and its theoretical-political formulation in the documents of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International is of decisive importance and has also therefore to be thoroughly evaluated. It can already be seen, however, that in this question too the C.P. of China's and Mao Tse-tung's line is basically in agreement with the Communist International's position at the Seventh World Congress and in the following years. This is true of Mao Tse-tung's line in 1935 when he still propagated the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek (See "Protocol of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International", Resolution "The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the Communist International in the struggle for the Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism", Vol.II, p.1003, German edition). This is also true of the change in the C.P. of China's policy towards the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, made possible and necessary in 1937. Thus, in the "Resolution of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I." it was laid down in 1938 concerning China:

"The presidium of the E.C.C.I. declares its total agreement with the political line of the Communist Party and expresses the full solidarity of the Communist International with the liberation struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese conquerors."
("Communist International", 1938, No.7, p.698;
translated from the German edition)

5. The Concessions made to the Kuomintang were based on well-defined Principles

In order to come to an agreement with the Kuomintang in the struggle against Japanese imperialism it was necessary that the C.P. of China made certain concessions. Mao Tse-tung explained that although on the one hand the Marxist-Leninist view of compromises includes making concessions to the enemy on the basis of certain principles, it also includes obtaining concessions from the enemy on the other. As Lenin had already explained in his work "'Left-wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder", it is not possible to lay down for all classes once and for all, when compromises are permissible and when not, because it is more a question of the concrete circumstances.

Lenin wrote:

"It would be absurd to formulate a recipe or general rule ('No Compromises!') to serve all cases. One must use one's own brains and be able to find one's bearings in each separate case. That, in fact, is one of the functions of a party organization and of party leaders worthy of the title."
("Left-Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder"; Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1975, pp.64,65)

The concessions which the C.P. of China was ready to make towards the Kuomintang were as follows:

- (1) the Communist-led government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia revolutionary base area will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military Council respectively;
- (2) a thoroughly democratic system will be applied in the areas under the Government of the Special Region;
- (3) the policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang by armed force will be discontinued; and
- (4) the confiscation of the land of the landlords will be discontinued." (+)
("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, p. 269)

These concessions or "four guarantees", as one called them, were expressly made dependent on the condition that:

"The Kuomintang abandons the policy of civil war, dictatorship and non-resistance to the foreign foe."
(Ibid, p.270)

Mao Tse-tung formulated these conditions in greater detail elsewhere in the same writing:

(+) While evaluating the slogan "discontinue the policy of forcible confiscation of the land of the landlords", it has to be taken into consideration that thereby it was not so much a question of winning directly landlords, who were not pro-Japanese, for the struggle against Japanese imperialism, but a question of obstructing the landlords from taking military action against the armed forces of the workers and peasants, that it was a question of, as Mao Tse-tung himself said, ending "the internal armed conflict" ("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, p.272), which would have been unavoidable if the policy of confiscation of land had been carried on as before.

In this connection it must be mentioned that the presence of the Red Army in those areas in which it advanced was utilized to improve the entire living conditions of the peasants by lowering the land rent and by helping them to organize their forces.

"stop attacking the revolutionary base areas, guarantee the freedoms and rights of the people, arm the people." (Ibid, p.264)

The C.P. of China's compromises for the alliance against Japanese imperialism, recommended and described as being "necessary and permissible" by Mao Tse-tung, were not only attached to very essential conditions, but they also had their very clear limits. Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"These pledges are necessary as well as permissible... These are principled and conditional concessions... Moreover, the concessions have limits. The preservation of the Communist Party's leadership over the Special Region and in the Red Army and the preservation of the Communist Party's independence and freedom of criticism in its relations with the Kuomintang - these are limits beyond which it is impermissible to go." (Ibid, pp.269,270)

As the limit beyond which the concessions could not go Mao Tse-tung laid down the preservation of the Communist Party's leadership, "the independence and freedom of criticism". This means that for Mao Tse-tung, concerning the cooperation with the Kuomintang, it was absolutely essential to guarantee that the C.P. of China remained an autonomous, independent political force as before which, corresponding to its Marxist-Leninist line, could carry out propaganda among the people and did not give up its leading role in the areas already liberated and in the army. (Accepting "directions" from the Central Government and its Military Council meant the willingness to cooperate extensively in the anti-Japanese war; it did not mean relinquishing the power to command in the Red Army!)

Already Lenin had stated that it is essential for Communist Parties to preserve their independence when entering into an alliance with bourgeois forces. He said:

"The Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in colonial and backward countries, but must not merge with it and must under all circumstances uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if in its most rudimentary form." (Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (for the Second Congress of the Communist International); in: "On the National and Colonial Question, 3 Articles", Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1975, p.27)

Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party had no illusions about the motives leading to the participation of the various bourgeois parties and organizations in the anti-Japanese war. They had no illusions about the fact that for them the really important thing was not the struggle against Japanese imperialism; rather, it was more important not to lose their influence among the people, to gain chances of influence, to win time, among other things.

Also in 1937, Mao Tse-tung cleared up in principle about Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang:

"They are always trying to destroy us... and indeed one would have to be fast asleep to overlook the point. But the question is whether there has been any change in the way they are trying to destroy us." (Mao Tse-tung, "Win The Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", 1937, SW I. p.287)

If the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang were disposed to replace their method of war and massacres by some sort of "soft" politics, by reforms and deceit, the C.P. of China and Mao Tse-tung would have the possibility to try to come to a temporary agreement with these forces in the interest of the struggle against Japanese imperialism.

Against left-opportunist deviations, Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

"To reject the participation of the bourgeoisie in the revolution on the ground that it can only be temporary and to describe the alliance with anti-Japanese sections of the bourgeoisie (in a semi-colonial country) as capitulation is a Trotskyite approach, with which we cannot agree." (Ibid., pp.290/291)

If one assesses this tactical line, one obviously cannot leave out of account the real procedure of this alliance and its effects on the practice of the Chinese revolution. As we have come to know by the presentation of the history of the Chinese revolution, the results as far as Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, were not very big. Although he could temporarily be induced to undertake certain, often only theatrical measures against Japanese imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek followed essentially the tactics of sitting on the mountain and watching the fight of the tigers in the valley, as Mao Tse-tung appropriately described it later. This fact should not be regarded as a failure of the C. P. of China's politics, for it was not the intention to turn people like Chiang Kai-shek into determined fighters against the Japanese aggression. On the contrary, the point was to diminish by this tactics towards him the pressure of Chiang Kai-shek's army on the Red army and on the liberated areas, in order to be able to concentrate more forces on the struggle against Japanese imperialism and to gain decisive influence upon the broadest masses. And this, as we all know, could successfully be fulfilled to a high extent.

6. The Changes in the Question of State Power

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In conformity with the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, the Sixth National Congress of the C.P. of China decided in 1928 to take up into its programme the establishment of a government of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers, in short, a dictatorship of the workers and peasants with specific anti-imperialist tasks (See the Ten-Point Programme of the C.P. of China of July 1928, SW I, Note 30, p.177).

In the course of the Chinese revolution this dictatorship of the workers and peasants was established in the liberated areas so that on 7 November, 1931 the first Soviet Congress (+) could take place, which adopted the provisional constitution of the "Chinese Soviet Republic". Mao Tse-tung was elected head of the "Central Soviet Government". In the first paragraph of the Provisional Constitution it is stated:

"The constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic guarantees the political power of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the Chinese soviet areas. Our task is their final establishment in entire China."

(Quoted in: "On the Chinese Revolution". MLSK, No. 1/81; V. Nikiforov, G. Erenburg, M. Jurjev, "The People's Revolution in China", Moscow 1950, p.43. - Translated from the German edition)

During the anti-Japanese war of resistance this programme point was changed in the sense that the C.P. of China's and Mao Tse-tung's line became directed towards extending in its social basis the dictatorship of the workers and peasants in an anti-imperialist, specifically in an anti-Japanese sense. Correspondingly, Mao Tse-tung found it necessary to change the programme of the Sixth Party Congress in such a direction that the slogan of the workers' and peasants' republic was replaced by that of the people's republic:

"But the present situation requires us to change our slogan, to change it into one of a people's republic. The reason is that Japanese invasion has altered class relations in China, and it is now possible not only for the petty bourgeoisie but even for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle."

("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.168)

(+) Organs of workers' and peasants' power were constituted in the Liberated Areas under the Communist Party's leadership in the form of soviets. Unlike the Soviets of the October Revolution, which were in their character organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviets in China, in accordance with the given stage of the revolution, could only be organs of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants.

Simultaneously, Mao Tse-tung emphasized:

"The government of the people's republic will be based primarily on the workers and peasants... The essential part of our programme must be the protection of their interests." (Ibid, p.169)

Already in 1926 Stalin had expressed his opinion on the question of the future state power in China and said:

"that the future revolutionary government in China will in general resemble in character the government we used to talk about in our country in 1905, that is, something in the nature of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, with the difference, however, that it will be first and foremost an anti-imperialist government." (Stalin, "Prospects of Revolution in China", 1926, Works 8, p.382)

With regard to the Canton Kuomintang government in the First Period of the Revolutionary Civil War, when the national struggle, and not the struggle against feudalism constituted the chief task of the democratic revolution in China, Stalin stated:

"It turns out that the Canton Kuomintang government, being a bloc of four 'classes,' was a revolutionary government, and not only revolutionary, but even a model for the future revolutionary-democratic government in China." (Stalin, "Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B)", 1927, Works 10, p.24)

Irrespective of the concrete estimation of that period, we find remarkable here that for Stalin right from the beginning it was clear that in a country like China a future government or future dictatorship necessitates not simply a classical dictatorship of the workers and peasants, or a government representing only the interests of the workers and peasants. Rather, it necessitates a broad power, which, because of the anti-imperialist aspect has also to be extended to other "classes" and sections.

Thus, related statements by Mao Tse-tung in Volume I in this sense agree with Stalin's demand for a "king of a dictatorship of the workers and peasants". These statements have to be specifically considered under the aspect of anti-imperialism. In certain sub-stages of the revolution anti-imperialism is expressed in such a way that the representatives of the national bourgeoisie can politically participate in the dictatorship, which, in its basic class content is a dictatorship of the workers and peasants.

In his writing of 1935, Mao Tse-tung for the time being considered it possible that representatives of the national bourgeoisie shared in state power. Contrarily, with regard to the compradors and landlords, he emphasized:

"The people's republic will definitely not represent the interest of the enemy classes. On the contrary, it will stand in direct opposition to the landlord and comprador classes, the lackeys of imperialism." ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.168)

In the same writing, however, Mao Tse-tung also said that not only the national bourgeoisie can participate in state power but even

"those who may oppose Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, though they are not opposed to the European and U.S. imperialists because of their close ties with the latter."
(Ibid, p.166)

This means that even individuals from a certain section of the comprador class should be permitted to share state power.

At that juncture, in 1935, it was not yet a question of including Chiang Kai-shek and his troops in a kind of coalition government against Japanese imperialism. Rather, he was then branded a traitor to the country (See "Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the Central Committee of the C.P. of China in 1935, SW I, Note 3, p.277). Two years later, however, in 1937, signs of change could be noted, which in the following years were pursued and developed in Mao Tse-tung's further writings (See for example: "On Coalition Government" from the year 1945, SW III, p.205). We shall concern ourselves with these changes in our analysis of Volumes II, III and IV of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works.

In 1937 Mao Tse-tung answered the question with regard to the "nature of the new democratic republic":

"It will consist of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, and all those in the country who agree with the national and democratic revolution; it will be the alliance of these classes in the national and democratic revolution. The salient feature here is the inclusion of the bourgeoisie, the reason is that in the present circumstances there is a possibility that the bourgeoisie will once again co-operate with us and join in the resistance to Japan."
("The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, pp.271,272)

From this context, it becomes obvious that here Mao Tse-tung no longer meant only the national bourgeoisie, but also included the Kuomintang. Though it is not elaborated further, the idea is set up here that a state power should emerge signifying, as it were, the coalition of two different powers, of two armies. This state power could no longer be a unified anti-imperialist government of chiefly the workers and peasants.

In this writing Mao Tse-tung then summed up:

"It was correct to put forward the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic in the past, and it is correct to drop it today."
(Ibid, p.272)

From 1937 onwards, even after the victory over Japanese Imperialism in 1945, the idea of coalition government runs through Mao Tse-tung's writings. We shall return to this question in the further analysis of Volumes II-IV of Mao Tse-tung's works.



Summing up, we can state - even though we still see problems in this connection, demanding a critical investigation (+) - that Mao Tse-tung, from the point of view of tactics concentrated the C.P. of China, the proletariat and the masses during the period of the anti-Japanese War of Resistance upon the struggle against Japanese imperialism. But he also - in spite of broader coalition possibilities in this particular phase - led the struggle for certain democratic, for certain political and economic interest of the workers and peasants because he realized no successful struggle against Japanese imperialism could be waged without these.



(+) Thus Mao Tse-tung wrote elsewhere in Volume I:

"Without a proper estimate of the strong and weak points of the Japanese and Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and of the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall be unable fully to understand the necessity of organizing a broad revolutionary national united front... or to use this tactical weapon of ours (the revolutionary national united front; Author's Note) to strike at the main target before us, but instead we shall aim at a variety of targets so that our bullets will hit not the principal enemy but our lesser enemies or even our allies. This would mean failure to single out the principal enemy and waste of ammunition."

("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.164)

In the framework of the discussion on the "Three World Theory", on the thesis of the "two superpowers" a social chauvinist of the likes of J. Jurquet from the "Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste Français" made specific use of this quotation to declare that the bullets of the French communists must hit the "superpowers", but not French imperialism - in short that the "secondary enemy", as French imperialism was estimated to be by this social chauvinist, must not be hit.

Apart from the profusion of absurdities contained in this statement, it nevertheless becomes clear that it is a very decisive question, whether, once the principal enemy is identified, the secondary enemy must not be attacked any further at all.

In our opinion, it is self-evident that, in a secondary sense even the secondary enemy has to be fought. In many passages of Volume I, Mao Tse-tung also takes precisely this stand. It must be admitted that in the passage quoted above, because of the transference of military aspects on to the political area, the possibility exists of making the interpretation that it is no longer necessary to fight the secondary enemy.

IV. ON THE ROLE AND TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

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In Volume I, in addition to individual passages in which Mao Tse-tung emphasized the unconditional necessity of the Communist Party's leadership as an expression of proletarian hegemony, in two articles he specifically expressed his viewpoint on the problems of inner Party struggle and on the problem of Party-building.

Firstly in "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party". This article was written in 1929 and combated a few ideological mistakes of the Party organizations of the Red Army. Secondly in "On Contradiction", from 1937, in which, among other things, he also specifically dealt with the question of contradiction inside the Party. Besides these, he also dealt with the necessity of first-rate cadres for achieving victory in the revolution, with the significance of inner-Party democracy for improving the activity of the Party, and with the need for its solid unity in his concluding speech at the National Conference of the C.P. of China "Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", held in 1937. (*)

Mao Tse-tung summed up his basic view on the Party in one sentence:

"Thus it can be seen that to lead the revolution to victory, a political party must depend on the correctness of its own political line and the solidity of its own organization."
("On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, p.315)

In order to achieve this Mao Tse-tung relentlessly struggled against mistaken and opportunist views inside the C.P. of China. As he himself emphatically stated:

"correct political and military lines do not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in the course of struggle. These lines must combat "Left" opportunism on the one hand and Right opportunism on the other. Without combating and thoroughly overcoming these harmful tendencies which damage the revolution and the revolutionary war, it would be impossible to establish a correct line and win victory in this war."
("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, p.194)

In conformity with Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's teachings, Stalin laid down the basic principle that a Party develops only through struggle. He wrote:

(*) In this number we can deal with only such questions of the Communist Party, which emerge from the writings in Volume I. We shall publish a more precise and detailed analysis of Mao Tse-tung's positions and works on the Party in our joint discussion number on Volumes II, III, and IV of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works.

"disagreements based on principle, which arise in the course of the Party's development, in the course of the class struggle of the proletariat... contradictions can be overcome only by means of a struggle for definite principles, for definite aims of the struggle, for definite methods of waging the struggle leading to the desired aim."
(Stalin, "Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in our Party", 1926, Works 9, p.4)

Similarly, Mao Tse-tung explained in his essay "On Contradiction" that the Party can only advance by overcoming its internal contradictions. He wrote:

"Opposition and struggle between the ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party's life would come to an end."
("On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, p.317)

Elsewhere in this essay, Mao Tse-tung emphasized the "method of criticism and self criticism" (Ibid., p.322) was the basic method to solve contradictions inside the Communist Party, i.e., within the ranks, in the ranks of the communists.

A few pages later, he further clarified that contradictions in the Party, even if they at first do not manifest themselves in an "antagonistic form" can still develop into an antagonism. In this connection Mao Tse-tung referred to Trotsky and Bucharin. With regard to the C.P. of China he referred to Chen Tu-hsin and Chang Kuo-tao. (Ibid., p.344)

The reference to Chen Tu-hsiu makes clear that Mao Tse-tung in "On Contradiction" definitely supported the expulsion of elements hostile to the party.

That Mao Tse-tung by no means opened the Party in a liberal fashion to all kinds of opportunists and careerists, as a few of his "critics" allege today, can clearly be seen in his article "The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains". When in June 1928, because of the open recruitment of Party members, the Party organizations of the C.P. of China were flooded by all kinds of elements, correct inner-Party education was no longer possible and many Party organizations were blown up due to this fact, the C.P. of China proceeded to carry out a "drastic", as Mao Tse-tung put it ,

"house cleaning and set strict class qualifications for membership. All the Party organizations in Yunghsin and Ning Kang Counties were dissolved and a re-registration was undertaken."
("The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains", 1928, SW I, p.95)

While carrying out a necessary and serious struggle against mistaken ideas in the Party, Mao Tse-tung emphasized as essential:

"Give the comrades who have committed errors ample opportunity to wake up."
("On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, p.345)

This is an important aspect of inner-Party struggle in Mao Tse-tung's writings. Mao Tse-tung pointed out thereby that contradictions which can be resolved through criticism and self-criticism should not superfluously be resolved by means of organizational measures, i.e., expulsion from the Party or something similar, as this could lead to a weakening of the Party.

In this context it seems to us to be specially important to understand, as Mao Tse-tung emphasized, that even mistaken ideas of comrades, contradictions between correct and incorrect views within the Communist Party are

"a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes,"
(Ibid, p.317)

which exist outside the Party. In our opinion, this means that contradictions in the ideological sphere are in their class content antagonistic contradictions. This also means that the mistaken views must be eliminated and the correct views must not reconcile with the erroneous ones. This, however, does not necessarily mean - and Mao Tse-tung polemicized strongly against such a mistaken view (See "On Contradiction", p.345) - that the bearers of these erroneous views are also themselves enemies.

Correctly understanding these connections is absolutely essential for the correct combination of criticism and self-criticism, for waging inner-Party struggle and, in the case of notorious opportunists, for taking the necessary organizational measures.

All Mao Tse-tung's writings in Volume I, and not only those dealing specifically with questions of inner-Party struggle, provide evidence for the fact that Mao Tse-tung not only recognized the necessity, of, but also in fact led a struggle against erroneous and opportunist views, that he fought for the acceptance of the correct line. (+)

In his writing "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" written in 1929, Mao Tse-tung struggled against over-emphasizing the military viewpoint, against ultra-democracy, against disregarding organisational discipline (++) and against absolute equitarianism. He emphasized that subjectivism and individualism

(+) See Note 4: "On the Struggle Against Opportunist lines inside the C.P. of China in the Period covered by Volume I (1926-1937)", p.93

(++) However, it is also documented in Volume I that Mao Tse-tung under very specific conditions, was also prepared to consciously violate organizational discipline.

In his article "The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains", Mao Tse-tung reported about a decision of the Provincial Party Committee which changed its position with regard to the plan of action in the border area three times, and then finally commanded the Red Army to go on march. Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"These rigid directives put us in a real dilemma, because
(Continued on the next page)

as well as remnants of putschism have to be eliminated if one really wishes to improve Party work.

Specially against those, who, like the Party of Labour of Albania, accuse Mao Tse-tung of having replaced the hegemony of the proletariat by the hegemony of the peasantry, it must be emphasized that Mao Tse-tung stressed in this essay that the underlying social basis for the deviation mentioned above were the immense masses of petty bourgeoisie in China, the "handicraft and small peasant economy" (Ibid, p.111). He characterized and fought the emerging deviations as an expression of the petty-bourgeois, individualistic mentality. (Ibid, pp.110, 112)

Here it becomes clear that Mao Tse-tung, in the interest of realizing the hegemony of the proletariat over the peasantry, had waged and had to wage a gigantic struggle against the ideology of the peasantry originating from their social situation. This ideological educational work with regard to the peasants by Mao Tse-tung and by the Party and by the Army led by him, reflected itself in the Party and the army. For, the eradication of petty-bourgeois thinking firstly in the Party and the army was the prerequisite for being able to educate the masses of the peasants.

Another specially striking feature of the essay "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" is the detailed exposition concerning the methods of rectification. Mao Tse-tung thus not only exposed the mistakes, but also showed the method of overcoming them.

Let us take, for example, the chapter "On Ultra-Democracy". Here Mao Tse-tung showed that in the application of democratic centralism in the Party it cannot be a question of ordering this. Rather, it is a constant process, in whose course a central authority based on the trust of the cadres is built up, confirmed and renewed.

(Footnote continued from last page)

failure to comply would be tantamount to disobedience, while compliance would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, the Army Committee, the Border Area Special Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party met in a joint session and decided against carrying out the Provincial Committee's instructions, as it was considered dangerous to move towards southern Hunan."
(Ibid, p.100)

Here it becomes clear that Mao Tse-tung did not arbitrarily disobey the directive. In this decision he based himself on a joint consultation of as many comrades as possible, familiar with the concrete situation, substantiated his steps and was thus later able to account for this behaviour with relation to the Central Committee.

Mao Tse-tung emphasized:

"In the sphere of organization, ensure democracy under centralized guidance. It should be done on the following lines:

(1) The leading bodies of the Party must give a correct line of guidance and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish themselves as centres of leadership.

(2) The higher bodies must be familiar with the life of the masses and with the situation in the lower bodies so as to have an objective basis for correct guidance.

(3) No Party organization at any level should make any casual decisions in solving problems. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly carried out.

(4) All decisions of any importance made by the Party's higher bodies must be promptly transmitted to the lower bodies and the Party rank and file. The method is to call meetings of activists or general membership meetings of the Party branches or even of the columns (when circumstances permit) and to assign people to make reports at such meetings.

(5) The lower bodies of the Party rank and file must discuss the higher bodies' directives in detail in order to understand their meaning thoroughly and decide on the methods of carrying them out."

(Ibid, p.109)

In our opinion, these instructions contain a wealth of Marxist-Leninist teachings on Party building. Based on Lenin's and Stalin's teachings (See for example Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", chapter "The Party", 1924, Works 6, pp.175ff), Mao Tse-tung very concretely laid down how democratic centralism can be created in the Party, and how it must be carried out in the further life of the Party.

The first point says, the leading bodies of the Party cannot as such lay claim to leadership. On the contrary, they have to find really convincing solutions in theory and practice for problems that arise, and have to thus attain leadership. For it is clear that only this can create confidence in the leadership qualities of the leading bodies.

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung emphasized in the second point that the Party leadership can find a solution for the problems at the base only if it knows this reality, if it has familiarized itself with the situation and has made a concrete study of the problems, because otherwise it must come to incorrect conclusions.

This question is also touched upon in the third point, which emphasizes that no hasty decisions should be made. However, once resolutions have been formulated after thorough discussion and consideration, they also have to be strictly carried out in a correct atmosphere of democratic centralism.

Finally, the fourth and fifth point clarify that for strict execution conscious discipline is required i.e., execution based

on an exact understanding of resolutions of the central authority; on the fact that they have been discussed. Only when - and we specially underline this aspect - the directions of the leading bodies have been "discussed in detail in order to understand their meaning thoroughly", every Party cell can decide the methods of carrying them out.

In the next chapter "On the Disregard of Organizational Discipline" Mao Tse-tung emphasized above all the necessary organizational discipline of the various Party organizations, i.e., the submission of minority to majority, the necessity of sincerely carrying out a decision taken after a discussion. Mao Tse-tung fought against individualism, a characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie. He fought against the attitude of not really devoting oneself to the cause of the proletariat, as minority not to carry out sincerely the decisions of the majority, but to sabotage them grumblingly, not to concentrate inner-Party criticism on the solution of the problems and the further advancement of the Party and the revolution, but to give it the character of petty-bourgeois quarrels, of mutual disparagement, of personal attacks, and of giving prominence to one's own person.

The method of correcting these mistakes, Mao Tse-tung said,

"is to help Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity in order to achieve victory in the class struggle and that it should not be used as a means of personal attack."

(Ibid, p.110)

For us of almost equal importance - especially in today's discussion on Mao Tse-tung's role, on the Party of Labour of Albania, in short on almost all essential questions - seems to be the aspect:

"statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre on politics."

(Ibid, p.112)

This means that in all discussions and debates one must work with proofs, one must use Marxist-Leninist methods. If one only throws open to discussion opinions, subjectivist views, rough estimations and such things, it does not lead to any advancement at all. On the contrary, it sabotages the ideological debate and merely augments the confusion.



NOTES

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1. The Use of the Term "National Bourgeoisie"

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It is very evident that the use of the term "national bourgeoisie" in Stalin's writings before and immediately after 1927 is not from the beginning identical with Mao Tse-tung's definition of the "national bourgeoisie", who essentially equated it with the "middle bourgeoisie". (See "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, SW I, p.13)

Initially Stalin does not understand the term "national" either in a positive or in a negative sense, but uses the term "national bourgeoisie" simply for a l l elements and sections of the bourgeoisie of one country. By the "national bourgeoisie" of China, Stalin first of all meant the bourgeoisie of this country in its entirety (See "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East", 1925, Works 7, pp.146,147).

Two years later, in 1927, shortly before the putsch of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, Stalin speaks of the national bourgeoisie in a general sense, whereby he regards Chiang Kai-shek as belonging to the national bourgeoisie. But at the same time he says that "the national bourgeoisie (not the compradors) sided with the revolution." (See "Questions of the Chinese Revolution", Works 9, p.250)

At this point, it becomes evident that for political reasons it had already become necessary to separate, terminologically, from the entire bourgeoisie a certain section, namely, the compradors. (+) Stalin made a similar distinction in "Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University", where he talks about the "national bourgeoisie of the non-comprador type" (Ibid, Works 9, p.250).

(+) That the bourgeoisie in the colonial and dependent countries is subject to a process of development and differentiation is put clear by Stalin in his writing "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East". Here Stalin clears up that one can no longer speak of a "single and all-embracing colonial East" and points out three categories of colonial and dependent countries. In this context he deals with the bourgeoisie in the various countries and explains that distinctions have to be made. In "countries like Morocco" the bourgeoisie has not yet split into a "revolutionary party and a compromising party". In countries like Egypt and China this split has already taken place, but "the compromising section of the bourgeoisie has already managed, in the main, to strike a deal with imperialism". (See Works 7, pp.148-150)

Such a differentiation became necessary because in the course of the Chinese revolution the division of the bourgeoisie into different sections became increasingly deeper because of the increased economic penetration of imperialism on the one hand, and because of the growth in the revolutionary forces on the other.

In connection with this development the term "national" was no longer used for simply characterizing the entire bourgeoisie of a country, but also to characterize a section of the bourgeoisie, in whose case the possibility of becoming a coalition partner in the democratic revolution existed under certain circumstances, even if this possibility could not be realized at all times, but only then and there, when and where the national aspect of the democratic revolution was predominant.

In its 1928 theses "On the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies", the Comintern has used the term "national bourgeoisie" in a double sense. Firstly as a collective term for the bourgeoisie of such countries as India, China etc. Thus it says:

"The national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries do not adopt a uniform attitude to imperialism. One part of the bourgeoisie, more especially the commercial bourgeoisie serves directly the interests of the imperialist capital (the so-called comprador bourgeoisie)...The other part of the native bourgeoisie, especially those representing the interests of the native industry, support the national movement. They represent a vacillating current, inclined to compromises and may be called national reformism."

(Quoted from "Leninism", No.VI "The National and Colonial Question", Moscow, 1935, p. 103 - Translated from the German edition)

Little later, however, the term "national bourgeoisie" is used with relation to that section of the native bourgeoisie, which is not comprador bourgeoisie. Thus it is stated:

"The independence of the country from imperialism;... also corresponds to the interests of the national bourgeoisie... Here we have a basic objective opposition of interests between the national bourgeoisie of the colonial country and imperialism."
(Ibid)

This double use of the term "national bourgeoisie" does not present any problem at all if - as in the passage quoted above - what is meant becomes clear from the respective context.

In the various brochures from the Soviet Union on the Chinese revolution the term "national bourgeoisie" came to be used in the sense as defined by Mao Tse-tung. (See for this P.Judin, "The First Volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" in "Neue Welt", 1952, Verlag "Tägliche Rundschau", Berlin, p.2336; V.Nikoforov, G.Erenburg, M.Jurev, "The People's Revolution in China - An Outline History of the Struggle and Victory of the Chinese People", Moscow 1950, p.9 - German edition; Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of Economy "Text book of

Political Economy - Part II", p.667 - German edition) (+)

It becomes clear that at times there existed differences between Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and the Comintern in the use of the term "national bourgeoisie". But these are not cases of contradictions in the political line, or an expression of irreconcilable differences.

For a further discussion on this complex of questions it is basically necessary, in our opinion, to comprehend the development of terms in the context of the real development of life, to see the terms in their changed meanings, in the context of the respective theme dealt with. Only in this way is it possible to gain a real understanding of the question and not to remain stuck in useless discussions of terminology.

In this connection, we point out a problem which emerges out of studying Mao Tse-tung's diverse positions on the question of the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie respectively. Mao Tse-tung treated the national bourgeoisie as one class and made a clear distinction between it and the comprador bourgeoisie as another class. (See for example "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1928, SW I, pp.13,14) In connection with Mao Tse-tung's writings after 1949 the question arises whether it was justified at long date not to regard the bourgeoisie in its entirety as one single class with all its counter-revolutionary qualities.

This aspect naturally does not play a directly decisive role in the democratic stage of the revolution; however, it becomes very significant in the question of the transition to socialist revolution and while building socialism. In this connection, it is essential to gain clarity about the fact that even that section of the Chinese bourgeoisie, defined as the "national bourgeoisie" by Mao Tse-tung is just as much as the comprador bourgeoisie part of the international bourgeois class, of the international bourgeoisie.

This question must be taken up again while discussing the role granted to their "national bourgeoisie" by the C.P. of China and Mao Tse-tung while building socialism, while discussing the line taken towards it.



(+) The last two texts have been reprinted in the series "Theory and Practise of Marxism-Leninism" by the Marxist-Leninist Study Circle of the MLPA in No. 1/1981.

2. On the Question of the Causes for the Defeat of the Chinese Revolution in 1927

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Till today, the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927 is used more than any other theme by the ideologues and demagogues of the bourgeoisie to manufacture the most fierce contradictions between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin. Even somebody like Edgar Snow, considered in whole China to be a friend of the Chinese revolution, gets excited on this point and accuses Stalin of being responsible for the defeat in 1927. (See "Red Star over China", Victor Gollancz Ltd, London 1968, pp.420,423,424)

In analysing Stalin's statements about causes and estimation of the defeat in 1927 it is first of all necessary to understand clearly that his polemics were directed against a very definite position of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc unfolded massive propaganda against Stalin and the Comintern. They averred, if at all it comes to a defeat of the revolution, then the subjective factor necessarily bears the blame. In the case of the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927 this was the Comintern. This is the position Stalin fought against. Contrarily, he emphasized, by no means such a general thesis can be set up, and in the specific case of China in 1927 it also does not hold true.

Giving the example of the defeat of the revolution in 1905 in Russia, Stalin proves it was not Lenin's line, thus not the subjective factor which was responsible, but "the correlation of the class forces" (See "Notes on Contemporary Themes", 1927, Works 9, pp.349-351; "Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B)", 1927, Works 10, p.9, pp.32-38)

On the causes of the defeat in 1927 in China, Stalin writes that:

"at the present stage the feudal landlords and imperialists in China have proved to be stronger than the revolution, that the pressure exercised by these hostile forces has induced the Wuhan Kuomintang to swing to the Right and has led to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution." ("Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B)", 1927, Works 10, p.33)

Elsewhere Stalin emphasizes:

"A correct policy is by no means bound to lead always and without fail to direct victory over the enemy. Direct victory over the enemy is not determined by correct policy alone; it is determined first and foremost by the correlation of class forces, by a marked preponderance of strength on the side of the revolution, by disintegration in the enemy's camp, by a favourable international situation." ("Notes on Contemporary Themes", 1927, Works 9, p.351)

In various passages of Volume I (+) Mao Tse-tung expressed himself on the question of the defeat in 1927. So it is said for example:

"However, this revolutionary war failed at the critical juncture, first of all because the big bourgeoisie turned traitor, and at the same time because the opportunists within the revolutionary ranks voluntarily surrendered the leadership of the revolution."
("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 1936, SW I, p.192)

In this passage Mao Tse-tung laid the main emphasis on the betrayal by the big bourgeoisie, but at the same time he also named the C.P. of China's errors as a secondary fact.

In our opinion Mao Tse-tung's position in 1935 contradicts this. There he said:

"The revolution failed in 1927 chiefly because, with the opportunist line then prevailing in the Communist Party, no effort was made to expand our own ranks (the workers' and peasants' movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party), and exclusive reliance was placed on a temporary ally, the Kuomintang. The result was that when imperialism ordered its lackeys, the landlord and comprador classes, to spread their numerous tentacles and draw over first Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei, the revolution suffered defeat."
("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SWI, p.166)

We wish to emphasize immediately that it is naturally undisputed that the C.P. of China - as Stalin said - committed "in this period a number of grave errors" (Stalin, "Note on Contemporary Themes", 1927, Works 9, p.349) and this was largely responsible for the sc ale of the defeat. At the same time we also wish to emphasize the full right of a Communist Party leader to aim at errors in the own ranks in the face of the defeat of a revolution. But we still do not agree with naming the subjective factor as the main cause for the defeat in 1927. In our opinion, this defeat - even if its consequences could have been moderated by a correct line of the C.P. of China - was unavoidable in the face of the correlation of class forces. Hereby is also to be emphasized the temporary character of the defeat, comparable with the defeat of the revolution in Russia in 1905.

We find correct the causes and conditions of the defeat as set forth in the "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party" of 1945, where it is said:

(+) See: "Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?", 1928, SW I, p.64; "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", 1937, SW I, p.273.

"Nevertheless, the revolution ended in defeat because the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang, then our ally, betrayed it in 1927; because the combined force of that clique and the imperialists was very strong; and particularly because in the concluding period of the revolution (about six months) the Right viewpoint in our Party, with Ch'en Tu-hsiu as its exponent, developed into a line of capitulation, and the Party's leading body, in thrall to this view, refused to carry out the wise directives of the Communist International and Comrade Stalin on the one hand and rejected the correct proposals of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades on the other, with the result that when the Kuomintang turned against the revolution and launched an assault on the people, our Party and the people failed to organise an effective resistance."
(Mao Tse-tung, "Our Study and the Current Situation", Appendix "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of our Party", Peking 1955, pp.23,24)

At this point it should also be pointed out that Mao Tse-tung in his essay "On Practice" deals with the relationship between the line and its results. He wrote:

"If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success."
("On Practice", 1937, SW I, pp.296,297)

This statement is fully correct philosophically and in a world historical sense. It still must be emphasized once again in the context of the discussion on the causes of the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927 that defeats of the revolution need not necessarily be caused by an incorrect line of the Communist party. Later, in 1963, in the scope of the discussion within the C.P. of China on the "Great leap forward", Mao Tse-tung cleared this up completely. In his Essay "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?" he explained:

"Generally speaking, those that succeed are correct and those that fail are incorrect, and this is especially true of man's struggle with nature. In social struggle, the forces representing the advanced class sometimes suffer defeat not because their ideas are incorrect but because, in the balance of forces engaged in struggle, they are not as powerful for the time being as the forces of reaction; they are therefore temporarily defeated, but they are bound to triumph sooner or later."
("Where do Correct Ideas come from?", May 1963. in: Mao Tse-tung, "Five Essays on Philosophy", Peking 1977, p.156)



3. Enver Hoxha's Criticism of Passages from Volume I of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung does not have a Marxist-Leninist Basis

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In his book "Imperialism and the Revolution" E.Hoxha has brought forward 32 criticisms in all, where he directly attacks passages from Mao Tse-tung's works. From Volume I Enver Hoxha has quoted and criticized directly only two passages which we now shall deal with. In both cases the criticisms are wrong on all accounts and express nothing but Enver Hoxha's own completely incorrect views.

a) Enver Hoxha claims Mao Tse-tung replaced the hegemony of the proletariat by the hegemony of the peasantry

In his book "Imperialism and the Revolution", Enver Hoxha states:

"Mao Tse-tung did not recognize the hegemonic role of the proletariat".

(Enver Hoxha, "Imperialism and the Revolution", Tirana, 1979, p.420)

As "Evidence" he bases himself on a passage in Volume I and writes:

"Mao expressed this idea also when he wrote about the role of the peasantry in the state. He has said that all other political parties and forces must submit to the peasantry and its views.

'Millions of peasants will rise like a mighty storm, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back...They will put to the test every revolutionary party and group, every revolutionary, so that they either accept their views or reject them.'

That means that in Mao's opinion the peasantry has to hold the hegemony in the revolution and not the proletariat."

(Ibid, p. 421)

This is a crass case of non-serious argumentation and baseless imputation. It must become evident to anyone who analyses Mao Tse-tung's line even a little seriously and does not engage in frenzied attempts to demonstrate Mao Tse-tung's revisionism only to please his prejudices.

Concretely with regard to the quoted passage, it is taken from the article "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" from 1927. In this writing, Mao Tse-tung aimed at defeating Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism. Chen Tu-hsiu, frightened by the reactionary trend in the Kuomintang, did not dare support the great revolutionary struggles of the peasants which had erupted or were erupting, in order to thus appease the Kuomintang.

The quote referred to by Enver Hoxha runs unmutilated in the original as follows:

"In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves. Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their way and oppose them? Every Chinese is free to choose, but events will force you to make the choice quickly."

("Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", 1927, SW I, pp.23,24)

Firstly, it is obvious that there is nothing wrong in this quotation. Corresponding with the facts, Mao Tse-tung clears up the rise of a tremendous revolutionary peasant movement in China and the necessity to express an opinion on it.

In order to prove with this quotation that Mao Tse-tung committed mistakes regarding the hegemony of the proletariat, it is necessary to manipulate, i.e., it is necessary to hush up entire sentences by Mao Tse-tung. Enver Hoxha uses just this method. Thus, he claims, here Mao Tse-tung is talking about the role of the peasantry in power, which itself is not true. He further claims, Mao Tse-tung demands all parties must submit to the peasants and their views. This is just not true at all. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung points out three possible ways of behaving towards the peasants, and in further course of the article he propagates clearly the first way, namely, the hegemony of the proletariat and the Communist Party over the peasantry (See *ibid* p.31). Enver Hoxha simply erases this basic concept of Mao Tse-tung.

Enver Hoxha's criticism of Mao Tse-tung in the question of proletarian hegemony is thus absolutely non-serious, it is nothing but a direct falsification of Mao Tse-tung's positions. One can prove this not only by a more exact consideration of the passage from Volume I quoted by Enver Hoxha. Entire Volume I - as we have already shown - is marked by Mao Tse-tung's defence and propagation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the leadership of the proletariat. Furthermore, this criticism by Enver Hoxha shows his own astonishing ignorance of the role of the peasantry in the democratic revolution.

b) Enver Hoxha claims Mao Tse-tung held the view that the bourgeois-democratic revolution need not pass into the socialist revolution

The second passage quoted by Enver Hoxha from Volume I pertains to the question of the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution.

Enver Hoxha "quotes" Mao Tse-tung in a way that can only be characterized as a crude falsification. He claims:

"Mao Tse-tung was never able to understand and explain correctly the close links between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution. Contrary to the Marxist-Leninist theory, which has proved scientifically that there is no Chinese wall between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, that these two revolutions do not have to be divided from each other by a long period of time, Mao Tse-tung asserted:

'The transformation of our revolution into socialist revolution is a matter of the future... As to when the transition will take place...it may take quite a long time. We should not hold forth about this transition until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present and until it is advantageous and not detrimental to the overwhelming majority of our people'.

Mao Tse-tung adhered to this anti-Marxist view, which does not stand for the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution during the entire period of the revolution, indeed even after the liberation."

(Enver Hoxha, "Imperialism and the Revolution" p. 421)

In reality, Mao Tse-tung says in the passage quoted by Enver Hoxha:

"The change in the revolution will come later. In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. As to when the transition will take place, that will depend on the presence of the necessary conditions, and it may take quite a long time. We should not lightly hold forth about transition until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present and until it is advantageous and not detrimental to the overwhelming majority of the people throughout China."

(Mao Tse-tung, "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", 1935, SW I, p.198 - translated from German edition)

Enver Hoxha has again erased from the quotation anything which would give his contention the lie. He tries to present things in such a manner as if Mao Tse-tung never made any propaganda for socialism in the period of the democratic stage of the revolution. However, as we have shown elsewhere, this is completely contrary to the facts. In order to substantiate his claim, Enver Hoxha is forced to resort to methods corresponding to the machinations of bourgeois journalists.

In the quotation used by him, Enver Hoxha leaves out the sentence where Mao Tse-tung states clearly "the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution", as well as the word "lightly". (★) Thus, for the reader of "Imperialism and the Revolution" who does not check this quotation in Mao Tse-tung's works, matters present themselves in such a way as if Mao Tse-tung had claimed one should not at all talk about the transition to the socialist revolution, furthermore, as if Mao Tse-tung was against this transition in principle.

(*) Footnote on the next page

Apart from that, Enver Hoxha completely ignores the nature of the deviations Mao Tse-tung had to struggle against in the period of the anti-Japanese national war, namely, against the Trotskyist thesis that the democratic revolution had already been completed in 1927 and that one should now start fighting for the socialist revolution.

It is also a falsification when Enver Hoxha claims Marxist-Leninist theory demands that a considerable period of time should be allowed to pass between the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist stage of the revolution. Such a claim is a crude simplification of Marxism-Leninism. It is really not at all a question whether a longer or shorter time-period lies between the two stages of the revolution (this naturally varies according to the respective conditions). Rather, it is a question whether there should be a t r a n s i t i o n from the one into the other w i t h o u t an intervening capitalist social order.

Mao Tse-tung fully correctly cleared up elsewhere, in China the bourgeois-democratic revolution still would have to be carried out for a long period of time and even the victory over the Japanese did not signify the end of this stage of the revolution. The task of smashing the other sections of the comprador bourgeoisie, the influence of the feudal lords and the big landlords still remained.



Footnote from the last page

(+) The English edition of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Volume I, p.170, Peking 1967) falsifies Mao Tse-tung's concept in the same manner as Enver Hoxha on the Albanian edition referred to by him. It omits the word "lightly". As opposed to this the German translation as well as the French (Oeuvres Choisies de Mao Tse-tung, Tome I, p.188, Peking 1967) and the Spanish (Obras Escogidas de Mao Tse-tung, Tomo I, p.183, Peking 1976) ones are fully correct and contain the word "lightly" in correspondence with the Chinese original as checked by us.

4. On the Struggle Against the Opportunist Lines inside the C.P. of China in the Period covered by Volume I (1926-1937)

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Without having studied the question of the development and temporary prevalence of wrong lines inside the C.P. of China with the required thoroughness and intensity we would still like to present a few comments drawn chiefly from Volume I (See notes 4, 5, 6, pp. 249ff) and the "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of our Party" published in 1945.

In the period covered by Volume I Mao Tse-tung chiefly struggled against the following three lines:

★ The first was the Right opportunist line under Chen Tu-hsiu's leadership, who was for some time General Secretary of the C.P. of China. He held the view that because the Chinese revolution in that stage was a bourgeois-democratic revolution it can only lead to the establishment of a bourgeois republic. Consequently, it must stand under bourgeois leadership and not under proletarian leadership. However, Chen Tu-hsiu not only wrongly estimated the role of the proletariat in the democratic revolution, but also the significant role of the peasantry. After the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927 he held the view, the establishment of the reactionary government under Chiang Kai-shek signified the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. According to him, now the proletariat had to restrict itself to legal struggle, wait until capitalism had been developed and only then carry out the socialist revolution. Chen Tu-hsiu, who formed an anti-Party group with the Trotskyites, was expelled from the C.P. of China in November 1929.

★ The second important struggle inside the C.P. of China took place against the "Left" opportunist line of Li Li-san, who stood at the head of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China (+). His views were above all characterized by the fact that he did not recognize the uneven development of the revolution, but proceeded from the fact that the revolutionary crisis matures simultaneously in all areas of China. In his opinion, preparations were to be made for immediate insurrections in all parts of the country, whereby the emphasis was to be laid on insurrections in the big cities. So he opposed Mao Tse-tung's position of creating rural base areas. Li Li-san further proceeded from the premise that the Chinese revolution must necessarily lead to the general outbreak of world revolution and could successfully be carried out only under this condition. In September 1930, Li Li-san relinquished his leading post in the Central Committee after he had realized the mistakes in his views.

★ A further wrong line, which in distinction to the ones mentioned above, dominated for a long time in the C.P. of China, namely, from 1931 to 1934, was represented by Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu). This line was similar to Li Li-san's line, even if its exponents apparently took a very firm stand against it. In order to conceal the similarly "Left" opportunist character of the wrong views of Wang Ming and his followers, they criticized Li Li-san's line as being "Right" opportunist and propagated that the main danger then existing in the Party was "Right opportunism". From the "Resolution on some Questions in the History of our Party" from 1945, which in detail deals with the "left" deviations inside the C.P. of China, one can gather that Wang Ming's positions were primarily characterized by his exaggeration of the weight of capitalism in Chinese economy. Proceeding from that, he overestimated the immediacy of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and rich peasants. He proceeded from the fact that the intermediate classes were the most dangerous enemies of the Chinese revolution and pursued a corresponding policy. The so-called socialist elements in the democratic revolution in China were exaggerated by him. Furthermore he and his followers presupposed a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary upsurge in entire China without taking the unevenness of the development into consideration, and propagated an offensive line for entire China, i.e., the capture of the biggest cities by the Red Army, the arming of workers and peasants in the entire country, the organization of general strikes in all factories in the White areas etc. This wrong line was finally defeated and Mao Tse-tung was elected at the head of the Central Committee at the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935.



(+) from June to September 1930

MAO TSE-TUNG'S WRITINGS BETWEEN 1950 - 1976
AND THE SO-CALLED "VOLUME V"

INTRODUCTION
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While trying to make a comprehensive evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's writings after the victory of the democratic stage of the revolution in 1949, of his work after 1949 up to his death, one encounters great difficulties which partly cannot be overcome in the near future.

"Seek truth from facts" and "without investigation there is no right to speak" - these were very correct basic theses of Mao Tse-tung in the struggle against empty talk, rumor-mongering and subjectivism.

For our task of investigating Mao Tse-tung's writings and work after 1949 and, while seeking the truth about this period we are confronted by the following problems:

- ★ There exist very, very few authorized writings of Mao Tse-tung on this period.
- ★ There exist very few exact analyses of the total development in China after 1949 which render possible an exact estimation of the concrete historical and political background.
- ★ There exist very few documents on the inner-Party struggle and on Mao Tse-tung's exact position in this struggle, specially in the period after 1970.

After Mao Tse-tung's death the new revisionist leadership of the C.P. of China announced the publication of all Mao Tse-tung's writings and promised the speedy publication of Volumes V and VI of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung".

In fact Volume V of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" was speedily presented, while Volume VI was not mentioned any more at all. Similarly, there was no talk any more of a complete edition. One can say with almost complete certainty that even a revisionist adaptation will not be published in the near future.

Our attitude to "Volume V" (+) published by the Hua-Teng revisionists is as follows:

(+) "Volume V" has been published by a Committee of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China, which is responsible for the selection, a foreword as well as a series of notes. Besides the official responsibility, there definitely

Footnote continued on next page

We accept unconditionally as authentic only those writings which were published during Mao Tse-tung's lifetime. This is so in the case of the following basic writings:

- ★ "On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture", 1955, ("Volume V", pp.184-207)
- ★ "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People", 1957 ("Volume V", pp.384-421)
- ★ "Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work", 1957 ("Volume V", pp.422-435)

These authorized writings contain the basic problems as well as our main criticism of Mao Tse-tung in the period of 1957 (chiefly his conception of an alliance in the political sphere with the national bourgeoisie for the construction of socialism).

Therefore in our criticism of Mao Tse-tung we shall concentrate on these three writings. (+)

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exists the possibility of an unofficial responsibility of the Committee (which represents in toto the revisionist line of Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping) for the falsification of Mao Tse-tung's speeches and writings. It would be totally naive to exclude such a possibility. The committee itself wrote with reference to those speeches, which had not been published till then:

"Some necessary technical editing of the records of the speeches was done in the course of compilation."
(Publication Note, 1977, "Volume V", p.6)

Today it is obvious, when these people say "technical", it should actually stand "bourgeois-revisionist". It is equally illuminating to see which authentic articles of Mao Tse-tung the Committee of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China did not include in "Volume V" brought out by it, namely:

- ★ "The Greatest Friendship" of March 1953, published in "People's China" of March 16, 1953. This article is an excellent address in memory of Stalin.
(See "Defend Stalin - Learn from Stalin", 1980, GDS No.8, p.48)
- ★ "Mao Tse-tung and Stalin Exchange Greetings on the Anniversary of the Victory over Japan" of September 1951, published in "People's China" of September 16, 1951
- ★ "To G.M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Soviet Aid to China", published in "People's China" of October 1, 1953

(+) Besides these, there are a few other articles included in "Volume V", which had already been published in 1950, 1951, 1954 and 1956 in "People's China" in English. These are:

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We shall deal very cautiously with the other writings in "Volume V" (+), i.e., we shall cite those passages from this volume which seem to us to be correct, even if they are not authorized, since we do not assume that the Teng-Hua revisionists alter Mao Tse-tung in a Marxist-Leninist sense. We shall certainly refute those passages, which seem to us to be wrong and Right opportunist, but we shall not use these passages to pass judgement on Mao Tse-tung, because we always reckon with a falsification by the editors of the Teng-Hua revisionists. (+ +)

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- ★ "Fight for a fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation's Financial and Economic Situation" of June 6, 1950 ("Volume V", pp.26 ff, published in "People's China" of July 1, 1950)
- ★ "Be a True Revolutionary" of June 23, 1950 ("Volume V", pp.37ff, published in "People's China" of July 1, 1950)
- ★ "Great Victories in Three Mass Movements" of October 23, 1951 ("Volume V", pp.59ff, published in "People's China" of November 1, 1951)
- ★ "Strive to Build a Great Socialist Country" of September 15, 1954 ("Volume V", pp.148ff, published in "People's China" of October 1, 1954)
- ★ "Prefaces to 'Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside'" of September and December 1955 ("Volume V", pp.235ff, published in "People's China" of February 1956)

These five articles (whose English translation has certainly got to be thoroughly compared once again with the German edition) can be regarded as originating from Mao Tse-tung's own hand. (The English edition of the article "Prefaces..." contains only excerpts from the German edition now available.)

None of these articles contain in any way new or essential aspects which have not been dealt with in the three basic articles.

(+) See also Note 2: "Enver Hoxha's Chief Attacks against Mao Tse-tung from 1950 to 1976", p. 231

(+ +) That such apprehensions are very well justified can be seen from the unscrupulous photo-faking undertaken by the Teng-Hua-clique. It is well known that immediately after Mao Tse-tung's burial the photos of this burial were crudely retouched so that the "Four", so disliked by them, now suddenly appeared only as bushes or empty spots, i.e., they were transformed into non-existing persons.

All the same these passages have to be criticized because they exert an ideological influence. Not seldom they are expressly evaluated as "correct", "deeply dialectical" etc. by those forces, who wish to defend "Mao Tse-tung Thought".

In general, however, we shall print all Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized quotes in small type and in two columns, in order to avoid any mixing up of these writings with the authorized ones.

There exists a further category of Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized writings. These are volumes published by the Western bourgeoisie and supposedly contain texts by Mao Tse-tung, about whose authenticity, however, we can hardly vouch for. Titles like "Mao Intern" and "We Do Things Differently From Moscow" (title of the German version of "A Critique of Soviet Economic" - translator's note) show the aims of the publishers, namely, to fish in troubled waters and create confusion.

Specially the book "A Critique of Soviet Economics", ostensibly containing Mao Tse-tung's notes while studying Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R" (!) and the "Textbook of Soviet Economy", published in 1960, is recently being used by the forces mentioned above (for example by the R.C.P. U.S.A.) to play up Mao Tse-tung against Stalin in a massive way, to blot out the difference between Stalin and the Khrushchov revisionists and to distort Marxism-Leninism in a shabby way.

It is certainly no accident that precisely all the criticisms of Stalin attributed to Mao Tse-tung are not authorized. There can only be two reasons for this: Either Mao Tse-tung did not have any basic criticism against Stalin, or for some reason or the other, he was not convinced of the necessity of making a public criticism against Stalin.

The entire complex of questions appears to us to be of such great importance that in one note we would like to go into all the criticisms of Stalin attributed to Mao Tse-tung without of course, being able to answer the question whether such a criticism by Mao Tse-tung at all existed in this particular content and form, whether and to what extent it has been concocted etc.

Mao Tse-tung's speeches and writings from the period of the Cultural Revolution have been preserved mainly as fragments in form of quotes. They were never published in their entirety. So there exist many unfilled gaps that have always to be kept in mind. However, we can and must take up position on a series of central questions.

This is necessary because in the ideological struggle within the world communist movement this particular period in Mao Tse-tung's life and work plays a special role.

However, while estimating and analysing the given historical facts and investigating and evaluating those writings which with certainty originate from Mao Tse-tung (as well as in the position taken up on the writings attributed to him) it is not only, or, in essence, even primarily merely a matter of judging and evaluating Mao Tse-tung himself.

We are concerned with more, namely, with the basic questions of the world proletarian revolution and the cardinal question of establishing and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat against and over the class of the bourgeoisie and all its remnants on all fronts. After the degeneration of the socialist Soviet Union after Stalin's death, the transformation of revolutionary China into a bastion of counter-revolution meant a great world historical defeat, the significance of which has to be comprehensively analysed and understood.

Therefore, questions of the world proletarian revolution and the socialist revolution, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the attitude towards the bourgeoisie and towards bourgeois ideology in class struggle are the t h e m a t i c focus of the following analysis.



I. ASSESSMENT OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S FEW FRAGMENTARY POSITIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND RELATED QUESTIONS OF THE WORLD PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

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An examination of all available authorized (and also unauthorized) statements after 1949 up to 1976 by Mao Tse-tung pertaining to the world proletarian revolution and to problems of the international situation soon reveals that there is not a single comprehensive work or even a detailed article on this theme.

On the contrary, apart from isolated statements in the authorized writings of 1957, the brief calls in 1964/1965 and the call in 1970 on the occasion of U.S.-aggression against Kampuchea and isolated quotes published in the Party documents or in leading articles of the C.P. of China, there does not exist a n y statement which is more comprehensive. First of all, this shows that Mao Tse-tung cannot be regarded as being a "successor of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin", as the "fifth classic author", as the "leader of the world proletariat", who is obligated to take a comprehensive stand on the cardinal questions of the International Communist Movement and on the international situation.

To arrive at a real comprehensive assessment of Mao Tse-tung's views on the international situation, on cardinal questions of the world proletarian revolution, on schemes like the "Three World Theory" etc. is thus practically impossible in view of the little material available. We can only express, point by point, our opinion on Mao Tse-tung's various related statements.

1. Mao Tse-tung's Correct Points of Departure

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Mao Tse-tung emphasized in 1960 in talks with delegations from Latin America, Africa, Japan, Iran, Iraq and Cyprus that the people are the "decisive factor". (See "Comrade Mao Tse-tung on 'Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers'".- Peking Review May 17, 1960, p.6) As per reproduction of this talk, on the one hand special attention is paid to U.S.imperialism in the struggle against Krushchovian reconciliation with the U.S., but without any kind of "positive" assessment of the other imperialists.

It is said there:

"The imperialists have done every kind of evil and all the oppressed people of the whole world will never forgive them. To defeat the reactionary rule of imperialism...it is necessary to form a broad united front and unite all forces, excluding the enemy, that can be united with and continue to wage arduous struggles."

(Chairman Mao Tse-tung Talks with Guests from Asia, Africa and Latin America", Peking Review, May 17, 1960, p.7)

In our opinion, these statements of Mao Tse-tung of May/June 1960 rightly emphasized both the decisive role of the people as well as the necessity of the struggle against imperialism as a whole.

This attitude of Mao Tse-tung corresponds to the theses already laid down by him before 1949 in conformity with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It is well-known that Mao Tse-tung had unmistakably declared in such a central writing like "On New Democracy":

"In the international situation of today, the 'heroes' in the colonies and semi-colonies either line up on the imperialist front and become part of the forces of the world counter-revolution, or they line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of the forces of world revolution. They must do one or the other, for there is no third choice." (Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy", 1940, SW II, p.356)

About the idea cherished by the national (mainly the middle) bourgeoisie of various countries, not completely dependent on imperialism, to establish their own, really independent state, of taking, so to say, a "third road" between imperialism and socialism, Mao Tse-tung wrote in his essay "Analysis of Classes in the Chinese Society" of 1926:

"But its attempt to establish a state under the rule of the national bourgeoisie is quite impracticable, because the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle." (Mao Tse-tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", 1926, SW I, p.14. See also "On New Democracy", 1940, SW II, pp. 354, 355)

These are clear Marxist-Leninist positions which proceed from the fact that in the present era two great camps exist in the world.

However, the study of Mao Tse-tung's positions after 1949 shows that Mao Tse-tung evidently no longer adhered in a fully consequent way to this Marxist-Leninist approach.

2. Obscuration of the Terms "Peoples", "Countries", "States" and "Nations"

Initially, it was only a matter of using the term "countries" instead of "peoples". In itself this is not problematic, provided it is clear that "countries" on no account stands for the ruling class, its state apparatus, but by that is meant the masses of the people standing in antagonistic contradiction to it. It is precisely this clarity, which is increasingly lost in Mao Tse-tung's statements and calls between 1956 and 1964.

Already at the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China on September 15, 1956, shortly after the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., Mao Tse-tung declared in the (authorized) opening address:

"As a result of the unceasing efforts of the peace-loving countries and peoples, there has been a trend towards relaxation of tension in the international situation. To achieve a lasting peace in the world, we must further develop our friendship and co-operation with the fraternal countries in the camp of socialism and strengthen our solidarity with all peace-loving countries."

(Mao Tse-tung, "Opening Address at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", 1956, in: "Documents of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking 1956, pp.8,9)

Here, for the first time in an authorized article by Mao Tse-tung we find the terms "countries" and "peoples" placed side by side. Such a combination of both these terms (+) can only mean that the term "countries" includes more class forces than the term "people". And really Mao Tse-tung in fact meant the "governments", the "states" of these countries. This can be seen in the following passage from the speech already quoted above:

"We firmly support the entirely lawful action of the Government of Egypt in taking back the Suez Canal Company, and resolutely oppose any attempt to encroach on the sovereignty of Egypt and start armed intervention against that country." (Ibid, p.9)

(+) When Lenin and Stalin in various contexts spoke of the fundamental contradiction between "imperialism and oppressed countries", they were concerned with characterizing a national contradiction. It was certainly not their intention to represent the governments and states of these countries, who have a comprador character, to be adversaries of imperialism along with the peoples of these countries. Therefore, in Lenin's and Stalin's case we do not come across the enumeration "countries and peoples".

However, this resolute support of the "fully legal act of the Egyptian government" over looked one fact, which was absolutely essential precisely for the communists of this country. Nasser's government, sitting on the back of the Egyptian people, had carried out the nationalization of the Suez Canal as comprador of international imperialism. It did it to enhance its own specific importance by utilizing the rivalry between the U.S., English and French imperialists and not to pass it to the Egyptian people. (Naturally a powerful dose of nationalist demagoguery also played a role.)

Precisely the example of Egypt, where these make-believe "anti-imperialist" measures were directly bound up with increased repression of the revolutionary forces in the country, also shows that such measures of counter-revolutionary governments precisely serve the purpose of isolating the communists in the country. At the same time, such actions can only be understood if one considers that large-scale people's movements and the entire atmosphere in a country can produce certain measures of the ruling comprador class (which, however, do not touch the nerve-centre of the imperialist system of dependency).

Therefore, it is necessary to make a differential analysis in each single case. A summary and unqualified support of such ruling class actions (precisely if they fall in a time of massive activity by the masses of the people) in dependent countries like Egypt does harm to the necessary clarity regarding the nature of the particular regime demagogically pretending to be anti-imperialist!

In 1957, Mao Tse-tung stated in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People":

"To strengthen our solidarity with the Soviet Union, to strengthen our solidarity with all the socialist countries - this is our fundamental policy, this is where our basic interests lie. Then there are the Asian and African countries and all the peace-loving countries and peoples - we must strengthen and develop our solidarity with them. United with these two forces, we shall not stand alone. As for the imperialist countries, we should unite with their people and strive to coexist peacefully with those countries, do business with them and prevent a possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notions about them." (Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, "Volume V", p.421)

This is the last paragraph in this important speech of 1957. The first thing which strikes one is that as the fundamental policy here is not outlined the alliance with the proletariat of all countries, but only with the states of the socialist camp.

In the case of the imperialist states, a clear distinction is made between these states (the ruling exploiting classes) and the peoples in these countries! This is correct,

just as Mao Tse-tung's adjunct directed against one aspect of the "Three World Theory" that "under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notions" about the imperialist states.

However, the following passage appears to us to be problematic, even directly mistaken (in spite of the conscious distinction between peoples and states which follows):

"Then there are the Asian and African countries and all the peace-loving countries and peoples - we must strengthen and develop our solidarity with them." (Ibid, p.421)

Here antagonistic forces, namely, the peoples as well as the countries are expressly characterized as equally "peace-loving". And in connection with Asia and Africa only solidarity with "countries" is mentioned.

Here it is similar true: If one enumerates peoples and countries in one breath, then the term "countries" must evidently include more than "peoples". In the term "countries" is also evidently included its ruling class, its government and the state. And we are of the opinion that precisely this is a serious mistake. (+)

Similar mistakes can be found in other authorized statements by Mao Tse-tung.

(+) In our opinion, seen from the class viewpoint, placing the terms "peoples" and "nations" side by side, just as placing the terms "peoples" and "countries" side by side, includes the governments. In and by itself it is no problem at all to talk of the "struggle of the oppressed nations", if it is clear that the term "nation" is used in a narrow sense, if it is used to mean the masses of the people defending their national interests, and not the ruling comprador and landlord classes dependent on imperialism.

However, if one enumerates "peoples and nations" and does not make such a clarification, the question inevitably arises, which forces, besides the people are included in the term "nation". Inevitably one arrives at including the ruling classes of the oppressed nations too.

Precisely this mistake can be seen in Mao Tse-tung's call in August 1963 on the occasion of the struggle of the Vietnamese people:

"The oppressed people and oppressed nations must not entrust their liberation to the 'wisdom' of imperialism and its lackeys."

(Mao Tse-tung, "Statement Opposing Aggression Against Southern Vietnam and Slaughter of its People by the U.S.- Ngo Dinh Diem-clique", August 29, 1963, in the English compilation "Peoples of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Lackeys", Peking 1976, p.6)

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It is a fact that Mao Tse-tung's statements from 1963 to 1965 contain not only the call to the people of the countries oppressed by U.S. imperialism to unite, but also have the aim of unity with the countries concerned, i.e., with the states or governments.

Thus is said in the call of January 12, 1964 "Statement on the Chinese People's Firm Support of the Panamanian People's Just, Patriotic Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism":

"All countries that are subject to U.S. aggression, control, interference and bullying should unite."
(Peking Review, Jan. 17, 1964, p.5)

Similarly Mao Tse-tung said in the "Statement on the Chinese People's Support of the Japanese People's Great Patriotic Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism" of January 27, 1964:

"All peace-loving countries should unite, all countries and individuals, subject to U.S. imperialist aggression, control and bullying should unite and form a broad united front against U.S. imperialism."
(Peking Review, January 31, 1964, p.5) (+)

On May 12, 1965 Mao Tse-tung wrote a "Statement Supporting the Dominican People's Resistance Against U.S. Armed Aggression".

There it is stated:

"All peace-loving countries and all countries subjected to U.S. bullying, interference, control and aggression should unite, and form the broadest united front."
(Peking Review 20/1965, p.6)

If it is the case of "intervention" etc. by the U.S., against which the countries and the peoples should unite, then it is also not surprising to find calls to the directly imperialist states, the monopoly bourgeoisie to unite with the people.

This consequence was indirectly launched upon in a telegram six years later to "Madame de Gaulle", on November 11, 1970.

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(One also finds verbatim the same formulation - "oppressed people and nations of the world" - in the call to the Japanese people "Statement on the Chinese People's Support of the Japanese People's Great Patriotic Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism", January 27, 1964, Ibid, p.12)

(+)

One passage of the unauthorized writings even mentions "people and authorities" in one breath:

"The people are dissatisfied (with the U.S.A. - Authors' Note) and in

some countries so are the authorities. All oppressed nations want independence."

("U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger", 1956, "Volume V", p.308; see also "Volume V", p.314)

There it is said about De Gaulle, the head of the government of the French imperialist bourgeoisie, which is not only drenched in the blood of the Vietnamese and Algerian people, but also as a strengthened big imperialist power, which through its policies in its African colonies and its neo-colonial policies has committed and daily commits new crimes.

"I...pay sincere respects to him, a dauntless fighter against fascist aggression and for the defence of the national independence of France."
(Peking Review, N.46/1970, p.3)

This grossly wrong passage (which cannot be justified by any reasoning that this was "diplomacy", since totally incorrect political judgments are expressed in this telegram) naturally contains much more than mere personal appreciation of De Gaulle. It was evidently Mao Tse-tung's view that the imperialist bourgeoisie or its political representatives could play a basically positive role, that they defend "national" interests!! (As far as De Gaulle's role in London during World War II is concerned, we are sure that the communist partisans in France would never have agreed to this assessment of him as being a "dauntless fighter".)

What the imperialist bourgeoisie "dauntlessly" defends is in reality, naturally nothing but its own imperialist interests. In view of this, it can only be the task of the communists to utilize conflicting imperialist interests in certain phases, without contributing towards the strengthening of one or the other, and without having, leave alone propagating, any kind of illusions regarding the motives of the imperialists!

The passages by Mao Tse-tung named above, which in our opinion are absolutely wrong and contain an important element of the "Three World Theory", lump together the peoples and the exploiting classes ruling over them. It is evident that they can only be understood in view of the fact that all calls quoted above are directed solely against U.S. imperialism. In our opinion, this concentration on only one enemy (+) is an important root cause for the mistake exposed above. (++)

(+) We have expressed our view on this theme in greater detail in connection with our standpoint taken towards the National Congresses of the C.P. of China and the important press articles in Part V of the Polemic-Critique, i.e., "Forces of International Counter-Revolution", pp.24-31.

(++)

While examining the unauthorized statements on the international situation in "Volume V", we came across two passages, which have to be mentioned. In the essay "Some Experiences in Our Party's History" of September 25, 1956, it is said:

"U.S. imperialism is your (the peoples of Latin America - Authors' Note) adversary as well as ours and the adversary of the people

of the world... It is a global imperialism."
("Volume V", p.324)

First of all, the category "global imperialism" does not correspond to Marxist-Leninist terminology. Four months later in the "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees" of January 27, 1957 it is said:

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"The three kinds of forces are: one, the United States, the biggest imperialist power, two, Britain and France, second-rate imperialist powers, and three, the oppressed nations."
(*Volume V, p.362)

Here it is suggested England and France as a consequence of their weakening through World War II were not able to pursue big imperialist power poli-

tics even in 1957, which seems to us at this time to be doubtful in both cases. The underlying problem is that the C.P. of China on the whole did not - as Stalin did already in 1952 - emphasize that the big imperialist powers England, France, Japan and Germany, weakened or even severely weakened for a time, would once again, very soon stand up against the U.S.A. and carry out their big imperialist power politics.

In our opinion, Mao Tse-tung analysed fully correctly the situation of the big imperialist powers after World War II in the authorized essay: "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship":

"Three big imperialist powers were knocked out, while two others were weakened. In the whole world only one big imperialist power, the United States of America, remained uninjured. But the United States faced a grave domestic crisis."
(Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", 1949, Selected Works IV, p.414)

England and France are estimated here as being big imperialist powers, which, although weakened, still continue to exist and which cannot be put on the same level as Italy, Japan and Germany.

3. The False Scheme of the "Preponderance" of the Forces of Revolution on a World Scale

In 1957, Mao Tse-tung stated at a conference of the representatives of the Communist and Labour Parties of the socialist countries:

"I am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning-point... I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces."
(Quoted in: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung on 'Imperialism and all Reactionaries are Paper Tigers'", Peking Review No.37/1958, p.9)

Mao Tse-tung explained this connection to Chinese students in the Soviet Union in the following manner:

"The whole world now has a population of 2,700 million, of which the various socialist countries account for nearly 1,000 million, the independent, former colonial countries make up more than 700 million, and the countries now struggling for independence or for complete independence and capitalist countries with neutral tendencies have 600 million. The population of the imperialist camp is only about 400 million; moreover, they are divided internally. 'Earthquakes' may occur there. At present, it is not the West wind which is prevailing over the East wind, but the East wind that is prevailing over the West wind."
(Ibid, p.9)

In our opinion, these theses of Mao Tse-tung are wrong, even more the peculiar differentiation of the world population. To put forward the question of the "preponderance" of the forces of imperialism or those of socialism, immediately raises the question about the criteria according to which this "preponderance" should be measured. The second question definitely to be asked is: What are the consequences resulting from this determination? What sort of change does it have concerning the tasks of the Communist Parties?

Mao Tse-tung indirectly went into the first question, when he tipped the scales with the number of human beings not belonging to the "imperialist" camp". In our opinion, this is not a convincing criterion because, seen objectively, at any point of time the majority of the people of the world is against imperialism, even though imperialism can still be much more powerful.

Much more questionable is that Mao Tse-tung only spoke of "earthquakes" in the imperialist camp, by which he probably meant revolutions. Thereby, he evidently restricted the imperialist camp to the U.S.A. and Western Europe (400 million) and did not include the capitalist countries and the countries of the compradors and landlords, which, in reality, are dependent on imperialism. This is a very dangerous mistake, a bridge leading to the "Three World Theory".

But we are of the opinion that any enquiry regarding the "preponderance" of the forces on a world-scale is not at all meaningful, but dangerous. The world proletarian revolution must be advanced in every country and in every single country the correlation of forces must be concretely determined.

With the thesis of the international "preponderance of the socialist forces" the idea could be created that now the "principal aspect" has changed, i.e., a qualitative turning-point has taken place, for example that imperialist wars are no longer possible (Mao Tse-tung clearly struggled against such an interpretation in the same conference). Or, that one no longer lives in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, in the era of Leninism, but that a "completely new era" has begun (This interpretation was actually propagated in the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the C.P. of China) etc.

For all these reasons we do not agree with such an estimation.

From the context it is clear that Mao Tse-tung always thought that both possibilities were real: the possibility of the imperialist world war and the possibility of the prevention of the imperialist world war. Mao Tse-tung himself did not draw the conclusion that an imperialist world war was no longer possible.

Even if we emphasize this, it still does not alter our criticism in any way that both criteria as well as sense and purpose of the thesis of the "superiority" of the socialist over the capitalist forces appear to us to be very dangerous today (*), all the more so, since the C.P. of China later put forward the totally wrong thesis of a "completely new era".

4. Mao Tse-tung's Statements on a "New Era"

It is well-known that since the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee up to the Tenth National Congress of the C.P. of China, the C.P. of China propagated that Mao Tse-tung:

(*) It is well-known that directly after the October Revolution Lenin said, the forces of imperialism were far superior to those of the Soviet Union in a military sense. In this concrete military sense it may be possible, at a particular point of time, if the revolution has not been victorious in only one or two more countries, to speak of the military superiority of the socialist countries over the enemy camp. But even here one should pay attention to the concrete purpose of such statements. Lenin was concerned with heightening vigilance in face of manifest interventions and threats of intervention.

It doesn't have to be specifically emphasized that the natural historical superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system - in so far as it is realized in a consequent way - should not be confused with the question of the actual relation of forces at a given moment.

"has raised Marxism-Leninism to a completely new stage. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to worldwide victory."
("Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee", Peking Review No.34, 1966, p.8)

Very evidently there existed a debate within the C.P. of China - unfortunately not carried out in public - about whether there existed a "new era" from that time onwards, whether one could correctly talk of "Mao Tse-tung Thought", and how this "Thought" had to be defined.

In the analysis undertaken here, we cannot concern ourselves with an exposition of this very significant debate (+). Rather, we are concerned with bringing to light the extent to which Mao Tse-tung himself expressed his views on these questions and which of these statements were utilized or misused, in order to construct a "completely new era".

While analysing existing statements of Mao Tse-tung (recently the Teng-Hua-revisionists published a few further unauthorized statements of Mao Tse-tung in Peking Review N.9/1981 - interpreted in line with their interests - in which he is supposed to have spoken out against "Mao Tse-tung Thought") it should first be noted that the above definition of the "new era", of "Mao Tse-tung Thought" respectively is consciously linked verbatim with a passage from Volume IV of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works in which it is said:

"The epoch we are living in is an epoch in which the imperialist system is heading for total collapse, the imperialists have fallen inextricably into crisis and, no matter how they continue to oppose the Chinese people, the Chinese people will always have a way to win final victory."
(Mao Tse-tung, "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference", 1949, SW IV, p.407)

(+)

Though a complete analysis remains outstanding, we have already examined and evaluated preliminary material relating to the construction of a "completely new era", the "era of Mao Tse-tung Thought" in the documents of the C.P. of China, firstly in:

"Critique of Enver Hoxha's Book 'Imperialism and the Revolution'", Part 2, Chapter III - Joint Statement of "Rote Fahne", "Westberliner Kommunist" and "Gegen die Strömung" (Rote Fahne No.191, Westberliner Kommunist No.19, 'Gegen die Strömung' No.22)

and secondly in:

"The Forces and the Course of the World Proletarian Revolution", Critique of the "Polemics", Part IV, Note 3 "On the Era of Mao Tse-tung Thought" - Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of "Rote Fahne", "Westberliner Kommunist" and "Gegen die Strömung" (Rote Fahne No.183, Westberliner Kommunist No.13, Gegen die Strömung No.14)

There is no doubt that here Mao Tse-tung means the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, precisely the era which can be characterized as the era of Leninism.

Elsewhere Mao Tse-tung emphasized very clearly that we are living in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. Thus he said:

"Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution precisely because Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for their resolution."
(Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction", 1935, SW I, p.325)

After 1949 - in the sixties - there are, however, three passages, which do not clear up that we are still living in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, but which offer starting points for talking of a "new era".

The Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China, which also established in its statute "Mao Tse-tung Thought" as the theoretical base of the C.P. of China in the claimed "new era", quoted a statement of Mao Tse-tung from 1962:

"The next 50 to 100 years, beginning from now, will be a great era of radical change in the social system throughout the world, an earthshaking era without equal in any previous historical period. Living in such an era, we must be prepared to engage in great struggles which will have many features different in form from those of the past."
("Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", delivered by Lin Piao, Peking Review No.18/1969, p.35)

"Without equal in any previous historical period", "the next... beginning from now" - by these words, underlined by us, the way is clearly paved for the thesis of a "completely new era".

In reality, imperialism has opened up on a world scale the possibility of the world proletarian revolution, and in this era the October Revolution was already the direct beginning of the "great era of radical change in the social system".

Of course, we do not know the context in which Mao Tse-tung formulated the above quotations. However, we are of the opinion that this quotation constituted one of the main bridges for the construction of a "completely new era".

The characteristics ascribed to this "completely new era" in the documents of the C.P. of China were mainly as follows:

- ★ A "total collapse of imperialism" in the near future, in the next 50 to 100 years (calculated from 1962 onwards)
- ★ Increasing importance of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America as "focal points" of the world revolution, as "one aspect of the principal contradiction" in the world

- ★ Narrowing the target of the world revolution to increasingly few enemies, fundamentally only to the "super-imperialists", the "super-powers".

There is not a single writing of Mao Tse-tung, in which one can find such theses combined into a coherent theory.

However, among the few published quotations of Mao Tse-tung, there are still two further passages, which, in our opinion, have to be criticized and relativized.

The telegram sent to the Fifth Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania in 1966 by the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China, signed by Mao Tse-tung and read out by Kang Sheng, - shortly after the definition of the "completely new era", the "era of Mao Tse-tung Thought" - laid the main emphasis on the existence of a "new era" in which the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America "deal a decisive and crushing blow" to the entire old world.

It is said there:

"We are now in a great new era of world revolution. The revolutionary upheaval in Asia, Africa and Latin America is sure to deal the whole of the old world a decisive and crushing blow.
(+) The great victories of the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation are convincing proof of this. The proletariat and working people of Europe, North America and Oceania are experiencing a new awakening."
(Peking Review No.46/1966, p.5)

The telegram does not clearly explain what is actually meant by the "new great era".

(+) We have already pointed out very often that in the documents and articles of the C.P. of China a "principal contradiction in the world" between imperialism and the oppressed nations was constructed by Peng Chen and Lin Piao. (See for that Part IV "The Forces and the Course of the World Proletarian Revolution" of the Polemics-Critique, Note 4, "Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of 'Rote Fahne', 'Westberliner Kommunist' and 'Gegen die Strömung' - Rote Fahne No.183, Westberliner Kommunist No.13, Gegen die Strömung No.14, pp.66/68).

In the case of Mao Tse-tung we do not find such a pronounced schematisation. The talks of the delegation of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Austria indicate that Mao Tse-tung very strongly emphasized the role of the proletariat of the imperialist countries. (See Report of the Talk of the Delegation of the MLPA with Mao Tse-tung in the "Rote Fahne" No.11, 1964, p.19).

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However, it is certain that the press of the C.P. of China did not interpret this "new era" as being one phase within the era of imperialism and the world proletarian revolution, but in the sense of a new era. The salient feature of this "new era" was that now the peoples not of Europe and North America, but of Asia, Africa and Latin America were "dealing decisive and crushing blows" to imperialism. Of course, Mao Tse-tung cannot be held directly responsible for such an interpretation. However, in our opinion, Mao Tse-tung's statements give scope for the opportunist idea that it is not the alliance of the peoples of the oppressed nations with the working class of the imperialist countries which is the decisive means for attaining victory over world imperialism, but that one of the main forces, i.e., the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, would play the main role.

However, the telegram sent to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour shows that Mao Tse-tung did not ignore, but rather expressly emphasized the role of the proletariat in the imperialist countries.

Let us now consider another statement of Mao Tse-tung, published three years later, in 1969, in which only a new historical period was mentioned. In the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China, Mao Tse-tung was quoted as having said :

"A new historical period of opposing U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun."
("Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", delivered by Lin Biao, Peking Review No.18/1969, p.34)

Two things are striking in this passage. Firstly, the obviously new thing in the period just begun is evidently the struggle against Soviet revisionism. We find already underlying in this quotation the idea that earlier one had had to struggle only against U.S. imperialism, which in our opinion is wrong, since in principle the struggle has to be led against world imperialism.

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An unauthorized passage from an interview between Edgar Snow and Mao Tse-tung is interesting. There it is said:

"The question is whether the contradiction between neo-colonialism and the revolutionary forces in what the French like to call 'Third World' - the so-called underdeveloped or ex-colonial or still colonial nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America - is today the principal political

contradiction in the world?...

Mao Tse-tung said that he had not reached an opinion about that."

(Edgar Snow, "The Long Revolution", Hutchinson Press, London 1973, pp.200,201)

This interview took place on January 9, 1965 and was published in the U.S.A. and Western Europe with the permission of the Chinese authorities after an examination of the notes made by E. Snow and Chinese protocol writers.

Furthermore, in the quotation the foundation is already laid for that which later as the "first world" or as the "two superpowers" increasingly gave shape to the C.P. of China's line and influenced many important passages of the Ninth National Congress in a wrong direction: The absolutization of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the enemies, as the principle enemies of the peoples of the world, whereby other possible enemies were then elevated into potential alliance partners.

Summing up, we can say that till 1973 Mao Tse-tung had not waged any public struggle against the thesis of the "new era", the "era of Mao Tse-tung Thought".

Then, in 1973, at the Tenth National Congress, Chou En-lai indirectly quoted Mao Tse-tung in the Political Report of the Central Committee, as "always" having taught that our era was still determined by imperialism and the proletarian revolution and that Leninism was the "theoretical foundation" of the Party.

In our opinion, it is all the more important to adhere to this important view of Mao Tse-tung, because even today attempts are made to utilize the C.P. of China's errors in this question and also Mao Tse-tung's defective statements, which we have quoted above, in order to substantiate a revival of the thesis of the further development of Leninism into "Mao Tse-tung Thought".

However, a critical note should be made about the fact that Mao Tse-tung's correct statement at the Tenth National Congress that Leninism should be the theoretical foundation (See "The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Documents, 1973, p.25) was thrown overboard a few pages later by the Tenth National Congress itself by declaring the triad Marxism - Leninism - Mao Tse-tung Thought to be the theoretical foundation (Ibid. p.69). It becomes clear that often it is not at all sufficient to make a correct statement, but that it is necessary to harshly expose and criticize openly the Party's mistakes in public, because otherwise revisionist deviations which have been thrown out of the door will again make their way in through the windows.

5. Mao Tse-tung's Statements Which Fundamentally Contradict the "Three World Theory"

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A few months after the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China, one finds in the New Year article of "Renmin Ribao" of January 1, 1970, a statement by Mao Tse-tung, in which he interestingly polemicised a g a i n s t the concentration on only the two imperialist powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union as being the sources of a war of aggression. In this quotation by Mao Tse-tung it is said:

"People of the world, unite and oppose the war of aggression launched by any imperialism or social-imperialism, especially one in which atom bombs are used as weapons! If such a war breaks out, the people of the world should use revolutionary war to eliminate the war of aggression, and preparations should be made right now."
(Quoted in Peking Review No.1/1970, p.7)

This position of Mao Tse-tung basically contradicts the one quoted in the Ninth National Congress. In this quote it is e m p h a - s i z e d that not only the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union are dangerous warmongers, but that all imperialist powers can unleash war, which has to be countered by a revolutionary war. (+)

(+) In the telegram of congratulation sent to the Japanese Communist Party on the occasion of its Ninth Congress on November 23, 1964, we can similarly find a passage, which speaks a g a - i n s t the thesis that Mao Tse-tung was for an a l l i a n - c e with the monopoly capital of the "Second world".

There, it is said:

"The Communist Party of Japan creatively integrates the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete conditions of Japan, holds high the revolutionary banner of opposing U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, and leads the revolutionary struggle of the Japanese people forward triumphantly."
(Peking Review No.49/1964, p.6)

Here the struggle even against the J a p a n e s e monopoly capital is correctly emphasized. But it is substantially devaluated by Mao Tse-tung's concluding sentence:

"The revolutionary cause of the Japanese people is certain to win new, great victories. An independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral and prosperous Japan is certain to become a reality."
(Ibid.)

Thus, Mao Tse-tung in fact accepts the rotten revisionist thesis of the Japanese Communist Party - a Party which the C.P. of China also soon counted as being part of the revisionist camp - that in imperialist Japan "a democratic stage of the revolution" was absolutely essential.

This passage naturally c o m p l e t e l y contradicts that part of the "Three World Theory" which says that the imperialists of the so-called "second world" can no longer wage a counter-revolutionary war, but only a "just war of liberation" against the "superpowers" etc.

This quotation of Mao Tse-tung originates from the period before the policy of rapprochement with U.S. imperialism was embarked upon. (In this period both, the Chinese press and Mao Tse-tung, talked about the "fascist cruelties of U.S. imperialists", and in May 1970 very concretely about "Nixon's fascist atrocities". See "Statement Supporting the American Negro's Just Struggle Against Imperialist Racial Discrimination" of August 8, 1963 as well as the famous call of May 20, 1970 "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs".)

Incidentally, the call of May 20, 1970 was Mao Tse-tung's last international statement. In this call, written at the time of U.S. aggression against Kampuchea, we find significant aspects directed against important elements of the "Three World Theory":

"The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today."
(Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs", May 20, 1970, Peking Review May 23, Special Issue/1970, p.8) (+)

Here Mao Tse-tung polemicizes against w a r h y s t e r i a the significance of which became clear only much later, after 1974, when the Chinese Communist Party press constantly propagated the "inevitability of a third world war", without, however, propagating the perspective of revolution. In opposition to that, Mao Tse-tung's call orients the people towards revolutionary struggle and supports those p e o p l e ' s w a r s which had already broken out.

In this last statement Mao Tse-tung does not appeal to the s t a t e s , to the ruling classes or to the g o v e r n - m e n t s of the countries under imperialist control. Rather, he appeals directly to the p e o p l e s :

(+) It is possible that even in this formulation the idea of a concrete "preponderance" of the forces of revolution is reflected - an idea, which is - as we have already said - difficult to substantiate and has dangerous consequences. (See also pp.108 ff for Mao Tse-tung's theses from 1957 onwards corresponding to our assessment.)

In spite of this possible interpretation this quotation by Mao Tse-tung is at all events an orientation of the peoples towards revolution, and a weapon in the struggle against war hysteria, and, from this point of view, we find it very valuable.

"The revolutionary armed struggles of the people of the South-east Asian countries, the struggles of the people of Korea, Japan and other Asian countries against the revival of Japanese militarism by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries, the struggles of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors, the national-liberation struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of North America, Europe and Oceania are all developing vigorously." (Ibid. p.9)

Even in the only passage where he talks of "countries"(*), it is not done in the form of lining up terms like "people" and "country"(*), but states unambiguously and correctly:

"A weak nation (*) can defeat a strong, a small nation(*) can defeat a big. The people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country. This is a law of history." (Ibid. p.9)

Very definitely this was not Mao Tse-tung's last speech before his death, but it was the last which was published.

There are many speculations coming from totally opposing camps, whether Mao Tse-tung was agreed with the "Three World Theory" as set forth by Teng Hsiao-ping in 1974 in the UNO. For the Party of Labour of Albania and its followers it is an established fact that Mao Tse-tung not only approved of the "Three World Theory", but that he was its originator - however, without being able to name any evidences or sources. Those forces who reject the "Three World Theory", but uncritically defend Mao Tse-tung and the C.P. of China before his death (like the R.C.P. U.S.A. and others who have a similar line) repudiate, similarly without any proofs, the possibility - even for the period after 1971 - that Mao Tse-tung might have accepted Teng Hsiao-ping's international line.

Our opinion is that here too one should "seek truth from facts"!

We can only take a stand on Mao Tse-tung's calls and quotations published in China upto 1970 because only these are reliably authentic. In our opinion, the "Three World Theory" fundamentally - mentally contradicts Mao Tse-tung's line in some writings like "On New Democracy".

Only after 1949 there are to be found in Mao Tse-tung's calls clear Right opportunist deviations in the attitude towards the states of the so-called "Third World", as well as in the attitude towards De Gaulle. And here elements of the "Three World Theory" undoubtedly can be found.

(*) The German version of Mao's writing says here "a weak country" ("Ein schwaches Land"). That's why we refer to the word "country" - Authors' Note to the English issue

But even at that time there simultaneously exist contrary passages, which of course must also be taken into account. A homogenous view of Mao Tse-tung therefore can not be crystallized from the existing material. Therefore, we also refuse to participate in speculations, whether and to what extent Mao Tse-tung was in agreement with the "Three World Theory" in the period after 1970. The only thing we can say with certainty is that there are elements of the later "Three World Theory", elements leading to it, in a few quotations of Mao Tse-tung.

6. Our Opinion on Some Non-Central Passages from the Unauthorized Writings

Now we shall only briefly deal with the following passages, which, in the debate regarding the C.P. of China's line, have or could have a certain

importance, or which have already been brought into debate by the opportunists in some way or the other.

The Significance of the Experience of the Chinese Revolution for Other Countries

The writing "Some Experiences in Our Party's History" (Volume V, pp. 324-29, a talk with Latin American Comrades) is not authorized.

This writing is the only one which once more takes a retrospective view of the Chinese revolution with the aim of bringing to light what communists of other countries could learn from it. In our opinion, it fully correctly says at first (directed against the generalization and mechanical transfer of the military path of the revolution in China to other countries):

"The experience of the Chinese revolution, that is, building rural base areas, encircling the cities from the countryside and finally seizing the cities, may not be wholly applicable to many of your countries, though it can serve for your reference. I beg to advise you not to transplant Chinese experience mechanically." (Ibid, p. 326)

In contrast to attempts to propagate the establishment of "Red areas" in the countryside without making an exact study of the pre-conditions for the establishment of such areas in China, and without studying exactly the conditions in one's own country, this advice would have been very correct.

However, the sentence following this makes a supplementation or a criticism necessary. The next sentence says:

"The experience of any foreign country can serve only for reference and must not be regarded as dogma. The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete conditions of your own countries - the two must be integrated." (Ibid, p. 326)

This statement is - even in relation to the Russian experience - at the most only then correct, if one understands by "experience of another country" the specificity, for example what is specifically Russian.

The sentence, however, precisely then becomes completely erroneous, if it is not made clear that Russia and the October Revolution, the historical birthplace of Leninism, gave something essential to all countries of the world, as Lenin emphasized in his "Left-Wing Communism". It can on no account only serve as reference, but is a direct guide to action.

In the same writing the Latin American Communists are given the following advice, which we consider to be wrong:

"In the struggle against the various comprador groups it is necessary to exploit the contradictions between imperialist countries, first coping with one of them and striking at the chief immediate enemy." (Ibid., p. 327)

This advice, illustrated by the particular example of the War of Resistance

against Japan and then against Chiang Kai-shek appears to us to be wrong in its over-generalization. In our opinion, such tactics were possible only in the period when Japanese imperialism invaded China in the context of World War II, which had just begun.

In our opinion, the attitude towards the national bourgeoisie is generalized in a similarly incorrect manner:

"Throughout the historical period
of the struggle against imperia-
lism and feudalism, we must win
over and unite with the national
bourgeoisie so that it will side
with the people against imperia-
lism. Even after the task of oppos-
ing imperialism and feudalism is
in the main accomplished, we must
still keep our alliance
with the national bourgeoisie for
a certain period. This will be ad-
vantageous in dealing with imperia-
list aggression, in expanding pro-
duction and stabilizing the market
and also in winning over and re-
moulding bourgeois intellectuals...

Towards the national bourgeoisie a policy of 'both unity and struggle' should be adopted... The aim of struggle is to unite with the national bourgeoisie and win victory in the struggle against imperialism." (Ibid, pp.328.329)

Here, something is demanded in a too general way (which, from a historical point of view is not correct even with reference to China), which may be correct only in certain phases, under certain pre-conditions in certain countries. It is well-known that the national element is not always the decisive one. If there is no foreign intervention, and if the current chief task consists in advancing the agrarian revolution, then it is as a rule impossible to win the national bourgeoisie for the revolution, as it was in China after 1927. Before 1949, Mao Tse-tung clearly talked about the possibility of the national bourgeoisie, or sections of it, being allies. (See for example Mao Tse-tung, SW I, p. 19)

After counter-revolutionary actions of the national bourgeoisie it is wrong to propagate "unity and struggle". Indeed, it is quite possible, if not the rule, that after counter-revolutionary actions of the national bourgeoisie it remains on the side of imperialism and feudalism up to the victory of the democratic



stage of the revolution. (See for example Albania.)

Here, in our opinion, once again the result of the peculiarity of a certain phase in the history of China (for example against Japan and against Chiang Kai-shek's troops led by U.S. imperialism) is generalized to other countries and periods, which is wrong and very dangerous.

On the distribution of work in the city and in the rural areas it is said in another passage:

"In the beginning our Party too did not realize the importance of work among the peasants and put urban work first and rural work second."
(Ibid. p.325)

In this passage an important, really very comprehensive experience of the C.P. of China, during a major phase of its work is falsely generalized.

After 1927, in connection with the situation in the cities, with the developing agrarian revolution and the situation in general, it was absolutely necessary to work chiefly in the rural areas. In our opinion, one can by no means later unconditionally draw the conclusion from this that it is a l w a y s right to work chiefly or mainly in the rural areas. Even before the victory in October 1949, Mao Tse-tung himself pointed out the necessity of once again shifting the centre of gravity of work to the city. (See Mao Tse-tung, SW IV, pp. 337, 338, 363.)

A proletarian Party must above all, particularly in the period of its founding, of creating its main nucleus, in the first phase of Party building, definitely work chiefly in the factories, in order to win and fill up its cadre base, in order to be able to send worker cadres to work in the rural areas. (On this complex of questions see also our standpoint on Volume I of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works.)

The passages criticized here from the writing "Some Experience in Our Party's History" of September 25, 1956, are on the whole characterized by the fact that, in spite of the initial urgent warning against a mechanical approach, certain partial experiences are still generalized in a mechanical way.

[illegible]

1. Basic Points of Departure and Problems of the Transition to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in China

a) Fundamental Principles of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Special Features of the Development of the Revolution in China

Before we analyse in greater detail Mao Tse-tung's views during various phases (1949/1953 - 1955/1956 - 1966/1967) and grapple with both unjustified attacks on, as well as the uncritical defence of these views, it is absolutely necessary to sketch out the main ideas regarding the principles of the socialist stage of the revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the basic special features of the transition to socialist revolution in China.

The experience of the socialist October revolution (the transition from the democratic revolution in Russia to the socialist revolution, the establishment of the iron dictatorship of the proletariat and its initial and later measures in the economic, political and ideological sphere) showed:

- ★ In the stage of the democratic revolution, Lenin considered the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants to be possible in principle before one started to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.
- ★ In Russia, the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution, to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be carried out by means of an armed uprising, by o v e r t h r o w i n g the counter-revolutionary b o u r g e o i s i e in power.
- ★ The absolutely essential establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an instrument of the socialist revolution excludes any political alliance with the parties and forces of the bourgeoisie because the aim of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist revolution is the elimination of all exploiting classes, specifically that of the bourgeoisie.
- ★ The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on no account means the immediate establishment of socialist relations of production in the entire country. Therefore, in the initial phase it is not only possible, but also necessary, not to destroy all sections of the bourgeoisie in the economic sphere at once. Rather, a compromise and even a temporary encouragement of certain sections of the bourgeoisie (specially in the

trade sector) while strictly retaining the dictatorship of the proletariat and firm control over all the command centres of the economy (including monopoly in foreign trade!!) is c o r - r e c t and unavoidable in all countries (even the highly developed ones) in a more or less lengthy first phase after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. (+)

In China, as a result of the victory of the democratic stage of the revolution and the smashing of the state apparatus of the comprador cliques and the feudal lords dependent on imperialism, a new state could be established, a state of all anti-imperialist and democratic classes and forces, chiefly the workers and peasants, but also including those sections of the national bourgeoisie which had really participated in the struggle against imperialism. Lenin and Stalin had already set forth in principle the real possibility of establishing a dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Stalin supplemented this possibility with regard to China (which, in distinction to Russia, was above all a country oppressed by imperialism, whereby Russia itself oppressed other peoples) to the effect that a revolutionary state power, which is above all a dictatorship of the workers and peasants, can include at times all really anti-imperialist forces, including sections of the national bourgeoisie.

In 1926 Stalin made clear:

"that the future revolutionary government in China will in general resemble in character the government we used to talk about in our country in 1905, that is, something in the nature of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, with the difference, however, that it will be first and foremost an anti-imperialist government."
(Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", 1926, Works 8, p.382)

(On the possibility in principle of temporarily including sections of the bourgeoisie in China, see Stalin, "Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-Sen University", 1927, Works 9, pp.249f).

In 1949, there arose the "democratic dictatorship" of the anti-imperialist type in China, as already analysed by Stalin, which Mao Tse-tung called the "people's democratic dictatorship". In its essence it was not a dictatorship of the proletariat. (++)

(+) In his talk on the programme of the Comintern regarding the NEP (New Economic Policy), as it was called by Lenin, Stalin emphasized:

"In one degree or another, the New Economic Policy, with its market connections, and the utilisation of these market connections, will be absolutely essential for every capitalist country in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat."
(Stalin, "Plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U. (B.)", 1928, Works 11, p.151)

(++) See also the brochure, "The People's Revolution in China", published in 1950 in Moscow and reprinted by the Marxist-Leninist Study Circle (MLSK) of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Austria, MLSK, No.1/1981, p.122.

In 1949, Mao Tse-tung had clearly proclaimed in public that for the present it was n o t the task of the new-democratic state, of the "people's democratic dictatorship" to e l i m i n a t e capitalism, but rather to r e g u l a t e it. (See Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", 1949, SW IV, p.411, published at that time in the organ of the COMINFORM "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy".)

The countries in Eastern Europe, however, already in 1944/45 cut themselves off the imperialist world system under the leadership of the working class and its Communist Party, with the help of the victories of the socialist Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin in the antifascist World War. These countries, building up an anti-fascist, anti-imperialist state apparatus under the leadership of the proletariat, were almost all able to declare in 1948/49 (+) that now they had essentially established the dictatorship of the proletariat (in a lower form than that of the Soviets, in the form of the "people's democracies") and had thus entered the phase of socialist revolution, of the liquidation of capitalism. On the other hand, in our opinion, one could not y e t state that in China, in 1949/50, the dictatorship of the proletariat had already been established.

P o l i t i c a l l y, with the seizure of power, with the smashing of the old imperialist-comprador-feudal state apparatus and the establishment of a new state apparatus of the "people's democracy" under the leadership of the working class, the m o s t i m p o r t a n t task of the democratic revolution had been completed.

On the e c o n o m i c front in 1949/1950, with the help of the new state power, comprador capitalism had now to be expropriated, its property converted into state property, the power of the feudal lords in the rural areas had to be broken, their property had to be confiscated and the agrarian reform had to be carried out. These tasks were largely completed in the years 1950/1953.

(+) In the period 1947/1950 a big struggle was led in the European "People's Democracies" against Right wing opportunism in the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the attitude towards the bourgeoisie. The documents of this struggle should definitely be studied and analysed once again - for example Dimitroff, "Role and Significance of the People's Democracy", Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Worker's Party (Communists) 1948; H.Minc, "Some Problems of the People's Democracies in the Light of Lenin's and Stalin's teachings on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", of the Communist Party of Poland; Gottwald, "On some Inner-Party Questions of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia" as well as the articles of Bierut (Communist Party of Poland) of May 8, 1950 and February 1951.

For building socialism, for setting oneself the aim of working at the creation of the socialist relations of production, in short for total economic destruction of the bourgeoisie as a class, the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be established and consolidated. Any political alliance with sections of the bourgeoisie (while continuing the economic concessions in the initial phase in the sense of Lenin's and Stalin's New Economic Policy), i.e., any participation of the national bourgeoisie in state power, any definition of the "national bourgeoisie" as "part of the people", as a "dual class" etc. had to be abandoned.

Commencement of the socialist revolution - i.e., establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat with a new programmatic aim: creation of socialist production relations, destruction of all exploiting classes and creation of the foundations for the transition to communism.

On the political front, the socialist revolution means the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This dictatorship of the proletariat, this political power of the proletariat is the indispensable instrument for carrying out the comprehensive socialist transformation of the entire relations of production in the class struggle against the bourgeoisie.

The transition to the socialist revolution must be a declaration of war against all exploiting classes, above all against the entire bourgeoisie, whose destruction as a class has to be propagated and tackled in a planned way.

Therefore a participation of parts of the bourgeoisie in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the political power in the phase of the socialist revolution contradicts fundamentally the essence of this revolution. It is wrong and basically contradicts Marxism.

However, the transition to the socialist revolution, to the dictatorship of the proletariat does not exclude the possibility and the necessity of negotiations, compromises and concessions in relation to certain sections of the bourgeoisie on the economic front, in order to secure supplies for the country and in order to prepare the next measures for building socialism.

Lenin expressly characterized the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the "main point" in Marx's teachings. In opposition to the bourgeois and opportunist falsifiers he emphasized:

"It is often said and written that the main point in Marx's teachings is the class struggle. But this is not true. And from this untruth very often springs the opportunist distortion of Marxism, its falsification in a spirit that makes it acceptable to the bourgeoisie. For the doctrine of the class struggle was created not by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie before Marx, and generally speaking it is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. He who recognizes only the class struggle is not yet a Marxist; it may turn out that he has not yet gone beyond the bounds of bourgeois thinking and bourgeois politics. To confine Marxism to the doctrine of the class struggle means curtailing Marxism, distorting it, reducing it

to something acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is what constitutes the most profound difference between the Marxist and the ordinary petty (as well as big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on which the real understanding and recognition of Marxism is to be tested." (Lenin, "The State and Revolution", 1917, Peking 1976, pp.41,42)

Fully aware of the immense national differences between various countries, Lenin wrote that the opportunists, even if they accept class struggle in general, make a stop exactly at one point, namely, just at the one which is most important:

"the period of the overthrow and the complete abolition of the bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably is a period of an unprecedentedly fierce class struggle in unprecedentedly acute forms and, consequently, during this period the state must inevitably be a state that is democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie)." (Ibid, p.43)

Lenin, who furthermore underlined the "abundance and variety of political forms" on the way to communism, then declared unambiguously:

"but the essence will inevitably be the same: the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Ibid, p.43)

The Marxist-Leninist teaching regarding the decisive criterion for the transition from the dictatorship of the workers and peasants (which in China was broadly as a consequence of the anti-imperialist revolution, but was still fundamentally based on the alliance of the workers and peasants) to the dictatorship of the proletariat proceeds from the basic idea:

"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and the second (that is between the democratic and the socialist stage of the revolution - authors'note), to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it, to replace it by liberalism." (Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", 1924, Works 6, p.106)

Elsewhere Lenin stated:

"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin to pass to the Socialist revolution." (Quoted in: "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course"; Moscow 1939, Red Star Press Reprint, London 1976, p.74)

Here it becomes clear that the subjective factor, the consciousness and degree of organization (not, however, the "growth of the economy") is the criterion for the transition to the second stage, to the socialist revolution.

Before we now analyse Mao Tse-tung's views from 1950 onwards on this complex of questions and confront them with Lenin's and Stalin's views, we shall, with the help of the C.P. of China's documents, sketch out the problem which appears central to us.

1.

Contrary to Mao Tse-tung's clear theses that in 1949 at first a new democratic state had been established, C.P. of China documents after 1956 suddenly claimed that, in essence, the dictatorship of the proletariat had already been established in 1949. (+)

Thus, for example Chou En-lai wrote in 1959:

"The state power of people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance established in 1949 as a result of the victory of the revolution, though including some representatives of the national bourgeoisie, was in essence already a state power of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

(Chou En-lai, "A Great Decade", Peking 1959, p.17)

And at the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China in 1956 Liu Shao-chi held the view:

"Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the working class has won the power to rule throughout the country in conditions of a firm alliance with several hundred millions of peasants; the party of the working class - the Chinese Communist Party - has become the party that leads the state power of the whole country; therefore, the people's democratic dictatorship has in essence become a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

(Liu Shao-chi, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Eighth National Congress of the C.P.C. - Documents", Vol. I, Peking 1956, Foreign Languages Press, p.19)

(+) For an understanding of the initial fundamental economic transformations in China in the first three to four years after the establishment of the people's republic the "Textbook of Political Economy II" is of considerable help. (See also the corresponding reprint in the brochure: "On the Chinese Revolution" in the series "Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism" No.1/1981.)

An exact assessment, especially of the real historical situation from 1956 to 1966, as well as an exact assessment of the real changes in the period from 1966 to 1969, as well as especially from 1970 to 1976, can hardly be derived from the C.P. of China's writings. (Chang Chun-chiao's writing of 1975 "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie" gives a general view of the state of the Chinese economy in 1973.)

By referring to the existence of the leadership of the proletariat, every dictatorship of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat and its party is, in an underhand manner, falsely given out to be a form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Thus, the essential distinction between the dictatorship of the proletariat (the aim of which is the destruction of capitalism) and the dictatorship of the workers and peasants (the aim of which is the expulsion of imperialism and the destruction of feudalism, and which "leaves untouched the foundations of the capitalist society") is obscured.

Similarly, in the writings after 1966 (+) it was claimed that in 1949 itself the socialist revolution had already begun and the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established. In the writing of 1971 "Fifty years of the C.P. of China" it is said on the question of the stages of the revolution and the nature of state power:

"The founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the basic conclusion of the stage of the new-democratic revolution and the beginning of the stage of the socialist revolution... In a space of three years, we rehabilitated the national economy and strengthened the people's democratic dictatorship, namely, the dictatorship of the proletariat." ("Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review No.27/1971, pp.11,12)

Even the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China proceeds from the fact that with the victory in 1949 the transition "from the new-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution" had begun. (Lin Biao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review No.18/1969, p.18)

This contradiction - which was never exposed in public and discussed in the C.P. of China -, shows that the central question is: when and under what pre-conditions the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the socialist revolution, was really begun in China?

2.

Perhaps this question sounds quite simple. But in reality the democratic and socialist stage of the revolution are interconnected. As the experience of the socialist October Revolution proves, there are democratic tasks which certainly can and must be solved in the socialist revolution.

On the other hand, even in the democratic stage of the revolution, measures already projecting into the socialist revolution can to a certain extent be taken.

(+) We essentially mean the following writings:

"Fifty Years of the C.P. of China" (Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the C.P. of China, July 1, 1971)

"Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China"

Furthermore, a distinction has to be made between the situation in the city and the situation in the rural areas. (Thus, in Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat established in the cities in October 1917 was extended to the rural areas only in the course of the year 1918.)

In China in 1949 (besides the task of the removal of the consequences of war, the restoration and development of production), the following chief tasks had to be tackled which all were fulfilled in the period upto 1953:

- ★ In the rural areas expropriation of the feudal lords, completion of the democratic agrarian revolution, annulment of all debts of the peasants, abolition of the entire feudal tax-system.
- ★ In the city expropriation of all factories and banks of the imperialists and compradors and their transference into state property, annulment of all imperialist debts, China's liberation from the imperialist yoke. Thus, 80 per cent of China's modern industry was already nationalized by measures taken in the democratic stage of the revolution.
- ★ On the cultural front, the struggle not only against feudal and imperialist culture, but especially against illiteracy!

In 1953, after the more or less successful carrying out of these tasks of the democratic revolution, the following tasks awaited completion:

- ★ Total elimination of the exploitation of the working class by means of the total liquidation of the bourgeoisie as a class.
- ★ Gradual elimination of the individual economy of the peasants in the process of socialist collectivization and creation of socialist state farms.
- ★ Getting accepted socialist culture and ideology among the working masses.

Precisely these tasks can be solved consequently only by a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the struggle for the liquidation of the bourgeoisie, both in the city and in the countryside.

Let us therefore now consider how Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the C.P. of China, approached these various tasks and the central question of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the various stages from 1949 to 1976.

2. The Period from 1950 to 1955

a) The Consolidation of the People's New Democratic Dictatorship

At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the C.P. of China in March 1949, Mao Tse-tung stated that:

"The people's democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance..."
(Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", 1949, SW IV, p.372)

At the same time, he demanded that the C.P. of China should unite with

"as many as possible of the representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie who can co-operate with us and with their intellectuals and political groups..."
(Ibid, p.372)

In the same report Mao Tse-tung made clear that the expropriation of the comprador bourgeoisie (and thus, the expropriation of the most important capital of the bourgeoisie) would make it possible

"to control the economic lifelines of the country and will enable the state-owned economy to become the leading sector of the entire national economy." (+)
(Ibid, p.367)

Besides, in this period of the people's democratic dictatorship, the private capitalist factors in the urban and rural areas "which are not harmful, but beneficial to the national economy" were supposed to continue to exist and even to develop under state control.

Finally, at this Second Plenary Session Mao Tse-tung stated:

"After the country-wide victory of the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is, the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second is external, that is, the contradiction between China and the imperialist countries."
(Ibid, p.369)

(+) Mao Tse-tung continued:

"This sector of the economy is socialist, not capitalist, in character."
(Ibid, p.367)

In our opinion, Mao Tse-tung here denies that as long as sections of exploiting classes, here the national bourgeoisie, share in state power, the state sector cannot be entirely free of being partly financed by the exploiters. Thus, it is not entirely free of exploitation, and can therefore hardly already be described as "socialist".

Three months later, in June 1949, Mao Tse-tung said in his writing "On People's Democratic Dictatorship": the task is

"the establishment of a state which is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants."
(Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", 1949, SW IV, p.415)

"Who are the people?

At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own government..."
(Ibid, p.417)

Elsewhere Mao Tse-tung spoke of the

"People's Democracy or New Democracy."
(Ibid, p.420)

Similarly, in "The Common Programme" of the Government of the People's Republic of China, which was laid down in legal form in 1949, it is said about the nature of the state:

"The People's Republic of China is a New Democratic or a People's Democratic state. It carries out the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class, based on the alliance of workers and peasants, and uniting all democratic classes...
The basic principle for the economic construction of the People's Republic of China is to develop production and bring about a prosperous economy through the policies of taking into account both public and private interests, of benefiting both labour and capital."
(Quoted in: "Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China" by Hu Chiao-mu, in People's China, September 1/1959, pp.31,32)

All these passages show clearly that initially no dictatorship of the proletariat was established. Rather, they show that after the most important political task of the democratic stage of the revolution - the seizure of power - the most important economic tasks of the democratic revolution, the nationalization of imperialist and comprador enterprises as well as the agrarian reform were accomplished. The agrarian reform was completed in early 1953. Towards the end of 1952 the First Five-Year Plan was begun.

On analysing Mao Tse-tung's statement in the authorized texts published after 1949 we must state that the dictatorship of the proletariat was not mentioned anywhere in the period from 1950 to 1953. Nevertheless, since 1953 it is already spoken of the socialist revolution and of the "construction of socialism" that had begun.

The problem of a "new period of socialism" was raised. But this was done without clearly raising the question of the necessity of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

b) Problems of Transition to the Socialist Stage of the Revolution

In the authorized writing "Be a True Revolutionary", which Mao Tse-tung presented as a speech on June 23, 1950 (See "Volume V", p.37, first published in "People's China" of July 1, 1950), Mao Tse-tung still clearly wrote that the agrarian reform was part of the democratic revolution and not part of the socialist revolution:

"The test of war is basically over, and we have all come through well, to the satisfaction of the people of the whole country. Now it is the test of agrarian reform that we have to pass..."

When the tests of war and agrarian reform are passed, the remaining test will be easy to pass, that is, the test of socialism, of country-wide socialist transformation.

As for those who have made contributions in the revolutionary war and in the revolutionary transformation of the land system and who continue to do so in the coming years of economic and cultural construction, the people will not forget them when the time comes for nationalizing private industry and socializing agriculture (which is still quite far off), and they will have a bright future.

This is how our country steadily advances; it has passed through the war and is undergoing new-democratic reforms, and in the future it will enter the new era of socialism unhurriedly and with proper arrangements when our economy and culture are flourishing, when conditions are ripe and when the transition has been fully considered and endorsed by the whole nation. (*)

I think it is necessary to make this point clear so that people will have confidence and stop worrying: 'Don't know when I'll no longer be wanted and be given the chance to serve the people even if I wish to.' No, that won't happen. The people and their government have no reason to reject anyone or deny him the opportunity of making a living and rendering service to the country, provided he is really willing to serve the people and provided he really helped and did a good turn when the people were faced with difficulties and keeps on doing good without giving up halfway."
("Be a True Revolutionary", 1950, "Volume V", pp.38,39)

Thus, it was unmistakably clear that at this time, mid 1950, the new democratic stage of the revolution had not yet been left behind. The "test of war" and the "test of agrarian reform" - this was not yet socialist revolution! The "test of socialism" still remained!

(*) Footnote on next page

Here we are specially interested in the aspects pointed out by Mao Tse-tung with respect to the coming transition to socialism, to the socialist revolution. Without doubt he addressed "those people", who feared the "nationalization" of private enterprises", and the socialization of agriculture, thus, primarily the "national bourgeoisie" and the capitalist rich peasants - both were forces which to some extent had participated in the new-democratic revolution.

In this passage Mao Tse-tung certainly did not promise them that they would continue to share political power. Contrarily, he merely guaranteed them their living, which was fully correct with regard to forces which were willing to "serve the people".

Nevertheless, neither here nor in the entire writing Mao Tse-tung talked about the question of the necessary establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the consequences resulting therefrom. This question remained open.

A further problem is envisaged in the fourth paragraph of the passage quoted above from Mao Tse-tung's writing. When and under what conditions the "test of socialism" should begin.

As a first condition, Mao Tse-tung mentioned "when our economy and culture are flourishing".

In our opinion, there is enough scope here for the view that one must first wait for China's industrialization before one begins with the socialist revolution. It turned out that such a trend towards postponing the socialist stage of the revolution until after industrialization was actually present in the C.P. of China's ranks (known as Liu Shao-Chi's "Theory of Productive Forces").

Mao Tse-tung, by making the transition dependent on the "flourishing of the economy", did not put an end to such wrong views. Instead, to a certain extent he left the door open for them.

The second essential criterion was formulated by Mao Tse-tung in the following way:

"When the transition has been fully considered and endorsed by the whole nation."

On the one hand, in this passage the fully correct and Leninist idea is touched upon that the transition from the democratic stage to the socialist stage of the revolution cannot be "ordered" or "proceed quietly and secretly", but must be the conscious and organized decision of the workers and their allies. But Mao Tse-tung, by speaking in this regard of "the entire nation" (*) and counting the "national bourgeoisie" as part of "the nation"(*) after 1949 (which

(+) The German edition (SW I, p.37) says here "the whole people" ("das ganze Volk"). The meaning of the statement, however, is not changed thereby. - Translator's Note.

after all, as a class, will not at all have a "bright future" in socialism, but which will be destroyed), in fact this section of "the people" is allowed to participate in the decision regarding the commencement of the socialist stage of the revolution.

In our opinion, some fundamentally wrong starting points of Mao Tse-tung, which were later systematized, are already evident here.

Above, we have already explained in detail that Leninism considers the ideological and organizational preparation of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the rural poor as being the criterion for the transition from the democratic to the socialist stage of revolution, i.e., from the dictatorship of the workers and peasants to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, for Marxism-Leninism, the subjective factor, the degree of consciousness and organization (but not the "flourishing of the economy") is the criterion for the transition to the "test of socialism". And it becomes clear that Lenin and Stalin did not proceed from the fact that the decision of the "entire nation", the decision of all allies of the democratic stage of the revolution brings about the transition to socialism. On the contrary, the class conscious proletariat and the degree of its unity with the rural poor are decisive. Thus, the proletariat and its allies have to make this decision. (+)

(+) Here, we emphasize once again that we do not have any criticism, above all, no principle criticism of the fact that in China the people's democratic dictatorship was established at first as a dictatorship of all anti-imperialist classes on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, with the guarantee of leaving untouched the property of the national bourgeoisie. It is a concrete tactical question, whether such a dictatorship should exist two, three or more years, before the strengthening of the class conscious proletariat and the rural poor and their organization are sufficient for the transition to the stage of the socialist revolution. In the Revolution of 1905 Lenin had propagated a phase of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants which did not touch capitalism as a whole. In this phase the proletariat and its allies had to accumulate experiences and strength for the next step, namely, to smash violently the bourgeoisie's resistance, i.e., to carry out the socialist revolution. Lenin wrote about a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", considered to be possible in 1905:

"Without a dictatorship it is impossible to break down that resistance and to repel the counter-revolutionary attempts. But of course it will be a democratic, not a Socialist dictatorship. It will not be able (without a series of intermediary stages of revolutionary development) to affect the foundations of capitalism."

(Quoted in: "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", p.72)

Stalin, resp. the group of authors of the "Short Course" emphasized that it was essential precisely in this phase of the democratic (contd. on the next page)

Precisely such an unambiguously clear estimation of the question of the transition to the socialist revolution, oriented at Lenin's and Stalin's teachings, c a n n o t be found in Mao Tse-tung's writings known to us, i.e., in his writings distributed internationally. (It is also not to be found in the C.P. of China's documents of this period.)

In the article "Great Victories in Three Mass Movements" of October 23, 1951, published in English in "People's China" of November 1, 1951, it was further said:

"The people's democratic dictatorship has been consolidated." (Ibid, 1951, "Volume V", p.60)

One year after completion of the agrarian reform, in 1954, a new constitution was adopted. On September 15, in the opening address at the First Session of the First National People's Congress, Mao Tse-tung said with regard to the constitution which was to be adopted:

"The constitution to be adopted at this session will tremendously promote the s o c i a l i s t cause in our country". ("Strive to Build A Great Socialist Country", 1954, "Volume V", p.148. First published in "People's China" of October 1, 1954)

The preamble of the constitution itself says:

"The system of people's democracy - new democracy - of the People's Republic of China guarantees that China can in a peaceful way banish exploitation and poverty and build a prosperous and happy s o c i a l i s t society." ("Constitution of the People's Republic of China", 1954, in: Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China", Peking, 1954, p.69)

There one evidently proceeded from the fact that it was possible to build up "socialist society" while m a i n t a i n i n g the state system of "new democracy", thus, while maintaining the alliance with the national bourgeoisie on the political front. By "peaceful" was in fact meant "using democratic means", that was, without the use of violence.

FOOTNOTE continued from last page

dictatorship of the workers and peasants that

"given the proletariat the opportunity of educating itself politically and organizing itself into a great army," of course "to begin the direct transition to the Socialist Revolution." (Ibid, p.74)

This further implied that the "people's democratic dictatorship" and such a state was declared sufficient to carry out the socialist revolution - thus w i t h o u t the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the state power of the working class, by a state power, in which the national bourgeoisie also participated. All this has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

Socialism cannot be built without a number of basic conditions. Most of all it requires that the working class as hegemon of the working masses, because of the education by the Party, becomes conscious of the necessity to take power in its hands. It requires that the working class rallies its allies around itself; however, without sharing this power with any other class. It requires that the working class under the leadership of the Communist Party directs this power up to the last consequence against the bourgeoisie and all its excrescences, remnants and elements with the aim of its total eradiction. Precisely this is one of the most essential characteristics of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

With a "new democratic" state it was certainly possible to carry out the agrarian reform and to expropriate the comprador bourgeoisie, but it was and is i m p o s s i b l e to carry out the socialist revolution with such a state, which included the national bourgeoisie in its state organs!

In another authorized writing from 1955, Mao Tse-tung stated that the transition period up to the creation of socialist relations of production should, from 1949 onwards, cover 18 years - three years for the reconstruction of the economy, plus three Five-Year Plans. However, he did not deal with the problem of whether a dictatorship of the proletariat had to be created or not.

Thus, in all spheres it was unmistakably talked about "socialist transformation", except for that of the s t a t e !

In the well-known authorized writing from the year 1955 "On the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture" (also widely circulated in the German language) the following position was taken on the questions of interest here:

- a) "An upsurge in the new, socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside. ... It is a vast socialist revolutionary movement involving a rural population of more than 500 million, and it has tremendous, world-wide significance." ("On the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture", 1955, Volume "V", p.184)
- b) "Having led the great people's democratic revolution to victory and established the people's democratic dictatorship headed by the working class, our Party can certainly lead the whole nation in basically accomplishing socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in the course of roughly three five-year plans." (Ibid, p.188)

c) In Chapter Seven of this writing, Mao Tse-tung explained that one had to learn from the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. There he unmistakably talked about the socialist revolution. He warned against proceeding from the interests of the rich peasants in the rural areas and pointed out that in Russia collectivization had continued from 1921 to 1937, i.w., for approximately seventeen years, and in China, too, three Five-Year Plans would be necessary. (Ibid., pp.197/198)

But even in this writing, which points out the danger of the spontaneous class differentiation taking place in the rural areas (+), Mao Tse-tung does not mention with a single word the problem of class struggle against capitalist elements in the economy and all the more in the state apparatus. Nor does he mention the necessity of the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat as an unconditional prerequisite for building socialism.

However, in view of Liu Shao-chi's total "rehabilitation" in China it would be wrong to leave unconsidered a few passages directed against Liu Shao-chi from the so-called "Volume V" published soon after Hua Guo-feng's accession to power.

In "Volume V" it is for example cited as Mao Tse-tung's "comment", dated June 1952:

"With the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China; therefore the national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined as an intermediate class."
("The Contradiction Between the Working Class and the Bourgeoisie is the Principal Contradiction in China", 1952, "Volume V", p.77)

This passage can only be understood in such a way that at that time the

socialist revolution was the order of the days, in which the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie had to be solved by eliminating this bourgeoisie as a class. In other words: There could no longer be any alliance with the national bourgeoisie, instead the main spearhead of the class struggle had to be directed against it.

This passage is all the more interesting because it stands in crass contradiction to the writing, written five years later: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". In this writing the national bourgeoisie was again assessed as "dual", i.e., as an intermediary class.

In 1953, after completion of the great task of the new democratic revolution - the elimination of the feudal system in the countryside by means of agrarian reform, a discussion on the termination of the new democratic order erupted in the Party.

(+) Mao Tse-tung very rightly demanded the elimination of "the rich peasant economy and the individual economy in the countryside". However, from that he rather surprisingly concluded:

"so that all the rural people will become increasingly well off together. We maintain that this is the only way to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance."
(Ibid, p.202)

In the perspective of co-operativization, as formulated here, the life-and-death class struggle with the capitalist rich peasants, against whom Mao Tse-tung had just warned, was omitted cohere in the conclusion. The creation of agricultural production operatives was not seen as a question of vigorous class struggle against the rich peasants, but as an act of cooperation with them, in which all would "become increasingly well off together". This passage therefore seems wrong to us. At least it very definitely gives scope for Right opportunist, Bucharinist deviations.

Should it be consolidated or should it be relinquished? (+)

An article by Mao Tse-tung on this question is included in "Volume V". Although this article is unauthorized, it appears to us to be highly noteworthy, precisely because of the correct formulation of the problem. Its editors, at the time of publishing "Volume V", still stated that with this article Mao Tse-tung refuted Right opportunist views, such as "firmly establish the new-democratic social order", put forward by Liu Shao-chi and others:

In this article it is said:

"Others (like Liu Shao-chi - Authors' Note) have remained where they were after the victory of the democratic revolution. They fail to realize there is a change in the character of the revolution and they go on pushing their 'New Democracy' instead of socialist transformation. This will lead to Right deviationist mistakes..."

This review of Mao Tse-tung's positions in the period from 1949 to 1955 can at first only roughly indicate that Mao Tse-tung at that time did not set forth and explain the connection between the commencement of the socialist stage of the revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which meant removal of all elements of capitalist forces in the city and countryside from the state apparatus, which meant a life-and-death struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie etc.

The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie - this is under all circumstances the cardinal question of the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution. And precisely this cardinal question was not correctly set forth in Mao Tse-tung's authorized writings known to us in the period from 1949 to 1955, more accurately at first from 1949 to 1953.

From these writings it certainly becomes clear that till 1953 the Chinese state was in no case understood to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat", but as a "people's democratic dictatorship", i.e., as a "new democracy".

Till 1953, no measures of the socialist revolution were carried out in important spheres, too... A state sector in the industry emerged merely as a result of the expropriation of the comprador bourgeoisie, as a result of consequently carrying out the democratic revolution. It was also left at this level.

(+) This question was also mentioned in the "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China", (Peking Review No.18/1969, p.19). It was also elucidated in the campaign

Our present revolutionary struggle is even more profound than the revolutionary armed struggle of the past. It is a revolution that will bury the capitalist system and all other systems of exploitation once and for all. The idea, 'Firmly establish the new-democratic social order', goes against the realities of our struggle and hinders the progress of the socialist cause."
("Refute Right Deviationist Views That Depart from the General Line" 1953, "Volume V", pp.93,94)

In this standpoint, directed against the Right opportunist line, it is correctly elaborated that and why the "new-democratic order" must not be consolidated. But here, as well as in the entire article, the question is not tackled: Should now, in place of the "people's dictatorship", the dictatorship of the proletariat be established or not? Should the "national bourgeoisie" continue to remain an ally in the social revolution, or is that no longer possible because it is now the target of the socialist revolution?

against Teng Hsiao-ping in 1976. See for example the article "From Bourgeois Democrats to Capitalist Readers" (Peking Review No.13/1976, p.7)

Till 1953 the national bourgeoisie was further unequivocally accepted as an ally.

Nevertheless, such a summary is not complete! Already in 1949 Mao Tse-tung had at the same time pointed out the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie now coming to the foreground. And there is much that speaks for the view that Mao Tse-tung waged a certain struggle against the formula "consolidation of the new-democratic order", even if such a struggle cannot be authoritatively documented.(+)

However, it is an established fact that the gradual process of socialist revolution on the economic front up to the establishment of essential socialist relations of production was clearly scheduled for three Five-Year Plans up to 1967, whereby the experience of the C.P.S.U.(B) was propagated as a model.

Leaving out the problem, or lack of clarity about what was to be done with the "new-democratic order" after 1953, the possible consequences of a possible change in the existing alliance on the political front with the national bourgeoisie - these are central questions, which shall be analysed later in another chapter on the basis of documents from 1956 to 1957.

c) On the Ideological Struggle Inside and Outside the Party

In this period, as a consequence of the victory of the democratic stage of the revolution, as a consequence of the fact that the C.P. of China was now the ruling Party, there evidently accumulated an abundance of rotten, careerist, bureaucratic and, seen from the class viewpoint, bourgeois and counter-revolutionary elements.

In this period (on which we do not possess a single coherent writing of Mao Tse-tung, which is authorized) there began the struggle against bureaucracy in the C.P. of China as a ruling Party, the struggle for the ideological education of all Party members who wished to fight on for the continuation of the revolution, as well as the struggle for purging the Party of such members who were not ready to be of service, or even had counter-revolutionary aims.

In 1955, Mao Tse-tung had to struggle against and had to liquidate the first big bourgeois head-quarter within the Communist Party after the victory of the democratic stage of the revolution - the Kao Kang - Jao Shu-shih - clique!

Already in 1950, Mao Tse-tung declared:

"The Central Committee's directives on consolidating and expanding the Party organization, on strengthening the ties between the Party and the masses, on conducting criticism and self-criticism and on launching a rectification movement throughout the Party should all be strictly carried out.

(+) The brochure "Fifty years of the C.P. of China" deals with this struggle and the Chinese newspapers in 1975/1976 also report on this in the struggle against Teng Hsiao-ping.

Since the membership of our Party has grown to 4,500,000, (+) we must henceforth follow a prudent policy in expanding the Party organization, be strict in preventing political speculators from gaining Party membership and take proper measures to clear out those already in. We must pay attention to admitting politically conscious workers into the Party in a planned way in order to increase the proportion of workers in the Party organizations. In the old liberated areas, in general Party recruiting in the villages should stop. In the new liberated areas, in general the Party organizations in the villages should not expand until agrarian reform is completed in order to prevent political speculators from worming their way into the Party. During the summer, autumn and winter of 1950, the whole Party must carry out a large-scale rectification movement in close co-ordination with its other tasks, not in isolation from them. Such methods as reading selected documents, summing up work, analysing the situation and making criticism and self-criticism should be used to raise the ideological and political level of cadres and rank-and-file Party members, correct mistakes in work, overcome the conceit and complacency of the self-styled distinguished veterans, eliminate bureaucracy and commandism and improve the relations between the Party and the people."

("Fight for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation's Financial and Economic Situation", June 6, 1950. Written Report to the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. "Volume V", p.31; published in English in "People's China" of July 1, 1950)

Five years later, when agrarian reform had already been completed for two years, namely, in 1955, Mao Tse-tung realized, in face of the immense tasks on the economic front, the increasing danger of an incorrect approach by cadres and the Party members towards economic work and work as such.

Therefore he warned:

"Political work is the life-blood of all economic work."
("Editor's Notes from 'Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside'", 1955, "Volume V", p.260. See also the "Red Book", Peking 1966, p.135)

Taking these fundamental guidelines as a starting point, we now have to, in absence of authorized writings by Mao Tse-tung, pass over to his unauthorized writings of this period.

We wish to remark thereby that in so far as we are in any way able to judge the situation at that time, we consider the rather informative writings of the period up to 1955 to be essentially correct in their content and we do not have any basic criticism of the questions dealt with here. So, let us now consider the unauthorized writings.

(+) For comparison: In 1945 the C.P. of China had 1,2 million members and in 1956 10,7 million members.

Besides the suppression of openly and actively operating counter-revolutionaries - some of whom had fled before the victory of the democratic stage of the revolution or were punished according to their crimes and stood under the dictatorship of the working masses - it had also to be made clear to the cadres and the masses of the people that the counter-revolutionaries were now - after the victory - increasingly penetrating into the new state apparatus of "New Democracy" and even into the Communist Party. They were winning by insidious means the trust of cadres and masses by putting on a mask to hide their true character, in order to continue their counter-revolutionary activity from within. A struggle had to be waged against this brand of counter-revolutionaries who concealed their true objectives and wished from within to carry through their reactionary ideas and objectives against the objectives and tasks of the Party. This struggle had the aim of unmasking these double-dealers and driving them out of the state apparatus and the Party. For this purpose it was necessary to comprehensively expose both the reactionary bourgeois views of these counter-revolutionaries who had "sneaked in" as well as their counter-revolutionary actions in their "practical" work in the state apparatus and the Party.

For this purpose a resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China of February 1951 (the authenticity of which, however, is uncertain) directed the attention of the entire Party towards the task of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries, who had sneaked into the state, the army and the Party:

(+) In similarly unauthorized writings from this period it is clearly emphasized that the suppression of counter-revolutionaries can also mean the execution of particularly detested criminals:

"Those who owe blood debts or are guilty of other extremely serious crimes and have to be executed to assuage the people's anger and those who have caused extremely serious harm to the national interest must be unhesitatingly sentenced to death and executed without delay."

("The Party's Mass Line Must Be Followed in Suppressing Counter-Revolutionaries", 1951. "Volume V", p.51)

"3. Pay attention to the 'middle layer' ('middle layer' are the counter-revolutionaries in the Army and in the government institutions; by the 'inner layer' are meant the hidden counter-revolutionaries in the Party- Authors' Note), and carefully weed out counter-revolutionaries hiding among the old personnel and among the intellectuals recently drawn into our work.

4. Pay attention to the 'inner layer' (+), carefully weed out counter-revolutionaries who have sneaked into the Party."
("Main Points of the Resolution of the Political Bureau", 1951, "Volume V", p.46)

By buying "its people" through bribery and corruption the bourgeoisie penetrated into the institutions. It tried to worm particularly into the trade-unions and other important mass organizations of the working class, led by the Communist Party for the purpose of the sharp class struggle against the class of capitalists. It did this by buying its agents among the cadres and encouraging bureaucracy, the alienation from the masses. A struggle had to be waged against these bought subjects. They had to be exposed in front of the masses and then cleared out from the Party.

"2. Draw a clear line of distinction between the working class and the bourgeoisie, and in trade unions eliminate corruption and bureaucracy which alienates the masses and weed out the capitalists' hirelings. Such hirelings and the middle elements vacillating between labour and capital are to be found in trade unions everywhere,

"To strike relentlessly means resolutely to kill all such reactionary elements as deserve the death penalty."

("Strike Surely, Accurately and Relentlessly in Suppressing Counter-Revolutionaries", 1951, "Volume V", p.53)

In 1956, the measures for suppressing the counter-revolutionaries in the period 1951/1952, especially the execution of counter-revolutionaries who were particularly hated and were guilty of serious crimes, were expressly defended as being correct against those in the Party who wished to make out that these measures for suppressing the counter-revolutionaries had been too "hard" or "unjust". (See "Volume V", pp.299,300)

and in the struggle we must educate and win over the middle elements, whereas those hirelings guilty of serious crimes should be expelled."
("Struggle Against 'Three Evils' and 'Five Evils'", 1952, "Volume V", p.68)

In addition to the struggle against the counter-revolutionaries who had "sneaked in", the class struggle against the "once deserving, but now degenerated" cadres came more and more into the foreground because the counter-revolutionaries from now on disguised themselves with the Party book. These cadres who had withstood the bullets of counter-revolution in the civil war now succumbed to the "sugar-coated bullets". The corruption of the Party members and the cadres in general by the bourgeoisie became a serious problem in the class struggle. The struggle against the "three evils", against corruption, waste and bureaucracy became an important task. It became necessary to expose and struggle against the demoralizing influence of the bourgeoisie on the cadres, to punish and clear out the degenerated cadres.

"For our Party and government, bureaucracy and commandism are a big problem not only for today but for a long time to come. In terms of social origin, it reflects the survival in our Party and government of the reactionary style of work (an anti-popular style of work, a Kuomintang style of work) of the reactionary ruling classes in dealing with the people... It means failure to carry out Party consolidation work at these three levels or, in cases where Party consolidation has started, failure to launch a struggle to combat commandism and comb out violators of the law and of discipline. It means failure to combat and stamp out the kind of bureaucracy still existing among cadres in the leading organizations at the prefectural level and above, which finds expression in ignorance of and callousness to both the hardship of the masses and the conditions in the grass-roots organizations.

If we strengthen and improve our role and methods of leadership, then bureaucracy and commandism, which are harmful to the people, will gradually diminish and many of our Party and government organizations will be able to break away sooner from this Kuomintang style of work.

And the sooner will the many bad people who have infiltrated our Party and government organizations be combed out and the many bad deeds still evident today be eliminated.

Therefore, in 1953 starting with the handling of letters from the masses, please make an investigation into bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline and wage a resolute struggle against them in co-ordination with Party consolidation, Party building and other spheres of work. Typical cases of bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline should be widely exposed in the press.

Serious offenders should be punished by law, and when they are Party members they should also be dealt with according to Party discipline." ("Combat Bureaucracy, Commandism and Violations of the Law and of Discipline", 1953, "Volume V", p.85)

In 1953 the situation in the countryside was such that in 10 per cent of the townships

"reactionary elements, enemy gendarmes and agents, heads of reactionary secret societies, hoodlums and ruffians, landlords and rich peasants have wormed their way in, become cadres and usurped the power of village governments, and some have even sneaked into the Communist Party. These types account for 80 to 90 per cent of the cadres guilty of serious violations of the law and of discipline, and degenerate cadres make up the rest. Therefore, the main problem in the backward townships is to strike at the counter-revolutionaries, but the degenerate cadres must be weeded out too."

("Criticism of Liang Shu-Ming's Reactionary Ideas", 1953, "Volume V", p.128)

In this connection the struggle against decentralism was an important task, in order to prevent the formation of "independent kingdoms", which are led by the revisionists and which destroy Party unity in a fundamental way. This struggle was intensified within the C.P. of China since 1941. After the victory in the new-democratic revolution, in 1953, it acquired increased importance because the degenerated bureaucrats and revisionists in the government attempted to evade the leadership of the Central Committee.

(See: "Combat Bourgeois Ideas in the Party", 1953, "Volume V", p.103)

Besides weeding out counter-revolutionaries, double-dealers, renegades and careerists from the Party, further important tasks were re-educating inactive and backward Party members and raising the political and ideological level in the Party.

Thereby, the expulsion of such Party members was practised who, even after re-education, did not come up to the standard of Party membership. Since 1951, Party building was increasingly directed towards the industrial proletariat in the cities. (See "Volume V", p.48)

Criticism of the Film "The Life of Wu Hsun" and the Right Deviation in the C.P. of China

Bourgeois elements and renegades in the Party remained at the democratic stage of the revolution and opposed the continuation of the revolution, the transition to the socialist revolution. With the aim of obstructing the class struggle against the bourgeoisie they propagated such reactionary personalities like Wu Hsun. He, "who did not lift a finger against the feudal economic base or its super-structure" ("Volume V", p.57) was declared to be a "servant of the people".

The aim of these reactionaries in the Party was to preserve the old and obsolete from being demolished in the revolution, to save the bourgeoisie from its downfall, and to negate class struggle.

"Certain communists who have allegedly grasped Marxism merit special attention. They have studied the history of social development - historical materialism - but when it comes to specific historical events, specific historical figures (like Wu Hsun) and specific ideas which run counter to the trend of history (as in the film 'The Life of Wu Hsun' and the writings about Wu Hsun), they lose their critical faculties, and some have even capitulated to these reactionary ideas."

Isn't it a fact that reactionary bourgeois ideas have found their way into the militant Communist Party? Where on earth is the Marxism which certain Communists claim to have grasped?

For the above reasons, it is imperative to unfold discussion on the film 'The Life of Wu Hsun' and on the essays and other writings about Wu Hsun and thereby thoroughly clarify the confused thinking on this question." ("Pay Serious Attention To the Discussion of the Film 'The Life of Wu Hsun'", 1951, "Volume V", p.58)

A struggle had to be initiated against these bourgeois elements and reactionary views in the Party which clung on to the "old" (New Democracy) and rejected the "new" (Socialist Revolution). These bourgeois elements propagated these "historical personalities" like Wu Hsun, in order to draw comparisons with the present situation in China, to deny class struggle and the continuation of the revolution, to spare the bourgeoisie and prevent the socialist revolution.

"Some people think the period of transition is too long and give way to impatience. This will lead to 'Left' deviationist mistakes. Others have remained where they were after the victory of the democratic revolution. They fail to realize there is a change in the character of the revolution and they go on pushing their 'New Democracy' instead of socialist transformation. This will lead to Right deviationist mistakes." ("Refute Right Deviationist Views that Depart from the General Line", 1953, "Volume V", p.93)

Instead of the slogan of the transition to the socialist revolution and socialist transformation, these Right deviators put forward the slogan: "Firmly establish the new-democratic order".

These Right opportunist views were advocated by Liu Shao-chi and others, who resisted the socialist revolution.

Struggle Against the "Three Evils" and "Five Evils" and Against the Tendency Towards Capitalism

At the end of 1951, a struggle against "corruption, waste and bureaucracy" was waged among the state and Party cadres. (Struggle against the "three evils")

In the beginning of 1952 the struggle against the "five evils" - bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, stealing of economic information - was started among the owners of private industrial and commercial enterprises.

The continuation of this struggle was the struggle against mistakes of principle in the Party's line, which consolidated capitalism instead of combating it, in order to finally eradicate it. These mistakes of principle are

"a reflection of bourgeois ideas within the Party and a matter of stand that is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. The movements against the 'three evils' and the 'five evils' dealt

heavy blows to bourgeois ideas inside the Party. But at the time only bourgeois ideas related to corruption and waste got a good thrashing, while those manifesting themselves in questions concerning the Party line were not dealt with.

The latter are to be found not only in our financial and economic work but also in political and judicial, cultural and educational and other fields, and among comrades in the localities as well as at the national level." ("Combat Bourgeois Ideas in the Party", 1953, "Volume V", p.103)

Thus, the renegade Po i-po suggested and got adopted a new tax system of "equality between public and private enterprises", which, in reality, brought benefits to the capitalist enterprises and harmed the state and co-operative enterprises. This was a Right deviation from the line of "transition to socialism", which would have "led inevitably to capitalism, in contravention of the Party's general line for the transition period" ("Volume V", p.103).

The Struggle Against the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih

In the writing "Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China" of 1955, stock was taken of the struggle against the anti-Party alliance of both renegades Kao and Jao, and lessons drawn from this struggle were explained:

"As you comrades all know, the emergence of the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih was by no means accidental, but was an acute manifestation of the intense class struggle in our country at the present stage. The criminal aim of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and seize supreme power in the Party and the state by conspiratorial means, and thus pave the way for a counter-revolutionary come-back."

Under the unified leadership of the Central Committee, our Party has smashed the anti-Party alliance and become still more united and consolidated. This is an important victory in our struggle for the cause of socialism.

The case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih serves as an important lesson for our Party, and all the members should take warning and make sure that similar cases will not recur in the Party. Kao Kang and Jao

Shu-shih schemed and conspired, operated clandestinely in the Party and surreptitiously sowed dissension among comrades, but in public they put up a front to camouflage their activities. These were precisely the kind of vile activities the landlord class and the bourgeoisie usually resorted to in the past." ("Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China", 1955, "Volume V", pp.155,156)

In these speeches the counter-revolutionary conspiracy was uncovered, comprehensively and point by point (see "Volume V", pp.161,162). The degree of the influence of these double-dealers in the Party leadership became obvious when a "second headquarter" in the Party was mentioned in addition to the Marxist-Leninist "headquarter".

"At an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to expose Kao Kang, I said there were two headquarters in Peking. The first headed by me stirred up an open wind and lit an open fire. The second headed by others stirred up a sinister wind and lit a sinister fire; it was operating underground. Did political leadership come from one or more sources?" (Ibid, p.162)

To guarantee leadership from one centre, namely from a revolutionary one, the second headquarter was disbanded.

The Counter-Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique: Learning from Negative Examples

In 1955 a brochure was published about the counter-revolutionary Hu Feng clique with materials of this clique, along with a preface (See "Preface and Editor's Notes to Material on the Counter-Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique", 1955, "Volume V", pp.176ff) so that the cadres and the broad masses of the people could study the methods of this counter-revolutionary double-dealers, in order to better be able to see through and combat them in future.

"The masses of the people are very much in need of this material. How do counter-revolutionaries employ their double-dealing tactics?

How do they succeed in deceiving us by their false appearances, while furtively doing the things we least expect?" (Ibid, p.177)

In order to be able to answer these questions and draw the correct lessons from this "negative example", these materials were published for study:

"We attach importance to the Hu Feng case because we want to use it to educate the masses of the people, and first those cadres who can read and also the intellectuals; to them we recommend this 'Material' for raising their level of political consciousness. The 'Material' is striking for its extreme sharpness and clarity. Counter-revolutionaries will naturally pay attention to it and revolutionary people even more so. If the masses of the revolutionary people learn something from this case and this material and thereby increase their revolutionary ardour and their ability to discriminate, we shall have all sorts of hidden counter-revolutionaries gradually uncovered." (Ibid, p.178)

This method of learning by "negative example" in no way means allowing the counter-revolutionaries to propagate their view unhindered. On the contrary, it is expressly emphasized that basically the counter-revolutionaries are deprived of freedom of speech. A stand is taken against Hu Feng who demanded for counter-revolutionaries the freedom of propagating their views in the media without any hindrance:

"What Hu Feng calls 'uniformity of public opinion' actually means that counter-revolutionaries are not allowed to express counter-revolutionary views.

Indeed this is true, our system does deprive all counter-revolutionaries of freedom of speech and allows this freedom only among the people. We allow opinions to be varied among the people, that is, there is freedom to criticize, to express different views and to advocate theism or atheism (i.e., materialism). In any society and at any time, there are always two kinds of people and views, the advanced and the backward, that exist as opposites struggling with each other, with the advanced views invariably prevailing over the backward ones; it is neither possible nor right to have 'uniformity of public opinion'. Society can progress only if what is advanced is given full play and prevails over what is backward. But in an era in which classes and

class struggle still exist both at home and abroad, the working class and the masses who have seized state power must suppress the resistance to the revolution put up by all counter-revolutionary classes, groups and individuals, thwart their activities aimed at restoration and prohibit them from exploiting freedom of speech for counter-revolutionary purposes." ("In Refutation of 'Uniformity of Public Opinion'", 1955, "Volume V", p.172)

In this period, in which the national bourgeoisie is not regarded as being part of the counter-revolution, important aspects even for the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat are already evident. We wish to once again sum up and emphasize these:

- ★ Pay attention to enemies within the Party. Purge the Party. Do not permit any second headquarter.
- ★ In the case of very serious crimes do not dispense with the death penalty.
- ★ Consider bureaucracy as an instrument of the class enemy.
- ★ Mobilize the masses by means of typical cases in the press. Do not hush up anything, but educate by means of negative examples too.

These teachings are in full conformity with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

3. The Period 1956/1957

a) The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. not only proclaimed a completely wrong line in regard to Stalin and in regard to the struggle against world imperialism in general, but it also propagated a certain deliberate mood of euphoria: We are now so strong that the enemy surrenders voluntarily, or even lets himself be convinced; the times of violence are past. Now we really have the possibility to deal with the bourgeoisie by parliament, by negotiations, by persuasion and by "democratic" methods!!

This was the tenor of Krushchovian demagogy! The Krushchovian revisionists also expressly referred to the "experiences of the Chinese revolution", where the bourgeoisie was now being "convinced" - for good reasons concealing the fact that the great majority of the comprador bourgeoisie had been expropriated by violence, but speculating with the attitude of the C.P. of China towards the "national bourgeoisie".

In our opinion, the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China must be seen in the background of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Mao Tse-tung's line must be evaluated in the background of both the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. and the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China.

For, undoubtedly the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. at the beginning of 1956 was an important caesura for analysing Mao Tse-tung's work. The Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China was held a few months later, in September 1956. Mao Tse-tung only held the Opening Address. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Chou En-lai made the reports to the National Congress in the name of the Central Committee. The Twentieth Congress made imperative the struggle against modern revisionism within the C.P. of China and internationally. It made particularly imperative a clear-cut attitude towards Stalin. How did the C.P. of China and how did Mao Tse-tung react?

First, two months after the Twentieth Congress, the Politbureau of the C.P. of China wrote the internationally much regarded article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". In this article it clearly and emphatically declared itself for Krushchov's struggle "against the personality cult" and criticized, without any proof, a number of mistakes allegedly committed by Stalin. (+)

(+) See for this Note 1: "On Mao Tse-tung's Ostensible 'Criticisms Against Stalin', Published By the Teng-Hua-Revisionists and Imperialist China Researchers", p.208

Although Stalin was characterized as an "outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter", at the same time all Khrushchov's points of criticism, including Stalin's allegedly "wrong decision" in the Tito-Yugoslavia question, were repeated.

At the Eighth National Congress itself Mao Tse-tung declared:

"At its 20th congress held not long ago, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulated many correct policies and criticized shortcomings which were found in the Party. It can be confidently asserted that very great developments will follow on this in its work."

("The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Documents, 1956, Volume I, p.10)

In the "Polemics on the General Line" the First Comment "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves" quotes a statement by Mao Tse-tung of April 1956, namely that:

"Stalin's merits outweighed his faults."

("The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves. Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U." Peking 1963, p.12)

On October 23, i.e., a f t e r the Eighth National Congress Mao Tse-tung declared:

"Stalin d e s e r v e s to be criticized, but we do not agree with the m e t h o d of the criticism, and there are some other matters we do not agree with." (Ibid, p.12)

Both these statements were only published in 1963.

On November 15, 1956 Mao Tse-tung stated in a speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee:

"I would like to say a few words about the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I think there are two 'swords': one is Lenin and the other Stalin. The sword of Stalin has now been discarded by the Russians.

... (+)

(+) In the unauthorized version, this quotation, rather confused in its middle section, continues as follows:

"Gomulka and some people in Hungary have picked it up to stab at the Soviet Union and oppose so-called Stalinism. The Communist Parties of many European countries are also criticizing the Soviet Union, and their leader is Togliatti. The imperialists also use this sword to slay people with. Dulles, for instance, has brand-

ished it for some time. This sword has not been lent out, it has been thrown out. We Chinese have not thrown it away. First, we protect Stalin, and, second, we at the same time criticize his mistakes, and we have written the article 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'. Unlike some people who have tried to defame and destroy Stalin, we are acting in accordance with objective reality." (Ibid, p.341)

As for the sword of Lenin, hasn't it too been discarded to a certain extent by some Soviet leaders? In my view, it has been discarded to a considerable extent. Is the October Revolution still valid? Can it still serve as the example for all countries? Khrushchov's report at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says it is possible to seize state power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away." ("Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", 1956, "Volume V", p.341)

We conclude from Mao Tse-tung's authentic statements reproduced here that on no account he was in agreement with treating Stalin like an e n e m y . Though he initially on the whole supported the Twentieth Congress in public (probably for all reasons other than agreement with its content, which however, does not improve matters!) he did n o t agree with the repudiation of Stalin.

On November 30, 1956 Mao Tse-tung stated in an internal discussion:

"the basic policy and line during the period when Stalin was in power were correct and that methods that are used against enemies must not be used against one's comrades."

("The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and ourselves. Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.", Peking 1963, p.12)

From Mao Tse-tung's authorized statements it also follows that he had certain criticism against Stalin. However, it is a fact as well that n o t a s i n g l e authorized criticism against Stalin with regard to the contents has been published by Mao Tse-tung. (See for this Note 1)

Therefore, first of all, it has to be noted that Mao Tse-tung (as well as the entire C.P. of China) was subjected to enormous ideological pressure by the Twentieth Congress, to which he publically submitted at the Eighth National Congress.

With regard to the attitude towards Stalin we shall now in the following quote an u n a u t h o r i z e d speech of January 1957.

In the "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees" on January 18, 1957 it is said:

"During the past year, several storms raged on the world scene. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they went for Stalin in a big way. Subsequently the imperialists stirred up two storms against communism, and there were two stormy debates in the international com-

munist movement. Amidst these storms, the impact and losses were quite big in the case of some Communist Parties in Europe and the Americas but smaller for the Communist Parties in the Orient. With the convocation of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, some people who had been most enthusiastic for Stalin became most vehement against him. In my view, these people do not adhere to Marxism-Leninism, they do not take an analytical approach to things and they lack

revolutionary morality. Marxism-Leninism embraces the revolutionary morality of the proletariat. Since formerly you were all for Stalin, you should at least give some reason for making such a sharp turn. But you offer no reason at all for this sudden about-face, as if you had never in your life supported Stalin, though in fact you had fully supported him before. The question of Stalin concerns the entire international communist movement and involves the Communist Parties of all countries.

Most cadres in our Party are dissatisfied with the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and think it went too far in attacking Stalin. That is a normal feeling and a normal reaction. But a few cadres started to vacillate. Before it rains in a typhoon, ants come out of their holes, they have very sensitive 'noses' and they know their meteorology. No sooner had the typhoon of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU struck than a few such ants in China came out of their holes. They are wavering elements in the Party who vacillate whenever something is astir." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.354)

In this passage, the great significance of the Twentieth Congress is fully correctly analysed as a "storm", as a great pressure on the cadres. We find momentous and correct the comment that all those who, like Krushchov, had formerly sung the most effusive (and empty) hymns of praise of Stalin were not accidentally the same ones who now executed a 180 degree turn, without any kind of self-criticism.

However, the evaluation of the situation inside the C.P. of China, that only a few vacillated, does not appear correct to us. In our opinion, in reality the leadership of the C.P. of China had submitted to the pressure of the Twentieth Congress. Later (which is a much more serious mistake) it did not self-critically analyse its initial vacillations and retreat. Instead, it even expressly justified it. (+)

(+) See for this: "On the Method of Struggle Against Modern Revisionism, Joint Standpoint of the Editorial Boards of 'Rote Fahne', 'Westberliner Kommunist' and 'Gegen die Strömung'". (Rote Fahne, No. 173; Westberliner Kommunist, No. 8; Gegen die Strömung, No. 11)

A crass example of the false evaluation of the situation, reflecting the influence of the Twentieth Congress was the assessment of the Hungarian incident in 1956. Mao Tse-tung wrote on this - and this passage is authentic:

"Everybody knows that the Hungarian incident was not a good thing. But it too had a dual character. Because our Hungarian comrades took proper action in the course of the incident, what was a bad thing has eventually turned into a good one. Hungary is now more consolidated than ever, and all other countries in the socialist camp have also learned a lesson." ("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, "Volume V", p.416)

The further revisionist development showed clearly enough that this was a total misunderstanding of the situation.

There is no comprehensive authorized writing by Mao Tse-tung from the year 1956.

Especially the writing "On the Ten Major Relationships", dated April 1956, was published for the first time after Mao Tse-tung's death, so that falsifications cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the unauthorized writings shall be dealt with only secondarily and briefly. Thereby, we shall base ourselves primarily on the probably most well-known and most widely propagated writing by Mao Tse-tung "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", originating from the year 1957.

A comprehensive criticism of this writing is all the more important because this writing was propagated in all central documents of the C.P. of China, even after 1966, without any qualification! (+)

(+) In the "Circular of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China of May 16, 1966" this writing is emphasized. (Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1967, p.11) Special attention is also called to it in the "Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" of August 8, 1966. (Peking Review No. 3/1966, p.11) The Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China emphasizes it as being a "great work". (Peking Review No. 18/1969, p.16) At the Ninth National Congress it is even claimed that by this work

"for the first time in the theory and practice of the international communist movement, it was pointed out explicitly that classes and class struggle still exist after the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production has been in the main completed." (Ibid, p.18)

In fact this was by no means something recognized for the first time. It can easily be proved that Stalin after 1936, i.e., after the creation of socialist relations of production in the main proceeded from the existence of classes, namely: "There remains the working class. There remains the peasant class." ("On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.", 1936, Works 14, p.157) There he has also correctly stated: "All the exploiting classes have been eliminated." (Ibid.) FOOTNOTE contd. next page

The basic theses of this writing are:

- a) Differently from what initially had been planned, "socialist relations of production" were in the main realized in 1957 itself. (Ibid,p.394) Thus, surprisingly and without further proof, the original plan of achieving this victory by 1966/1967 was declared fulfilled ten years earlier.
- b) In spite of this the "people's democratic dictatorship" continued to rule (Ibid,pp.387,412), including the national bourgeoisie as "part of the people".
- c) "In our country, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people." (Ibid,p.386)
- d) The parties of the national bourgeoisie are "for the cause of socialism". (Ibid,p.413)

In our opinion, such statements fundamentally violate the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Rather, after completion of the democratic revolution, even on the economic front, Mao Tse-tung should have concluded from the analysis of the situation in 1953:

Commencement of the socialist revolution, this makes absolutely necessary:

- ★ First and foremost, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
- ★ End of the political alliance with all sections of the bourgeoisie in the city and countryside, establishment of the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie as an indispensable requirement of the actual dictatorship of the proletariat. (+)

FOOTNOTE contd. from last page

Already in 1937, Stalin cleared up in "Defects in Party Work And Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite And Other Double-Dealers",

"We must smash and cast aside the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here must subside... One end of the class struggle operates within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., but its other end stretches across the frontiers of the bourgeois states surrounding us."
(Ibid., 1937, Works 14, pp.263,264)

(+)

In the unauthorized writing "Combat Bourgeois Ideas in the Party" it is said:

"On the other hand (as distinguished from the attitude to the peasants - Authors' Note), the contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie are antagonistic."
(Ibid, 1953, "Volume V", p.107)

In spite of this clear statement it is simultaneously said that besides the primary alliance of the workers with the peasantry, "the alliance of the working class with the national bourgeoisie" (Ibid.) also exists. Yet, nothing is said about the perspective of this alliance in view of the proclaimed socialist revolution!

- ★ Commencement of the socialist revolution on the economic front, step by step, planned transformation of the capitalist relations of production still existing in the city and the countryside.
- ★ Temporary NEP-line, i.e., a line of temporary tolerance of an arrangement with sections of the bourgeoisie on the economic front, in face of the impossibility of immediately and at one go creating solid socialist relations of production.
- ★ Move in the direction of (this was planned for fifteen years) a total economic liquidation of the bourgeoisie as a class.

It is evident that since 1956 such a line was not carried out in China, and also not even propagated.

b) The Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China

In order to be able to better classify Mao Tse-tung's position let us first consider the position taken by the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China.

In those National Congress documents, which clearly take the socialist revolution as a starting point, it is said among other things: We

"could attain the goal of socialist revolution by peaceful means."

("The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Documents", 1956, Vol. I, p.20)

Unfortunately, this did not simply mean that a new civil war could be avoided; rather, this formulation (evidently following the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.) meant that socialism could be established in China without using violence against the bourgeoisie, without the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie.

Thus, with reference to the national bourgeoisie it is said:

"Therefore our policy towards the national bourgeoisie is, as in the past (meant is: as in the democratic stage of the revolution - Authors' Note) still one of simultaneously uniting with them and waging struggles against them, of attaining unity with them through struggle."
(Ibid, p.30)

This aim of unity with the national bourgeoisie, thus in fact building socialism together with the bourgeoisie, is even assessed in such euphoric terms:

"Our bourgeoisie has heralded its acceptance of the socialist transformation with a fanfare of gongs and drums."
(Ibid, p.68)

That "peaceful" means n o n - v i o l e n t , is evident in the following passage as well:

" a l l former exploiters should be reformed in a peaceful manner to become working people living by their own labour." (Ibid, p.138)

In view of all these positions it is totally clear that there c o u l d be n o mention of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. Indeed, a revisionist line was actively followed against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is known that Mao Tse-tung c r i t i c i z e d the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China in important questions.

This criticism of Mao Tse-tung (as it was presented in some articles of the Cultural Revolution after 1966 or in the Report to the IX Party Congress, see "Important Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", p. 20 ff. Ger. ed.) was labelled above all at the "theory of the productive forces", the development of which - according to Liu Schao-tschi - would have been the m a i n t a s k , as well as at the unlimited expansion of capitalism !

However, his criticism was n o t expressly d i r e c t e d (+) against the thesis of political co-operation with the national bourgeoisie! One year later, Mao Tse-tung himself expressly advocated precisely this thesis (even if not nearly in the same euphoric manner as the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China).

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The unauthorized speech: "Be Activists in Promoting the Revolution", of October 1957, contains the criticism of the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China. There it is said:

"The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the socialist road and the capitalist road, is undoubtedly the p r i n c i p a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n in contemporary Chinese society. Our present task is different from that in the past. Previously the principal task for the proletariat was to lead the masses in struggles against imperialism and feudalism, a task that has already been accomplished. What then is the prin-

cipal contradiction now? We are now carrying on the socialist revolution, the spearhead of which is directed against the bourgeoisie...

consequently the principal contradiction is between socialism and capitalism... in a nutshell between the socialist road and the capitalist road. The resolution of the Eighth Congress makes n o mention of t h i s question. It contains a passage which speaks of the principal contradiction as being that between the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive forces. This formulation is i n c o r r e c t ." (Ibid, "Volume V", pp. 492, 493)

c) Serious Violations of Marxism-Leninism in Mao Tse-tung's Writing of 1957 "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People"

Thus, it is said in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People":

"The contradictions between ourselves and the enemy are antagonistic contradictions. Within the ranks of the people, the contradictions among the working people are non-antagonistic, while those between the exploited and the exploiting classes have a non-antagonistic as well as an antagonistic aspect. There have always been contradictions among the people, but they are different in content in each period of the revolution and in the period of building socialism. In the conditions prevailing in China today, the contradictions among the people comprise the contradictions within the working class, the contradictions within the peasantry, the contradictions within the intelligentsia, the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry, the contradictions between the workers and the peasants on the one hand and the intellectuals on the other, the contradictions between the working class and the other sections of the working people on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie on the other, the contradictions within the national bourgeoisie, and so on." ("Volume V", p. 385)

"In our country, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people. By and large, the class struggle between the two is a class struggle within the ranks of the people, because the Chinese national bourgeoisie has a dual character. In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, it had both a revolutionary and a conciliant side to its character. In the period of the socialist revolution, exploitation of the working class for profit constitutes one side of the character of the national bourgeoisie, while its support of the Constitution and its willingness to accept socialist transformation constitute the other. The national bourgeoisie differs from the imperialists, the landlords and the bureaucrat-capitalists. The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between exploiter and exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between the two classes, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods. However, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie will change into a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy if we do not handle it properly and do not follow the policy of uniting with, criticizing and educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie does not accept this policy of ours." (Ibid, p. 386)

"Our state is a people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance. What

is this dictatorship for? Its first function is internal, namely, to suppress the reactionary classes and elements and those exploiters who resist the socialist revolution, to suppress those who try to wreck our socialist construction, or in other words, to resolve the contradictions between ourselves and the internal enemy."
(Ibid, p.387)

On the basic of these positions, quoted at length, it can be cleared up beyond doubt that Mao Tse-tung considered it possible to build socialism w i t h o u t a dictatorship over the class of the bourgeoisie, thus without any real dictatorship of the proletariat, with a "p e o p l e ' s dictatorship" including the national bourgeoisie. In the entire writing the dictatorship of the proletariat is not mentioned.

Although Mao Tse-tung in his "Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work", held a few months later, talked about the dictatorship of the proletariat:

"They (certain intellectuals - Authors' Note) do not like our state, the dictatorship of the proletariat..."
(Ibid, "Volume V", p.423)

he again, a few pages later, in effect, e q u a t e d this state with the people's dictatorship and wrote:

"The state, the people's democratic dictatorship, has paved the way for the rapid economic and cultural development of our country."
(Ibid, p.429)

Apart from this contradiction, which o b s c u r e s the essential distinction between the state power of the democratic revolution and the state power of the socialist revolution, it in any case becomes clear that Mao Tse-tung with this standpoint, namely, that the "national bourgeoisie" p o l i t i c a l l y belongs to the category of the people, that no dictatorship will be exercised over it, rather as part of the people it should i t s e l f s h a r e in the exercise of the dictatorship, fully remained within the framework of the revisionist line of the Eighth National Congress.

Thus, Mao Tse-tung who in this writing protested against the revisionism of the C.P. of China in a number of passages (which we shall later document in detail) remained holding a revisionist position in the central question of the attitude towards the national bourgeoisie in this period.

Mao Tse-tung attempted to p r o v e in theory the necessity of such an alliance, which had merely been a s s e r t e d by the Eighth National Congress. First of all he stated the contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie is "by nature antagonistic" - as he had also stated in the years before.

This formulation in fact attempts to show that this principle of Marxism-Leninism is valid to say "purely in theory", but in practice, for the politics in C h i n a , it is just not appropriate.

"Under the concrete conditions of our country" - this is so to say the magic formula, meant to slur over the antagonism.

And this is absolutely wrong! The antagonism does n o t follow from this or that special feature of this or that country, but is comprised in the essence of capitalism, in the e s s e n c e of this e x p l o i t i n g s y s t e m . It follows from the existence of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the working class, namely, that it m u s t appropriate the "surplus" created by the proletariat by means of the capitalist mode of production, precisely in order to exist!

This was naturally also the case in C h i n a . Unavoidably, sooner or later, this contradiction had to be resolved by v i o l e n c e , even if this contradiction, conditioned by the peculiarities of China, could continue to exist for some time during the socialist revolution.

Mao Tse-tung diverted precisely from this. He did not deal with the national bourgeoisie as a c l a s s , but distinguished between various i n d i v i d u a l s of this class, spoke about the chances of remoulding them etc.

Besides referring to the Chinese peculiarities which allegedly rescind general principles like the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao Tse-tung's second big theoretical lever is the reference to the "dual character" of the national bourgeoisie in China. (+)

O n t h e o n e h a n d "exploitation of the working class for profit" - o n t h e o t h e r h a n d "its willingness to accept socialist transformation".

Here the question arises: What kind of socialist transformation is this that the bourgeoisie "accepts"? (Though Mao Tse-tung did not say "heralded with a fanfare of gongs and drums" like the Eighth National Congress, he nevertheless said "accepts"!)

This can o n l y be a "socialist transformation" which does not lay a finger on the existence of the bourgeoisie itself as an exploiting class.

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We wish to draw attention to the fact that in the unauthorized writing of 1952 "The Contradiction Between the Working Class and the Bourgeoisie

is the Principal Contradiction in China" it was particularly demanded that "the national bourgeoisie should n o longer be defined as an intermediate class" (Ibid, "Volume V", p.77)

And here we come to a further, very important problem:

Was it correct to state that socialist relations of production had already been essentially created, when the bourgeoisie as a class, as an exploiting class, still existed?

Here it is n o t possible to investigate China's reality in detail. But, as stated by Mao Tse-tung himself, here the problem was that mixed state-private enterprises existed, in which the workers were still exploited in the form of fixed yields pocketed by the national bourgeoisie. (+)

We do n o t assert that something like this could not exist on the way to the socialist revolution. In fact, something like this c a n exist and something similar had existed in Russia during the NEP - even with the participation of foreign capital!

But we most decisively declare:

I n s u c h a c a s e, in essence, or in the main socialist relations of production have not yet been established, in such a case serious battles for the liquidation of the exploiters are still at hand.

Precisely such a statement was n o t made by Mao Tse-tung in 1957 !

Rather, Mao Tse-tung declared:

"In China...socialist transformation has in the main been completed as regards the s y s t e m o f o w n e r s h i p, and although the large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end."
("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, "Volume V", p.409)

(+) The large-scale "revelations" by the Party of Labour of Albania or the Communist Party of Germany/Marxist-Leninist about the forms of exploitation indisputably existing in China have been undertaken from an unprincipled standpoint, since they represent the matter in such a way as if the socialist revolution could eliminate exploitation entirely all at one blow.

This is nothing but demagoguery. For example, even after the October Revolution, during the period of socialist construction, exploitation existed for seventeen years, without the socialist Soviet Union having been an "exploitative society" before 1934.

Even the fact that in the initial years in China the struggle against the rich peasants was at first not started on a massive scale must be compared with the offensive against the Kulaks in the Soviet Union, correctly undertaken only in 1927/28 .

(See for that "Volume V", p.24 and p.227.)

Simultaneously, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that class struggle was by no means over and that the b o u r g e o i s i e still existed:

"There are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remoulding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. Class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field will still be protracted and tortuous and at times even very sharp. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is not really settled yet."
(Ibid, p.409)

This passage, which was very often quoted during the Cultural Revolution and in the Report to the Ninth National Congress, talks of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, raises the question of "which will win out"!

What strikes at first is that Mao Tse-tung on the one hand said that in 1957 socialist transformation had already "in the main been completed" in China. On the other hand, however, he also stated that not only some "remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes" continued to exist, but also declared without any qualification: "There is still a bourgeoisie". These formulations at least give scope for the interpretation that in Mao Tse-tung's view the bourgeoisie as a class continues to exist even after the socialist transformation has "in the main" been completed.

Apart from that, it also does n o t correspond to the truth that Mao Tse-tung took here as a starting point the irreconcilable contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. At least he did not do so c o n s e q u e n t l y (the formulation "which will win out" is actually meaningful only in the case of antagonistic contradictions) because he had already earlier spoken of the fact that "by and large the class struggle between the two (the working class and the national bourgeoisie - translator) is a class struggle within the ranks of the people" (Ibid, p.386).

It is also of great significance that Mao Tse-tung then, in spite of his formulation "which will win out", came to speak of the political parties of this bourgeoisie and accepted them at long date as instruments of the bourgeoisie.

The essence of the problem is that Mao Tse-tung clearly renounced the political dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, that he wished to lead the class struggle against the bourgeoisie "among the people" without the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

He explained:

"The slogan 'long-term coexistence and mutual supervision' is also (+) a product of China's specific historical conditions. It was not put forward all of a sudden, but had been in the making for several years. The idea of long-term coexistence had been there for a long time. When the socialist system was in the main established last year, the slogan was formulated in explicit terms. Why should the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties be allowed to exist side by side with the party of the working class over a long period of time? Because we have no reason for not adopting the policy of long-term coexistence with all those political parties which are truly devoted to the task of uniting the people for the cause of socialism and which enjoy the trust of the people." (Ibid, p.413)

Here it becomes clear that no dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and its partners was strived for at long date because, strictly speaking, these parties were seen as advocating the "cause of socialism", as if the bourgeoisie in China would allegedly advocate its own total destruction.

Without doubt this is a case of a serious revisionist deviation.

It may well be true that taking the consciousness of the petty bourgeois masses into consideration, it is possible and correct under certain circumstances to permit for some time and for tactical reasons petty-bourgeois parties even at

(+) The word "also" refers to the policy of "Let a hundred flowers blossom" explained earlier and, in a certain sense, also to the attitude towards the national bourgeoisie in general. Mao Tse-tung stated:

"The views set out above are based on China's specific historical conditions. Conditions vary in different socialist countries and with different Communist Parties. Therefore, we do not maintain that they should or must adopt the Chinese way." (Ibid, p.413)

This express reference and also limitation to the "national peculiarities" of China unfortunately does not improve matters.

The basic problem is that Mao Tse-tung here did not (as he did in his writings about the specific features of warfare in China, or about the specific feature that in China, differently from in Russia, temporary alliances with the bourgeoisie were possible in the democratic stage of the revolution) at first set out the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, in this case the all-round dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and did not then apply these principles to the specific conditions of China. Rather, the "specific policy" fundamentally contradicts these principles, evades and must evade them, dislodges and replaces these principles. And thus even in the method itself lies a basically revisionist position.

the start of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat (just as a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia were removed from the government of the Bolsheviks only after they had been totally exposed in front of the masses). It may well be true that, under certain circumstances at the start of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat it is correct for a short period and for tactical reasons, in countries like China, not to ban the parties of the national bourgeoisie immediately, considering the still insufficient exposure of these parties and the still insufficient socialist education of the masses, but to allow them to exist for some more time in a controlled and limited way. Still, it is in principle wrong to propagate such a line - with the declaration, which can only serve to disorient the masses, that the bourgeoisie is "for socialism".

In our opinion, it is no coincidence that such views were propagated in the year 1956, that is, in the year of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. and the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China.

They were in total conformity with the revisionist line of the "peaceful, non-violent overcoming of the bourgeoisie", propagated internationally by Krushchov, and with the thesis of the Eighth National Congress that the national bourgeoisie in China ostensibly enthusiastically welcomed socialism!

d) Antagonistic and Non-Antagonistic Contradictions in Socialism and the National Bourgeoisie in China

This question, which in the first instance is a philosophic one, was already tackled by Mao Tse-tung in his essay "On Contradiction" in the context of the current political questions of inner-Party struggle against the enemies and against misguided comrades.

In his essay "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" Mao Tse-tung stated that antagonistic contradictions in the political sphere had to be resolved by dictatorial methods, by the method of coercion (contradictions between "ourselves and the enemy"), while non-antagonistic contradictions in the political sphere had to be resolved by the method of persuasion, non-violently, by democratic methods.

Thereby, Mao Tse-tung took into consideration that non-antagonistic contradictions could be transformed into antagonistic ones and, in general, antagonistic contradictions could be transformed into non-antagonistic contradictions.

With the example of "Hungary" Mao Tse-tung showed that the enemies naturally endeavoured to exploit the contradictions among the people in their own favour. Therefore, the communists had to obstruct these attempts of the enemies by correctly handling the contradictions among the people.

This exposition by Mao Tse-tung, which on the whole is not wrong, is aimed at a very definite point. It does not remain universally philosophic, but serves as a justification for the revisio-

nist position that in China the contradiction between two definite classes, namely, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat must be handled "non-antagonistically", democratically and non-violently.

Let us now consider in detail Mao Tse-tung's reasoning:

"In our country the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people."
("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, "Volume V", p.386)

"The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between exploiter and exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between the two classes, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods."
(Ibid, p.386)

"In ordinary circumstances, contradictions among the people are not antagonistic. But if they are not handled properly, or if we relax our vigilance and lower our guard, antagonism may arise. In a socialist country, a development of this kind is usually only a localized and temporary phenomenon. The reason is that the system of exploitation of man by man has been abolished and the interests of the people are fundamentally identical."
(Ibid, p.391)

"Contradictions in socialist society are fundamentally different from those in the old societies, such as capitalist society. In capitalist society contradictions find expression in acute antagonisms and conflicts, in sharp class struggle; they cannot be resolved by the capitalist system itself and can only be resolved by socialist revolution. The case is quite different with contradictions in socialist society; on the contrary, they are not antagonistic and can be ceaselessly resolved by the socialist system itself."
(Ibid, p.393)

Thereby Mao Tse-tung evidently referred to Lenin's statement, already quoted in "On Contradiction", that "antagonism and contradiction" were not at all "one and the same". "Under socialism, the first will disappear, the second will remain". (Ibid, p.345) (+)

As Mao Tse-tung proceeded from the fact that in China

a) socialist relations of production had in the main been established,

(+) The context of this quotation by Lenin can be looked up in: "Critical Comments on Bukharin's 'Economics of the Transition Period'", 1920, Reprint in German, Frankfurt/Main 1981.

b) the national bourgeoisie and its parties were "for socialism",

he concluded that "the antagonism" between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat "has disappeared", that indeed it had been transformed into a non-antagonistic contradiction, which could be resolved democratically and peacefully.

In opposition to extreme Right opportunists, Mao Tse-tung correctly stated that the class contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie, which was still getting a "fixed rate of interest on their capital in the joint enterprises" (Ibid, p.403) was not yet "completely resolved". He emphasized that it "will take a considerable period of time" to resolve it completely! (Ibid, p.402)

(In passing: The antagonistic aspect of the "dual nature of the bourgeoisie", mentioned by Mao Tse-tung, does not play any actual role with regard to the actions of the Party. It is taken into account merely as a possibility, and not as a fact!)

In our opinion all these views of Mao Tse-tung should without fail be subjected to thorough criticism.

1) Mao Tse-tung very wrongly refers to Lenin. For Lenin it is clear that in socialism the class antagonism "disappears" only as far as the exploiting classes "disappear", i.e., as they are liquidated as classes. For Mao Tse-tung, on the contrary, the class antagonism allegedly disappears without the bourgeoisie having disappeared as a class. For Lenin the disappearance of the antagonism is clearly a consequence of the liquidation of the bourgeoisie as a class, i.e., its violent expropriation by the proletariat in power, that is, by the dictatorship of the proletariat. For Mao Tse-tung, on the contrary, the originally antagonistic contradiction is mysteriously transformed into a non-antagonistic one, whereupon the bourgeoisie, though it does not disappear as a class, ceases to oppose socialism and even accepts its construction. In a word: Mao Tse-tung stands here in a drastic contrast to Lenin.

2) Mao Tse-tung in fact wrongly concludes that as there exists socialism there could not exist any antagonistic contradictions between classes. Thereby, socialist society, which was still being built, and which in the economic sphere still had substantial remnants of the old exploiting society, was mixed up with fully developed and fully realized socialist society.

In China's case the socialist system by no means existed in all essential areas, especially not in the year 1957, as Mao Tse-tung claimed. Rather, capitalist exploitation existed to a large extent. There also still was the bourgeoisie. Precisely this part of China's reality could not be termed as "socialist society". Various relations of production still existed side by side in China (just as in Russia in the initial years after the October revolution) (+). This fact should

(+) At this point we would once again like to bring to mind that even the characterization of the state sector as socialist was by no means without its problems, because the bourgeoisie as the exploiting class shared in state power.

not be slurred over, all the more so, since it is a question of systems of exploitation and of abolition of exploitation standing in antagonistic contradiction to one another.

Precisely for this reason, it is absolutely absurd to claim that "in a socialist society" "the antagonism...disappears", because the bourgeoisie does not and can not exist within the socialist system.

3) A distinction of principle has to be made between the question of individual members of a certain class changing from being enemies into being friends, and the question how historically conditioned economic formations of society like capitalism and the classes representing it, are related to one another, and how they can be abolished.

This is not a question of national peculiarities separated from laws of historical development. Rather, it is a question of principle for all countries of the world, how, by what methods, by what state, by what struggle, led by what class etc. capitalism and the capitalist class can be liquidated.

In the preface to the first edition of the "Capital" Marx characterized the historical replacement of one social formation by another as a "law of nature". Marx also clears up that in the case of these laws he is not concerned with the fate and the actions of individual capitalists and landowners, but that he deals with such individuals only in so far as they are the

"personifications of economic categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests."

(Karl Marx, "Capital" Volume I, Preface to the First Edition, 1867. Penguin Edition, p.92)

From this it follows (independent of the possibility of "settling" matters rapidly or gradually, harshly or "moderately", conditioned by specially favourable or unfavourable national peculiarities) in every country the building of socialism must include the liquidation of the bourgeoisie as a class, in every country the building of socialism is from the first impossible without the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is a dictatorship over the class of capitalists with the aim of its total destruction as a class.

Here we must call to mind Stalin's sentences formulated in the struggle against the Bukharinites:

"One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests between the capitalist class and the class of the workers who have come to power and have organised their dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing remains - namely, to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

One thing or the other:

either Marx's theory of the class struggle, or the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism; either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, or the theory of harmony of class interests."

(Stalin, "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U. (B)", 1929, Works 12, p.133)

e) Summary of Our Assessment and Evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's Attitude Towards the National Bourgeoisie in 1957

In sum, it emerges that Mao Tse-tung in his writing "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" propagated two positions, fundamentally contradicting Leninism:

a) In the economic sphere one could not only come to an agreement with and coexist with the bourgeoisie for a certain period of time (as in the phase of the NEP), but rather a close co-operation was precisely the path leading to the creation of socialist relations of production at long date and to the "peaceful" dissolution of the bourgeoisie, since the parties of the bourgeoisie were allegedly "for the cause of socialism".

b) Thus, right from the beginning, there was no need for a dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie for building of a socialism understood in this manner. Rather, the bourgeoisie, as an ally, could share in socialist state power at long date.

Mao Tse-tung did not primarily regard the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to be an unconditional, indispensable prerequisite for the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution.

Instead, under the cover of "Chinese peculiarities" he denied the universally valid antagonism between the working class and the class of capitalists in China and demanded its non-antagonistic treatment. Thus he immensely aided the revisionist propaganda of a "peaceful-democratic" transition to socialism without a dictatorship against the bourgeoisie, disseminated internationally ever since the Twentieth Congress.

We once again expressly emphasize: This criticism of ours is not directed against the fact that the people's democratic dictatorship was initially maintained for three to four years in order to carry out the democratic revolution, which, in a country like China had extraordinarily vast and complicated, and therefore, time-consuming tasks to fulfil.

Our criticism does not at all demand that right at the beginning of the socialist revolution all capitalists should be expropriated. It is fully correct to carry out for a certain period of time a policy of the NEP (not to be confused with a policy of a political alliance with the bourgeoisie).

The basic distinction between Lenin at the time of the NEP and the C.P. of China consists in the following:

While L e n i n clearly insisted upon proletarian state power which temporarily u n i t e d with state capitalism only on the economic front, the C.P. of China and Mao Tse-tung talked of a political alliance with the national bourgeoisie and its parties!! Precisely such an alliance n e v e r existed at the time of the NEP, in Lenin's and Stalin's time. On the contrary Lenin taught not to shrink "from adopting dictatorial methods" while taking over state capitalism (Lenin, "Left-Wing Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality", 1918, Selected Works p.441) and refused any political alliance with the socialist-revolutionary forces, which had become counter-revolutionary, not to speak of the NEP-people, who, though they were tolerated economically, were on no account allowed to take part in government, or even allowed to legally establish a party! In the same article Lenin emphasized that in spite of state capitalism (of the NEP)

"there is no question, and can be none, of sharing p o w e r , of renouncing the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie."
(Ibid, p.446)

Based on t h i s dictatorship against the bourgeoisie, Lenin even advocated winning over to our side "not grudging the cost, the most skilled people capitalism has trained" (Ibid.) in the certainty that armed workers were watching over their activity!

Thus, to finally conclude:

Our crucial criticism is: not to have refuted the revisionist thesis of the Twentieth Congress of the "democratic way to socialism", of the "persuasion of the bourgeoisie", but to have considered the bourgeoisie and socialism to be reconcilable. (+)

(+) The essay "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" was not only highly praised by W. Ulbricht in the GDR, but was also mentioned positively in diverse textbooks after the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.. Specially the passage on the "non-antagonistic" contradiction with the national bourgeoisie was extensively quoted.

(See for example, "Textbook of Philosophy", Moscow 1958, p.297, Ger. ed. - in which it is emphasized that the contradiction with the bourgeoisie changes into a "non-antagonistic contradiction", that it can be democratically resolved by means of persuasion, that it "moderates itself" etc. Or even "Textbook of Political Economy", Moscow 1959, pp.414ff Ger. ed. - where, by directly quoting Mao Tse-tung's writing mentioned above, the "peaceful", "non-antagonistic way" to socialism as a reconciliation with the bourgeoisie is highly praised).

The decisive mistake is not to have connected the commencement of the socialist revolution with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the class of capitalists!

Mao Tse-tung's revisionist mistake is basically one which also for a time appeared in the various people's democracies in the countries of Eastern Europe, which had traversed two stages of the revolution. In the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution they too wanted to start building socialism without having consciously established the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In opposition to this R i g h t o p p o r t u n i s t deviation, Comrade Dimitroff emphasized in conformity with Lenin's thesis, that - even while taking all national peculiarities into account - the transition to socialism is in e s s e n c e only made possible by the dictatorship of the proletariat:

"The particular form of transition from capitalism to socialism in Bulgaria does not and cannot alter the basic laws on the transition period from capitalism which are valid for all countries.

The transition to socialism cannot be carried out without the dictatorship of the proletariat against the capitalist elements and for the organization of the socialist economy." (G. Dimitroff, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Reply to the Discussion". - in: "Selected Speeches and Articles", with an Introduction by Harry Pollitt. London 1951, p.274)

On the whole, it has been certainly the fact in the C.P. of China that Mao Tse-tung's writings as well as Party documents contain c o n t r a d i c t o r y positions. Firstly, this does not make things any better. Secondly, it also means that in the case of the authorized writings, as well as while evaluating the unauthorized writings, one should not use the method of picking out certain quotations and thus presenting only o n e aspect of the matter. The revisionist positions must be seen and must be criticized. But it must also be seen that a d e v e l o p m e n t took place in Mao Tse-tung's views: At first - specially under the influence of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. - a swing towards clearly revisionist positions. Later, a gradual - to be sure contradictory and insufficient - breaking loose from the idea of being able to build socialism without a dictatorship over the e n t i r e bourgeoisie, thus without a dictatorship of the proletariat in the full sense of the term.

We shall see that in 1957 Mao Tse-tung evidently propagated revisionist positions of a "democratic" resolution of the contradiction between the working class and the class of capitalists in China. Later - having learnt by practical experience - he once again in the Cultural Revolution joined the views of Marxism-Leninism, as formulated by Stalin, and spoke of the "life-and-

death struggle", of the "dictatorship over the bourgeoisie". He rejected "peaceful co-existence" and "equality" with the bourgeoisie, as well as limiting oneself to the use of only "democratic" methods against it!

f) Unauthorized Passages on the Attitude Towards the National Bourgeoisie and the Transition from the Democratic to the Socialist Stage of the Revolution

While going through Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized writings on this theme the following aspects emerged which at least should be touched upon here:

In the writing "Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions", dated August 30, 1956, it is said about the bourgeoisie:

"The bourgeoisie in Russia was a counter-revolutionary class, it rejected state capitalism at that time, organized slow-downs and sabotage and resorted to the gun. The Russian proletariat had no choice but to finish it off. This infuriated the bourgeoisie in other countries, and they became abusive. Here in China we have been relatively moderate with our national bourgeoisie, who feel a little more comfortable and believe there are some good points in our policy." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.313)

This exposition contains a few "uncovered flanks" which are open to revisionist interpretations. For it is at least suggested here (even if not openly said) that it is not only possible to be "relatively moderate" with the Chinese bourgeoisie, but also that it was possible in China to dispense with the policy of destr roy in g the bourgeoisie as a class.

In fact, the inevitable clash and irreconcilable class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat came to the forefront in China a little later, and not immediately after the victory in 1949. This was because of the peculiarities of the democratic stage of the revolution which had proceeded under the leadership of the proletariat.

In one of the "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees" of January 1957 it is said:

"We have undertaken to provide for the capitalists and pay them a fixed rate of interest for a period of seven years. What is to be done after the seven years? That is to be decided according to the circumstances prevailing then. It is

better to leave the matter open, that is, to go on giving them a certain amount in fixed interest. At this small cost we are buying over this class. The Central Committee has given this policy very careful consideration. On the whole, the capitalists plus the democrats and intellectuals associated with them have a higher level of cultural and technical knowledge. By buying over this class, we have deprived them of their political capital and kept their mouths shut. The way to deprive them is to buy them over and make arrangements to give them jobs. Thus political capital will not be in their hands but in ours. We must deprive them of every bit of their political capital and continue to do so until not one jot is left to them. Therefore, neither can our urban policy be said to have deviated to the Right." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.357)

In this passage it becomes clear for reasons, which were certainly weighty in part, that it was expedient to pay the bourgeoisie a fixed rate of interest, to concede them limited profits, really based on exploitation, as a price for obtaining their cultural and technical knowledge, in order to make maximum use of their professional knowledge etc.

Even then the formulation "buying over this class" strikes us as rather precarious. Firstly, such a course means a policy of expropriation against compensation. This is a policy by which the class of the bourgeoisie on the whole is equipped with considerable means. These means not only originate from the exploitation of the proletariat, but could also be used to restore this exploitation. Secondly, such a course supposes that the bourgeoisie as a class really lets itself be bought over. This we fundamentally doubt. Of course, it will take what it can get, but therefore it will on no account give up its class interest as an exploiting class. It remains bourgeoisie, and thus an enemy of socialism, provided that socialism is not deformed into a caricature for its sake.

The opinion that this class would lose its political capital through such a course seems to us to be completely wrong. On the contrary, it gains in weight, especially because it has its own political parties which share in the state apparatus.

At this point it must be emphasized that certainly it is not so much the economic-financial concessions made to the national bourgeoisie which we consider to be wrong. (Here really a lot depends on the concrete conditions. We know that even after the October Revolution bourgeois specialists necessarily continued to get much too high special salaries for a certain period of time; members of the old exploiting classes were made "interested" in their labour by means of high payments etc.)

- o The salient point is and remains
- o the idea that "the political capital", the political power, the
- o political influence of the bourgeoisie could be broken "peacefully - non-violently", i.e., democratically, that consequently
- o the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie is
- o not necessary.

However, in the unauthorized writings of "Volume V" there are passages standing in direct opposition to the ones quoted above. In the writing "Have Firm Faith in the Majority of the People", of October 13, 1957, it is unmistakably said:

"The bourgeoisie will be eliminated, but not physically; the bourgeoisie will be eliminated as a class." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.504)

In our opinion, here the perspective of eliminating the bourgeoisie as a class is correctly pointed out. We therefore underline this statement. However, at the same time, it must be emphasized that the elimination of the class of capitalists is an indispensable prerequisite to create socialist relations of production, to abolish exploitation of man by man!

However, in opposition to this, it is well-known that in 1957 Mao Tse-tung talked about the fact that "in the main" socialist relations of production had been established, though the bourgeoisie continued to exist as a class.

In another unauthorized writing, however, this all too soon proclamation of socialism is again considerably relativized:

"Only... (in a period of ten to fifteen years; Authors' Note) will it be possible to regard our state (the superstructure) as fully consolidated and our socialist society as fundamentally built. It is not built yet, and ten to fifteen years more are needed." ("The Situation in the Summer of 1957", "Volume V", p.479)

With this assessment, which appears to be considerably more realistic, on the whole recourse is taken to the original orientation of the fifties, namely, to have really established the "foundations of socialism" only in the course of three to four Five-Year Plans.

This change in attitude in the unauthorized writings also touches the attitude to a part of the national bourgeoisie. In the writing mentioned above the following attitude towards the bourgeoisie is developed:

"The bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals do not gladly submit to the Communist Party, and the Rightists among them are determined to match their strength with ours. Once beaten in a trial of strength, they will realize that the game is up and their position is hopeless. Not until then will the majority (the middle section plus a number of the Rightists) begin to behave themselves, gradually abandon their bourgeois stand, come over to the side of the proletariat and make up their minds to throw in their lot with it. A small number will refuse to change to the very end; we'll just have to let them take their reactionary views with them to the grave. We must however heighten our vigilance. It must be realized that at the first opportunity they will again stir up trouble. Counting from now, this struggle will probably last ten or as many as fifteen years." (Ibid, p.478)

On evaluating this passage it is striking that now, differently from Mao Tse-tung's speech in 1957 "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", the reality of antagonistic contradictions, the necessity of a really socialist

revolution even against parts of the national bourgeoisie is seen - although as before, there are theses like - the counter-revolutionary Rightists will understand after being "beaten in a trial of strength, that the game is up and their position is hopeless" - which do not conform to Leninism. Leninism demands exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie (and not only over part of it) from the beginning to the end!

In another authorized writing it can clearly be seen the mistake of mixing the two questions, of not clearly distinguishing between the class of the national bourgeoisie on the one hand, and individuals belonging to this class who possibly come over to the side of the people on the other. After practice had evidently proved that the "purely democratic" attitude towards the national bourgeoisie is not sufficient, but dictatorial measures are necessary two sections of the national bourgeoisie are defined immediately:

"about 10 per cent of our total population disapprove of or oppose socialism. The figure comprises the landlord class, the rich peasants, part of the well-to-do middle peasants, part of the national bourgeoisie, part of the bourgeois intellectuals, part of the upper stratum of the urban petty bourgeoisie and even a few workers and poor and lower-middle peasants... 90 per cent of our people are in favour of socialism. This comprises the proletariat, the poor peasants who are the semi-proletariat of the rural areas, the lower-middle peasants and the majority of the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, the majority of the bourgeois intellectuals and part of the national bourgeoisie." ("Have Firm Faith in the Majority of the People", 57, "Vol. V", p. 500)

In our opinion, on the basis of this (and the following) passage, it can be clarified that in general socialism and the bourgeoisie are wrongly considered to be reconcilable. Although in general it is clear that the socialist revolution must be directed against the bourgeoisie but, in reality, while viewing it class-analytically, there is no class approach. Instead, there are speculations about which individuals (i.e., not as representatives of their class) can be won over, and which cannot be won over.

In the same article after the passage quoted above, at first it is stated fully correctly:

"What is the scope of the socialist revolution, what classes are involved in this struggle? The socialist revolution is a struggle waged by the proletariat at the head of the working people against the bourgeoisie." (Ibid, p. 501)

Directly following this, after the forces of the proletariat's allies are considered, the class of the bourgeoisie is again confused with individual persons:

"We should also take an analytical approach towards the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals and not regard them all as being opposed to socialism, because that is not the case." (Ibid, p. 501)

And further on:

"It can convince the majority of the bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois intellectuals and of the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie." (Ibid, p. 502)

First it is declared that the bourgeoisie must be eliminated as a class (not physically). But from this it is not clearly concluded that every member of the bourgeoisie representing his class has to be suppressed, that dictatorship has to be exercised over him.

On the contrary, the attitude towards members of this exploiting class is treated in one and the same breath with the stratum of bourgeois intellectuals. And precisely the big, decisive question is not (or indirectly wrongly) answered: Do socialism and bourgeoisie exclude one another, or can both be "democratically combined with one another" till this contradiction finally disappears?

Because ostensibly the "majority" of the bourgeoisie can be convinced!

However, as a perspective this is absolutely false because at the very least a "convincing" by means of a fixed rate of interest is not "convincing". Rather, it is a "buying over" which does not and can not have anything to do with "standing for the cause of socialism".

The following passage from the writing "Be Activists in Promoting the Revolution" of October 1957, though not un-

authorized, but indirectly mentioned in the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China, points in a different, even correct direction:

"We are now carrying out the socialist revolution, the spearhead of which is directed against the bourgeoisie..." (Ibid, "Volume V", p. 492)

From the unauthorized writings it is apparent that up to 1956 there was no comprehensive discussion, no clarity about the scope and the consequences of the socialist revolution, especially about the dictatorship of the proletariat, among the broad masses of the people. Even in the Party there was no clarity on this point. With reference to long-term co-existence with bourgeois parties, Mao Tse-tung mentioned in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" as well as in other writings:

"The socialist revolution came to swiftly that the Party's general line for the transition period has not been fully debated either inside the Party or in society at large. This may be likened to a cow eating grass. It gulps the grass down, stores it in its stomach, then regurgitates it and slowly chews the cud. We have been making socialist revolution in the system, firstly in the ownership of the means of production and secondly in the superstructure, in the political system and the sphere of ideology, but there has never been a full debate on the question." ("Beat Back the Attacks of the Bourgeois Rightists", 1957, "Volume V", p. 464)

Now, in 1957, this debate was to be initiated and carried out:

"This great debate among the people throughout the country has solved or is in the process of solving questions of cardinal importance, such as whether our work in the revolution and in construction is correct (that is, whether achievements in the revolution and in construction are primary), whether the socialist road should be taken, whether the leadership of the Communist Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism are needed, and whether our foreign policy is correct. It is natural that such a great debate should have taken place. It took place in the Soviet Union in the twenties (the debate with Trotsky and others on whether socialism could be built in one country),

and it is taking place this year in our country, in the fifties." ("The Situation in the Summer of 1957", 1957, "Volume V", p. 479)

In these passages something basically catastrophic is described with considerable frankness, namely, that the broad masses of the working people, led by the proletariat, should be made to "slip into" socialism, practically without socialist consciousness. This, however, is totally impossible and completely contradicts the basic idea of socialist revolution as a revolution of the conscious working class.

More aggravating is the supposition, repeatedly coming to the fore, that without a revolution on the political front, that is to say, without establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat (in place of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants and other anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces), a socialist revolution could be carried out on the economic front.

Precisely this, however, is impossible. In fact up to 1956 the economic foundation of socialism was also not laid in China in the sense of abolishing capitalist exploitation. The measures of nationalization and expropriation were in the main those that had been carried out by the expropriation of imperialist and comprador capital in the course of the new-democratic revolution by the masses with solely democratic and anti-imperialist motives.

Through the protracted process of the revolution, the broad masses of the people in China became convinced that the capital, the factories and possession of the imperialist and the "bureaucrat capital", the capital of the comprador bourgeoisie had to be expropriated.

This was something magnificent pointing towards the future, but it was still not socialist understanding. Rather, it was national-democratic understanding, anti-imperialist consciousness, which should have been developed further into socialist consciousness by the Party.

De facto 80 per cent of the existing factories in China were converted into state property already in the first phase of the revolution. This sector was taken out of the hands of the exploiters, and it produced without any exploitation. Thus (seen economically) it was de facto a quasi "socialist sector"

in the phase of the revolution which was still new-democratic.

This was definitely a good thing and could have effectively prepared and facilitated the advance to the socialist stage of the revolution.

In view of the lack of clarity in the Party about the entire complex of the transition to the higher stage of revolution, this characteristic of the Chinese revolution was changed into a lap of idleness, into a factor for slurring over and negating the distinctions between the two necessary stages of the revolution.

The complexity of the passing over of the democratic into the socialist stage of the revolution is shown, among other things, in the fact that in the democratic stage, with a democratic consciousness of the masses, de facto even socialist measures can be taken, while on the other hand, in the socialist stage of the revolution possibly many big tasks, democratic in nature, have to be solved and mastered.

Thereby, it is of decisive importance what line is propagated by the Communist Party, how it educates the masses of the people, above all how it educates the working class.

g) The Campaign "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom" in 1957 and the Underlying Questions of Establishing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Through Mass Struggle

An important theme in the International Communist Movement is the assessment of Mao Tse-tung's instructions in 1957 "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom" and the questions underlying it.

We find wrong those who find "totally correct" and in every way defend this campaign and Mao Tse-tung's principal statements, as well as those who, on the basis of fundamentally bureaucratic conceptions, reject Mao Tse-tung's statements as "totally misguided".

The campaign "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom" has really many aspects. Some of these do not manifest themselves in Mao Tse-tung's authorized writings, but do so later in the C.P. of China's statements (as well as in descriptions in unauthorized passages from "Volume V".)

First of all, in our opinion, it is not a question limited to the areas of "science and culture" (although the approach in these areas was an important component). Rather, it is a question of Mao Tse-tung's attempts to educate the masses ideologically in view of the sharpening class struggle between capitalism and socialism internationally and in China. This class struggle utilized the division in the world communist movement caused by the

If the hegemony of the proletariat is secured by the Communist Party in the democratic stage of the revolution, then enterprises in public ownership, a socialist sector can exist in the democratic stage of the revolution. However, in order to really build socialism, in order to carry out the socialist revolution with the aim of eliminating capitalism and every kind of exploitation, a strong dictatorship of the proletariat, a high socialist consciousness and socialist education is an absolute prerequisite in China as elsewhere.

It is absolutely impossible to build socialism over the heads of the masses of the people, without them being conscious of it, and then later announce: You built socialism without noticing it - See, how good it is!

This is because socialism is not merely an economic system, but a social system. Indeed the first social system, which in all areas, economic, political and ideological etc. must be carried by the active participation, the conscious and organized participation of its producers.

Krushchov revisionists, and in face of the Hungary incident expressed itself as an ideological anti-communist tidal wave.

Mao Tse-tung evidently saw that a bureaucratic conception would only worsen a situation in which broad sections of the working masses had, to this or that extent, been influenced by the anti-communist tidal wave - also as a result of the already existing bureaucracy. He saw that the masses would have to be convinced, and that conviction and education cannot take place under compulsion and by violent measures.

So the campaign "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom" was also meant to practise a "mass line" directed against bureaucracy.

In view of the "Hungary incident" in 1956 Mao Tse-tung developed his theses on the correct handling of demonstrations and strikes by the masses, which are carried out without or even against the leadership of the Party.

In our opinion, in all these statements by Mao Tse-tung there are many valuable aspects, which must definitely be sifted.

However, in order to classify correctly both negative and positive aspects of Mao Tse-tung's line in the campaign "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom" in the following analysis, it must first of all be recalled that this campaign does not exist outside of Mao Tse-tung's entire political line in this period.

o The basis of Mao Tse-tung's political line in this period was not to regard the bourgeoisie as part of the counter-revolution, not to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat over it.

Another aspect is that Mao Tse-tung evidently repeatedly overestimated the possibilities of convincing, as has been proved by the necessity of a radically new revolution, the Cultural Revolution in China, thus by practice itself.

The two basic authorized writings on the theme "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom" are "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" and "Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work".

The unauthorized writings contained in the so-called "Volume V" give some indications of the concrete course of events. In so far we shall also refer to them.

The Role of the Negative Teacher/ Development Through Struggle

One of the most important ideas in general, which also played an important role for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was Mao Tse-tung's Marxist-Leninist view that a real understanding of Marxism, of proletarian ideology, is impossible without knowledge of the enemy's ideology.

In "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" Lenin said:

"who would know the enemy must go into the enemy's territory."
(Ibid, 1908, Coll. Works Vol. 14, p. 317, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1962)

Accordingly, Lenin also recommended to the Russian ambassadors in Germany not only to see to the circulation of his criticism of Karl Kautsky, but also

"not to stint thousands in buying up this book (Kautsky's "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat" - Authors' Note) and distributing it gratis among the class-conscious workers in order to trample in the mud this "European" - read: imperialist and reformist - Social-Democracy, which has long been a 'stinking corpse'."
("The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", 1918, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1975, p. 69)

Mao Tse-tung stated on this question:

"It is only through repeated education by positive and negative examples and through comparisons and contrasts that revolutionary parties and the revolutionary people can temper themselves, become mature and make sure of victory. Whoever underestimates the role of teachers by negative example is not a thoroughgoing dialectical materialist."
(Quoted in: "Attach Importance to the Role of Teachers by Negative Example" by Chi Ping, Peking Review 13/1972, p. 5)

In the essay "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"Marxism can develop only through struggle, and this is not only true of the past and the present, it is necessarily true of the future as well. What is correct invariably develops in the course of struggle with what is wrong. The true, the good and the beautiful always exist by contrast with the false, the evil and the ugly, and grow in struggle with them. As soon as something erroneous is rejected and a particular truth accepted by mankind, new truths begin to struggle with new errors. Such struggles will never end. This is the law of development of truth and, naturally, of Marxism."
(Ibid, "Volume V", p. 409; see also "Volume V", p. 433)

Proceeding from this consideration, in 1955 the C.P. of China published "Material on the Counter-Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique" with main notes by Mao Tse-tung. In 1957 it allowed the "bourgeois Rightists" to have their say in the press, to then "crush them into the dust". At the time of the "Great Polemics" volumes of Krushchov's speeches were published. (Here, we do not know to what extent these volumes were commented. We emphasize, however, that in all circumstances we are for a devastating criticism of all "poisonous weeds".)

So, one of Mao Tse-tung's basic ideas was that struggles should be waged, that contradictions should not be concealed, that pre-

cisely the masses of the people develop their consciousness only in struggle, that for the struggle the opponent's ideas must be set forth clearly and authentically and must be crushingly exposed and refuted. (We shall return to the concrete course of this method in 1957 in the section on Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized writings.)

In "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" of 1957, Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"Marxists should not be afraid of criticism from any quarter. Quite the contrary, they need to temper and develop themselves and win new positions in the teeth of criticism and in the storm and stress of struggle. Fighting against wrong ideas is like being vaccinated - a man develops greater immunity from disease as a result of vaccination. Plants raised in hothouses are unlikely to be hardy." (+)
(Ibid, p. 410)

We fully agree with precisely this idea and also with the formulation of this idea. It is fully correct and an important guiding principle for the cadres as well as for the education of the masses.

Democratic Methods of Conviction and Dictatorial Methods of Coercion in Ideological Struggle

A really conscious education of the proletariat and other working people by the Communist Party demands "learning from negative examples" and the knowledge of counter-revolutionary ideology!

All bureaucrats are fundamentally unable to grasp this truth. They do not understand how, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, counter-revolutionary writings can be introduced even in

(+) On the "hothouse effect" it is said in the writing "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees" of January 1957:

"It is a dangerous policy to prohibit people from coming into contact with the false, the ugly and the hostile, with idealism and metaphysics and with the twaddle of Confucius, Leo Tzu and Chiang Kai-shek. It will lead to mental deterioration, one-track minds, and unpreparedness to face the world and meet challenges."
(Ibid, "Volume V", p. 366)

As a consequence the same writing reports:

"We have now decided to increase the circulation of News for Reference from 2,000 to 400,000 so that it can be read by people both inside and outside the

Party. This is a case of a Communist Party publishing a newspaper for imperialism, as it even carries reactionary statements vilifying us. Why should we do this? The purpose is to put poisonous weeds and what is non-Marxist and anti-Marxist before our comrades, before the masses and the democratic personages, so that they can be tempered. Don't seal these things up, otherwise it would be dangerous."
(Ibid, p. 369)

We do not know exactly what these "News for Reference" looked like. In our opinion, such a thing can be a very good and useful arrangement, if the anti-Marxist and non-Marxist theses are really combatted. In special cases, articles by the imperialists, excerpts from revisionist articles etc., can and should be printed in the Central Organ of the Marxist-Leninist Party and should be subjected to a devastating criticism.

the Party press, w h y bourgeois ideology is c r i t i c i z - e d at all, although one is in possession of an a p p a r a - t u s which can regulate all this by "administrative" means.

It is well known that in the fight against bureaucracy it is necessary on the one hand not to fall into l i b e r a l i s m, and at the same time unwaveringly achieve a consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of a broader participation in state power by the proletariat, and under it's leadership, of the other working people.

While permitting counter-revolutionary writings, indeed while permitting even counter-revolutionary agitation in certain situations, o n e point is essential:

The Party and the power of the working class, the dictatorship of the proletariat, can permit this only in a c o n t r o l l - e d and l i m i t e d way, only by simultaneously leading a firm and offensive struggle against such views! Basically, this permission should s e r v e the struggle for destroying the counter-revolutionary ideology in the minds of the working masses and to crush all connected political plans of counter-revolution.

However, the decisive problem arises when counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary ideology find a b r o a d following among the masses of the people. Here, w i t h o u t excluding right from the beginning the well-thought use of force, one must primarily use the method of convincing and educating the masses of people, one must lay the m a i n e m p h a s i s on this method; one cannot convince and consciously educate by coercion.

In "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" Mao Tse-tung raised the question:

"What should our policy be towards non-Marxist i d e a s ? As far as unmistakable counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs of the socialist cause are concerned, the matter is easy, we simply deprive them of their freedom of speech. (+) But incor-

(+) In an unauthorized speech in January 1957, it is said:

"Let a hundred flowers blossom - I think we should go on doing that. Some comrades hold that only fragrant flowers should be allowed to blossom and that poisonous weeds should not be allowed to grow. This approach shows little understanding of the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. In general, counter-revolutionary statements will naturally be prohibited. However, if they are made not in a counter-revolutionary form but in a revolutionary guise, you will have to allow them. That will help us see these statements for what they are and wage struggles against them."

(Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal

and Autonomous Region Party Committees", 1957, "Volume V", p.359)

In our opinion, this formulation gives scope for many different interpretations. We think that, for example, revisionist statements which as yet have not been seen through by the masses should indeed be first published under the control of the Party, even if they are counter-revolutionary in essence. H o w e v e r, camouflaging counter-revolutionary statements in a revolutionary guise cannot in general be used as an argument for allowing them. In our opinion, counter-revolutionary statements in a revolutionary guise, which have already been exposed in the presence of and by the masses of the people should not be allowed at all, but must be suppressed by the masses of the people. They cannot be discussed ad infinitum.

rect ideas among the people are quite a different matter. Will it do to ban such ideas and deny them any opportunity for expression? Certainly not... You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will still be there." (Ibid, "Volume V", pp.410,411)

In this passage, it is proclaimed that counter-revolutionaries do not have any right to speak. We fully agree with this. However, it must be kept in mind that when Mao Tse-tung made this speech in 1957(+) he expressly did n o t regard the bourgeoisie as part of counter-revolution.

Secondly, in our opinion, in the last sentence of the above quotation it is not only a question of wrong ideas being expressed among the people, but a question of expressing wrong statements in general, among them counter-revolutionary ones. Though, it is in fact true that merely hindering the expression of wrong ideas- quite independent of their character- does not prevent them from continuing to exist, to exert influence and possibly to even gain further influence etc.

However, one should not draw from this the g e n e r a l conclusion that the expression and dissemination of such ideas must unconditionally be allowed. It is a matter of the Party's analysis to lead a planned and systematic struggle especially against ideas that are directly counter-revolutionary. This must be done in accordance with the requirements and conditions in the ideological area in unison with the political and economic struggle, i.e., with the total situation, at times to present or even

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In the unauthorized writing "Things are Beginning to Change" of May 15, 1957, it is said:

"The bourgeoisie and many of the intellectuals who formerly served the old society are invariably stubborn in asserting themselves, invariably yearn for that old world of theirs and invariably find themselves somewhat out of their element in the new. It will take quite a long time to remould them, and in the process crude methods should not be used. On the other hand, we must take into account the fact that, compared with the early days of liberation, most of them have made considerable progress, and their criticisms of our work are mostly correct and must be accepted. Only some of the

criticisms are wrong, and in such cases matters should be clarified. It is in order for them to ask to be trusted and given authority commensurate with their positions: they must be trusted and given authority and responsibility." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.443)

Precisely the policy of giving the bourgeoisie "authority and responsibility" (See our criticism in Part II) reflected the wrong attitude to the bourgeoisie as bearer of bourgeois ideology. The bourgeoisie was simply not considered to be counter-revolutionary.

publish in original this or that idea in the framework of this planned ideological struggle, in order to better combat them.(+)

In our opinion, Mao Tse-tung's exposition becomes problematic above all, when he refers to bourgeois ideology in general.

In the same work Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"It is inevitable that the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie will give expression to their own ideologies. It is inevitable that they will stubbornly assert themselves on political and ideological questions by every possible means. You cannot expect them to do otherwise. We should not use the method of suppression and prevent them from expressing themselves, but should allow them to do so and at the same time argue with them and direct appropriate criticism at them. Undoubtedly, we must criticize wrong ideas of every description. It certainly would not be right to refrain from criticism, look on while wrong ideas spread unchecked and allow them to dominate the field. Mistakes must be criticized and poisonous weeds fought wherever they crop up. However, such criticism should not be dogmatic, and the metaphysical method should not be used, but instead the effort should be made to apply the dialectical method. What is needed is scientific analysis and convincing argument. Dogmatic criticism settles nothing. We are against poisonous weeds of whatever kind, but we must carefully distinguish between what is really a poisonous weed and what is really a fragrant flower. Together with the masses of the people, we must learn to differentiate carefully between the two and use correct methods to fight the poisonous weeds."

("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", "Volume V", p.411)

We repeat: one cannot convince and consciously educate by using coercion.

(+) The bourgeois Rightists in China got a chance to express themselves in the official press only for a short period of time. Then finally the "free expression of opinion" of the bourgeois reactionaries was stopped.

In an unauthorized writing it is reported:

"The counter-attack on the Rightists may take a few more weeks, a month or so. However, it would be impossible if the press kept on publishing the Rightists' views as it is now doing and continued

for the rest of the year, next year and the year after. There are just so many Rightists, the press has carried just about enough of their views, and there isn't much more to print. From now on, we shall print a little more in some form or other but none when there is nothing worth printing. In my view July is still a month for intensive counter-attack on the Rightists."
("Beat Back the Attacks of the Bourgeois Rightists", 1957, "Volume V", p.462)

We very much agree that bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies, which inevitably express themselves, have to be criticized analytically and convincingly.

Our criticism of the passage quoted above begins there when, from the inevitability that bourgeois ideology will express itself, it is concluded that one should let it "manifest itself" without any hindrance ("without the method of suppression"). We find precisely this connection to be wrong. While discussing the theme "national bourgeoisie", we have already dealt with the deeper roots of this mistake in relation to the dictatorship of the proletariat. We said that, in general, the dictatorship of the proletariat was not exercised over the bourgeoisie.

Mao Tse-tung's reasoning can also be used with reference to counter-revolutionary utterances, which, of course, can hardly be totally obstructed. However, this does not at all mean that no methods of suppression should be used against them. In our opinion, the central idea is that the dictatorship of the proletariat can permit the dissemination of certain counter-revolutionary ideas under its control and within well-considered limits (differently from the democratic stage this also includes bourgeois-democratic ones in the stage of the socialist revolution). However, this must be done without giving a general license that bourgeois ideas be combated only ideologically, and not also with appropriate coercive measures.

Using democratic methods among the people, combating wrong ideas among the masses of the people by persuasion, discussion and reasoning is a fundamental aspect of the slogan "Let a hundred flowers blossom". One can thoroughly agree with this.

Mao Tse-tung stated:

"Many people seem to think that the use of the democratic method to resolve contradictions among the people is something new. Actually it is not. Marxists have always held that the cause of the proletariat must depend on the masses of the people and that Communists must use the democratic method of persuasion and education when working among the labouring people and must on no account resort to commandism or coercion. The Chinese Communist Party faithfully adheres to this Marxist-Leninist principle."
("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, "Volume V", p.391)

In the struggle against the Trotskyist deviation of introducing "military methods" in mass work and on the trade-union front, Lenin had already fought a basic battle against commanding airs. Similarly, in the struggle against Trotskyism, Stalin put forward this fundamental principle. (+)

(+) See for this, Lenin's writing "On Trade Unions" of December 1920 in LW 32, p.1ff (Ger.ed.) and Lenin's "Talk on the Trade Unions" of March 1921 at the Tenth Party Congress in LW 32, p.211ff and Stalin "Our Disagreements", 1921, Works 5, pp.5,6.

However, it is not so easy to carry out this basic principle, because possibly such contradictions arise among the people that laws are violated, the minority does not submit to the majority after the close of a discussion, rendering insufficient the methods of education and persuasion.

With regard to such cases Stalin stated:

"Leadership is ensured by the method of persuading the masses, as the principal method by which the Party influences the masses. This, however, does not preclude, but presupposes, the use of coercion, if such coercion is based on confidence in the Party and support for it on the part of the majority of the working class, if it is applied to the minority after the Party has convinced the majority."

(Stalin, "Concerning Questions of Leninism", 1926, Works 8, p.56)

Mao Tse-tung in no case excluded the possibility that even among the people coercion can be used. (Even if some formulations give this impression and are open to such a wrong notion.)

In the basic writing, already quoted, he unambiguously wrote:

"Lawbreakers among the people will be punished according to law, but this is different in principle from the exercise of dictatorship to suppress enemies of the people."
("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, "Volume V", p.387)

In our opinion Mao Tse-tung at the same time rightly exposed that such measures can in no case achieve a solution of the ideological problem. The impression should not be created that the use of coercive measures (which are sometimes necessary among the people) can lead to an ideological solution of the problem.

On this question he wrote:

"The only way to settle questions of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the people is by the democratic method, the method of discussion, criticism, persuasion and education, and not by the method of coercion or repression."
(Ibid, "Volume V", p.389)

In his writing "Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work", 1957, he said:

"Our comrades must understand that ideological remoulding involves longterm, patient and painstaking work, and they must not attempt to change people's ideology, which has been shaped over decades of life, by giving a few lectures or by holding a few meetings. Persuasion, not coercion, is the only way to convince people. Coercion will never result in convincing people. To try to make them submit by force simply won't do. This kind of method is permissible in dealing with the enemy, but absolutely impermissible in dealing with comrades or friends."
(Ibid, "Volume V", pp.432,433)

At first, in this passage the same idea is formulated as in the writing quoted above. In the last sentence, however, there is a problem involved in saying "absolutely impermissible".

Further above, we quoted Mao Tse-tung himself who said that coercive measures can and must be used against sections of the people, against law-breakers! The above formulation that it is "absolutely impermissible" to use force or coercion against friends and comrades does not take this case into consideration. In so far it is wrong to use words like "absolutely impermissible".

We shall see that during the Cultural Revolution the revisionists used this obvious shortcoming in the formulation to register a "protest" against the "coercion" by the revolutionary rebels of the Cultural Revolution, to stop the mass movements, to "drive away" or not allow the dictatorship of the proletariat in the superstructure etc.

However, Mao Tse-tung's above defective statement is fully correct in two ways :

Firstly, if short-term coercive measures (for example, the withdrawal of a theatre play, of a film, even if parts of the people are not convinced of the correctness of such a measure etc.) are carried out, then it does not lead to the convincing of this part of the people. This can in fact only be achieved on a long-term basis using the method of persuasion, on the basis of one's own experiences, led by the education by the Party, which imparts socialist consciousness.

Secondly, the fact must really be taken into consideration that in the case of coercive measures precisely those against whom it is directed are not convinced. Though the ideological contradiction is initially concealed and suppressed, it cannot be resolved. Indeed, in a certain sense, the ideological problem is even sharpened.

Coercion, organizational-administrative measures are not the basic line of the Party in mass work. The basic line of the Party is to convince the masses with the help of its own experiences in the struggle.

On this basis (and in no way disconnected from it) it can definitely be necessary to use coercive methods within and outside the Party, even against comrades and part of the people, if - in a certain situation in class struggle - this is based on the trust and support of the majority of the proletariat and the working people; with the consciousness that thereby the ideological problems cannot be solved and even are possibly sharpened.

"A Hundred Flowers" in the Area of Science and Art

In our opinion, Mao Tse-tung's statements with regard to the slogan "Let a hundred flowers blossom" in the spheres of art and literature contain no big problems and are easy to under-

stand (+).

In our opinion, Mao Tse-tung very rightly referred here to Stalin's struggle against the bureaucratic-revisionist regime in some areas of Soviet science. This struggle was brilliantly exposed in the writing "Marxism and Problems of Linguistics". Here Stalin wrote:

"It is generally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism."

(Ibid, 1950, Peking edition 1976, p.29)

Already in 1929, comrade Stalin stated:

"Of course, it is very easy to 'criticise' and to demand the banning of non-proletarian literature. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. It is not a matter of banning but of step by step ousting the old and new non-proletarian trash from the stage by competing against it, by creating genuine, interesting, artistic Soviet plays capable of replacing it. Competition is a big and serious matter, because only in an atmosphere of competition can we arrive at the formation and crystallisation of our proletarian literature."

(Stalin, "Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky", 1929, Works 11, p.343)

(+) On the development and f o r m s of struggle it is said in an unauthorized writing:

"With the majority of the people supporting socialism, the current appearance of the new form - speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way and writing big-character-posters - is advantageous. This form has no class character. The Rightists too can use it. We are indebted to the Rightists for inventing the expression 'in a big way'. In my talk of February 27 this year I didn't use this expression, I said nothing about speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way. At a meeting here in May last year, when we talked about letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend, we were referring to 'airing views' and 'speaking out', and in neither case was the expression 'in a big way' used. What is more, letting a hundred

flowers blossom was meant to apply only to the sphere of literature and art and letting a hundred schools of thought contend only to academic matters. Later on the Rightists called for extending the application to political matters, in other words, they called for the airing of views on all matters, for a 'period of airing views', and what is more, they wanted them aired in a big way. It is evident that this slogan can be used by the bourgeoisie as well as by the proletariat; it can be used by the Left, the middle and the Right alike. Which class really benefits from this slogan of speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way and writing big-character posters? In the final analysis, the proletariat, not the bourgeois Rightists." ("Have Firm Faith in the Majority of the People", 1957, "Volume V", pp.502,503)

In "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" Mao Tse-tung wrote entirely in this sense:

"Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting progress in the arts and sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. Different forms and styles in art should develop freely and different schools of science should contend freely. We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in these fields. They should not be settled in an over-simple manner. A period of trial is often needed to determine whether something is right or wrong. Throughout history, at the outset new and correct things often failed to win recognition from the majority of the people and had to develop by twists and turns through struggle. Often, correct and good things were first regarded not as fragrant flowers but as poisonous weeds. Copernicus' theory of the solar system and Darwin's theory of evolution were once dismissed as erroneous and had to win out over bitter opposition. Chinese history offers many similar examples. In a socialist society, the conditions for the growth of the new are radically different from and far superior to those in the old society. Nevertheless, it often happens that new, rising forces are held back and sound ideas stifled. Besides, even in the absence of their deliberate suppression, the growth of new things may be hindered simply through lack of discernment. It is therefore necessary to be careful about questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences, to encourage free discussion and avoid hasty conclusions. We believe that such an attitude will help ensure a relatively smooth development of the arts and sciences."

(Ibid, "Volume V", pp.408,409)

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung very clearly saw that an ideological class struggle between proletarian and bourgeois ideology, thus a basic problem of c o n t e n t, can of course be expressed behind the struggle between "different" schools and styles.

With respect to this Mao Tse-tung expressly emphasized:

"We advocate 'letting a hundred schools of thought contend', and there may be many schools and trends in every branch of learning, but on the matter of world outlook, there are basically only two schools in our time, the proletarian and the bourgeois. It is one or the other, either the proletarian or the bourgeois world outlook. The communist world outlook is the world outlook of the proletariat." ("Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work", 1957, "Volume V", p.427)

Even Mao Tse-tung's sharpest critics will not succeed in proving that he advocated liberalism in the ideological sphere; as if according to him "poisonous, counter-revolutionary" views should be allowed to spread themselves, as if they should not be criticized and refuted.

Mao Tse-tung often very rightly emphasized:

"All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all ghosts and monsters, must be subjected to criticism; in no circumstances should they be allowed to spread freely. However, the criticism should be fully reasoned, analytical and convincing, and neither rough and bureaucratic, nor metaphysical and dogmatic." (Ibid, p.434)

Undoubtedly, these are unrelinquishable Marxist-Leninist principles, which cannot be dispensed with.

Dogmatism and Revisionism

In 1957, the main problem was the "bourgeois Rightists" outside the Communist Party. But at this juncture, Mao Tse-tung also probably realized that in view of the influence of the Twentieth Congress on part of the C.P. of China's cadres, and in view of the situation in the world communist movement, the struggle had to be concentrated against the main danger of revisionism, that is, Right opportunism.

Thus, he wrote in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People":

"At the same time as we criticize dogmatism, we must direct our attention to criticizing revisionism. Revisionism, or Right opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought that is even more dangerous than dogmatism. The revisionists, the Right opportunists, pay lip-service to Marxism; they too attack 'dogmatism'. But what they are really attacking is the quintessence of Marxism." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.411)

In the speech on propaganda work in 1957 on the whole the same thing is said:

"For a long time now people have been levelling a lot of criticism at dogmatism. That is as it should be. But they often neglect to criticize revisionism. Both dogmatism and revisionism run counter to Marxism. Marxism must necessarily advance; it must develop along with practice and cannot stand still. It would become lifeless if it were stagnant and stereotyped. However, the basic principles of Marxism must never be violated, otherwise mistakes will be made. It is dogmatism to approach Marxism from a metaphysical point of view and to regard it as something rigid. It is revisionism to negate the basic principles of Marxism and to negate its universal truth. Revisionism is one form of bourgeois ideology. The revisionists deny the differences between socialism and capitalism, between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. What they advocate is in fact not the socialist line but the capitalist line. In present circumstances, revisionism is more pernicious than dogmatism. It is an important task for us to unfold criticism of revisionism on the ideological front now."

("Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work", 1957, "Volume V", pp.434,435)

This assessment of Mao Tse-tung was proved fully correct. It also contributed to gathering in for him the irreconcilable hatred of Right opportunists and revisionists in the C.P. of China and internationally. (+)

To make the masses participate in the ideological struggle, not to underestimate the role of the negative teacher, to criticize "poisonous weeds" - these are the basic ideas, which later played an important role against the "bourgeois Rightists" inside the Party during the Cultural Revolution.

However, on analysing Mao Tse-tung's writings up to 1957 a fundamental contradiction is manifested between the correct call to combat revisionism as the main danger, and his Right opportunist attitude towards the national bourgeoisie, towards the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in all areas, including the ideological one.

It is well-known, in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism the main question is that of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to gain it and to consolidate it.

And precisely in this question Mao Tse-tung did not wage a real struggle against the modern revisionists in 1957, but himself advocated revisionist positions.

The further development in China showed that the revisionist positions established at the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China totally corresponded to Liu Shao-chi's and Teng Hsiao-ping's revisionist line to sabotage the socialist revolution. These revisionist positions developed into such a danger that the Cultural Revolution had to be started. In our opinion, it is beyond doubt that in 1957 Mao Tse-tung did not see the danger of revisionism in its totality. With the positions held by him on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat he was quite unable to do so. ★

(+) The unauthorized writing "Things are Beginning to Change" of May 15, 1957 correctly says:

"There are a number of people whose thinking errs on the side of dogmatism. Most of them are staunch and steadfast and devoted to the Party and the country, only their approach to problems shows a 'Left' one-sidedness. After overcoming this one-sidedness, they will take a big step forward. There are also a number of people whose thinking errs on the side of revisionism or Right opportunism. They pose the bigger danger because their ideas are a reflection of bourgeois ideology inside the Party, and because they yearn for bourgeois liberalism, negate everything and are tied in a hundred and one ways to bourgeois intellectuals outside the Party. Over the last few months, people have been criticizing dogmatism but have allowed revisionism to

go unchallenged. Dogmatism should be criticized, or else many mistakes cannot be rectified. Now it's time to direct our attention to criticizing revisionism. When dogmatism turns into its opposite, it becomes either Marxism or revisionism." (Ibid, "Volume V", p.440)

Even the last sentence is not wrong in any way because the bearers of dogmatic views (if they struggle against dogmatism) are indeed confronted by the danger of now throwing overboard the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, of becoming revisionists. On the other hand, precisely with regard to revolutionary cadres who have committed dogmatic errors (as an 'infantile disorder') there naturally exists a real possibility of coming to a deeper understanding of Marxism-Leninism, of understanding the significance of the consequent application to concrete conditions and of becoming mature Marxist-Leninists.

III. ON THE QUESTION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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Perhaps the most difficult task while evaluating Mao Tse-tung's life and work from 1949 to 1976 is the assessment of the period from 1965/66 onwards. From this period of the Cultural Revolution (which was officially concluded only in 1977 by the Eleventh National Congress, but in actual fact was to some extent brought to an end with the Ninth National Congress in 1969), which took place in China as a specific occurrence under extraordinarily complex conditions, there exist very few statements by Mao Tse-tung and hardly any exact information about his work. His speeches at the Plenary sessions of the Central Committee since 1966 (described as being "highly significant") as well as his speeches at the Ninth and Tenth National Congress of the C.P. of China were not published.

In the following we want to assess and, if necessary, critically comment on Mao Tse-tung's most important statements from this period. However, this is impossible unless we have some evaluation of the Cultural Revolution itself.

The Cultural Revolution in general as well as concretely in China this is a self-contained, comprehensive theme going far beyond the scope of this analysis of Mao Tse-tung's life and work. In this way or that, it will engage us for many more years.

With this awareness, we therefore first wish to put forward our assessment of the Cultural Revolution in the form of these. Then, within this framework, we wish to consider Mao Tse-tung's most important statements:

1. Lenin's and Stalin's Teachings on the Cultural Revolution, Necessary in all Socialist Countries, must Strictly be Differentiated from the Peculiarities of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

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a) Lenin's and Stalin's Basic Positions on the Cultural Revolution

The proletarian revolution begins first with the political revolution (establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, proletarian state power) and the revolution in the economic sphere (the creation of socialist relations of production) before real communist culture can become a dominating and determining factor in the country. Lenin expressly pointed out the impossibility of making communist consciousness and culture dominating among the masses of the people under the conditions of capitalism. (See Lenin, "On Co-operatives", 1923, LW 33, p. 461 - Ger.ed.) Directly after the victory of the October Revolution he even emphasized in opposition to the "Proletcult"-movement that - in view of the immense problem of illiteracy and the absence of the most simple rules of administration and accounting - as a beginning, in the cultural sphere, even a certain minimum amount of bourgeois culture would be a big step ahead!

The question of proletarian cultural revolution came increasingly to the forefront in the Soviet Union owing to the development of socialist construction, the elimination, or extensive elimination of illiteracy and the all-round education of the working masses precisely in those basic rules of administration and accounting spoken of Lenin.

In the struggle for communism the consciousness of the masses of the people is decisive. The invincibility of communism is guaranteed only by the victory over conservatism, petty-bourgeois egoism and indiscipline, by the victory over the heritage of the ruling class ideologies. (See Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 409)

The ideological resistance of the "old world" against the world of communism is the "most deep and most stubborn" resistance, which is much more difficult and complicated to break than economic, political and military resistance. (See "Speech at the All-Russian Conference of the Commissions", LW 31, p. 364 - Ger.ed.)

The target of this proletarian revolution was specifically the reflection of bourgeois ideology in the minds of the working people, in the minds of the communist cadres in particular, and not simply bourgeois ideology and culture in general. It also aimed at unmasking those enemies hidden in the Party.

Mass struggles against petty-bourgeois influence (according to Stalin in: "Concerning Questions of Leninism", Works 8, p. 49), struggles against the power of habit, struggles against the rotten concentration exclusively on economic questions (according to Stalin in: "Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite and other Double Dealers", Works 14, pp. 256, 257), struggles from above by the Party leadership and from below by the mobilized masses in their millions, primarily against bureaucratic rigidity and the danger emanating from the "worst bureaucrats", namely those with the Party book, who hypocritically praise the leadership and thus try to worm their way in (See Stalin, Works 11, pp. 75, 138; Stalin, Works 14, pp. 253, 254) - these are the basic tasks of the proletarian cultural revolution.

The proletarian cultural revolution is an ideological cultural revolution in so far as it aims at eliminating bourgeois consciousness in the ranks of the working people. It is a political force in so far as it aims at uncovering and removing class enemies in the Party's ranks and in the proletarian state. Both these tasks are very closely connected in practice and influence one another. The strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat takes place by mobilizing and making the masses of the people under the dictatorship of the proletariat more conscious. It takes place by weakening and neutralizing the class enemy who disguises himself, or who consists of previously meritorious, but now degenerated cadres.

The cultural revolution does not decrease the role of the Communist Party. Rather, it is increased because the struggle for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat must be waged in all spheres. New and bigger demands will be made upon the

Party because the struggle is much more complex, the role of communist theory much greater. The significance of the disciplined avantgarde becomes much more powerful as the readiness and capability of the broad masses of people to extensively assimilate communism under the leadership of the Party grows. On the way to making itself superfluous the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the role of the proletarian Party expands! (See Stalin, Works 12,p.35)

The significance and the possibilities of the subjective factor also grow in the struggle against the danger of degeneration. Therefore the significance of purging the Party (as well as the state apparatus) not only of class enemies but also of unreliable, weakened and vacillating elements increases (see "Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet", 1919, LW 29, pp.15,16 -Ger.ed.)

Therefore the increase in the importance of self criticism and answerability of the entire Party, especially that of the Party leadership, towards the working class, the constant control of the work done, the public and open disclosure of mistakes, in order not to repeat them in future:

- o "Nothing can ruin us but our own mistakes".
- o (Lenin, "The Second All-Russian Congress of Miners", 1921, Coll.Works 32, p.56)

b) The Peculiarities of the Cultural Revolution in China

The Cultural Revolution, begun in China in 1965/66, definitely took up in its practice - without expressly referring to Lenin or Stalin in these questions - a number of elements of Lenin's and Stalin's teachings on cultural revolution in socialism.

Thereby, one can name chiefly the mass struggle against bureaucracy and against the danger of degeneration, against petty-bourgeois egoism and the power of habit, and then also the struggle for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But one of the most important, perhaps the most important characteristics of the Cultural Revolution in China was that above all it was a gigantic class struggle, a political revolution for the real establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in all areas against the revisionist clique of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

The revisionists had seized power in the Party, in the state apparatus and even in the majority of the enterprises. They had to be overthrown!

The Cultural Revolution as a political revolution, as a socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie, was also an attempt to consequently continue the struggle for socialism, which up to now had inconsequently been begun and waged. It was now a life-and-death class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and should therefore be understood as an attempt to make a transition from the democratic to the socialist stage of the revolution under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

In addition, the Cultural Revolution in China was a conscious world political answer to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and other East European countries. As one basic factor it stressed that even the generations who have grown up in socialism must continue to hold high the flag of revolution, that millions of successors for the cause of the proletariat must emerge from among the youth.

To study, analyse and to comprehensively grasp the peculiarities of the Chinese Cultural Revolution means actually to analyse and understand the pre-history and the wrong developments which made the Cultural Revolution with such unusual features (as the predomination of the revisionists in the Party, in the state and in the majority of the enterprises) at all necessary. Above all, it means to understand how such a catastrophic situation arose that the C.P. of China on the whole was no longer the real Marxist-Leninist headquarter of the proletariat.

Such a critical study of the Chinese Cultural Revolution uncovering all its mistakes is all the more necessary because the tendency in the C.P. of China to recommend its Cultural Revolution as a model for all countries was for a while dominant in the Party press.

However much we hail in the Chinese Cultural Revolution all that, which is linked with Lenin's and Stalin's teachings on the cultural revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, however much we defend the Cultural Revolution as a powerful blow against revisionism in China and also against the world-wide Krushchovian revisionism, we have still to be very conscious of where and to what extent during the Cultural Revolution the C.P. of China, i.e., Mao Tse-tung too, gave wrong answers to the situation that had arisen.

c) Our Opinion About the Basic Mistakes of the Cultural Revolution Must Be Understood as Criticism Based on Solidarity

Formulated in the form of theses, our criticism relates to the following points:

1.
In the ideological struggle prime importance was not given to the propagation of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin either in general or in relation to the questions of cultural revolution and the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In particular, the experiences from Stalin's time were in fact wrongly used as being in the main a "negative lesson". The positive experiences of the class struggle in the Soviet Union were not really evaluated and propagated. A completely wrong criticism of Stalin was made.

2.
Instead "Mao Tse-tung Thought" was propagated as the main ideological weapon and with that the role of Marxism-Leninism was

devalued. Underlying this was the notion that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution had now eliminated Lenin's and Stalin's "mistakes" (which they had committed unavoidably, or on the basis of subjective responsibility) and that now Marxism-Leninism had reached an "entirely new peak".

3. Such a notion made two things impossible: Firstly, no understanding at all could be created about the extensive mistakes of the C.P. of China's line before 1966, which had at all enabled the pre-dominance of the revisionists; nor could an understanding be created about Mao Tse-tung's mistakes in this connection. The completely wrong thesis was propagated that all mistakes were "smuggled in" by Liu Shao-chi. Thus, the entire scope of the struggle against revisionism could not be recognized at all.

Secondly, with such a notion the mistakes committed during the Cultural Revolution itself could not be exposed critically.

4. Basic theoretical mistakes of the Cultural Revolution (in connection with the attempts to construct "Mao Tse-tung Thought" and the absence of self criticism of the C.P. of China's basic line) consisted in wrongly generalizing specific characteristics of Chinese reality. The causes of these should have been uncovered, instead of raising them to the level of a theory.

Firstly, this concerns the thesis that in socialism the bourgeoisie exists as a class up to communism. In reality, obviously there still existed up to 1966 profit for part of the national bourgeoisie. In fact, some of the state enterprises became independent profit-bringing enterprises of the new bourgeoisie. However, just this was a mistake, and also a specific feature in China, connected with the wrong ideas on the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution. Precisely this was not exposed: the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class was not propagated, instead the continued existence of the "bourgeoisie as a class" even under socialist relations of production, was presented as a theoretical discovery of "Mao Tse-tung Thought". In this connection it was even criticized that Stalin eliminated the bourgeoisie as a class and the law of the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class up to communism was propagated for all countries of the world.

Similarly, this also concerns the thesis of the "two-line struggle within the Party". It was right to disclose that in China the "bourgeoisie as a class" still existed (but in order to d e n o u n c e this fact!). Just so, it also had to be made clear that evidently there existed t w o lines reaching even into the leadership of the C.P. of China for a long time. The mistake at this point did not lie in admitting this openly and honestly. The mistake began when a virtue was made of a necessity, when this fatal fact was generalized for the future and for all countries (as a theoretical discovery of Mao Tse-tung Thought), instead of making clear that the Marxist-Leninist line completely had to smash the revisionist line, had to eliminate it from the Party.

5. The attempt to hush up past mistakes which led to the Cultural Revolution in this particular form also showed itself in the thesis that the Cultural Revolution was most timely. With this thesis a self-critical analysis regarding the reasons for permitting the revisionists to predominate was naturally made impossible.

6. The thesis, a new Cultural Revolution should take place every six to seven years, so to say cyclically, was wrong in many respects:

★ The specific form of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, with all its very unfavourable conditions and peculiarities, was propagated as a law which regularly repeated itself.

★ This thesis suggested the idea that a new massive appearance of the revisionists was to be regarded as "normal". All hopes were set on the "next" cultural revolution, instead of on the immediate uncompromising struggle.

7. With regard to the practice of the Cultural Revolution (here apart from the extreme forms of ridiculing Mao Tse-tung through absurd forms of personality cult, which were later corrected) the serious point was the absence of a mass line in the practice of the Party leadership, the lack of publicity with regard to the i n n e r - P a r t y situation and the inner-Party struggle.

Particularly in connection with Lin Piao's downfall and the dismissal of Chen Po-ta, as well as with the comet-like re-ascent of Teng Hsiao-ping, on no account c o n f i d e n c e in the Party leadership was created. On the contrary, all these things were n o t of sufficient transparency and were not extensively substantiated.

Necessarily an atmosphere of uncertainty arose. The clear proletarian leadership of a Bolshevik Party was missing, which gained and retained the confidence of millions of people by the public and comprehensive substantiation of all its steps and by its unity between word and action.

A systematic and comprehensive exposition and above all a substantiation of all these theses is, of course, yet to be undertaken.

Thereby, already here it should be emphasized that in the majority of Mao Tse-tung's quotations cited below there is evidence of the endeavour to check or combat certain erroneous developments.

At the same time, it is also evident that Mao Tse-tung did n o t oppose certain mistakes of the Cultural Revolution, indeed he even gave massive support to them.

In the following we shall take a stand on each of Mao Tse-tung's important statements. But even all these statements in no way

enable a real analysis of Mao Tse-tung's role. His life and work in this period are not known extensively enough owing to the entirely wrong practice of secretiveness, even in central ideological debates.

d) Standpoint on Mao Tse-tung's Most Important Statements Before and During the Cultural Revolution

In the following section not a single writing by Mao Tse-tung can be used because only excerpts or fragmentary quotations exist as authentic statements by Mao Tse-tung.

This is all the more unfortunate because in the last phase of his life Mao Tse-tung had obviously changed his attitude towards the bourgeoisie. (+)

It is also highly unfortunate for another reason, namely, that precisely these statements by Mao Tse-tung which cannot be verified in their context, have very often been interpreted in a certain sense, namely, in a sense making them valid for all countries.

The most important passages from Mao Tse-tung's speeches and writings in this period are contained in the following writings:

- ★ "On Krushchov's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons For the World" (Ninth Comment in the "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the World Communist Movement")
- ★ "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China"
- ★ "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the C.P. of China"
- ★ as well as in lead articles from the period of the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "struggle against the wind from the right" against Teng Hsiao-ping.

The Period immediately Prior to the Cultural Revolution

In the period following 1957 the main problem was not the "old" national bourgeoisie. Certainly, in connection with the international struggle against modern revisionism, a serious struggle took place in various phases within the C.P. of China itself between the line of the "Chinese Krushchov" Liu Shao-chi and Mao Tse-tung's line. This means that above all it was the question of the newly arisen bourgeoisie.

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It is not authorized whether Mao Tse-tung performed self-criticism within the Party with regard to his attitude towards the national bourgeoisie. To be sure,

in the wall newspapers it was mentioned that Mao Tse-tung had performed self-criticism at the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee. (See "Reflections on China" by Enver Hoxha, Vol. I, p. 339)

At first, in view of the revisionist catastrophe, Mao Tse-tung drew the attention of the Party and the world communist movement towards the question of cadres, i.e., the question of the successors of the revolution.

In fact, here was a serious answer to the question: How was it possible that Stalin's Socialist Soviet Union degenerated though it had a correct line in the struggle against imperialism and for building socialism? How was it possible that there were not enough steeled, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist cadres who were able to withstand not only the metal bullets, but also the sugar-coated ones of the bourgeoisie?

Mao Tse-tung elaborated:

"In order to guarantee that our Party and country do not change their colour, we must not only have a correct line and correct policies but must train and bring up millions of successors who will carry on the cause of proletarian revolution."

In the final analysis, the question of training successors for the revolutionary cause of the proletariat is one of whether or not there will be people who can carry on the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary cause started by the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries, whether or not the leadership of our Party and state will remain in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries, whether or not our descendants will continue to march along the correct road laid down by Marxism-Leninism, or, in other words, whether or not we can successfully prevent the emergence of Krushchovite revisionism in China. In short, it is an extremely important question, a matter of life and death for our Party and our country. It is a question of fundamental importance to the proletarian revolutionary cause for a hundred, a thousand, nay ten thousand years. Basing themselves on the changes in the Soviet Union, the imperialist prophets are pinning their hopes of "peaceful evolution" on the third or fourth generation of the Chinese Party. We must shatter these imperialist prophecies. From our highest organizations down to the grass-roots, we must everywhere give constant attention to the training and upbringing of successors to the revolutionary cause.

What are the requirements for worthy successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat?

They must be genuine Marxist-Leninists and not revisionists like Krushchov wearing the cloak of Marxism-Leninism. (+)

(+) Unfortunately, Mao Tse-tung did not elaborate in greater detail this first, in our opinion most important criterion. It would have been necessary to elaborate the exceeding importance of the Marxist-Leninist education of the cadres and all Party members for a real mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory.

At the Eighth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B) Stalin said: FOOTNOTE continued on next page

They must be revolutionaries who whole-heartedly serve the majority of the people of China and the whole world, and must not be like Khrushchov who serves both the interests of the handful of members of the privileged bourgeois stratum in his own country and those of foreign imperialism and reaction.

They must be proletarian statesmen capable of uniting and working together with the overwhelming majority. Not only must they unite with those who agree with them, they must also be good at uniting with those who disagree and even with those who formerly opposed them and have since been proved wrong. But they must especially watch out for careerists and conspirators like Khrushchov and prevent such bad elements from usurping the leadership of the Party and Government at any level.

They must be models in applying the Party's democratic centralism, must master the method of leadership based on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses", and must cultivate a democratic style and be good at listening to the masses. They must not be despotic like Khrushchov and violate the Party's democratic centralism, make surprise attacks on comrades or act arbitrarily and dictatorially.

They must be modest and prudent and guard against arrogance and impetuosity; they must be imbued with the spirit of self-criticism and have the courage to correct mistakes and shortcomings in their work. They must not cover up their errors like Khrushchov, and claim all the credit for themselves and shift all the blame on others.

Successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in the great storms of revolution. It is essential to test and know cadres and choose and train successors in the long course of mass struggle." ("On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World", 9th Comment in the "Proposal Concerning the General Line..." and : Peking Review, No.29/1964, pp.26,27)

FOOTNOTE continued from last page

"The higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state or Party work, the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degeneration altogether." (Stalin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B)", 1939, Works 14, pp.407f)

Therefore Stalin also set the task:

"the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development." (Ibid, p.409)

In our opinion, in this passage a really fundamental problem is very rightly brought up, namely, that of the solid education of the cadres and the masses in the class struggle against imperialism and opportunism under the conditions of socialism.

One answer with regard to the danger of bureaucratic separation of functionaries from the masses was the collective participation of functionaries in productive work, practised even before the Cultural Revolution:

"It is necessary to maintain the system of cadre participation in collective productive labour. The cadres of our Party and state are ordinary workers and not overlords sitting on the backs of the people. By taking part in collective productive labour, the cadres maintain extensive, constant and close ties with the working people. This is a major measure of fundamental importance for a socialist system; it helps to overcome bureaucracy and to prevent revisionism and dogmatism." (Ibid, p.25)

Similarly, even before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tse-tung had repeatedly drawn attention to the new possibilities of the enemies and the danger of restoration:

"After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately against us, and we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit the gravest mistakes." (Mao Tse-tung at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the C.P. of China, 1949, quoted in: "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review, No.18/1969, p.18)

At the working conference in August 1962, i.e., at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee Mao Tse-tung said, while pointing out the danger of degeneration:

"Socialist society covers a fairly long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct socialist education. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every day so that we can retain a rather sober understanding of this problem and have a Marxist-Leninist line." (Quoted in: "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China", Peking Review, No.18/1969, p.20)

This basic statement, quoted again and again in the C.P. of China's documents, aimed unquestionably at heightening vigilance and demanded a monthly, even daily confrontation with the danger of capitalist restoration.

In our opinion, this was a very important and correct advice given by Mao Tse-tung. (+)

A year later Mao Tse-tung sharpened his tone further and warned even more urgently against the danger of revisionist degeneration. With the frightful experience of the degenerated Soviet Union in view, he called upon Party members, the working class and the masses of the people never to forget class struggle:

"If, in the absence of these movements, the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and ogres of all kind were allowed to crawl out, while our cadres were to shut their eyes to all this and in many cases fail even to differentiate between the enemy and ourselves but were to collaborate with the enemy and become corrupted and demoralized, if our cadres were thus dragged into the enemy camp or the enemy were able to sneak into our ranks, and if many of our workers, peasants, and intellectuals were left defenceless against both the soft and the hard tactics of the enemy, then it would not take long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a counter-revolutionary restoration on a national scale inevitably occurred, the Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or a fascist party, and the whole of China would change its colour."

(Mao Tse-tung, Note on "The Seven Well-Written Documents of the Chekiang Province Concerning Cadres' Participation in Physical Labour", May 9, 1963. Quoted from: "On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World", Peking Review, No. 29/1964, p. 26)

(+) The fully correct statement that "classes, class contradictions and class struggles" continue to exist in the period of socialism was often interpreted to mean that the bourgeoisie must continue to exist as a class in the entire period of socialism up to communism.

Such a view, however, is a very arbitrary interpretation of this quotation. Even if the bourgeoisie as a class is eliminated, there still exist various classes, class struggle still takes place against class enemies inside and outside the country. In so far as Mao Tse-tung's quotation is completely correct, though it was used to start a false polemic against Stalin. For the bourgeoisie is not directly considered at all. In this passage it remains open whether Mao Tse-tung by the classes existing "in the historical period of socialism" meant only the working class and the class of the co-operative farmers, or whether he also included the bourgeoisie which continued to exist as a class.

In 1965, actually in 1966, the Cultural Revolution began with great force in China. The dangerous picture warningly presented by Mao Tse-tung in 1963 had become even more menacing. Against this the Cultural Revolution was begun.

The Period from 1966 to 1969

The Cultural Revolution as a political revolution, as a life-and-death struggle against the bourgeoisie - the Cultural Revolution as a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, as a lever for the socialist revolution - these are the determining features of the Cultural Revolution in Mao Tse-tung's statements.

With regard to the question of the "national bourgeoisie", i.e., the bourgeoisie in general, absolutely no more statements by Mao Tse-tung can be found in the quotations published during this period saying that the contradictions between proletariat and bourgeoisie can be resolved "democratically", that these contradictions have a "non-antagonistic aspect" and so forth.

Quite the contrary (+), Mao Tse-tung defined the Cultural Revolution as

(+) However, in a qualified sense, it must be said that not only the writing "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" was propagated as a model in the central documents of the Cultural Revolution, but much worse: In the so-called "Red Book", published in mass editions in December 1966, in Chapter II precisely the wrong revisionist position is propagated (which had practically been thrown overboard in the documents of this period) that "in our country, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people" (Ibid, p. 56) and can "be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods" (Ibid, pp. 56, 57).

Ideologically and politically, this was a sabotage of the life-and-death class struggle against all representatives of the exploiting classes during the Cultural Revolution. In its method it shows that the entire manner of compiling quotations unhistorically and non-self-critically not only contradicts Marxist-Leninist study, but also leads to the possibility of arbitrarily misusing the authority of a leader like Mao Tse-tung for certain revisionist purposes. For, the aim of the quotations' compilation in the Red Book was expressly to be able to influence the current struggle with the help of Mao Tse-tung's teachings. (See for that the foreword to the "Red Book" by Lin Biao)

This particularly crass example also shows that it is an unforgivable mistake (which facilitated this methodical falsification), firstly to publish faulty writings without a self-critical foreword, secondly not to publish any more entire speeches by Mao Tse-tung, but to treat them, so to say, as secret documents. For both these mistakes Mao Tse-tung very definitely shares a large part of the responsibility.

"a great political revolution carried out by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie."

(Quoted in: "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China", Peking Review, No.18/1969, p.20)

What character does the contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie have? At the time of the Cultural Revolution Mao Tse-tung unambiguously stated:

"Can equality be permitted on such a basic question as the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the superstructure, including all the various spheres of culture, and the continued efforts of the proletariat to weed out those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Communist Party and who wave 'red flags' to oppose the red flag? For decades the old-line Social Democrats, and for over ten years the modern revisionists, have never allowed the proletariat equality with the bourgeoisie. They completely deny that the several thousand years of human history are a history of class struggle. They completely deny the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie... They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries opposing the Communist Party and the people."

Their struggle against us is one of life and death, and there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them, too, can be nothing but a life-and-death struggle, and our relationship with them can in no way be one of equality. On the contrary, it is a relationship in which one class oppresses another, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. There can be no other type of relationship, such as a so-called relationship of equality or of peaceful coexistence between exploiting and exploited classes, or of kindness or magnanimity.

(Quoted in: "Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", May 16, 1966. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, pp.6,7)

In this passage it becomes clear that evidently, caused by the hard struggle after 1957, Mao Tse-tung had unambiguously arrived at the Leninist position that the dictatorship of the proletariat must be exercised over the bourgeoisie, that this is an antagonistic contradiction, a "life-and-death struggle". With this view, the old one contradicting Marxism-Leninism is, in effect, thrown overboard (but unfortunately this is done without any self-criticism).

Let us return to the question of the bourgeoisie as a class in socialism. In 1968, Mao Tse-tung said that he proceeded from the fact that in China the bourgeoisie still existed as a class.

"We have won great victory. But the defeated class will still struggle. These people are still around and this class still exists."

(Quoted in: "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review, No.18/1969, p.28)

Here a problem is raised, which had already been broached in the "General Line Polemics", namely, whether it is a law that the bourgeoisie exists as a class during the entire period of socialism. Does the necessity of class struggle arise solely or above all from this fact?

On the contrary, is it not so that precisely after a certain point, namely, after the elimination of exploitation of man by man, after the establishment of socialist relations of production in the entire country, the bourgeoisie as a class owning the means of production is liquidated, and yet the class struggle of the proletariat against imperialism in general, against the remnants of inner reaction and newly arisen revisionist elements must be continued?

This question is necessary because the C.P. of China itself (for example in the Ninth Party Congress or in the "General Line Polemics") indeed postulated the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class as a general law valid for all countries for the entire period of socialism.

From Mao Tse-tung's passage quoted above it does not follow that the bourgeoisie as a class must necessarily exist up to communism. Rather, he goes into the concrete conditions existing in China at that time and states that there the bourgeoisie, at this point of time, still existed as a class. And this was an indisputable fact.

This must be emphasized today, especially against those "defenders" of Mao Tse-tung, whose main method consists in a schematic generalization of certain statements and conclusions of Mao Tse-tung - which merely established China's concrete situation - for all countries and all times, and thereby do this ad absurdum. Beyond that, these "defenders of Mao Tse-tung" have also gone over to giving out, unexamined, positions of the C.P. of China as being Mao Tse-tung's views and to ascribing all those statements to Mao Tse-tung, which the imperialists and revisionists simply assert to be originating from him.

In another quotation, too, it becomes clear that Mao Tse-tung is concerned with the aim of the Cultural Revolution in China:

"the fundamental contradiction to be solved by the great proletarian cultural revolution is the contradiction between the two classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the two roads, the socialist and the capitalist. The main target of attack in the present movement is those in the Party who are in power and are tak-

ing the capitalist road."

(In: "Comrade Lin Piao's Speech at the Peking Rally to Receive Revolutionary Teachers and Students from All Parts of China", September 15, 1966, Peking Review, No. 39/1966, p. 10)

Here it becomes clear that prior to the Cultural Revolution the bourgeoisie had not yet been eliminated as a class. (+)

However, it also becomes clear that Mao Tse-tung did not direct the gigantic class struggle of the Cultural Revolution against the "old" exploiters. For, (not in any way disassociated from this "old" exploiting class, as can be seen today) in the Party once revolutionary cadres had degenerated, certain "independent kingdoms" had been rigged up. These resisted the dictatorship of the proletariat and established bourgeois power organs with the help of which they gained possession of certain sectors of production and embezzled funds. Thus they became new exploiting elements. Precisely in this sense we understand Mao Tse-tung's brief statement: "The bourgeoisie is right in the middle of the Communist Party."

The Cultural Revolution was, however, not only a harsh revolution against the class enemy, it was also an ideological revolutionizing of the consciousness of the masses, a revolutionizing of the Party too.

It was a question of finding new forms of educating the masses and the cadres in the mass struggles.

It is certainly Mao Tse-tung's merit to have pointed out that the struggle against the class enemy and the solidarist education of the comrades can on no account be so simply separated from another. On this theme, he stated:

(+) After the Teng-Hua clique acceded to power the bourgeois press reported with great satisfaction that now expropriation and annulment of the fixed rates of interest of the national bourgeoisie from the period of the Cultural Revolution had been rescinded, and that the national bourgeoisie had now regained its expropriated property, including its rates of interest. The bourgeois parties banned in the Cultural Revolution were now permitted.

During the Cultural Revolution the C.P. of China did not publish in its press any details about the concrete line taken towards the national bourgeoisie, to what extent the national bourgeoisie had been expropriated, its rates of interest annulled or demanded back etc. This is naturally a serious drawback for an exact understanding of the C.P. of China's line, its practical modification and correction. One of the causes is definitely that the capitalist roaders in the Party and not the old national bourgeoisie were seen as the main target - undoubtedly rightly so.

"In the past, we fought north and south; it was easy to fight such wars. For the enemy was obvious. The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is much more difficult than that kind of war."

"The problem is that those who commit ideological errors are mixed up with those whose contradiction with us is one between ourselves and the enemy, and for a time it is hard to sort them out."

(Quoted in: "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review, No. 18/1969, p. 23)

The immediate aim of the Cultural Revolution was naturally the victory over Liu Shao-chi's revisionist clique. But it was much more basic to steel the masses and the cadres ideologically in this political class struggle. For this reason the Cultural Revolution was not only a political revolution for the real establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in all areas, but, beyond that, it was very consciously also an ideological cultural revolution of the proletariat.

Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

"The great proletarian cultural revolution is a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and aims at solving the problem of their world outlook."

(Quoted in: "Advance Along the Road Opened Up By the October Socialist Revolution", Peking Review, No. 46/1967, p. 15)

And so the Cultural Revolution not only mobilized the masses in their millions against the bearers of bourgeois ideology, who were enemies, but the masses were also called upon to demolish bourgeois ideology in general, in order to arm themselves with proletarian ideology.

Mao Tse-tung stated fully correctly:

"There is no construction without destruction. Destruction means criticism and repudiation, it means revolution. It involves reasoning things out, which is construction. Put destruction first, and in the process you have construction."

(Quoted in: "Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", May 16, 1966, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1967, p. 7)

Another axiom propagated in the Cultural Revolution was the mass line, i.e., incorporation of the masses in all affairs, revolutionary mass publicity, mass criticism and mass debate.

Mao Tse-tung declared:

"Historical experience merits attention. A line or a viewpoint must be explained constantly and repeatedly. It won't do to explain them only to a few people; they must be made known to the broad revolutionary masses."

(Quoted in: "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review, No. 18/1969, p. 30)

In 1967, he said about the Cultural Revolution itself:

"In the past we waged struggles in rural areas, in factories, in the cultural field, and we carried out the socialist education movement. But all this failed to solve the problem because we did not find a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to expose our dark aspect openly, in an all-round way and from below."
(Ibid, p.21)

In the Cultural Revolution various forms of proletarian democracy became active: millions of factory meetings, huge mass debates and prosecution meetings, millions of wall newspapers - all these were an expression of the activation of the masses in their millions without which the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot really exist. These were magnificent, exemplary forms of struggle and, although they caused monstrous calumnious tirades from imperialists and revisionists in the whole world, they also enthused revolutionaries all over the world.

A serious "charge" against the Cultural Revolution was and still is that allegedly the "youth" had the leadership, that the "students" dominated. Behind these clumsy attacks is the real problem that at first the Red Guards mainly consisted of youth, and that they played a specially active role in the struggle against the revisionist clique - especially in 1966. But at the latest in January 1967, when the "January storm in Shanghai" set into action an important section of China's working class against the revisionists, it became clear that the most conscious sections of the working class were the actual leading force, who had to ensure clarity even in the universities and schools.

Particularly in 1968, Mao Tse-tung issued the call:

"The working class must exercise leadership in everything."
(Ibid, p.25)

and

"The working class should always raise its political consciousness in the course of the struggle."
(Ibid, p.26)

The question of the proletarian hegemony was naturally above all a question of the proletarian Party.

We do not know whether there is any more exact analysis of the Party's conditions by Mao Tse-tung. (The leadership of the Party was obviously in the revisionists' hands prior to the Cultural Revolution.) It is still very characteristic that Mao Tse-tung called for purging the Party of all "waste matter", and propagated a renewal of the Party. He declared:

"The Party organization should be composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat; it should be a vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in the fight against the class enemy."
(Ibid, p.28)

and:

"A human being has arteries and veins through which the heart makes the blood circulate, and he breathes with his lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling fresh oxygen, that is, getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh. A proletarian party must also get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, for only thus can it be full of vitality. Without eliminating waste matter and absorbing fresh blood the Party has no vigour."
(Ibid, p.29)

In our opinion, Mao Tse-tung's statements quoted here on the importance of the ideological education of the masses in class struggle, on the forms of proletarian democracy, on the leadership of the working class and on the purge and renewal of the proletarian Party are all correct, must be defended and not rejected. Of course, not a single quotation cited here exhausts even approximately the underlying problem of the real course of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, or even the theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism on the necessity and the methods of carrying out a cultural revolution in general.

On the causes and perspectives of the concrete Cultural Revolution in China, we wish to emphasize four passages originating from this period:

At first, at the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China, Mao Tse-tung stated in retrospective:

"It seems that it won't do not to carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for our foundation is not solid. Judging from my observations, I am afraid that in a fairly large majority of factories - I don't mean all or the overwhelming majority of them - leadership was not in the hands of genuine Marxists and the masses of workers."
(Mao Tse-tung's Speech at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the C.P. of China. Quoted in: "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie" by Chang Chun-chiao, Peking Review, No.14/1975, p.7)

This candid statement, which appears to be very realistic too, naturally raises the question why the masses in their millions were not mobilized earlier against the revisionists, for example, at a time when they did not yet have the leadership in the majority of the enterprises, their position in the Party leadership had not yet been consolidated etc.

This and similar questions raised by the delegation of the MLPA in China were regularly answered by responsible comrades of the C.P. of China with the following quotation of Mao Tse-tung:

"The current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism."
(Report to the Ninth National Congress of the C.P. of China, Peking Review, No.18/1969, p.16)

"Most timely" - precisely this we find w r o n g . We do not know the context of this quotation, but it is certainly possible that Mao Tse-tung with this quotation replied to those who babbled that precisely now, at this moment, when the Vietnam war had sharpened the international situation etc., the situation was too unfavourable for the Cultural Revolution in China and similar excuses. Nevertheless, even in such a case Mao Tse-tung should have emphasized that the Cultural Revolution was perhaps begun a little too l a t e , and in no case too early.

Mao Tse-tung's above quotation necessarily serves to justify the situation prior to the Cultural Revolution. A self-critical analysis of the conditions in China, which necessitated the Cultural Revolution as a political campaign to remove Liu Shao-chi from power, is made impossible right from the beginning by putting forward the thesis that everything was "most timely" and took place so to say according "to plan". Whereas during the Cultural Revolution it became evident, even to the external observer, that naturally the struggle against the revisionist bandits in China should have been taken up very much earlier and very much more radically. With respect to the p e r s p e c - t i v e of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tse-tung during the Cultural Revolution itself drew attention to the fact that for him the problems could not be considered so easily as being settled.

In 1966 he stated:

"Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through, others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchov, for example, who are still nestling beside us." (Quoted in: "Circular of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China", Foreign Languages Press Peking, 1967, pp.12,13)

Envisaging the problem of double-dealing, Mao Tse-tung obviously proceeded from the fact that the Party cannot really be purged in one single campaign like that of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969.

Mao Tse-tung declared:

"The present great cultural revolution is only the first; there will inevitably be many more in the future. In the last few years Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said repeatedly that the issue of who will win in the revolution can only be settled over a long historical period. If things are not properly handled, it is possible for a capitalist restoration to take place at any time. It should not be thought by any Party member or any one of the people in our country that everything will be all right after one or two great cultural revolutions, or even three or four. We must be very much on the alert and never lose vigilance." (Quoted from: Renmin Ribao of May 18, 1967 in: "A Great Historic Document", Peking Review 21/1967, p.12)

Here it becomes clear that by c u l t u r a l r e v o l u - t i o n Mao Tse-tung did not mean the continuous cultural revolution, which in principle was always to be carried out in the sense of Lenin and Stalin. This cultural revolution naturally had its peaks and low points, but it still was not concluded from time to time and then restarted. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung understood by it certain campaigns (and he foresaw many more of them), which could be used as a specific weapon according to necessity.

Underlying this view is the mistake of not going to the root of the matter. We do not deny the necessity at all that in China after the campaign from 1966 to 1969 a renewed revolutionary storm, say from 1975 to 1976 should have swept away much more thoroughly people like Teng and consorts. So, a "second Cultural Revolution", in Mao Tse-tung's sense of the term, would have been urgently opportune. However, we are much more concerned with the fact that by this representation Mao Tse-tung does not create any understanding of the question that here we are not dealing with an objective law, but with the attempt to correct grossly wrong developments by extraordinary means.

However, in the long run, the method c a n only go amiss because each time - by considering and referring to future cultural revolutions' campaigns in Mao Tse-tung's sense - the growth of revisionism will be considered "normal". Revisionism will be given a chance to recuperate, to recover itself etc., in order to then again initiate "at a most timely moment" a cultural revolutionary mass movement.

The correct thing is always to look for one's own mistakes which at all enabled the strengthening of revisionism, to eliminate these, and so by means of a permanent activation of the masses in the most varied forms, by means of a permanent deepening of the cultural revolution, prevent the revisionists from again entering the Party leadership, or even seizing leadership.

The Period after 1969

Lin Piao's downfall - the details of which were not disclosed under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, so that Teng Hsiao Ping can today afford to prosecute Lin Piao's people along with the four deposed Politbureau members in his counter-revolutionary process - had to remain without its necessary consequence, precisely because of this defect. It would have been absolutely necessary to have made an analysis of these events, to have published it and to have discussed it with the masses.

Later, a few quotations by Mao Tse-tung were published, in which he pointed out that one of the reasons why people like Lin Piao could succeed in restoring capitalism consisted in the fact that bourgeois right still existed in the economic sphere, that there were still big differences in income, that thus objective causes facilitated work for people like

Lin Piao. (+)

(+) In the last years before Mao Tse-tung's death, in 1975-76, the press of the C.P. of China issued the call to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mao Tse-tung's quotations were published in which he pointed out the danger of an eight-grade wage system, at the absolute necessity of restricting the still existing commodity system (which, as he emphasized, can only be restricted under the dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as at the effect of "distribution to each according to his work" and "exchange by means of money".

These quotations were used in 1975 in a brochure by Chang Chun-chiao. It strikes one at first that in the entire campaign at that time only Marx, Engels and Lenin are considered in the quotation compilations and that Stalin's analyses are impermissably left out. At the same time, both in the press articles of this period as well as in Chang Chun-chiao's brochure, the old basic mistake showed itself: the C.P. of China's line was not worked up self-critically, the emphasis was not laid on the subjective factor. Rather, there was an attempt to explain the emergence of revisionism by emphasizing the objective causes. Consequently, such explanations were to some extent fatalistic and objectivist in character.

In our opinion, the chief mistake in Chang Chun-chiao's article consists in the fact that the unresolvable contradiction between Mao Tse-tung's wrong attitude towards the national bourgeoisie in 1957 and his correct attitude since 1966 is ignored, and of all things the wrong class analysis of 1957 in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" is propagated. (See "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie", Peking Review, No.14/1975, p.6) The writing by Yao Wen-yuan "On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique", which was published almost simultaneously, and which similarly wrongly concentrated primarily on the analysis of the relations of production, stated:

"When the economic strength of the bourgeoisie grows to a certain extent, its agents will ask for political rule, try to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system, completely change the socialist ownership, and openly restore and develop the capitalist system." (Peking Review, No.10/1975, p.6)

In our opinion, precisely this "when" is dangerous. For the attacks to conquer the Party leadership are definitely possible without such an "economic strength of the bourgeoisie", and they are always a real danger. Here Yao Wen-yuan on the whole draws attention to whether the bourgeoisie already possesses "economic strength", so that it follows logically that above all it must be prevented that the bourgeoisie (old or new elements) attains economic strength. However, the correct thing is to concern oneself primarily with the condition of the Communist Party and the consciousness and the degree of organization of the working class led by it. For these factors are the sole guarantee to smash the always possible revisionists' attacks against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In this period 1973/74 Teng Hsiao-ping again succeeded in moving up into the leading positions of the C.P. of China. In 1975, after the counter-revolutionary actions at the Tien An Men Square, the campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping and his programme started.

Mao Tse-tung resolutely struggled against the programme adopted by the revisionist clique in the C.P. of China with Teng as its chief representative and emphasized:

"What's taking the three directives as the key link! Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it." (Quoted in: "Criticism of 'Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link'", Peking Review, No.14/1976, p.6)

Mao Tse-tung stigmatized Teng's class-conciliatory approach:

"This person does not grasp class struggle; he has never referred to this key link. Still his theme of 'white cat, black cat', making no distinction between imperialism and Marxism." (Quoted in: "Beat Back the Right Deviationist Attempt to Reverse Correct Verdicts, Promote Industrial Production", Peking Review, No.14/1976, p.5)

Teng Hsiao-ping was dismissed from his post, but was not expelled from the Party. The Central Committee of the C.P. of China assessed the contradiction with him to be "non-antagonistic".

A renewed sharp struggle broke out, but perhaps more concealed than within view of the masses. In our opinion, this was rendered possible only on account of the mistakes of the Marxist-Leninist forces.

It is known that Teng Hsiao-ping with the help of the Party chairman Hua Guo-feng and others arrested and suppressed the revolutionary forces and openly took the road to counter-revolution in China.

Shortly before his death Mao Tse-tung himself made clear that the central question was the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. We can and must emphasize and defend the following statement by Mao Tse-tung against all deviations from Marxism-Leninism:

"Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to get this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. It won't do if only a few people grasp the point; this should be made known to the whole nation." (Quoted in: "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie" by Chang Chun-chiao)

Concluding Remarks

The above review of the development of Mao Tse-tung's views from 1950 to 1976 shows (inspite of big gaps with regard to his complete writings) that fundamental changes can be noted in his attitude towards the bourgeoisie in general and thereby to the national bourgeoisie, and with that in the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat too.

In the first three years after the victory of 1949 it was at least clearly stated, without mentioning the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the national bourgeoisie was no longer an intermediary class, that the main contradiction was between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. In 1957, however - probably not without the influence of Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China and the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. - a revisionist position was taken towards the national bourgeoisie - inspite of a certain opposition against extreme Right-opportunistic forces.

The resolution of the contradiction with it was not aimed at by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rather, it was attempted to settle it "democratically". Indeed, its parties were even to be part of the people's dictatorship, i.e., sharing in power.

There was absolutely no clarity about the principal difference that had to exist between the dictatorship of many democratic classes, proclaimed in 1949, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and about how the transition from the one to the other was to be made. Indeed, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the political alliance with the national bourgeoisie and its parties was obviously held to be possible by Mao Tse-tung. This was a revisionist dilution of the basic idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a dictatorship over the bourgeoisie.

Already in 1957/58 it became evident that the anticipated "non-antagonistic" contradictions with the national bourgeoisie contained more antagonistic seeds than it had been thought. Unfortunately, it is not known how Mao Tse-tung later judged his views from "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". Nevertheless, on the base of Mao Tse-tung's authorized writings and quotations it is evident that, at the latest by 1966, at the start of the Cultural Revolution he recognized the antagonistic nature of the contradictions between proletariat and bourgeoisie and demanded the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie.

We do not know to what extent the bourgeoisie as a class was really eliminated in the years of the Cultural Revolution - like in 1934 in the Soviet Union. It is an established fact that Mao Tse-tung called for a "life-and-death struggle" with the bourgeoisie in 1966/67.

Consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, dictatorship over all capitalist elements - these were Mao Tse-tung's

slogans at this time up to his death. Against those who slander him we must unconditionally defend this correct Marxist-Leninist basic approach (in distinction to the necessary criticism of his position of 1957).

However, this absolutely necessary defence of Mao Tse-tung's Marxist-Leninist position on the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, on the continuation of class struggle from the mid-sixties onwards, should not be confused with another problem. This is, that the C.P. of China's press represented matters in such a way as if Mao Tse-tung held the view that the bourgeoisie existed as a class up to communism and that the class struggle had to be continued for this reason.

An examination of Mao Tse-tung's well-known passages shows that Mao Tse-tung did not make any such general (and totally wrong) statements. (To be sure, he also did not publicly resist such an interpretation.) On the contrary, he merely stated the then prevailing condition in China that the bourgeoisie continued to exist as a class.

This must be clear while correctly defending Mao Tse-tung's Marxist-Leninist positions, in order not to take over a rotten generalization - a generalization which is basically directed against Stalin's class analysis of 1936. Stalin correctly established that while eliminating exploitation of man by man the bourgeoisie as a class must essentially be eliminated. Thereby the class struggle against its remnants as well as against all capitalist manifestations must still be continued in all spheres, indeed it must be intensified.

Precisely the example of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this cardinal question of Marxism-Leninism clearly shows that Mao Tse-tung can neither be simply wholly "defended", nor simply wholly "rejected". Rather, it is necessary to divide his work into different stages and to take differing positions on it, according to its content. In other words: it is necessary to defend his undoubtedly Marxist-Leninist work, but to criticize his wrong positions.

In the case in question it is of great importance that Mao Tse-tung evidently corrected and replaced his views, wrong for a time, by correct ones. Unfortunately, this was not done publicly and with self-criticism. Of course, this very much facilitates the struggle against the uncritical "defenders of Mao Tse-tung Thought", who curiously defend above all his old wrong positions. At the same time this supplies us with a sharp weapon to put in their place all those "who condemn" Mao Tse-tung and who, referring to Mao Tse-tung's revisionist positions of 1957, condemn him as being totally "revisionist" etc.

The period from 1950 to 1976 on no account presents self-contained "teachings" of Mao Tse-tung. From this period there do not exist any basic expositions on definite questions which are applied to concrete problems like in Volumes I to IV of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works. Rather, there exist a few brochures and writings

chiefly written in the on-going struggle, with the exception of "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". Though this is a writing which every Marxist-Leninist must study well and can learn from, it is wrong in central questions.

Precisely this period shows that a c r i t i c a l attitude towards Mao Tse-tung, and more so towards the Communist Party of China, is a b s o l u t e l y essential, indeed, that m i s - t a k e s in this period must be criticized in a thorough-going manner.



NOTES

1. On Mao Tse-tung's Ostensible "Criticisms Against Stalin", Published by the Teng-Hua-Revisionists and Imperialist China Researchers

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a) On the Sources of Mao Tse-tung's Ostensible "Criticisms Against Stalin"

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On investigating whether and what criticisms Mao Tse-tung had against Stalin, we can very soon ascertain that there does not exist any authorized criticism of content by Mao Tse-tung against Stalin which was published during his life-time.

In the sole authorized comment after the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Mao Tse-tung emphasized:

"The basic policy and line during the period when Stalin was in power were correct; method that are used against enemies must not be used against one's comrades." (Quoted in: "The Origin and Development of Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves", Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1963, p.12)

However, at the same time he demanded an analysis of Stalin's mistakes, but did not go into this aspect in greater detail. He said:

"Stalin's merits outweighed his faults", and that it was necessary to 'make a concrete analysis' and an all-round evaluation of Stalin". (Ibid, p.12)

In October 1956 Mao Tse-tung said:

(+) See for this the criticism of the "Polemics", Part II A, "On the History of the Struggle Against Modern Revisionism", Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of "Rote Fahne",

(++) Thus it is said in the "Summary of the Conference on Work in the Field of Literature and Art in the Army Convened By Comrade Chiang Ching on the Instructions of Comrade Lin Biao" from February 2 to 20, 1966:

"We must destroy blind faith in Chinese and foreign classical literature. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist. His criticism of the modernist literature and art of the bourgeoisie was very sharp. But he uncritically took over what

"Stalin deserves to be criticized, but we do not agree with the method of criticism, and there are some other matters we do not agree with." (Ibid, p.12)

The C.P. of China published two programmatic articles "On the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (1956) and the Second Comment in the "Proposal Concerning the General Line", titled "On the Question of Stalin" of September 13, 1963, in which Stalin is criticized. Another criticism by the C.P. of China is to be found in "On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World" (+) - the Ninth Comment in the "Proposal Concerning the General Line".

Otherwise there existed only isolated statements in C.P. of China's brochures published later. (++)

Naturally, Mao Tse-tung has a share in the responsibility for these documents, as well as for central Party documents published later, in which Stalin is attacked. Yet the fact that Mao Tse-tung himself never allowed the publication of his criticisms against Stalin, mentioned in 1956, is a very important fact and can have various reasons.

"Westberliner Kommunist" and "Gegen die Strömung" (Rote Fahne, No. 172, Westberliner Kommunist, No. 7, Gegen die Strömung, No. 10)

are known as the classics of Russia and Europe and the consequences were bad. The classical literature and art of China and of Europe (including Russia) and even American films have exercised a considerable influence on our literary and art circles, and some people have regarded them as holy writ and accepted them in their entirety. We should draw a lesson from Stalin's experience." (Peking Review, June 2, 1967, pp. 13, 14)

It is possible that Mao Tse-tung, after repeated and more detailed studies, and in view of his deeper understanding of Khrushchov's revisionism, realized that his criticisms against Stalin were wrong and superficial, even untenable!

Naturally, this aspect is not cogent. It must be taken into consideration, that, in general, very few of Mao Tse-tung's writings and speeches were published after 1949.

It is an established fact:

FOOTNOTE from the last page

The article of "Hongqi" and "Renmin Ribao" on the first anniversary of the Circular of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China (May 16, 1966) entitled "A Great Historic Document" of May 18, 1967 similarly contains a criticism against Stalin:

"Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist who actually cleared out a large number of counter-revolutionary representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into the Party, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov and their like. But where he failed was in not recognizing, on the level of theory that classes and class struggle exist in society throughout the historical period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and that the question of who will win in the revolution has yet to be finally settled; in other words, if all this is not handled properly there is the possibility of a come-back by the bourgeoisie. The year before he died, Stalin became aware of this point and stated that contradictions do exist in socialist society and if not properly handled might turn into antagonistic ones. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has given full attention to the whole historical experience of the Soviet Union. He has correctly solved this series of problems in a whole number of important writings and instructions, in this great historic document and in the most significant practice of the proletarian cultural revolution personally initiated and led by him. This is a most important sign indicating that Marxism has developed to an entirely new stage. In the early years of the twentieth century, Marxism developed into the stage of Leninism. In the present era, it has developed further into the stage of Mao Tse-

tung's thought."
("A Great Historic Document", Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, pp. 17, 18)

Here the C.P. of China propagated Mao Tse-tung Thought as a new stage of Marxism-Leninism which had been developed as a result of Mao Tse-tung's "rectification" of alleged mistakes by Stalin. Here, in our opinion, literally everything is wrong.

We have already taken a comprehensive stand on the questions touched upon in this "criticism". For example in "Note 1" ("Self-Critical Remarks on Our 'Joint Statement', 'Criticism of the C.P. of China's Revisionist Line in the Eleventh National Congress'") in Part I of the Criticism of the Polemics, "A Few Vital Questions of the Development of the World Marxist-Leninist Movement and the Necessity of a Criticism of the Documents of the 'Great Polemics', Joint Statement of the Editorial Boards of 'Rote Fahne', 'Westberliner Kommunist', and 'Gegen die Strömung'" (Rote Fahne, No. 171, Westberliner Kommunist, No. 11, 'Gegen die Strömung', No. 13); and in "Defend Stalin - Learn from Stalin!" (Gegen die Strömung, No. 8).

In the brochure "Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End" by Lu Jui-ching of 1965, mistakes in "military questions" are imputed to Stalin. However, nowhere in the brochure or in any other C.P. of China publication this criticism of Stalin's alleged mistakes is exactly precised. Instead it is sweepingly stated:

"Stalin committed certain mistakes, including a number in military affairs."
(Lu Jui-ching, "Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End", Peking Review, No. 20/1975, p. 7)

Only after Mao Tse-tung's death, for the first time "Criticisms against Stalin" were published officially in China, which were supposed to have been written by Mao Tse-tung personally.

This is so in the case of the texts "On the Ten Major Relationships" of April 1956 (published in "Volume V" of the Selected Works, pp. 284-307) and "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees" of January 1957 (published in "Volume V" of the Selected Works, pp. 350-383). In both these texts there are some extensive passages which deal with the criticism of Stalin. Two further writings of "Volume V" of the Selected Works contain some brief criticisms. These two writings are: "Strengthen Party Unity" of August 1956 ("Volume V", pp. 312-323) and "Some Experiences in Our Party's History" of September 1956 ("Volume V", pp. 324-329).

It must be emphasized that these writings, published by the Teng-Hua revisionists, are not authorized.

As against that, in the Selected Works I to IV there are many writings in which Mao Tse-tung has clearly and positively propagated Stalin's work and the experiences of the Soviet Union and has urged the entire Party to learn from them. (+)

The fact that not a single one of Mao Tse-tung's positive articles on Stalin after 1949, published in the English journal "People's China", was included in "Volume V" (not even Mao Tse-tung's address at Stalin's death) shows that the Hua-Teng revisionists, by means of the selection itself, present Mao Tse-tung's attitude towards Stalin in a biased and falsifying manner.

With regard to the texts, allegedly by Mao Tse-tung, compiled and translated by imperialist researchers on China and by bourgeois journalists, the question of the sources of these texts must unconditionally

all be clarified. Everyone must be made aware of these sources, so that they can judge for themselves their reliability.

One of the first compilations of texts by Mao Tse-tung, published by the imperialist press, are the "Mao Papers, Anthology and Bibliography" published by Jerome Ch'en in 1970 in New York (published in German language in Munich in 1972). The "Mao Papers" contain a major part of the texts published outside China during the Cultural Revolution up to 1970 as texts by Mao Tse-tung. This selection of texts does not contain any criticism against Stalin of such significance as to be found in compilations published later. On the contrary, this selection contains Mao Tse-tung's speeches at Stalin's 60th and 70th birthdays, in which Stalin and his work were propagated. In this selection many extracts of texts by Mao Tse-tung are put together which were published as Mao Tse-tung's quotations in official journals and newspapers of the C.P. of China during the Cultural Revolution.

The compilations of texts brought out since 1973 by bourgeois researchers on China consist in the main, or even exclusively, of translations of extracts from two Chinese books, supposedly compiled and published by Red Guards in 1967 and 1969. Both these collections carry the title: "Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought". The first book of 1967 is 280 pages in length. The second book of 1969 has the sub-title: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the Greatest Marxist-Leninist of Our Time" and has 271 pages. (See: "Das machen wir anders als Moskau", Hamburg 1975, p. 140, Note 8; "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1975, pp. 282, 283)

These two Chinese books are the most comprehensive compilations of Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized texts. The compilations of texts published in

(+) These writings are:

- "The Identity of Interests Between the Soviet Union and All Mankind", 1939, SW II, pp. 275-284
- "Stalin, Friend of the Chinese People", 1939, SW II, pp. 335-336
- "The Turning Point in World War II",

1942, SW III, pp. 103-108
- "In Celebration of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the October Revolution", 1942, SW III, pp. 109-110
- "Revolutionary Forces of the World - Unite, Fight Against Imperialist Aggression", 1948, SW IV, pp. 282-286)

German language (+) , edited by H. Martin, are a selection from both these books.

In the foreword of "Mao Intern" the following is said on the source of these two Chinese books: (++)

"The present selection of Mao texts after 1949 is largely based on two books, compiled and published in China in 1967 and 1969 by young activists of the Cultural Revolution. For whatever reasons, a slightly damaged copy (which is perhaps the only one known to exist) of both these Volumes was made available to Western specialists on China in a photo-mechanic reprint only in the second half of 1973, i.e., about four years after the slackening of the Cultural Revolution." ("Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, p.11; translated from the Ger.ed.)

The answer to the question who made available this legendary single copy to the Western specialists is given in fine print in the epilogue to "Mao Intern". The actual source is the "Institute of International Relations in Taipei", in the capital of Taiwan, which made both these collections of texts available "in a reprint in mid-summer 1973". ("Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, p.243)

It is small wonder that imperialist China researchers accept such a source, and thereby in the last analysis the CIA as a reliable source. These texts with their extensive criticisms against Stalin were the sought for and finally found great happening for bourgeois journalists. With that they could nourish their anti-communism and put forward all kinds of theories and assertions about Mao Tse-tung's attitude towards Stalin and the Soviet Union in Stalin's life-time. Immediately all notable bourgeois researchers on China were of the firm opinion that these texts "quite clearly" ("Mao Intern", p.243) originated from Mao Tse-tung and composed entire articles to remove doubts about the authenticity of these texts, even in the case of bourgeois scientists. However, even they had to concede that these texts would not correspond to the originals by Mao Tse-tung. Some texts have various vers-

ions, some are summaries and in other texts distortions are evident which can be established from the context etc.

To sum up, though one can take a stand on these so-called "internal writings" of Mao Tse-tung, which bourgeois researchers on China have compiled, one must still at all events be fully clear on the question that it is not proved that these texts in the existing version are by Mao Tse-tung. Further, it must be clear that one should use these texts only by giving the original source, so that the reader himself can form a judgement with regard to the reliability of the source. It cannot be tolerated that texts which appeared in the "Pravda" in the sixties and seventies, or texts, which bourgeois sinologists wish to recognize as Mao texts on the basis of their style, are used on par with Mao Tse-tung's authorized writings and speeches.

In the following criticism of passages in "Volume V" of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works we are not so much concerned with gathering material against Mao Tse-tung. We are concerned with setting forth our attitude to these "Stalin-criticisms" because they, independent of whether they originate from Mao Tse-tung or not, have an ideological influence, and therefore demand a clear repudiation.

o In this context we must clearly demarcate ourselves from the method of o all those who specially like to use o publications of unauthorized texts, o without allowing for justified doubts o with regard to the authenticity of o these texts, in order to make propaganda with Mao Tse-tung's alleged opinion. Interestingly, both those o who condemn him as well as his "hundred per cent defenders" use this o method.

Such a non-serious method is used by the representatives of the groups, who, under the flag of defending Mao Tse-tung against Enver Hoxha's false criticism, take the field with Mao Tse-tung's alleged views against Stalin and the Communist International and thereby similarly base themselves in the main on Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized texts. The R.C.P. U.S.A. is the outsider of these groups. In the book "Mao Tse-tung's Immortal Contributions" by Bob Avakian of May

(+) "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, and "Das machen wir anders als Moskau", Hamburg 1975 ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", New York 1977)

(++) In this connection see also "Chairman Mao Talks to the People", Ed. by Stuart Schram, Pantheon Books, New York, 1974, p.51

1979 extensive "criticisms of Stalin are unfolded in almost 350 pages. The publication of alleged Stalin-criticisms by Mao Tse-tung suits Avakian very much because he uses the opportunity to consecrate his attacks against Stalin, so to say, with Mao Tse-tung's authority and standing.

Bob Avakian partly refers to "Volume V", partly he simply dispenses with any references. This is no accident. For he makes extensive use of texts, ostensibly by Mao Tse-tung, which have been fished out by imperialist researchers on China like Stuart R. Schram from (as we have described) untrustworthy sources, which are unacceptable for communists. In his book, he refers to publications like:

★ Stuart R. Schram, "Chairman Mao Talks to the People", New York, 1974

★ Moss Robert, "A Critique of Soviet Economics", "Criticism of Stalin's

'On the Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.', Monthly Review Press, London, 1977 (German: "Das machen wir anders als Moskau", H. Martin, Hamburg 1975)

Bob Avakian uses these compilations of texts from imperialist sources without the least doubt about the authenticity of these texts. In view of the facts described above about the sources of these texts - facts, which cannot be hidden from Avakian - his approach is totally irresponsible. On no account can we agree with this method of Bob Avakian because thereby one proceeds to the sphere of the wildest bourgeois speculations. In Bob Avakian's case this leads to his drawing the sword against Stalin and the Communist International under the label of "defending Mao against the PLA". This he does with the help of unauthorized texts against Stalin, allegedly by Mao Tse-tung.



o Most of the following "criticisms" o against Stalin are crude s l a n- o d e r s and grotesque l i e s , o which in no case should be made a o "subject of discussion", but must o be branded as slanders. However, o this does not signify for us that o we do not deal with these slanders. o Rather, it signifies that we prove o their obvious untenability and re- o fute these crude lies, i.e., com-

c b a t these "criticisms" i d e o l o g i c a l - c l y. In view of the abundance of o questions touched upon, this can o be done in the following only in o the form of theses. However, since o an entire army of bourgeois, rev- o sionist, Trotskyist and social-de- o mocrat "critics" pounce upon Sta- o lin, we shall have to return to the o questions broached here in some way o or the other.

b) The Criticism Against Stalin and the Ideological Pressure of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

It is certainly not by chance that all criticisms against Stalin ascribed to Mao Tse-tung originate from the period after the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.. Even in the case of people like Schram, Moss and Avakian, there is no writing by Mao Tse-tung from the period before the Twentieth Congress expressing comparable criticisms against Stalin.

In the authorized "Opening Speech at the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China" of September 15, 1956 (published in "People's China", October 1, 1956) the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. is clearly "positively" assessed. It is said there:

"At its 20th congress held not long ago, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulated many correct policies and criticized shortcomings which were found in the Party. It can be confidently asserted that very great developments will follow on this in its work."

("The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Documents", Volume I, Peking 1956, p.10)

In the unauthorized writing "On the Ten Major Relationships" (published in "Volume V", pp.284-307) the call is issued that from the faults and mistakes uncovered shortly in the Soviet Union - with which is meant Khrushchov's criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress lessons should be drawn, in order to avoid such mistakes in China:

"Particularly worthy of attention is the fact that in the Soviet Union certain defects and errors that occurred in the course of their building socialism have lately come to light. Do you want to follow the detours they have made? It was by drawing lessons from their experience that we were able to avoid certain detours in the past, and there is all the more reason for us to do so now." ("On the Ten Major Relationships", 1956, "Volume V", p.284)

In this same writing, the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", published a few weeks earlier in the "Renmin Ribao" (People's Newspaper), is commended:

"It is the opinion of the Central Committee that Stalin's mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent of the whole and his achievements to 70 per cent, and that all things considered Stalin was nonetheless a great Marxist. We wrote: 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' on the basis of this evaluation. This assessment of 30 per cent for mistakes and 70 per cent for achievements is just about right." (Ibid, p.304)

The writing "On the Ten Major Relationships" shares the evaluation of Stalin made in the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". Although this, in opposition to the Khrushchov revisionists, states Stalin's merits as being 70 per cent, and although it rejects the 100 per

cent condemnation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress, it, however, at the same time contains massive errors, from which the writing "On the Ten Major Relationships" does not demarcate itself. The Renmin Ribao article sweepingly claims, without any proof, Stalin

"became conceited and imprudent. Subjectivism and onesidedness developed in his thinking and he made erroneous decisions on certain important questions."

("On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", 1956, Foreign Language Press Peking 1956, p.7)

"...the cult of the individual was accepted and fostered, and the arbitrariness of a single person prevailed." (Ibid, p.9)

"...violated the Party's system of democratic centralism..."
"...broadened the scope of the suppression of counter-revolution...lacked the necessary vigilance on the eve of the anti-fascist war...failed to pay proper attention to the further development of agriculture and the material welfare of the peasantry...made a wrong decision on the question of Yugoslavia." (Ibid, p.10)

"Subjectivism and one-sidedness" (Ibid, p.10) were named as the roots of these "mistakes" by Stalin. Stalin

"divorced himself from the objective reality and from the masses." (Ibid, p.10)

Though the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" did not agree with the total condemnation of Stalin by Khrushchov, it clearly shows that the C.P. of China's attacks against Stalin's theoretical and practical work are basically identical with those brought forth against Stalin in these questions by the Khrushchov revisionists.

Therefore it cannot be defended that in "On the Ten Major Relationships" the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" is propagated as a correct demarcation from Khrushchov's criticisms against Stalin. Instead of showing up the mistakes in this article and saying that it cannot be the base from which one can successfully combat Stalin's condemnation by Khrushchov, this article is represented as being "in accordance with objective reality":

"First, we protect Stalin, and, second, we at the same time criticize his mistakes, and we have written the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". Unlike some people who have tried to defame and destroy Stalin, we are acting in accordance with objective reality." ("Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", November 1956, "Volume V", p.341)

The essential difference between Khrushchov's

c) Slander one The Ideological Root of Stalin's Alleged Mistakes is "Subjectivism"

Just as the "Renmin Ribao" article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", an article from "Volume V", ascribed to Mao Tse-tung, also regards "subjectivism" as the root of Stalin's mistakes:

"Why did Stalin make mistakes? Because on a number of issues his subjective thinking failed to correspond with objective reality."

d) Slander two Stalin Taught Many People to Follow Metaphysics

The general criticism ran as follows:

"Stalin had a fair amount of metaphysics in him and he taught many people to follow metaphysics." ("Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees", January, 1957, Volume V, p.167)

The "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", and the chapter "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism" contained in it, were referred to as proof for this criticism. Two criticisms of this were formulated. Firstly, it is said:

"As the fourth feature he (Stalin, Authors' Note) talks of the internal contradiction in all things, but then he deals only with the struggle of opposites, without

Stalin's criticism of Stalin and the criticisms by the C.P. of China, roughly sketched above, was not so much the content or the direction of assault of the criticism. Here there was more or less agreement. The C.P. of China, however, at no time was ready to treat Stalin as an enemy and vilify him.

The criticisms against Stalin in the "Renmin Ribao" article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" are in essence the same as in Mao Tse-tung's unauthorized articles dated after this article. This will become clear from the following.

("Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions", 1956, "Volume V", p.315)

The writing brings no evidence for this assertion. Apparently, the criticisms in the other unauthorized texts from that period were taken to be "evidence". The criticisms against Stalin in these are concretized in the following reproaches.

"mentioning their unity." (Ibid, pp.367,368)

This criticism is wrong. Stalin's representation of the four basic features of dialectics in the "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course" which incidentally correspond to Lenin's representation in "Karl Marx" (See Lenin, "Karl Marx", 1914, LW 21, pp.41-43, Ger.ed.) and also to the introductory review in "On Contradiction" by Mao Tse-tung himself (Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction", 1937, SW I, p.311), proceeds from the interconnection of things, then shows the development of things, whereby qualitative leaps in development are especially emphasized, and finally comes to speak of the motor of development, the struggle of opposites.

So, the second criticism too does not apply which asserts:

"As the first feature he talks of the interconnection of things, as if all things happened to be interconnected for no reason at all." (Ibid, p.367)
 "Stalin failed to see the connection between the struggle of opposites and the unity of opposites." (Ibid, p.369)

In fact it was not Stalin who was "incapable", but it is his critics who in this question are incapable of grasping Stalin's construction of the four features of dialectics as a representation of materialist dialectics complete in itself, and of understanding that when Stalin speaks of

"disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena..." (Stalin, "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", FLPH, Moscow 1939, Red Star Reprint London 1976, p.109)

thereby is included the struggle within a unity, within a phenomenon etc. Stalin concludes with Lenin's sharp remark:

"in its proper meaning...dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things." (Ibid, p.109)

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." (Ibid, p.109)

e) Slander three Stalin Paid too Little Heed to the Learning from Negative Examples

"If you don't study the negative stuff, you won't be able to refute it. Neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin was like that... In this respect Stalin was not as good. For instance, in his time, German classical idealist philosophy was described as a reaction of the German aristocracy towards the French Revolution. This conclusion totally negates German classical idealist philosophy. Stalin negated German military science, alleging that it was no longer of any use and that books by Clausewitz should no longer be read since the Germans had been defeated."

(Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees", 1957, "Volume V", p.367) (+)

Such "criticisms" are defamations which in the first instance must be branded as such. This "criticism" is a lie because Stalin has in no way negated classical German philosophy in toto. Rather, he defended Marx's and Engels' critique of classical German philosophy. Stalin gave an excellent summary of this critique of the German idealist philosophy in the chapter "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism" in the "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course" (See "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", pp.105-131.op.cit).

Regarding Clausewitz's work in the field of military science, Stalin emphasized in his "Reply to Colonel Professor Dr. Rasin" of February 23, 1946 that Lenin referred to Clausewitz, not because of his theoretical work in military science, but because

the opposite side...Neither Marx, Engels nor Stalin were so... In the case of Stalin there is a snag; he negated German Philosophy (Kant and Feuerbach) because Germany had lost the war and he also negated German military science" ("Summary at the Conference of Provincial and Party Secretaries" in: "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, p.92, Ger.ed., translated by us)

The lack of logic and the distortion of meaning immediately leaps to the eyes. The lost war was supposed to have led to Stalin's negation of Kant's and Feuerbach's philosophy.

"We Communists know too little of

"Who in his time was reputed to be an authority in the field of military theory, confirmed in his works the famous Marxist thesis that there is a direct connection between war and politics, that politics gives birth to war and that war is the continuation of politics by violent means. Here Lenin needed the reference to Clausewitz in order to once more convict Plechanov, Kautsky and others of social chauvinism and social imperialism." (Stalin, "Reply to Colonel Professor Dr. Rasin to a Letter of January 30 About Clausewitz and About Questions of War and the Art of War", February 23, 1946, Works 15, p.55, translated from Ger.ed.; See also "On the Great Patriotic War", p.104, Ger.ed. "Über den Grossen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion", Roter Druckstock, Frankfurt/Main 1972)

Drawing lessons from historical experience, Stalin emphasized that:

"...in the last thirty years Germany has twice forced upon the world a bloody war, and both times it has suffered a defeat..." (Ibid, p.56)

and that

"...it's military ideology has not stood the test." (Ibid.)

And Stalin demanded that the obsolete theses and statements, especially of the bearers of military ideology in Germany have to be subjected to a critical analysis.

f) Slander four Stalin Ignored the Contradiction Between the Relations of Production and the Productive Forces and the Contradiction Between the Superstructure and the Economic Base in Socialism

In the second speech (of January 1957), contained in "Volume V", it is said:

"For a long time Stalin denied that contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base exist under the socialist system." ("Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees", "Volume V", p.376)

Even if Stalin is conceded a certain progress in this question in his later years - in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." he "hesitantly mentioned" this contradiction and "admitted" that incorrect policies could lead to disturbances - it is further said:

"Even then he did not...realize

that they are the basic contradictions which propel socialist society forward." (Ibid, pp.376,377)

In the compilation of texts "Mao Intern" there is a "second speech at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress" of May 17, 1958. This text also has Taiwan as its source. It contains a similar criticism:

"Stalin said the relations of production in socialist society corresponded totally to the development of the productive forces, and he negated the contradictions. Before his death he wrote an article in which he revoked his own views and said that a total correspondence did not mean there were no contradictions..." ("Second Speech at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress", "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, p.110) (+) (Transl. from Ger.ed.)

(+) A "criticism" proceeding in the same direction is contained in the Volume "A Critique of Soviet Economics". Part of the texts contained in this book is a criticism of Stalin's work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.". The source of these texts too is Taiwan. It is striking that these texts practically do not reason at all, but proceed by unrestrainedly making wrong assertions and without bringing forward any kind of proof:

"Stalin speaks only of the production relations, not of the superstructure, nor of the relationship between superstructure and economic base... Stalin mentions economics only, not politics... The role of people, the role of the laborer- these are not mentioned." ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", London 1977, pp.130,131)

This criticism too refers, even if not expressly so, to the "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", namely to the chapter "Historical Materialism", pp. 105-131; in this chapter the relation between the productive forces and the relations of production is set forth in general:

"First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on the-

se changes and in conformity with them, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change. This, however, does not mean that the relations of production do not influence the development of the productive forces and that the latter are not dependent on the former. While their development is dependent on the development of the productive forces, the relations of production in their turn re-

FOOTNOTE continued from last page

"Stalin does not speak of the superstructure. He only speaks of economics, not of politics."

("Das machen wir anders als Moskau", Hamburg 1975, p. 100; these lines have been translated from the German edition because the entire section "Some Notes on 'Reply to Comrades A.V. Samina and V.G. Venzher' - around 1959", from which these lines are taken, is not included in the English version "A Critique of Soviet Economics" - Translator's Note)

"Stalin's book from first to last says nothing about the superstructure. It is not concerned with people; it considers things, not people." ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", p. 135, op. cit.)

One only needs to read Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." to realize how serious these reproaches are. Firstly, the writer of these lines evidently does not understand that in a writing "On Economic Problems..." in the main just these economic problems will be dealt with, just as a writing about the Chinese revolution will not primarily deal with questions of the Russian Revolution.

Secondly, evidently the critic did not read Stalin's work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." very thoroughly because otherwise the passages in which Stalin very well deals with superstructure, politics and human beings - which is doubted by him would not have remained hidden to him. Some brief observations can prove the untenability of this criticism.

Thus, for example, in the first pages of his work Stalin deals with the special role of Soviet power while establishing socialist forms of economy. Stalin emphasizes that only on the

We shall cite another example to show how absurd the reproach is that Stalin did not consider people. Thus Stalin writes in his criticism of capitalist production that in it man with his needs disappears from view. However, in socialist production things are fundamentally different. Stalin wrote:

"The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements... Consequently, maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society is the aim of socialist production; continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques is the means for the achievement of the aim. Such is the basic economic law of socialism." (Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism...", Peking Edition 1976, pp. 79, 80)

Solely by means of these few lines it becomes clear that any criticism which asserts that "Stalin is not concerned with people", he "did not consider people", "says nothing about the superstructure" etc., is simply an insolent bluff.

act upon the development of the productive forces, accelerating or retarding it... Therefore, however much the relations of production may lag behind the development of the productive forces, they must, sooner or later, come into correspondence with - and actually do come into correspondence with - the level of development of the productive forces, the character of the productive forces." (Stalin, "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", p. 122, op. cit.)

In contradistinction to capitalism, it is then described that the socialist national economy in the Soviet Union is

"an instance in which the relations of production completely correspond to the character of the productive forces." (Ibid, p. 122)

For now, the relations of production with their social ownership of the means of production correspond to the character of the productive forces, which is social in capitalism itself. (+)

In the following historical sketch of different social orders in the chapter "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism" (Ibid, pp. 105-131) the development of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in the course of the history of mankind is briefly described. In contradistinction to all exploiting societies, it is emphasized that in the historical stage of socialist society the

"relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces." (Ibid, p. 126)

For,

"the basis of the relations of production under the Socialist system... is the social ownership of the means of production. Here

there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labour performed, on the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat'. Here the mutual relations of people in the process of production are marked by comradely co-operation and the Socialist mutual assistance of workers who are free from exploitation...

For this reason socialist production in the U.S.S.R. knows no periodical crises of overproduction and their accompanying absurdities." (Ibid, p. 126)

Precisely in the work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", Stalin is not concerned with a historical portrayal of different social orders. He analyses the relationship between the relations of production and the productive forces in socialism and emphasizes that one should not view the correspondence of relations of production and the level of development of the productive forces, typical under socialism, in the sense of an automatic and absolute correspondence. Thus, in his "Reply to Comrade A.I. Notkin" he pointed out that

"the words 'full conformity' must not be understood in the absolute sense..."

(Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", Peking Edition 1976, p. 52)

Further, on the relation between the relations of production and the productive forces in socialism Stalin said:

"The productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production. They undeniably move in advance of the relations of production even under socialism... the words 'full conformity'... are to be understood as meaning that under socialism things do not usually go to the

(+) In this sense it is also said in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.":

"The working class utilized (after the victory of the socialist revolution - Authors' Note) the law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the pro-

ductive forces, overthrew the bourgeois relations of production, created new, socialist relations of production and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces." (Stalin, "Economic Problems...", Peking Edition 1976, p. 50)

length of a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces, that society is in a position to take timely steps to bring the lagging relations of production into conformity with the character of the productive forces."

(Ibid,p.52)

Similarly, in the polemics against Yaroshenko Stalin emphasized that there exist and there will continue to exist contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces in the Soviet Union:

"the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms...it would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy."

(Ibid,p.69)

g) Slander five

Stalin Rejected the Middle Forces in Society and the Comrades Who had Corrected Their Mistakes

In "On the Ten Major Relationships" it is said:

"In those days when the dogmatists headed by Wang Ming were in the saddle, our Party erred on this question, picking up the bad aspect of Stalin's style of work. In society the dogmatists rejected the middle forces and inside the Party they did not allow people to correct their mistakes; they barred both from the revolution." ("On the Ten Major Relationships", 1956, "Volume V", p.301)

In the form of theses, without any attempt at proof, a direct relationship is established between an allegedly "bad aspect of Stalin's style of work" and the dogmatists around Wang Ming. Thereby, regarding the content of the criticism, it is practically imputed to Stalin that he

In the "criticisms" quoted earlier, the historical-materialistic comparison of capitalism and socialism on the one hand and the analysis of economic problems of socialism on the other hand - these two totally different questions are not separated from one another. Instead, the formulation of the law of the "unconditional conformity of the relations of production with the character of the productive forces" is rejected as being wrong. However, this cannot be accepted. These "criticisms", therefore, also do not deal with arguments in Stalin's writings in which he is concerned with the characteristics of the socialist system. Precisely in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." and in "Problems of Linguistics" Stalin analysed a series of phenomena and laws which emerge from the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production and between base and superstructure.

"rejected the middle forces" in the society and did not allow other comrades in the Party "to correct their mistakes" and "barred both from the revolution."

This "criticism" stands in direct contradiction to facts. In the struggle against the views of Trotskyism Stalin described in detail the possibility of agreements with sections of the bourgeoisie in China in the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. (See the collection of Stalin's writings and speeches about the Chinese Revolution published in the Series Marxist-Leninist Writings: "J.W.Stalin, On the Chinese Revolution") Moreover, the C.P.S.U. and Stalin allowed an entire group of former Trotskyists to work again in the Party after they had renounced Trotskyism. (See for example Stalin, Works 10, p.10 and "Short Course", pp.289, 290)

h) Slander six

Stalin was Against Class Struggle from Below

In the texts published in Taiwan, reprinted in "Mao Intern", there is a criticism against Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." which, without any proof, reproaches

this writing of Stalin with abandoning class struggle from below upwards:

"In his 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.' Stalin said that reforms after the revolution were peaceful reforms steered from above downwards. Stalin did not practise any class struggle from below upwards. In Eastern Europe and North Korea he had a peaceful agrarian reform carried out. There was no struggle against landowners and no anti-Right campaigns were permitted. The capitalists were combated only from above downwards."

("Second Speech at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress", in: "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, III - translated from the Ger.ed.)

Anybody can easily ascertain on his own that such a passage, as imputed to Stalin by the writer of the above "criticism", does not exist in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.". For the critic, "above" is evidently something negative even after the revolution; "reforms from above" after the victory of the revolution are an abomination. Such a "criticism" treats state power without a class standpoint. Such a view does not see the fundamental difference between reforms from above under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie which serve to maintain their class rule, and reforms from above under the dictatorship of the proletariat which, for the proletariat, have the function of consolidating its class rule, for gathering strength for a new offensive in the struggle against its enemies. The rejection of reforms proceeding from the dictatorship of the proletariat on the whole signifies the worshiping of spontaneity and a rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat itself, because the proletarian state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, is an instrument of proletarian class struggle used by the proletariat, - led by its Party - for its class aims in the struggle against its opponents.

In conformity with the teachings of Leninism about the dictatorship of the proletariat, Stalin defended, applied and developed further the teaching of class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat against all deviations in the C.P.S.U.(B). Precisely a f t e r the victory of the proletarian revolution, a f t e r the victory of the armed uprising the proletariat must smash the old state power and establish its own, the proletarian state power and make use of it as a weapon, as an instrument in the struggle against the

bourgeoisie. Stalin set forth this aspect in great detail in "The Foundations of Leninism" in the section "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat as the Instrument of the Proletarian Revolution" in Chapter IV "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (pp.111-116).

Stalin's "critics" are evidently unable to grasp in this context that with the establishment of the state power of the working class, which is the dictatorship of the proletariat, the opposition between "below" and "above", which is naturally very sharp, indeed irreconcilable in principle in an exploiting society, no longer exists, if and as long as the Party does not make any serious mistake, and the proletarian state really fulfils its role and tasks. With their criticisms, the "critics" demonstrate that they are neither able to conceive of a real state power of the working class, nor do they know anything about the role of the Party as vanguard, as avant-garde, as General Staff of the proletariat. They separate Party and masses, indeed, they raise an unbridgeable gap between the two.

Only for the totally superficial observer "everything comes from above" in the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In reality, the state or Party decrees are p r e c e d e d by the will of the proletarian masses and the entire working people manifesting itself in the most varied forms, they are preceded by a manifold movement at the base, thus "from below upwards". Even if a decree is effected "above" - either for a big revolutionary transformation or merely for a comparatively modest reform - , it would remain only on paper, or would congeal into a caricature, if it did not find any active acceptance or support from "below". What a pity that one has to explain this "elementary ABC" of socialism to people who claim to be "correct" and to "refute" Stalin.

The reproach, Stalin did not demand class struggle from below, is simply laughable.

In the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B)", for example, the collectivization of the agricultural economy and the elimination of the kulaks as a class in the countryside are described as a fundamental revolutionary transformation. Thus it is said there:

"Solid collectivization was not just a peaceful process - the overwhelming bulk of the peasantry simply joining the collective

farms - but was a struggle of the peasant masses against the kulaks. ... the peasants would expropriate them, driving them from the land, dispossessing them of their cattle and machinery and demanding their arrest and eviction from the district by the Soviet authorities." (Stalin, "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", 1939, p.303)

"The distinguishing feature of this revolution (the collectivization of agriculture and the elimination of the kulaks as a class - Authors' Note) is that it was accomplished from above, on the initiative of the state, and directly supported from below by the millions of peasants, who were fighting to throw off kulak bondage and to live in freedom in the collective farms." (Ibid, p.305)

Another example: when Stalin analysed bureaucracy

"one of the most serious obstacles, if not the most serious of all" (Stalin, "Against Vulgarising the Slogan of Self-Criticism", 1928 Works 11, p.137)

for the socialist Soviet Union, 1928, he pointed at the control and criticism of the masses from below as being the fundamental antidote against bureaucracy. Stalin demanded:

"develop self-criticism... rouse the vast masses of the workers and peasants to the task of criticism from below, of control from below..." (Ibid, p.138)

Even in the struggle against the Trotskyist wreckers, Stalin emphasized that it is necessary to heighten the vigilance of the masses and not be taken in by the wrong theory

"that with every advance we make the class struggle here must subside, the more successes we achieve the tamer will the class enemy become. This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and enables the class enemy to recuperate for the struggle against the Soviet government." (Stalin, "Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite and Other Double-Dealers", Works 14, pp.263, 263)

Very evidently the emphasis on the

"vigilance of the masses", or the admonition to the communists not to be lulled into security is anything but a rejection of "class struggle from below upwards".

Regarding the criticism about peaceful reforms in the people's democracies we must first brand the bourgeois reasoning and bourgeois style of this criticism. It is really not worth discussing the assertion that Stalin "had peaceful reforms carried out in the people's democracies", or he did not permit struggle against the landlords, or did not allow any anti-Right campaign to be carried out in North Korea.

However, this criticism, which obviously misses class struggle from "below" in the people's democracies, on the whole conceals a lack of understanding of the real problems of class struggle in the people's democracies of Eastern Europe.

Here we shall deal with this theme only very briefly: In some countries of Europe it was a real problem that the old state apparatus of the exploiting classes was not above all smashed by a revolution of the masses of the people, but chiefly by the struggle of the Soviet Red Army. Basic economic and political measures against the old exploiting classes had to be carried out on the basis of the anti-fascist struggle, because these to a large extent had been the support of Hitler fascism in these countries. Therefore, the basic problem there was to make conscious and organize the working class and the working people after the old state apparatus had already been smashed, to lead them towards socialist revolution.

Under these extraordinary circumstances specific difficulties, of course, arose in fully mobilizing the masses of people for socialist ideals; however, this was conditioned by the concrete circumstances. The entire world communist movement knew that the extent to which the masses could be mobilized to themselves take the path of revolution and to consciously struggle for it was decisive for the progress of the people's democracies.

1) Slander seven The Soviet Union Made Serious Mistakes While Eliminating Counter-Revolution

A favourite reproach from the anti-communists' repertoire of tricks is to defame the Communists by saying that they lock up dissenters and "behead them". The same reproach is to be found in the text "Summary of the Conference of the Provincial and Municipal Secretaries" of January 1957 (from Taiwan source). By the way, this passage is missing in "Volume V". Probably it was too unauthenticated even for its editors.

"Whoever had a different opinion about the Soviet Union was charged with anti-Sovietism. However, real life showed Stalin that one cannot always proceed in this manner. Even Stalin could not behead everyone and imprison them. In the years 1936 and 1937 he had many put to death. In 1938 there were a little less and in the year 1939 he put a still smaller number to death. To immediately behead somebody who holds a different opinion is no solution." ("Summary at the Conference of Provincial and Party Secretaries", in: "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, pp.92,93; translated from Ger.ed.)

History itself refutes all these slanders. Stalin led an exhaustive ideological struggle against Trotskyism and Right opportunism in the C.P.S.U. (B).

During this ideological struggle Trotsky was member of the Central

Committee and a Party member. His anti-Leninist views were comprehensively exposed and criticized by Stalin and the C.P.S.U. (B). The Party masses and the working class were educated in the spirit of Leninism in the struggle against Trotskyism and later in the struggle against Bucharin's Right opportunism and could convince themselves of the wrongness of the opportunists' views. They were expelled from the C.P.S.U. (B) only after it had been proved that they were incorrigible opportunists and enemies of Communism and the C.P.S.U. (B).

Such a procedure fully corresponds with the teachings of Leninism about the Party of a new type which does not tolerate any fraction within the proletarian Party. Only when the Trotskyites and other opportunists had become bitter enemies of the Soviet Union, enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat, after they had committed sabotage, murder and other crimes in the Soviet Union as spies of the fascist states, and when, far beyond the Party, the masses had become conscious of this, they were convicted according to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The verbatim reports of these processes were all published - a procedure which for diverse "critics" of Stalin and unfortunately also for some ostensible defenders of Stalin, is in no way something to be taken for granted.

j) Slander eight Stalin Paid Little Heed to Light Industry and Agriculture

"On the question of heavy industry, light industry and agriculture, the Soviet Union did not lay enough emphasis on the latter two." ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", London 1977, p.129; from the Taiwan source)

It is an old reproach of the anti-communists that in the Soviet Union human beings had to starve because only heavy industry was one-sidedly set up. The same reproach underlies the above criticism.

In fact the concrete experiences of building the socialist national economy in the Soviet Union showed that in the entire period of reconstruction

from the beginning of the NEP in 1921 till after the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B) in 1926, primarily light industry was developed and put on its feet. (See "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", 1939, p.280, op.cit.)

After the reconstruction of the national economy was completed, Stalin not without reason, laid down that the task now was

"to tip the scales in favour of heavy industry" (Ibid, p.280)

because the task of socialist industrialization now presented itself.

"The problem of light industry presents no special difficulties. We solved that problem several years ago. The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and more important.

It is more difficult because its solution demands colossal investments, and, as the history of industrially backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot manage without huge long-term loans.

It is more important because, unless we develop heavy industry, we cannot build any industry at all, we cannot carry out any industrialisation." (Stalin, "A Year of Great Change", 1929, Works 12, p.127)

The first Five-Year Plan also set itself the task of establishing modern large-scale industry as the foundation of Soviet power. In order to really create a modern large-scale industrial technical base for the national economy the main link of such a plan had to first be found. The main link was

"heavy industry, with machine building as its core. For only heavy industry is capable of reconstructing both industry as a whole, transport and agriculture, and putting them on their feet." (Stalin, "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan", 1933, Works 13, p.177)

In his "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral Area", Moscow February 2, 1946, Stalin emphasized in sum the correctness of the path of industrialization as taken by the Soviet Union.

Stalin asked the question: How could the Soviet Union be transformed from an agricultural to an industrial country in only thirteen years? And he answered:

"Above all by the Soviet politics of industrializing the country. The Soviet method of industrializing the country radically differs from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries industrialization usually begins with light industry. Since light industry requires smaller investments than heavy industry, since the turnover of capital is quicker and profits are more easily obtained, light industry becomes there the first object of industrialization. Only after a long time, in the course of which light

industry accumulates profits and concentrates it in banks, the turn of heavy industry comes. The gradual transference of accumulated capital to heavy industry begins, in order to create the prerequisite for its development. However, this is a lengthy process requiring a long period of many decades in which one has to wait for the expansion of light industry and lead a miserable existence without heavy industry. It is understandable that the Communist Party could not take this path. The Party knew that war was coming closer, that it was impossible to defend the country without heavy industry, that the development of heavy industry had to be tackled as soon as possible, that here delay meant defeat. The Party recollected Lenin's words that without heavy industry it was impossible to assert the independence of the country, that without it the Soviet order could perish. For this reason the Communist Party of our country rejected the 'normal' path of industrialization and started the industrialization of the country with the development of heavy industry. This presented great difficulties, but none which could not be overcome. This work was considerably aided by the nationalization of the industry and the banks, which enabled a speedy accumulation of means and their transference to heavy industry.

There can be no doubt that otherwise it would have been impossible to attain the transformation of our country into an industrial country in such a short time." (Stalin, "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral Area", Moscow, 1946, Works 15, pp.46,47. Translated from Ger.ed.)

By this it becomes clear that the rejection of the method of industrialization in the Soviet Union in reality serves the interests of world imperialism, and not that of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. This "criticism", joined in by imperialists and opportunists of all shades, clearly serves the purpose of leaving the socialist country undeveloped, of transforming it into an appendage of the world imperialist market and delivering it up to the attack of world imperialism without any modern defence.

Further, it is precisely Stalin's merit to have comprehensively applied

the Marxian theory of reproduction to the construction and development of socialist economy in the Soviet Union. In his work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." Stalin summed up the experience of economic construction and developed further Marx's comments in the second volume of "Capital" and Lenin's in "Criti-

k) Slander nine Stalin Advocated the "Theory of Productive Forces"

"Stalin emphasized only technology, technical cadre. He wanted nothing but cadre; no politics, no masses." ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", London 1977, p.129; Critique of "Economic Problems...". See also p.135)

"Stalin propagated both these parables, they are very one-sided. 'Technique decides everything' - but what about politics? 'Cadres decide everything' - but what about the masses? Dialectics is lacking here." ("Mao Intern", Hamburg 1974, p.109,

"Second Speech at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the C.P. of China", 1958, from the Taiwan source; translated from the Ger.ed.)

By detaching from the context two temporary slogans, sharpened to fit a certain situation in the Soviet Union, and by representing them as being principles, valid forever, it is imputed to Stalin to have neglected politics and the masses. In reality, however, in certain situations in revolution and socialist construction, certain tasks come to the forefront and become the tactical main link which the Communists have to take hold of and solve, in order to be able to then take up other tasks leading further.

Thus the slogan "technique decides everything" is the main link in the reconstruction of industry on a modern technical base. It has as an aim the creation of a foundation for socialist industry, the overcoming of economic-technical backwardness. To accomplish this task it was required of the Bolsheviks to learn technical skills, to create communist specialists and to educate a socialist intelligence of the working class in order to replace the bourgeois specialists.

In the "History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course" the following is said about the urgency of fulfilling this task:

cal Comments on Bukharin's Economics of the Transition Period" about the theory of reproduction in socialism, and thus summed up the basic guiding principles of the theory of reproduction in socialism. (See Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", Peking Edition 1976, pp.72-84)

"It was necessary to get Communist business executives to turn their attention to technical matters, to acquire a taste for technique; they needed to be shown that it was vital for Bolshevik business executives to master modern technique, otherwise we would run the risk of condemning our country to backwardness and stagnation." ("History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", 1939, pp.313,314)

In this situation, the mastery of modern technology became the main link in the work of the Bolsheviks:

"Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves become experts. In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything." (Stalin, "The Tasks of the Business Executives", 1931, Works 13, p.43; quoted in "Short Course...", p.312 op.cit.)

With the completion of the reconstruction period the lack of technology was overcome. But the development of cadres who could master technology did not keep pace with the development of technology. The slogan "technique decides everything" was obsolete and had to be replaced by the slogan "cadres decide everything".

"But, having emerged from the period of dearth of technique, we have entered a new period, a period, I would say, of a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of harnessing technique, and advancing it... Formerly, we used to say that 'technique decides everything'. This slogan helped us to put an end to the dearth of technique and to create a vast technical base in every branch of activity, for the equipment of our people with first-class technique. That is very good. But it is not enough by far. In order to set technique going and to utilise it to the full, we need people who have mastered technique, we need cadres capable of mastering and utilising this technique

according to all the rules of the art... That is why emphasis must now be laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered technique... 'Cadres decide everything.' That is the main thing now." (Stalin, "Address to the Graduates From the Red Army Academies", 1935, Works 14, pp. 75, 76)

In "Defects in Party Work" Stalin once again explained why the slogan "technique decides everything" became the main slogan for the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union during a certain period:

"Technical questions and not political ones were our weak spot at that time... We eliminated our technical weakness by advancing the slogan on the mastery of technique and by educating during this period tens and hundreds of technically equipped Bolshevik cadres." (Stalin, "Defects in Party Work", 1937, Works 14, p. 262)

Apart from this, the fact that in a certain situation this old slogan was replaced by the new slogan

"on the mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres and

1) Slander ten

The Soviet Union Under Stalin Took too Much Away From "the Peasants" and Gave Them too Little

With reference to the attitude towards the peasants, it is asserted in "On the Ten Major Relationships":

"The Soviet Union has adopted measures which squeeze the peasants very hard. It takes away too much from the peasants at too low a price through its system of so-called obligatory sales (which existed up to 1957 until Khrushchov abolished this along with the machine and tractor stations: Authors' Note) and other measures." ("On the Ten Major Relationships", 1956, "Volume V", p. 291)

"In the Soviet Union and in some East European countries, agricultural collectivization invariably brought about decreases in grain production for a number of years." ("Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of ... Party Committees", 1957, "Volume V", p. 380)

These passages do not approach the rural population and the peasants with the method of class analysis.

the abandonment of our political carelessness." (Ibid, p. 263)

shows Stalin's estimation of the cadres who, after the line is laid down, decide everything. It does not indicate a low opinion of the masses, as the critics allege.

This is underscored by an extract from the sixth conclusion in the "History of the C.P.S.U. (B)":

"Lastly, the history of the Party teaches us that unless it has wide connections with the masses, unless it constantly strengthens these connections, unless it knows how to hearken to the voice of the masses and understand their urgent needs, unless it is prepared not only to teach the masses, but to learn from the masses, a party of the working class cannot be a real mass party capable of leading the working class millions and all the labouring people... A party perishes if it shuts itself up in its narrow party shell if it severs itself from the masses, if it allows itself to be covered with bureaucratic rust."

("History of the C.P.S.U. (B), Short Course", 1939, p. 362, op.cit.)

Rich peasants and kulaks were really in a certain sense "squeezed" in Stalin's time. More precisely, their wealth, based on exploitation, was taken away from them and - as the last exploiting class in the Soviet Union - they were eliminated. Towards the other social strata of the peasants, who were allies of the proletariat, the politics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union consisted in systematically raising the material and ideological level of these strata of the peasants. The decrease in grain production in the Soviet Union was the consequence of sabotage, arson, hiding in the ground and destruction of grain by kulaks. This was just as much an accompanying phenomenon of class war as for example destruction during civil war. In the years after collectivization had been completed grain production already reached the highest levels in the history of the country so far.

In the criticism of Stalin's writing "Economic Problems of Socialism in

the U.S.S.R.", Stalin's attitude towards "the peasants" and the policy of the C.P.S.U. (B) is dealt with in the following manner:

"My view is that the last of the three appended letters is entirely wrong. It expresses a deep uneasiness, a belief that the peasantry cannot be trusted to release agricultural machinery but would hang on to it." ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", London 1977, p. 130; See also pp. 100, 101 in: "Das machen wir anders als Moskau", Hamburg 1975, chapter "Some Notes on 'Reply to Comrades A.V. Sanina and V.G. Venzher' Around 1959". This chapter is not included in the English edition "A Critique of Soviet Economics" - Translator's Note)

Here too the language is very instructive. "Cannot be trusted to release agricultural machinery" - this phrase alone reveals a total lack of understanding of socialist relations, under which the means of production are no longer private property.

m) Slander eleven

Stalin Did Not Recognize the Way to Public Ownership

"Stalin did not discover a way to make a transition from collective to public ownership." ("A Critique of Soviet Economics", "Critique of Stalin's 'Economic Problems...' ", p. 136)

"Stalin is avoiding the issue, having failed to find a method or suitable formulation (on the transition from collective to public ownership - Authors' Note)." (Ibid, p. 145)

However, in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", the entire second part of the "Reply to Comrades A.V. Sanina and V.G. Venzher" is devoted to this question. Here Stalin developed important guiding theses in this question, which the pamphlet "A Critique of Soviet Economics" does not deal with at all.

As apparent from the foregoing criticism, the path of transition from collective to public ownership as sketched by Stalin is rejected. However, this is done without going into the content of Stalin's theses.

Precisely in the writing "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", in the "Reply to Comrades A.V. Sanina and V.G. Venzher" Stalin showed very clearly how kolkhoze property can be

The reproach of a lack of confidence in "the peasants", which is substantiated with the establishment of the machine and tractor stations, in reality is aimed at conserving relations in rural areas, at sabotaging socialist transformation and transition to communism. If the peasants in the collective farms remained owners of important means of production, like machines and tractors, then the transformation of a significant part of the means of production into public property would be obstructed. The establishment of machine and tractor stations on the contrary means that, besides land, the most important means of production in agriculture are transformed into general public property, and as such are available to the peasants in the collective farms on specially easy terms.

Directly opposed assertions contradicting this "criticism" are made in the "criticism" of the "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." which follows below.

raised to the level of general public property.

"The collective farm is an unusual kind of enterprise. It operates on land, and cultivates land which has long been public, and not collective-farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates."

Further, the collective farm operates with basic implements of production which are public, not collective-farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of its basic implements of production. Further, the collective farm is a cooperative enterprise: it utilizes the labour of its members, and it distributes its income among its members on the basis of workday units; it owns its seed, which is renewed every year and goes into production.

What, then, does the collective farm own? Where is the collective farm property which it disposes of quite freely, at its own discretion? This property of the collective farm is its product, the product of collective farming: grain, meat, butter, vegetables, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc., not counting the buildings and the personal husbandry of the col-

lective farmers on their household plots. The fact is that a considerable part of this product, the surplus collective-farm output, goes into the market and is thus included in the system of commodity circulation. It is precisely this circumstance which now prevents the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property. It is therefore precisely from this end that the work of elevating collective-farm property to the level of public property must be tackled. In order to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective-farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation

n) Slander twelve

It is Imputed to Stalin that he Forgot the Ideological and Political Conditions for the Transition to Communism

"A Critique of Soviet Economics" criticizes one passage in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.". Here, Stalin, in his polemics against Yaroshenko, names at least three basic pre-requisites which have to be fulfilled in the transition to communism. The criticism refers to the third point:

"Stalin was speaking of culture when he proposed the three conditions, the physical development and education of the whole people..., but the political conditions are missing."
("A Critique of Soviet Economics", London 1977, p.133; Taiwan source)

Apart from the fact that the theme of the polemics with Yaroshenko is the field of economics, even in this context Stalin is evidently not only concerned with the chief economic conditions for the preparation of the transition to communism. Precisely in point three this can be seen. Stalin here emphasizes the all-round development of the physical and mental capabilities of all members of society, their development into active participants in social development. To be sure, this is done from the point of view of the given theme, from the point of view of Yaroshenko's mistakes. It is done in the context of a written polemics and not in the context of an encyclopaedia of Marxism-Leninism.

ion and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms. That is the point."
(Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", Peking edition 1976, pp.97,98)

The writer of the "criticism against Stalin" mentioned above - who ever it was - totally ignores the truism that the road to communism demands the raising of kolkhoze property to the level of general public property and not the transformation of public property into group property, that for this the sphere of commodity circulation must be restricted and finally totally eliminated, and not extended.

In his entire writing "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." Stalin is not concerned with the political conditions of the transition to communism, but with the transition

"from one form of economy, the economy of socialism, to another, higher form of economy, the economy of communism."
(Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", Peking edition 1976, p.71)

At the Seventeenth Congress Stalin laid down in detail the ideological tasks which still have to be solved after the creation of socialist relations of production on the road to communism, thus, for example, overcoming the remnants of capitalism in the economy and in the consciousness of the people. (See Works 13, pp.355-388)

Moreover, at the Eighteenth Congress Stalin developed further in theory and expounded upon in detail a central political question - the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the state. What is to happen with the state in the Soviet Union if, under the conditions of capitalist encirclement, the task of the transition to the building of communism is taken up. (See "Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P. S.U. (B)", Works 14, pp.411-429)

o) Slander thirteen

The Soviet Union and Stalin were Great-Power-Chauvinistic After the Second World War

The compilation published in Taiwan also contains an article from the "Pravda" of September 2, 1964: an alleged talk of Mao Tse-tung with members of the Japanese Socialist Party. This alleged talk already served the Soviet revisionists as a base for their instigations. Mao Tse-tung is supposed to have said in this talk:

"The Soviet Union has occupied too many territories... Outer Mongolia... has been separated from China. They have also separated a portion from Rumania, called Bessarabia. They similarly separated areas from Germany, namely, a piece of East Germany. They chased away all Germans living there to the Western part. Even from Poland they separated a piece and added it to White Russia. They separated another piece from Germany and attached it to Poland as a compensation for the territories which they had separated from Poland and had given to White Russia. Finally, they also separated a piece from Finland. All they could in any way separate they separated... In my opinion they should not have separated anything at all... Little more than a hundred years ago they separated the entire area east of Baikal lake with Poli (Chabarovsk), Haishenwai (Vladivostok) and the Kamchatka peninsula. This account cannot be squared so easily. We still have not settled with them on this score. Therefore, as far as we are concerned your Kurile Islands are no problem; they must be returned to you."
("Talk at the Reception of Sasaki, Kozo and other of the Japanese Socialist Party", 1964, in: "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1975, pp.46,47 - translated from the Ger.ed.)

It is impossible to discuss at the level of such reasoning. These statements imputed to Mao Tse-tung by "Pravda" are really nothing but imperialist propaganda against Stalin's Soviet Union which, in the period of the "Cold War", could have been found in any imperialist newspaper as criticism of so-called "Soviet Great Power aspirations".

Unfortunately, the C.P. of China has never repudiated the agitation pursued by the Soviet revisionists with this quotation.

In this connection, we only briefly want to say:

The writer of the above nationalist tirade against Stalin's Soviet Union reveals that he has a b s o l u t e l y n o idea of the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist foreign policy, he shamelessly falsifies history, and adds grist to the mills of the imperialists' anti-communism.

In 1947 the Information Bureau of the Soviet Union published the brochure "Falsifiers of History (A Historical Rectification)" (Reprint Frankfurt/Main), in which it repudiated similar accusations as nasty slanders. This brochure makes clear that, at a time when Hitler-Germany was making massive preparations for a war against the Soviet Union, the territorial gains in Eastern Europe aimed solely at the maximum strengthening of the defence of the socialist Soviet Union against fascist attack, at gaining positions - as favourable as possible - for the impending attack by Hitler-Germany. And as history shows, this was fully justified. This is also true in the case of Finland which attacked the Soviet Union. The Finnish reactionaries, backed by the English and French imperialists, did not reckon with the strength of the Soviet Army which inflicted a defeat on Finland. Since Finland did not alter its hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union and did not conclude any pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was compelled to push further its borders in the area of Leningrad for reasons of its own security.

This was a fully legitimate and Marxist-Leninist policy conforming to the approach of Communism to the national question, namely, that the national question, the question of the right of nations to self-determination must be subordinated to the cause of the working class, to the world proletarian revolution.

Regarding the policy of Stalin and the Soviet Union after World War II - which here cannot be dealt with in detail - imperialist slanders "accusing" Stalin's Soviet Union of Great Power chauvinism cannot be accepted, but must be branded as slanders and attacks on the Marxist-Leninist foreign policy.

p) Slander fourteen
Stalin is Responsible for the C.P. of China's Mistakes

A number of the C.P. of China's mistakes are shifted to Stalin, again without giving any proof or naming documents. Specially Wang Ming's errors are presented as Stalin's mistakes with regard to China.

"Stalin did a number of wrong things in connection with China. The 'Left' adventurism pursued by Wang Ming in the latter part of the Second Revolutionary Civil War period and his Right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan can both be traced to Stalin."
 ("On the Ten Major Relationships", 1956, "Volume V", p.304)

"If we had followed Wang Ming's, or in other words Stalin's methods the Chinese revolution could't have succeeded."
 ("Talks At the Chengtu Conference", 1958, in: "Chairman Mao Talks to the People". Ed. by Stuart Schram, Pantheon Books, New York 1974, p.102. Also in "Mao Intern", Hamburg 1975, p.38. From the Taiwan source) (+)

In opposition to these slanders, it must be emphasized that in his writings and speeches Stalin had set forth and resolved in theory the fundamental problems of the Chinese revolution with a high degree of firmness in principles. Proceeding from the theses of Leninism about the revolution in colonial and dependent countries Stalin fought the wrong views about the Chinese revolution, as they were put forth by the Trotskyites and by Chen Tu hsiu in China, and developed a correct line. In his

Selected Works, Volume I to IV, Mao Tse-tung emphasized in many passages of his writings on the democratic stage of the revolution in China the correctness of the Comintern's and Stalin's line, which he propagated and took as his guide.

In "Volume V" it is twice imputed to Stalin that he was against the victory of the Chinese revolution:

"At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself."

("On the Ten Major Relationships", 1956, "Volume V", p.304)

"The Chinese revolution won victory by acting contrary to Stalin's will... When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake."
 ("Talks at the Chengtu Conference", March 10, 1958, in: "Chairman Mao Talks to the People", Ed. by Stuart Schram, op.cit. pp.102,103. Also in "Mao Intern", op.cit. p.38. From the Taiwan collection.)

Not a single word is said about when and where Stalin made such statements and exhibited such intentions. However, if such statements are made about Stalin's practice - as similarly made earlier in the field of theory - without the least bit of proof, without pointing out in any way to any document, one should not discuss them, but must repudiate them as being foul slanders!

(+) Even though in the Comment "On the Question of Stalin" "some wrong ideas" are imputed to Stalin (Peking Review No.38/1963, p.10) the article still stresses the C.P. of China's own responsibility:

"In its struggle against 'Left' and Right opportunism therefore, our Party criticized only its own erring comrades and never put the blame on Stalin."
 (Ibid, p.10)

q) The "Criticisms Against Stalin" Obscure the Decisive Caesura
Signified by the Betrayal of the Modern Revisionists After
Stalin's Death

In a speech at a conference of the secretaries of the Party committees Mao Tse-tung is supposed to have said:

"After World War II, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and certain East European Parties no longer concerned themselves with the basic principles of Marxism. They no longer concerned themselves with class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Party leadership, democratic centralism and the ties between the Party and the masses, and there wasn't much of a political atmosphere. The Hungarian incident was the consequence."
 ("Volume V", pp.377,378)

Such a representation is not only a monstrous distortion and unscrupulous generalization of shortcomings really existing in the world communist movement after World War II. Above all, such a representation ignores Stalin's magnificent work of explaining, propagating and defending the basic

principles of Marxism-Leninism after World War II. Stalin's fight against emerging modern revisionism - documented in writings like "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." and "Problems of Linguistics" and in his fight against Tito-revisionism - is an example and model for our struggle today. The representation in "Volume V" obscures the fact that the principles of Marxism-Leninism were thrown overboard by modern revisionism. It totally ignores that modern revisionism could gain the upper hand only after Stalin's death - after it no longer had to fear Stalin's struggle - and that the decisive qualitative caesura only came with the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. .

Thus, in effect, absurdly Stalin's C.P.S.U. and then perhaps even the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., are equally "blamed" for Hungary, and thus, Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism are unscrupulously treated alike.



2. Enver Hoxha's Chief Attacks Against Mao Tse-tung from 1950 to 1976

In his assault against Mao Tse-tung in "Imperialism and Revolution" Enver Hoxha listed twenty-one sources from Mao Tse-tung's so-called "Volume V". Beyond that, Enver Hoxha cited further ten to fifteen "references" from the period 1949-1976 (partly without any list of sources, partly taken directly from bourgeois newspapers, or from statements of people like Tito).

Here, it is not possible to take a thorough stand on and reply point by point to these charges. We shall do this exhaustively in the various sections of the critique of Enver Hoxha's "Imperialism and the Revolution". (+)

Here we shall not once again go into our criticism against Mao Tse-tung's authentic writings from the period 1949 to 1976 or against his statements in unauthorized writings (we presuppose the study of our analysis of Mao Tse-tung's work from the period 1949 to 1976). We neither want to discuss to what extent Enver Hoxha now and then cites a really debatable standpoint of Mao Tse-tung. Here we shall merely give an overview and take a stand, in order to set forth the underlying mistakes of Enver Hoxha himself in the form of theses.

Enver Hoxha's first assertion is that Mao Tse-tung treated the counter-revolutionaries in China "too mildly". For us it is beyond question that Mao Tse-tung used the death penalty and various suppressive methods etc. against the "old" counter-revolution. This assertion by Enver Hoxha can only imply that he simply slandered Mao Tse-tung, or that he confuses the question of the "old" counter-revolutionaries with the question of the method of struggle against the revisionists within the Party!

Enver Hoxha's second assertion that by allowing capitalism in the economy Mao Tse-tung was on the whole for capitalism in reality, is directed against Lenin's and Stalin's theses on the necessity of a NEP period of temporarily allowing capitalism in some branches which are not central. Therefore, Enver Hoxha is also not at all in a position to criticize from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint Mao Tse-tung's real mistakes in the political sphere with regard to a political alliance with the national bourgeoisie.

(+) "Part I" of the "Critique of Enver Hoxha's Book 'Imperialism and Revolution'" by the three Editorial boards of "Rote Fahne", "Westberliner Kommunist" and "Gegen die Strömung" with the title "A Fundamentally Wrong Line in the Struggle Against Imperialism (from the 'Super-Power Theory' to the 'Support of Bourgeois States')" was published in September 1980; "Part II" "A Fundamentally Wrong Approach to the Assessment of Mao Tse-tung, the C.P. of China and the Chinese Revolution" was published in May 1981. (Part III: "Enver Hoxha in the Wake of Modern Revisionism: A Fundamentally False Viewpoint Towards the Problems of the Democratic Period of the Chinese Revolution" was published in February 1982; the fourth and last part "Revisionist Positions Towards Some Basic Questions of the Development of Socialism and Communism" was published in May 1984 - Translator)

Enver Hoxha's third assertion is intended to say that no bourgeois ideology, no hostile propaganda should at all be allowed to exist (or can exist) under the dictatorship of the proletariat! Here there is no Marxist-Leninist criticism of certain statements by Mao Tse-tung, which are exaggerated for the sake of polemics. Rather, education of the masses of the people, on the ideological front too, with the help of "negative examples" in the struggle against them, is fundamentally rejected. Rejected is also the incorporation of the own experiences of the masses of the people in the process of education. Indeed, thereby any kind of debate is rejected.

Enver Hoxha's fourth assertion that Mao Tse-tung on the whole condemned Stalin completely is substantiated with the most doubtful sources. It also primarily proceeds from a defence which is oriented not towards content, but towards the notion that it is not allowed to discuss Stalin's theses at all. However, it is soon evident that (for example in the question of the NEP) Enver Hoxha, in spite of his obeisance to Stalin, himself disregards fundamental teachings of Stalin.

Enver Hoxha's fifth assertion that Mao Tse-tung argued for the "two-line struggle" which he put on the same level as the permission of factions, is in no way based on a Marxist-Leninist foundation. In reality, two lines in the Party - though not as a law - are indeed possible and as well were to be found in Lenin's and Stalin's C.P.S.U.(B)!

In reality, it is definitely possible that Party leaders come up with a wrong line, but remain loyal to the organization and do not build any factions. Enver Hoxha attacks the Leninist principle of first creating ideological clarity and taking organizational measures only after a phase of convincing, or only if representatives of a wrong line engage themselves in splitting the organization. Enver Hoxha's concept is bureaucratic and directed against conscious discipline!

In our opinion, Enver Hoxha's sixth assertion that Mao Tse-tung by dialectics understood a "mere change of place", or that he wrongly proceeded from a qualitative leap between socialism and communism, is based on a mechanical standpoint. It does not perceive that after a qualitative leap, i.e., after the revolution, at first for example proletariat and bourgeoisie really change places - the oppressed become the oppressors and the oppressors become the oppressed - the bourgeoisie is eliminated as a class only after a certain period of time. With reference to the transition from socialism to communism Enver Hoxha does not perceive the qualitative leap between a society with a state and a society without a state, a society according to the motto "Each according to his needs", or a society in which distribution still takes place according to achievement.



3. Some Unauthorized Passages from 1956 - 1957

The following unauthorized passages give us the opportunity of briefly setting down and putting across our opinion on a few theses of "Volume V" which touch upon questions which seem important to us.

- a) "We seemed to have the initiative, but this was at best only half true"

In June 1957, with reference to the cause of the struggle which at that time erupted against the bourgeois Rightists it is said that since 1950 the reactionaries had half of the initiative.

"This is a great political and ideological struggle. Only by waging it can our Party keep the initiative, temper our cadres, educate the masses, isolate the reactionaries and put them on the defensive. During the past seven years, we seemed to have the initiative, but this was at best only half true. The surrender of the reactionaries was a sham, and many of the middle elements submitted unwillingly. Now the situation has begun to change. Though outwardly on the defensive, we are actually gaining the initiative. The reason is that we are carrying out the rectification in all seriousness. The reactionaries who have lost their heads and run wild only appear to have the initiative, but they have gone too far and as a result are alienating the people and finding themselves on the defensive. As the situation varies from place to place, you can be flexible in your tactics and dispositions.

In short, this is a big battle (with the battleground both inside and outside the Party). If we don't win this battle, it will be impossible to attain socialism." ("Mustering Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild Attacks", 1957, "Volume V", pp. 449, 450)

This self-critical estimation appears realistic to us. Above all, it already shows the recognition that the struggle against the bourgeois Rightists is a struggle which also takes place inside the Party.

- b) "The Contradiction Between the People and the Bourgeois Rightists...an Antagonistic, Irreconcilable, Life-And-Death Contradiction"

In June 1957 it is said:

"During the period of socialist revolution in our country the contradiction between the people and the bourgeois Rightists, who oppose the Communist Party, the people and socialism, is one between ourselves and the enemy, that is, an antagonistic, irreconcilable, life-and-death contradiction.

The bourgeois Rightists who have launched wild attacks against the working class and the Communist Party are reactionaries or counter-revolutionaries. They are not so labelled but are instead called Rightists because, first, this will make it easier to win over the middle and, second, it will help split the Rightists and enable some of them to change and come over." ("The Situation in the Summer of 1957", July 1957, "Volume V", p. 473)

Here it must first be stated that naturally the estimation of the "bourgeois Rightists" as being counter-revolutionaries is fully correct. (The term "bourgeois Rightists", however, certainly gives scope for the wrong idea that other sections of the national bourgeoisie are "for the cause of socialism".)

However, the entire conception becoming evident here of splitting the counter-revolutionaries by "mild labels", by "tactics", appears to us to be deeply rotten.

Without wanting to exclude such a possibility in principle for a short period, Leninism teaches us that every tactic should in principle lead to a raising and not to a lowering of the fighting class consciousness of the workers.

The "tactic" of concealing the central opponent's class nature in a certain campaign - as quoted in the above passage - seems totally wrong to us, since specially among the people, and above all among the working class, it must undoubtedly become clear by the own experience of the masses when and where the "life-and-death struggle" has to be waged.

- o To "conceal" precisely this from the people is an unforgivable mistake. It is a great loss which cannot be outweighed by the "gain" of a few counter-revolutionaries who have come over!

- c) "You can't Attack the Rightists All the Time" ?

In one writing of October 1957 it is said:

"The counter-attack on the Rightists will have to draw to a close. Some Rightists have anticipated this. The storm will be over sooner or later, they said. That's quite true. You can't attack the Rightists all the time, day after day and year after year. For instance, in Peking the air is not as thick with the dust of the battle against the Rightists as before, because the counter-attack is nearly over. However, it is not quite over and we must not relax our efforts. To this day, some Rightists obstinately refuse to surrender, for instance Lo Lung-chi and Chang Nai-chi. I think we should try reasoning things out with them a few more times, and if they still refuse to be convinced, what can we do - call them to meetings every day? A number of die-hards will never mend their ways, and we will just have to give them up." ("Have Firm Faith in the Majority of the People", 1957, "Volume V", pp. 508, 509)

At first, one thinks the passage is directed against "Left" deviations, which should be stopped in the struggle against the Rightists, so that they do not attack the Rightists all the time.

Then suddenly "attack" is reinterpreted: One should not try to "convince" the Rightists endlessly. As the contradictions with at least "some" of the Rightists are unresolvable, one has to just "give them up"!

Such thoroughly contradictory passages - a complicated mixture of partially correct and totally wrong thoughts - can frequently be found precisely in the unauthorized writings. The passage quoted above can stand as an example for similar passages.

Elsewhere, it is said fully correctly about the bourgeois Rightists who at first retreated:

"It must be realized that at the first opportunity they will again stir up trouble. Counting from now, this struggle will probably last ten or as many as fifteen years. The time can be shortened if things are well managed. Of course, this is not to say that class struggle

will cease in ten to fifteen years. As long as imperialism and the bourgeoisie exist in this world of ours, the activities of the domestic counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois Rightists will always partake of the nature of class struggle, and what is more, they will invariably mesh with those of the foreign reactionaries." ("The Situation in the Summer of 1957", July 1957, "Volume V", pp. 478, 479)

It must be specially emphasized that here Mao Tse-tung took up an important general concept of Stalin, namely, that the activities of the counter-revolutionaries "invariably mesh with those of the foreign reactionaries"!

- d) "Whoever Wants to Make Trouble May Do so for as Long as he Pleases" ?

In January 1957 it is said:

"In my opinion, whoever wants to make trouble may do so for as long as he pleases, and if one month is not enough, he may go on for two, in short, the matter should not be wound up until he feels he has had enough. If you hastily wind it up, sooner or later he will make trouble again. Where students make trouble, don't give the school a vacation but fight the matter out as at the Battle of Chihpi in ancient times. What good will come of this? It will help to expose problems to the full and to draw a clear distinction between right and wrong, so that everyone can be tempered and those who are unreasonable, those bad types, will suffer defeat.

You should learn this art of leadership. Don't always try to keep a lid on everything. Whenever people utter queer remarks, go on strike or present a petition, you try to beat them back with one blow, always thinking that these things ought not to occur. Why is it then that these things which ought not to occur still do? This very fact proves that they ought to occur. You forbid people to strike, to petition or to make unfavourable comments, you simply resort to repression in every case, until one day you become a Rakosi. This is true both inside and outside the Party. As for queer remarks, strange happenings and contradictions, it is better to have them exposed. Contradictions must be exposed and then resolved.

Disturbances should be differentiated into several categories and handled accordingly. In one category there are the justifiable disturbances, in which case we should admit our mistakes and correct them. In another category there are the unjustifiable ones, and these we must rebut. Disturbances having good grounds ought to occur; groundless ones will get nowhere. In yet another category, the disturbances are partly justifiable and partly not, and we should accept what is justifiable and criticize what is not; here we must not give way at every step in total disregard of principle and promise to do whatever is demanded. Don't be too ready to use force or to open fire on people, except in the case of a real, large-scale counter-revolutionary rebellion which necessitates armed suppression." (+)
 ("Talks at a Conference of Party Committee Secretaries", January 1957, "Volume V", p.374)

This passage is extremely contradictory. Evidently, it is part of a provocative polemic against bureaucratic conceptions in which, in our opinion, "Shooting beyond the target" it propagates totally wrong views.

The thesis "contradictions must be exposed and resolved" is correct. The last two sentences which warn against "the too ready" use of the power of state organs, whereby their use is not excluded, are at first, naturally not wrong. However, we find disputable the stress of the last sentence in connection with the evaluation of Rakosi's mistakes. This passage describes the causes of the Hungarian incident and Rakosi's mistakes in such a way as if the decisive thing was not the Right opportunist retreat in face of the strengthening counter-revolution, but "Left mistakes", whereby sections of the people were treated like enemies.

Precisely this view is totally wrong. The Hungarian incidents could only become possible because the vigilance of the communists - determined in part by the Twentieth Congress - had diminished and the determination to finish off the counter-revolution in time and to mobilize the revolutionary masses of people against it had been crippled.

(+) Elsewhere, it is emphasized:

"Of course, dictatorship must be exercised over the very few who stage such counter-revolution-

The first polemically over-exaggerated sentence ("whoever wants to make trouble may do so for as long as he pleases") is also wrong. Basically the writer contradicts himself when he very rightly demands a little later to "fight the matter out". Thus, instead of an administrative conclusion or elimination of disturbances he recommends a mass struggle with which we naturally completely agree.

Even a sentence like "Why is it then that these things which ought not occur still do? This very fact proves that they ought to occur", bespeaks pragmatism and spontaneity! Naturally there is the possibility of thinking and working in a preventive way, so as to avoid certain incidents right from the beginning!

Indeed, to educate oneself to such foresight is precisely a central task of scientific leadership by the Party.

e) "Whenever Students and Workers Take to the Streets...it is a Good Thing" ?

In the speech at the Second Plenary Session on November 15, 1956, it is said about the question of mass actions against bureaucracy, which are not led by the Communist Party:

"If you alienate yourself from the masses and fail to solve their problems, the peasants will wield their carrying-poles, the workers will demonstrate in the streets and the students will create disturbances. Whenever such things happen, they must in the first place be taken as good thing, and that is how I look at the matter."

Several years ago, an airfield was to be built somewhere in Honan Province, but no proper arrangements were made beforehand for the peasants living there nor any adequate explanations offered them when they were compelled to move out. The peasants of the village affected said, even the birds will make a few squawks if you go poking with your pole at their nest in a tree and try to bring it down. Teng Hsiao-ping, you, too, have a

any rebellions as the Hungarian incident."
 ("Talks at a Conference of Party Committee Secretaries", January 1957, "Volume V", p.375)

nest, and if I destroyed it, wouldn't you make a few squawks? So the local people set up three lines of defence: the first line was composed of the children, the second of the women, and the third of able-bodied young men. All who went there to do the surveying were driven away and the peasants won out in the end. Later, when satisfactory explanations were given and arrangements made, they agreed to move and the airfield was built. There are quite a few similar cases. Now there are people who seem to think that, as state power has been won, they can sleep soundly without any worry and play the tyrant at will. The masses will oppose such persons, throw stones at them and strike at them with their hoes, which will, I think, serve them right and will please me immensely. Moreover, sometimes to fight is the only way to solve a problem. The Communist Party needs to learn a lesson. Whenever students and workers take to the streets, you comrades should regard it as a good thing...

The workers should be allowed to go on strike and the masses to hold demonstrations. Processions and demonstrations are provided for in our Constitution. In the future when the Constitution is revised, I suggest that the freedom to strike be added, so that the workers shall be allowed to go on strike. This will help resolve the contradictions between the state and the factory director on the one hand and the masses of workers on the other."
 ("Speech at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", 1956, "Volume V", pp.344,345)

At first this passage states that it is concerned with such cases where bureaucracy exists and where the cadres are alienated from the masses.

The sentence "Whenever students and workers take to the streets, you comrades should regard it as a good thing", seen in absolute terms and outside of this total context, is naturally wrong if these workers and students are counter-revolutionary putschists.

From a historical point of view, this was not only possible in an abstract sense. June 17, 1953, in Berlin (GDR) with counter-revolutionary actions, in which students and also workers

participated as well as the counter-revolutionary actions in Hungary in 1956 prove precisely this.

However, we think in the given context such counter-revolutionary actions are not meant. This can be seen by the example of the peasants who rebelled against the building of the airport. The kernel of this entire quotation is directed against the danger of degeneration of cadres into bureaucrats. It is correct in so far as it emphasizes the necessity of giving the working masses the possibility to resist degenerated elements and bureaucrats.

In this passage the right to strike is mentioned and its inclusion in the constitution is demanded (See also *ibid*, p.374). Without being able to discuss this question exhaustively here, we shall merely point out two aspects.

Lenin certainly recognized the possibility of strikes in socialism. However, he did not legitimatise these strikes in general, but only under certain circumstances.

The following standpoint of Lenin is largely unknown. Lenin wrote the following under the conditions of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russian (Bolsheviks) of January 1922 under the title "On the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions Under the Conditions of the NEP":

"Under the transitional type of proletarian state such as ours, however, the ultimate object of every action taken by the working class can only be to for-tify the proletarian state and the state power of the proletarian class by combating the bureaucratic distortions, mistakes and flaws in this state, and by curbing the class appetites of the capitalists who try to evade its control, etc. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must never forget and must never conceal from the workers and the mass of the working people that the strike struggle in a state where the proletariat holds political power can be explained and justified only by the bureaucratic distortions of the proletarian state and by all sorts of survivals of the old capitalist system in the government offices on the one hand, and by

the political immaturity and cultural backwardness of the mass of the working people on the other." (Lenin, "The Role and Functions of the Trade-Unions Under the New Economic Policy", LW 33, p.187)

In this context, Lenin names as a task of the unions "to facilitate the speediest and smoothest settlement of these disputes" (ibid.).

In our opinion, this remark by Lenin contains both aspects, possible bureaucratic excesses as well as possible backwardness of the masses. Both these aspects must be analysed while investigating the causes of strikes under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the debate, which has still to take place, on making constitutional the right to strike in a country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this passage of Lenin should, in our opinion, be the starting point while evaluating the experience of strike movements existing in the countries of the dictatorship of the proletariat so far.

f) On the Concrete Method of the Campaign "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom"

In one passage it became clear in detail how the campaign was conducted, so that the Party led the struggle together with the masses. The following passage refers only to the universities, but things were conducted in a similar manner in the factories and in the rural areas.

"Organize forums at colleges and universities to let professors speak their minds about the Party, and as far as possible try to get the Rightists to spew out all their venom, which will be published in the newspapers. Let the professors make speeches and let the students respond freely. Better let the reactionary professors, lecturers, assistants and students spew out their venom and speak without any inhibitions. They are the best teachers. When the opportune moment arrives, lose no time in organizing separate meetings of Party and League members to sort out the criticisms; accept those criticisms that are constructive and correct mistakes and shortcomings, but refute those criticisms that are destructive. At the same time, organize some non-Party people to make speeches and state the correct views. Then, have a

responsible Party cadre who enjoys prestige make a summing-up speech that is both analytical and convincing to effect a complete change in the atmosphere." ("Mustering Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild Attacks", June 1957, "Volume V", p.449)

Here it is the case of a specific tactic in a certain situation which in principle does not seem wrong to us, but which nevertheless can entail many big dangers and disadvantages.

The same tactic is evident in the following passage:

"Was it wrong for a while to refrain from publishing any positive views or to publish only a few and to let erroneous views go unrefuted? Between May 8 and June 7, acting on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, our paper and all the other Party papers did precisely that. The purpose was to let demons and devils, ghosts and monsters 'air views freely' and let poisonous weeds sprout and grow in profusion, so that the people, now shocked to find these ugly things still existing in the world, would take action to wipe them out. In other words, the Communist Party foresaw this inevitable class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals were allowed to start this war, and for a time the press refrained from publishing any positive views or published only a few and did not take any action to repulse the wild attacks of the reactionary bourgeois Rightists, nor did the Party organization in any of the departments and schools where the rectification movement was in progress. The masses could thus clearly distinguish those whose criticism was well-intentioned from those whose so-called criticism was malevolent, and thus forces could be mustered to counter-attack when the time was ripe. Some people say this was a covert scheme. We say it was an overt one. For we made it plain to the enemy beforehand: only when ghosts and monsters are allowed to come into the open can they be wiped out; only when poisonous weeds are allowed to sprout from the soil can they be uprooted. Don't the peasants weed several times a year? Besides, uprooted weeds can be used as manure. The class enemies will invariably seek opportunities to assert themselves.

They will not resign themselves to losing state power and being expropriated." ("Wen Hui Pao's Bourgeois Orientation Should be Criticized", 1957, "Volume V", pp.253,254)

Even if in isolated instances it may be completely correct to let "poisonous weeds" (meaning the activities of the class enemy) sprout to some extent, in order to then better be able to weed them out, still, on no account, an obligatory rule should be derived therefrom. Otherwise it is impossible to recognize and nip in the bud counter-revolutionary danger and activities.

In our opinion, the reasoning in the following passage describing the course of the campaign "Let a hundred flowers blossom" is totally wrong:

"Fifteen days or so will be sufficient for the free airing of views in organizations at the provincial and municipal level and in colleges and universities. The reactionary elements have been unbridled in their attacks. Among Party and League members the waverers have already deserted to them or are contemplating desertion. Among the vast numbers of Party and League members the activists and middle elements are rising to give battle. Using the big-character poster as a weapon, both sides are gaining experience and being tempered in the struggle. We needn't worry, for the reactionary elements number no more than a few per cent and the most frantic only 1 per cent. Don't be scared stiff just because the sky appears overcast for the time being. The reactionary elements will go out from their own organizations or colleges to carry on their activities in factories and other colleges, and precautions should be taken to keep them out. Call meetings of the principal cadres and veteran workers in the factories and explain to them that some bad capitalists, bad intellectuals and reactionary elements in society are mounting wild attacks against the working class and the Communist Party, in an attempt to overthrow the state power led by the working class, and that they should make sure not to be taken in by these persons. Stop anyone trying to incite the people. Mobilize the masses to tear down reactionary posters on street walls." ("Mustering Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild Attacks", June 1957, "Volume V", p.448)

Precisely here - behind the appeasement not to become scared stiff - a totally wrong reasoning is to be seen. There is nothing to be afraid of, the reactionaries are only 1 per cent. This reasoning is absolutely rotten because it is well-known that for thousands of years 1 per cent as the ruling class has suppressed 99 per cent. Precisely even after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat there is the danger that again 1 per cent will rule over 99 per cent. Therefore caution is necessary. (We, of course, agree with the method of exposing reactionaries in the factories and of mobilizing the masses against the reactionary slogans.)

g) An Extreme Example of Liberalism Inside the Party

A very controversial passage of August 30, 1956 "Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions" deals with the question whether even those "100 per cent opportunists" should be expelled from the Party who have not committed counter-revolutionary crimes.

Indeed, it was a question of whether Li Li-san, and above all Wang Ming, should be elected into the Central Committee of the Eighth National Congress. It is said in the passage:

"More comrades are ready to forgive Li Li-san, whereas there are fewer ready to forgive Wang Ming. As Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping stated, if we elect them the significance will be similar to their election at the Seventh Congress. At that congress, many delegates were unwilling to elect them (not only Wang Ming, but quite a few other comrades as well). We said at the time that we would make a mistake if we adopted such a policy. Why would we have made a mistake if we had not elected those who had erred? Because it would have meant that we were following their example. Their procedure was to reject anyone once labelled by them as an opportunist, regardless of whether or not he had actually made mistakes. If we had followed this procedure, we would have been following their line, the Wang Ming line or the Li Li-san line. We would do nothing of the kind, under no circumstances would we follow the Wang Ming or the Li Li-san line. The inner-Party relations they cultivated were such that they rejected without exception all those who

had made mistakes and those who had waged struggles against them or denounced them as opportunists. They styled themselves 100 per cent Bolsheviks, only to be shown later to be 100 per cent opportunists. On the other hand, it is those of us once labelled by them as "opportunists" who have some grasp of Marxism.

The heart of the matter here is that they are not just a few isolated individuals but represent a substantial part of the petty bourgeoisie. China is a country with a huge petty bourgeoisie. A considerable part of the petty bourgeoisie vacillates." ("Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions", August 1956, "Volume V", pp.319,320)

Explaining this idea it is said further on:

"Their mistakes on the Party line are known all over the country and throughout the world, and the fact that they are well known is precisely the reason for electing them. What can you do about it? They are well known, but you who have made no mistakes or have made only small ones don't have as big a reputation as theirs. In a country like ours with its very large petty bourgeoisie they are standards. If we elect them, many people will say, 'The Communist Party continues to be patient with them and is willing to give up two seats to them in the hope that they will mend their ways.' Whether they will or not is another matter, which is inconsequential, involving as it does only the two of them. The point is that in our society the petty bourgeoisie is vast in number, that in our Party there are many vacillating elements of petty-bourgeois origin and that among the intellectuals there are many such vacillating elements; they all want to see what will happen to these test cases. When they see these two standards still there, they will feel comfortable, they will sleep well and be pleased. If you haul down the two standards, they may panic. Therefore, it is not a question of whether Wang Ming and Li Li-san will mend their ways, that does not matter very much. What matters is that the millions of Party members of petty-bourgeois origin who are prone to vacillate, and the intellectuals in particular, are watching the kind of attitude we take

towards Wang Ming and Li Li-san. This is like our treatment of the rich peasants in the agrarian reform; when we left the rich peasants untouched, the middle peasants were at ease. If we adopt the same attitude towards these two men at the Eighth Congress as we did at the Seventh, our Party will have something to gain, to derive benefit from, that is, the task of remoulding the masses of the petty bourgeoisie throughout the country will be easier. This will also have an influence in the world. Few countries, or one can say none, adopt the attitude we do towards persons who have made mistakes." ("Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions", August 1956, "Volume V", pp.322,323)

This passage contains a number of mistakes, which in principle are directed against the teachings of Leninism about the Party of the new type.

The last sentence also clears up that this passage directly polemicizes against the C.P.S.U.(B) and the entire world communist movement, whereby, in our opinion, it is obvious that especially Lenin's and Stalin's line in the question of the Bolshevik Party is polemicized against.

We must say, at first, in the first paragraphs of this passage in a certain way it is not yet clear that this is a mistake of principle. Under certain conditions, we do not refuse to re-elect into the Party leadership comrades who have committed mistakes in line, but are true to communism. These conditions are, not mere self-criticism in words, but struggle against the own wrong line in deeds, in qualified work.

Is this so in the case of Wang Ming? No!

This passage clearly proceeds from the fact that he is a 100 per cent opportunist. Indeed, on careful reading of the passage, it can be ascertained that Wang Ming on the whole refused self-criticism! This passage itself comes to speak of the essence of the question: The question is to uphold both these leaders of wrong lines as "standards", as standards of the petty bourgeoisie inside and outside the Party! Anybody who tries to defend this passage because it is supposedly only a question of not to immediately clear out comrades who have committed mistakes, but have then realized them, should be told this is only a p -

parently the question. In reality, it is a question of:

a class Party or a bloc of various class forces?

A monolithic Party, purging all opportunist elements, or transformation of the Party into an educational institution for opportunists?

On the first question comrade Stalin said that

"the Communist Party is the monolithic Party of the proletariat, and not the Party of a bloc of heterogeneous class elements." (Stalin, "Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B)", November 1928, Works 11, p.295)

From the social viewpoint, representatives of other classes can only then be taken into the Party if they do not come as representatives of their class but are ready to take the proletarian standpoint. Already Marx and Engels had advocated this in "The Communist Manifesto".

Evidently in "Volume V" another position is taken in this fundamental question. In one unauthorized passage it is said:

"Some seem to think that, once in the Communist Party, people all become saints with no differences or misunderstandings, and that the Party is not subject to analysis, that is to say, it is monolithic and uniform, hence there is no need for talks. It seems as if people have to be 100 per cent Marxists once they are in the Party." ("A Dialectical Approach to Inner-Party Unity", November 1957, "Volume V", p.515)

This polemic does not touch upon the main issue and points in the wrong direction! The fact that naturally the Party must be an object of analysis, that struggles exist within it, that there are disagreements, should not lead to a negation of the fact that the Party must really become monolithic, both from the class viewpoint and with regard to unity of action. This has nothing at all to do with "uniformity", "Gleichschaltung" or dispensing with the struggle of opinions.

Similarly, the other question has long ago been answered by Leninism, but in a totally opposite sense as in the passage quoted above.

"The theory of 'defeating' opportunist elements by ideological struggle within the Party, the theory of 'overcoming' these elements within the confines of a single party, is a rotten and dangerous theory, which threatens to condemn the Party to paralysis and chronic infirmity, threatens to make the Party a prey to opportunism..."

Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists..." (Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", 1924, Works 6, p.192)

A debate about the question broached above is all the more important as views similar to the ones in the passage quoted above evidently were of great weight in the C.P. of China. Precisely such rotten views enabled the renewed ascent of elements like Teng Hsiao-ping, led to a temporary co-existence of Marxist-Leninist and revisionist forces, until finally the C.P. of China was delivered "root and branch" to the hands of the opportunists.



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